The Federalist Papers #40: James Madison Argues the Constitutional Convention Had the Warrant to Make Its Proposal—and Its Advice Should Be Taken Even If Not
James Madison, portrait by James Sharples. Image source: Wikipedia article “James Madison.”
Having now read forty of the Federalist Papers in order to blog about them, I find myself agreeing with a common opinion that James Madison is a more incisive writer than Alexander Hamilton. the Federalist Papers #40 is a good example of James Madison’s clear writing and thinking.
The Federalist Papers #40 responds to the criticism that the Constitutional Convention exceeded its authority in proposing a constitution so dramatically different from the Articles of Confederation it was tasked to amend. James Madison makes the following arguments:
The charge given to the Constitutional Convention from two different meetings urging such a convention was, in fact, quite broad, and urged a substantial change, using the following language (with, presumably, emphasis by James Madison):
… such convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these States A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT …
REVISING THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS THEREIN, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION
SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS
To the extent the charge to the Constitutional Convention was ambiguous, priority should be giving to the statement of the ends to be achieved over the means to that end; hence, for example, “alterations and provisions therein” should be interpreted liberally if necessary to further the aim of a “firm national government” “adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the union.”
The proposed constitution keeps the fundamental principles of the Articles of Confederation—with the exception of the rules for the ratification of the constitution, which are not raising much objection. In particular, these aspects of the proposed Constitution have precedent in what was happening under the Articles of Confederation:
“the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns”
“members of the government should derive their appointment from the legislatures, not from the people of the States? One branch of the new government is to be appointed by these legislatures; and under the Confederation, the delegates to Congress MAY ALL be appointed immediately by the people, and in two States [Connecticut and Rhode Island] are actually so appointed.”
“Do they require that the powers of the government should act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective characters. In some instances, also, those of the existing government act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture; of piracy; of the post office; of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of land by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials by courts-marshal in the army and navy, by which death may be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil magistrate; in all these cases the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens.”
“Do these fundamental principles require, particularly, that no tax should be levied without the intermediate agency of the States? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the post office. The power of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source also. But pretermitting these instances, was it not an acknowledged object of the convention and the universal expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general revenue? Had not Congress repeatedly recommended this measure as not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Confederation?”
“… in the new government, as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction.”
Making the stated principles and aims of the Articles of Confederation actually effective was inevitably going to look like a radical transformation:
“The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles of Confederation. The misfortune under the latter system has been, that these principles are so feeble and confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it, and to require a degree of enlargement which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old.”
As proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, there is an inherent right of the people to frame a government for themselves that supersedes any particular set of established forms. Moreover, there is ample precedent for innovations that bend the established forms where there is a consensus that it is the right thing to do. Indeed, the establishment of the Continental Congress must be seen as an example of this.
The Constitutional Convention did not adopt, it merely recommended. Surely, any group is at liberty to recommend something. The legitimacy of the Constitution rests on its ratification, not on the manner in which it was proposed. And there is relatively little dispute that ratification by the people of nine states would be a legitimate way to establish a compact between those nine states.
The members of the Constitutional Convention had a duty to make the best recommendation they could, trusting the people to judge whether that was, in fact, a good recommendation.
These text behind these points is not confined to this order. But each of these points is clearly stated. Judge for yourself the power of James Madison’s prose. Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #40:
FEDERALIST NO. 40
The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
From the New York Packet
Friday, January 18, 1788.
Author: James Madison
To the People of the State of New York:
THE SECOND point to be examined is, whether the convention were authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitution. The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents. As all of these, however, had reference, either to the recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in September, 1786, or to that from Congress, in February, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these particular acts. The act from Annapolis recommends the "appointment of commissioners to take into consideration the situation of the United States; to devise SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF THE UNION; and to report such an act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every State, will effectually provide for the same. "The recommendatory act of Congress is in the words following:"WHEREAS, There is provision in the articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, for making alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the United States, and of the legislatures of the several States; and whereas experience hath evinced, that there are defects in the present Confederation; as a mean to remedy which, several of the States, and PARTICULARLY THE STATE OF NEW YORK, by express instructions to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a convention for the purposes expressed in the following resolution; and such convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these States A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:"Resolved, That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient, that on the second Monday of May next a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose OF REVISING THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS THEREIN, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION. "From these two acts, it appears, 1st, that the object of the convention was to establish, in these States, A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; 2d, that this government was to be such as would be ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT and THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION; 3d, that these purposes were to be effected by ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS IN THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, as it is expressed in the act of Congress, or by SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS AS SHOULD APPEAR NECESSARY, as it stands in the recommendatory act from Annapolis; 4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be reported to Congress, and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the former and confirmed by the latter. From a comparison and fair construction of these several modes of expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the convention acted. They were to frame a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, adequate to the EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT, and OF THE UNION; and to reduce the articles of Confederation into such form as to accomplish these purposes.
There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. The one is, that every part of the expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to some common end. The other is, that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important should give way to the more important part; the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the means. Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the authority of the convention were irreconcilably at variance with each other; that a NATIONAL and ADEQUATE GOVERNMENT could not possibly, in the judgment of the convention, be affected by ALTERATIONS and PROVISIONS in the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION; which part of the definition ought to have been embraced, and which rejected? Which was the more important, which the less important part? Which the end; which the means? Let the most scrupulous expositors of delegated powers; let the most inveterate objectors against those exercised by the convention, answer these questions. Let them declare, whether it was of most importance to the happiness of the people of America, that the articles of Confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate government be provided, and the Union preserved; or that an adequate government should be omitted, and the articles of Confederation preserved. Let them declare, whether the preservation of these articles was the end, for securing which a reform of the government was to be introduced as the means; or whether the establishment of a government, adequate to the national happiness, was the end at which these articles themselves originally aimed, and to which they ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed. But is it necessary to suppose that these expressions are absolutely irreconcilable to each other; that no ALTERATIONS or PROVISIONS in THE ARTICLES OF THE CONFEDERATION could possibly mould them into a national and adequate government; into such a government as has been proposed by the convention? No stress, it is presumed, will, in this case, be laid on the TITLE; a change of that could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted power. ALTERATIONS in the body of the instrument are expressly authorized. NEW PROVISIONS therein are also expressly authorized. Here then is a power to change the title; to insert new articles; to alter old ones. Must it of necessity be admitted that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the old articles remain? Those who maintain the affirmative ought at least to mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innovations; between that degree of change which lies within the compass of ALTERATIONS AND FURTHER PROVISIONS, and that which amounts to a TRANSMUTATION of the government. Will it be said that the alterations ought not to have touched the substance of the Confederation? The States would never have appointed a convention with so much solemnity, nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some SUBSTANTIAL reform had not been in contemplation. Will it be said that the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES of the Confederation were not within the purview of the convention, and ought not to have been varied? I ask, What are these principles? Do they require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the Constitution proposed. Do they require that the members of the government should derive their appointment from the legislatures, not from the people of the States? One branch of the new government is to be appointed by these legislatures; and under the Confederation, the delegates to Congress MAY ALL be appointed immediately by the people, and in two States [Connecticut and Rhode Island] are actually so appointed. Do they require that the powers of the government should act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective characters. In some instances, also, those of the existing government act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture; of piracy; of the post office; of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of land by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials by courts-marshal in the army and navy, by which death may be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil magistrate; in all these cases the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens. Do these fundamental principles require, particularly, that no tax should be levied without the intermediate agency of the States? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the post office. The power of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source also. But pretermitting these instances, was it not an acknowledged object of the convention and the universal expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general revenue? Had not Congress repeatedly recommended this measure as not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Confederation? Had not every State but one; had not New York herself, so far complied with the plan of Congress as to recognize the PRINCIPLE of the innovation? Do these principles, in fine, require that the powers of the general government should be limited, and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of their sovereignty and independence? We have seen that in the new government, as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction. The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles of Confederation. The misfortune under the latter system has been, that these principles are so feeble and confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it, and to require a degree of enlargement which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old. In one particular it is admitted that the convention have departed from the tenor of their commission. Instead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation OF THE LEGISLATURES OF ALL THE STATES, they have reported a plan which is to be confirmed by the PEOPLE, and may be carried into effect by NINE STATES ONLY. It is worthy of remark that this objection, though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the publications which have swarmed against the convention. The forbearance can only have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth; from the example of inflexible opposition given by a MAJORITY of one sixtieth of the people of America to a measure approved and called for by the voice of twelve States, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the people an example still fresh in the memory and indignation of every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and prosperity of his country. As this objection, therefore, has been in a manner waived by those who have criticised the powers of the convention, I dismiss it without further observation. The THIRD point to be inquired into is, how far considerations of duty arising out of the case itself could have supplied any defect of regular authority. In the preceding inquiries the powers of the convention have been analyzed and tried with the same rigor, and by the same rules, as if they had been real and final powers for the establishment of a Constitution for the United States. We have seen in what manner they have borne the trial even on that supposition. It is time now to recollect that the powers were merely advisory and recommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and so understood by the convention; and that the latter have accordingly planned and proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more consequence than the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed. This reflection places the subject in a point of view altogether different, and will enable us to judge with propriety of the course taken by the convention. Let us view the ground on which the convention stood. It may be collected from their proceedings, that they were deeply and unanimously impressed with the crisis, which had led their country almost with one voice to make so singular and solemn an experiment for correcting the errors of a system by which this crisis had been produced; that they were no less deeply and unanimously convinced that such a reform as they have proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their appointment. It could not be unknown to them that the hopes and expectations of the great body of citizens, throughout this great empire, were turned with the keenest anxiety to the event of their deliberations. They had every reason to believe that the contrary sentiments agitated the minds and bosoms of every external and internal foe to the liberty and prosperity of the United States. They had seen in the origin and progress of the experiment, the alacrity with which the PROPOSITION, made by a single State (Virginia), towards a partial amendment of the Confederation, had been attended to and promoted. They had seen the LIBERTY ASSUMED by a VERY FEW deputies from a VERY FEW States, convened at Annapolis, of recommending a great and critical object, wholly foreign to their commission, not only justified by the public opinion, but actually carried into effect by twelve out of the thirteen States. They had seen, in a variety of instances, assumptions by Congress, not only of recommendatory, but of operative, powers, warranted, in the public estimation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent than those by which their conduct was to be governed. They must have reflected, that in all great changes of established governments, forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former, would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the people to "abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness," [Declaration of Independence] since it is impossible for the people spontaneously and universally to move in concert towards their object; and it is therefore essential that such changes be instituted by some INFORMAL AND UNAUTHORIZED PROPOSITIONS, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or number of citizens. They must have recollected that it was by this irregular and assumed privilege of proposing to the people plans for their safety and happiness, that the States were first united against the danger with which they were threatened by their ancient government; that committees and congresses were formed for concentrating their efforts and defending their rights; and that CONVENTIONS were ELECTED in THE SEVERAL STATES for establishing the constitutions under which they are now governed; nor could it have been forgotten that no little ill-timed scruples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary forms, were anywhere seen, except in those who wished to indulge, under these masks, their secret enmity to the substance contended for. They must have borne in mind, that as the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted TO THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, the disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it forever; its approbation blot out antecedent errors and irregularities. It might even have occurred to them, that where a disposition to cavil prevailed, their neglect to execute the degree of power vested in them, and still more their recommendation of any measure whatever, not warranted by their commission, would not less excite animadversion, than a recommendation at once of a measure fully commensurate to the national exigencies. Had the convention, under all these impressions, and in the midst of all these considerations, instead of exercising a manly confidence in their country, by whose confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished, and of pointing out a system capable, in their judgment, of securing its happiness, taken the cold and sullen resolution of disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing substance to forms, of committing the dearest interests of their country to the uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events, let me ask the man who can raise his mind to one elevated conception, who can awaken in his bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought to have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen, on the conduct and character of this assembly? Or if there be a man whose propensity to condemn is susceptible of no control, let me then ask what sentence he has in reserve for the twelve States who USURPED THE POWER of sending deputies to the convention, a body utterly unknown to their constitutions; for Congress, who recommended the appointment of this body, equally unknown to the Confederation; and for the State of New York, in particular, which first urged and then complied with this unauthorized interposition? But that the objectors may be disarmed of every pretext, it shall be granted for a moment that the convention were neither authorized by their commission, nor justified by circumstances in proposing a Constitution for their country: does it follow that the Constitution ought, for that reason alone, to be rejected? If, according to the noble precept, it be lawful to accept good advice even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends? The prudent inquiry, in all cases, ought surely to be, not so much FROM WHOM the advice comes, as whether the advice be GOOD. The sum of what has been here advanced and proved is, that the charge against the convention of exceeding their powers, except in one instance little urged by the objectors, has no foundation to support it; that if they had exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted, but required, as the confidential servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed, to exercise the liberty which they assume; and that finally, if they had violated both their powers and their obligations, in proposing a Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the people of America. How far this character is due to the Constitution, is the subject under investigation.
PUBLIUS.
Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:
The Federalist Papers #1: Alexander Hamilton's Plea for Reasoned Debate
The Federalist Papers #3: United, the 13 States are Less Likely to Stumble into War
The Federalist Papers #4 B: National Defense Will Be Stronger if the States are United
The Federalist Papers #5: Unless United, the States Will Be at Each Others' Throats
The Federalist Papers #6 A: Alexander Hamilton on the Many Human Motives for War
The Federalist Papers #11 A: United, the States Can Get a Better Trade Deal—Alexander Hamilton
The Federalist Papers #12: Union Makes it Much Easier to Get Tariff Revenue—Alexander Hamilton
The Federalist Papers #13: Alexander Hamilton on Increasing Returns to Scale in National Government
The Federalist Papers #14: A Republic Can Be Geographically Large—James Madison
The Federalist Papers #21 A: Constitutions Need to be Enforced—Alexander Hamilton
The Federalist Papers #24: The United States Need a Standing Army—Alexander Hamilton
The Federalist Papers #27: People Will Get Used to the Federal Government—Alexander Hamilton
The Federalist Papers #30: A Robust Power of Taxation is Needed to Make a Nation Powerful
The Federalist Papers #35 A: Alexander Hamilton as an Economist
The Federalist Papers #35 B: Alexander Hamilton on Who Can Represent Whom
The Federalist Papers #36: Alexander Hamilton on Regressive Taxation
The Federalist Papers #39: James Madison Downplays How Radical the Proposed Constitution Is
An Example of How Mormons Teach Personal Responsibility
In “Mormonism Has More Important Things to Preach than the Purported Evils of Gay Marriage,” I write:
Mormonism is one of the key reservoirs of belief in personal responsibility these days—that by dint of effort, one can make one’s own life better and contribute to making the world a better place.
Jordan Peterson tells the story of giving a talk about personal responsibility to students at Harvard—who had to be quite accomplished to get admitted—and having many come up afterward to tell him how meaningful that message was to them and how no one had ever given them that message of personal responsibility like that. I got that message of personal responsibility growing up in Mormonism. I am grateful for that. This is the kind of message that Mormonism should be telling the world, going up against the tide that emphasizes injuries and rights without sufficiently balancing that emphasis by also talking about responsibility and personal agency.
At the top of this post is a recent example of Mormon’s being taught personal responsibility—that they can make a difference in their own lives and for the world. It isn’t exactly how I would teach personal responsibility, but it does a good job of getting the basic message across.
Harvard 40th Reunion Profile: Miles Kimball
Harvard’s Quincy House
5 years ago, I posted “Harvard 35th Reunion Profile: Miles Kimball.” Here is my report about the last 5 years, adapted a bit (for example, adding links):
In the last 5 years, my wife Gail and I have been happily living in Superior, Colorado. We recently celebrated our 37th wedding anniversary. On top of my duties as an economics professor, I am now a certified life coach, following in Gail’s footsteps. I now blog about ideas related to that coaching as well as blogging about economics, religion, political philosophy (1, 2, 3) and diet and health on my blog “Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal.”
My research as an economist has shifted more and more toward working with coauthors. I continue to work on negative interest rate policy, on the principles for building a national well-being index, and on the highly mathematical economics of risk and time.
Our daughter Diana is married; we are delighted to have two grandchildren. She is now a venture capitalist working for Matrix Partners and lives in San Francisco. Our son Jordan is engaged. He works as a coder in Columbus, Ohio.
The death of both of my parents and of my sister Sarah makes me think more realistically about the future. I think I’m still at least a decade away from retirement, but I often think about what I’ll do then. I’d like to do different kinds of writing than the economics journal articles and blog posts I have done up to now. I also want to continue to learn more math.
A lot of the excitement in my life is about progress on my many different projects and in learning new things. Much of that excitement is documented on my blog. My life has a lot of variety in it, despite outwardly having a lot of routine.
Because our work is easy to do remotely, Gail and I have not suffered much personally from the Covid-19 pandemic. But people close to us have died or become very sick from it. I hope we are better prepared for the next highly infectious, highly dangerous disease down the road.
How Rising Anorexia Can Go Along with Rising Obesity: Both Can Be Caused By Environmental Contaminants
Note: this post follows on my posts “Are Processed Food and Environmental Contaminants the Main Cause of the Rise of Obesity? and “Livestock Antibiotics, Lithium and PFAS as Leading Suspects for Environmental Causes of Obesity.”
Many drugs have “paradoxical effects”: for a minority of people they will have the opposite of the usual effect. Also, for a minority of people drugs can cause the opposite of a usual side effect. To suss out evidence of environmental contaminants messing with our weight, this means we should look for increases in both obesity and anorexia. One may affect more people, but both should be going up if there is an environmental contaminant. They are. Since 1980, both obesity and anorexia have increased a lot.
It may seem strange that a chemical could have both an effect and—on a smaller fraction of people—the opposite of that effect. But look at the scatterplot across countries between obesity and eating disorders at the top of this post, between the two images of slimemoldtimemold posts. There is a strong relationship between rates of obesity and rates of anorexia. Basically, a given chemical messes with something in the body and sometimes immediate effect of the chemical and the body’s further reaction can go the opposite of the usual direction. (For more on this, see the Wikipedia article “Paradoxical reaction.”)
Not only are the two extremes of fatness and thinness increasing in humans, the prevalence of those extremes is increasing in animals as well, as the “Anorexia in Animals” post shown above argues.
These effects can differ by gender. In humans, the extremes of high and low weight seem to have been burgeoning especially for females. For those who have daughters at home, the following speculation about per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) contamination from the “Paradoxical Reactions” blog post shown above is worth paying attention to:
It’s notable that anorexia most often occurs in teenagers and young adults, especially young women. Are young women being exposed to large doses all of a sudden, just as they start going through puberty? Where would these huge doses come from? It may not be that much of a stretch — PFAS are included in many cosmetics.
In addition to arguing for environmental contaminants contributing to the rise in obesity—and anorexia—the “A Chemical Hunger” series of blog posts is also important in making the case for the powerful influence of a “lipostat.” A lipostat is a fat-regulating mechanism in your body that pulls us strongly toward a particular weight—a weight that can get pushed around by chemicals. Our lipostats invalidate the naive version of “calories in/calories out” that treats calories in and calories out as if they were entirely under our conscious control. One of the reasons this is wrong is fidgeting. Here is the relevant passage from the “Paradoxical Reactions” blog post:
… avoiding food and collecting cookbooks isn’t the lipostat’s only method for controlling body weight. It has a number of other tricks up its sleeve.
Many people burn off extra calories through a behavior called “non-exercise activity thermogenesis” (NEAT). This is basically a fancy term for fidgeting. When a person has consumed more calories than they need, their lipostat can boost calorie expenditure by making them fidget, make small movements, and change posture frequently. It’s largely involuntary, and most people aren’t aware that they’re burning off extra calories in this way. Even so, NEAT can burn off nearly 700 calories per day.
… people with anorexia fidget like crazy. A classic symptom of anorexia is excessive physical activity, even in the most severe stages of the illness. When one group measured fidgeting with a highly accurate shoe-based accelerometer, they found that anorexics fidget almost twice as much as healthy controls.
This kind of fidgeting is the classic response in people whose bodies are fatter than they want to be. In studies where people were overfed until they were 10% heavier than their baseline, NEAT increased dramatically. All of this is strong evidence that people with anorexia have lipostats that mistakenly think they desperately need to lose weight.
Don’t despair. Ultimately, we may collectively figure out how our lipostats work and be able get them back on track. In the meantime, fasting works for those who tend toward overweight. (Fasting is a very bad idea for those who are underweight!) If you have a disregulated lipostat tending toward making you overweight, it might take a lot of fasting sprinkled into each year to get to and stay at a healthy weight, but it can be done. I assess that to be my own situation: personally, in order to stay even at a healthy weight, I seem to need to do an extended fast that adds up to about as many days as the number of weeks since I last did an extended fast. (“Increasing Returns to Duration in Fasting” explains why I do extended fasts.)
For organized links to other posts on diet and health, see:
Redemption for Nonsupernaturalists
Link to “The Wondrous Cross,” performed by Christy Nockels, on YouTube
People sometimes ask me if I believe in God. I answer that I am a nonsupernaturalist, and believe in God as a nonsupernaturalist can. To define “nonsupernaturalist,” see my post “What Do You Mean by 'Supernatural'?” In effect, it makes physicists the arbiter of what counts as supernatural.
If you google “Teleotheism” you will go straight to my blog post “Teleotheism and the Purpose of Life” which gives the basics of my belief in God—or as I prefer to say: “the God or Gods Who May Be.” (See my bare beginning of a prayerbook in “The Book of Uncommon Prayer.”) In 2021, I elaborate that to these dimensions of god:
God Within: our highest and best self (even when nascent).
God Between: what emerges when the highest and best selves of more than one person interact.
God Ahead: the best that we can build together; or as I put it in “Teleotheism and the Purpose of Life,” the greatest of all things that can come true.
As time goes on, I come across more and more strands of nonsupernaturalist religion. In my sermons, I recommend Unitarian-Universalism as an institutional framework, though recently other aspects of its religious mission have begun to be overtaken by wokeness. Liberal Judaism and very liberal Christianity are congenial to nonsupernaturalists. There has always been a strong nonsupernaturalist strain in Buddhism, especially in Zen. (For Zen, I highly recommend the Zen koan practice sequence in Sam Harris’s Waking Up app.) And Jordan Peterson is digging deep into religion from a psychological and essentially nonsupernaturalist point of view—though he is careful to express agnosticism, allowing for the possibility of the supernatural. (See for example Jordan Peterson’s talks on the Bible.) I also see a strong strand of nonsupernaturalist religion in resurgent Stoicism and in the Human Potential movement. (See “On Human Potential” and other links at the very bottom of this post.)
Today, I want to talk about the need nonsupernaturalists, just as supernaturalists, have for redemption. A big barrier to positive change in our lives is the pain we experience in beholding the badness in our lives and the badness we see right now when we look inside our hearts. By “redemption” I mean help in coming to terms with our own badness in a way that doesn’t paralyze us.
For those who can simultaneously retain and temporarily suspend disbelief, I think the Christian supernaturalist narrative has a lot to offer even the nonsupernaturalist. As for any religion trying to claim that the divine is all good, Christianity has difficulty explaining the evil in the world. (See the Wikipedia article “Theodicy.”) But for the purpose of understanding redemption, take the existence of evil as an unexplained given. As well, take as a given that our own personal badness will cause serious disruptions in the world, that especially effect us individually because we are at the center of those disruptions. Then, starting from that point, dive into the Christian narrative of a being who loves us so much that he is willing to die a horrible death and suffer in other ways to help us deal with our own personal badness. Jesus preaches forgiveness and dies and suffers to further forgiveness—our forgiving others and our forgiving ourselves. We desperately need to forgive others and to forgive ourselves. So the Christian narrative brings hope. I am a nonsupernaturalist witness that, simultaneously retaining and suspending disbelief, this narrative still helps me to face my own personal badness.
To see what I mean about the Christian narrative helping you to face your own personal badness, try an experiment. Contemplate for a few minutes some of the ways in which you have been genuinely bad in your life—things you regret from an ethical point of view. Once you feel the weight of it emotionally, try listening to Christy Nockels’s video at the top of this post “The Wondrous Cross,” and see what that does for you psychologically. It may not work as well for you as it does for me, but if there is any lifting at all of the paralysis that often comes from contemplating one’s own badness, that backs up my claim of the redemptive value of at least some parts of the Christian narrative, even for a nonsupernaturalist.
Don’t miss my Unitarian-Universalist sermons on my blog
Sharing Epiphanies (including the video)
The Message of Mormonism for Atheists Who Want to Stay Atheists (video here)
Also, don’t miss Noah Smith’s religion posts:
Other Posts on Religion:
Posts on Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral Compass:
Co-Active Coaching as a Tool for Maximizing Utility—Getting Where You Want in Life
How Economists Can Enhance Their Scientific Creativity, Engagement and Impact
Judson Brewer, Elizabeth Bernstein and Mitchell Kaplan on Finding Inner Calm
Recognizing Opportunity: The Case of the Golden Raspberries—Taryn Laakso
Taryn Laakso: Battery Charge Trending to 0% — Time to Recharge
Savannah Taylor: Lessons of the Labyrinth and Tapping Into Your Inner Wisdom
Greg Mankiw: Yes, the Wealthy Can Be Deserving →
I like what Greg Mankiw is saying here. We shouldn’t focus on the bad side of things without also looking at the good side. For other perspectives, see:
My Quartz column, “Odious Wealth: The Outrage is Not So Much Over Inequality but All the Dubious Ways the Rich Got Richer”
Michael Tomasky’s Daily Beast piece Michael Tomasky’s Daily Beast piece “Greg Mankiw: the Wealthy are ‘Deserving,’ Even When They’re Crooks”
On Greg Mankiw
I was Greg Mankiw’s very first dissertation advisee. Soon after he became an assistant professor at Harvard in 1985, he hired me as a research assistant. (In particular, I was an RA for his Brookings Paper “The Term Structure of Interest Rates Revisited.” I also helped a bit with “Assessing Dynamic Efficiency: Theory and Evidence,” with Andrew Abel, Lawrence Summers, and Richard Zeckhauser, and “The Optimal Collection of Seignorage.”) Greg was arriving at Harvard just as I had decided to become a macroeconomist. Then I received my PhD in 1987 and went off to the University of Michigan. So Greg’s period of maximum impact on me was during a two-year period. But that impact has been strong and lasting.
One of the most important impacts of being a student of Greg’s is one that was reinforced by his example and well as what he said: understanding the importance not only of scientific discovery in economics but also of getting economic principles across to a wide audience. Greg has done that with his blockbuster textbooks, his blog, and his New York Times columns. Also, a great deal of his time in government service has been spent in getting economic principles across to government officials in one-on-one tutorials. Greg persuading me of the importance of public engagement had a lot to do with my interest in being a blogger. (Greg’s long-lasting influence was also behind my encouraging my student Noah Smith in becoming a full-time economic journalist.)
As a dissertation adviser, Greg was relatively laissez-faire. He was always calm, encouraging and helpful. My interest in precautionary saving was stimulated by his paper “Ricardian Consumers with Keynesian Propensities,” with Bob Barsky and Stephen Zeldes. Coauthoring “Precautionary Saving and the Timing of Taxes” with Greg helped me see what good writing in economics looked like. (I am Greg’s coauthor on one other paper: “Optimal Advice for Monetary Policy” with Greg, Susanto Basu and David Weil.) As I worked away on precautionary saving, Greg astutely saw the connection between my efforts to get a precautionary saving motive decreasing in wealth (and a higher marginal propensity to consume) with “Proper Risk Aversion” by John Pratt and Richard Zeckhauser, which not only helped me greatly with my research on the theory of precautionary saving but expanded my interests to the economics of risk much more broadly.
Greg’s influence on me continued after I graduated and left Harvard. For example, Greg’s paper “Government Purchases and Real Interest Rates” had a big effect on what I teach in my PhD field course on business cycle theory. (You can see where that went in my already lengthy, but unfinished graduate textbook on business cycle theory. See also my course website on graduate business cycle theory.)
Greg’s politics have been of continuing interest to me. It is quite a kick to see one’s adviser regularly showing up in the newspaper, in the news pages as well as the op-ed pages. In the political arena, people lean toward being ungrateful about the political competition that keeps our system healthy—half-wishing for their party to be the only party in a one-party system—but it is of the utmost importance for us to have two healthy political parties with top-notch economists on both sides of the political spectrum. As long as the Republican party remained reasonably healthy, Greg was one of those top-notch economists on the Republican side. Then, in a blog post on October 28, 2019, Greg announced “I am no longer a Republican.” That, too, was valuable for our political system.
Greg was generous in advertising my new blog back in 2012. I have enjoyed talking to him at conferences and when I have given seminars at Harvard or when he came to Michigan. (Greg hasn’t yet visited the University of Colorado Boulder since I moved there in 2016.)
Let me end with one factoid. At the University of Michigan, we posed to ourselves the question “Who has coauthored the most papers with University of Michigan economics faculty?” The answer: Greg Mankiw. Greg is prolific and a great coauthor. Greg cares deeply about economic issues and loves economics—a love that is infectious.
Livestock Antibiotics, Lithium and PFAS as Leading Suspects for Environmental Causes of Obesity
Last week, with my post “Are Processed Food and Environmental Contaminants the Main Cause of the Rise of Obesity?” I reviewed the first three posts in the slimemoldtimemold.com series “A Chemical Hunger.” This week, I review the next four posts that detail leading suspects as environmental contaminants. The three suspects are livestock antibiotics, lithium and the per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) used “in stain- and water-resistant fabrics and carpeting, cleaning products, paints, and fire-fighting foams. … [and] for limited use in cookware, food packaging, and food processing equipment.” All of these arguably became much more prevalent in the environment since 1980, so that the timing is reasonably consistent with the acceleration of the rise in obesity beginning in 1980.
Livestock antibiotics are used precisely to make animals fatter, so it isn’t surprising that they might make humans fatter too. Lithium, used to treat bipolar disorder, is well known to cause people to gain weight. Scandalously, not enough experiments have been done to see what the effects of PFAS are on obesity at relevant dosages. Only very high dosages have been studied, which can make lab rodents sick enough that they lose weight. So PFAS are one step more speculative as culprits than livestock antibiotics and lithium. Also scandalously, although we know that lithium can make people fat, we don’t know how much lithium has been in our drinking water; it isn’t routinely tested for.
Getting into water supplies means none of these can be entirely avoided. However, eating less meat can probably reduce (but even going vegan would not entirely eliminate) one’s exposure to livestock antibiotics substantially. Little is known about the degree of contamination of various types of food by PFAS and lithium. For processed food, it could depend on how much was in the water used at the particular factory the food was processed at. And even for whole food, it could depend on the level of contamination of the irrigation water.
In most of my diet and health posts I emphasize strategies such as fasting and eating low on the insulin index that can help any individual who employs them. But by its nature, environmental contamination is something we need collective action on. Fortunately, small groups of people can get the ball rolling by pushing forward relevant research. For example, anyone who measures antibiotics, lithium and PFAS levels in tap water and reports them is making a real contribution. And anyone who studies the effects of PFAS on rodents at previously unstudied dosages is making a real contribution. (There are many different chemicals under the heading of livestock antibiotics and under the heading PFAS, so there is a lot to be done there.)
Note that for us to not already know which environmental contaminants are helping along the rise in obesity (and the argument is good that something is), those environmental contaminants have to somehow be in our blindspot. Besides becoming more prevalent at the time the rise in obesity was accelerating, each of these is in our blindspot: livestock antibiotics because strong commercial interests try to keep them in our blindspot, PFAS because their effects are understudied and lithium because its levels in drinking water are not routinely measured. Of course, until we get them out of our blindspot, we won’t know for sure if they or one or two of them are key culprits.
Numbers IV—VII in the “A Chemical Hunger” series give many more details of the argument. I am persuaded that we should take these hypotheses seriously.
For organized links to other posts on diet and health, see:
The Federalist Papers #39: James Madison Downplays How Radical the Proposed Constitution Is
The Roman Senate. Image source
James Madison was aware that the Constitutional Convention had done something radical. Therefore, he was at pains to argue in the Federalist Papers #39 that the proposed Constitution was not that radical. First, he argued that the proposed Constitution did followed the pattern of state constitutions. Second, to reassure those who thought that the Constitution gave too much power to the national government, he pointed to all the ways in which states still mattered.
As an introduction to the Federalist Papers #39, James Madison gives this definition of a “republic”:
… a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic. It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; …
To a modern reader, the restriction back then of the vote to white males with some amount of property betrays the republican stipulation that
It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; …
But of course many governments back then and even now have a narrower basis than even that:
Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter.
Here are some of the points by which James Madison reassures his readers by saying that the proposed Constitution follows the same pattern as state constitutions. I have added bullets to separate passages:
The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people.
The Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the people.
The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the example in most of the States.
Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves, …
The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina.
The Senate is elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia.
The President is to continue in office for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware, the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election is annual.
The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior.
After emphasizing on many points the similarity of the proposed constitution to the existing state constitutions, James Madison argues that it is in one respect more republican than many of the state constitutions: by making more provision for impeachment of the president:
In several of the States, however, no constitutional provision is made for the impeachment of the chief magistrate. And in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office.
But the most important purpose of the Federalist Papers #39 was to answer the charge that the proposed constitution centralized power in the national government. James Madison lays out the charge he is answering as follows:
"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, "for the convention to adhere to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States."
There is also a charge that the Constitutional Convention exceeded its authority; the answer to that charge is left to another number in the Federalist Papers.
James Madison concedes the following ways in which the central government is given great power under the proposed constitution:
The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL.
… the operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government.
It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; …
Note particularly the third bullet, which claims a power of the central government against “dissolution of the compact.” This, claim, of course, became important during the Civil War.
But James Madison points to these ways in which the proposed constitution preserves substantial state power:
the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL act.
That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union, nor from that of a MAJORITY of the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves.
The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL.
The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic.
In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.
If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. … In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.
James Madison ends with the conclusion that the proposed constitution is somewhere between federal and national:
The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.
Given his goal of getting the constitution ratified, I think James Madison was right to think he should try to display the proposed constitution in as reassuring a light as possible, trying to make it look less radical than it definitely looked from some angles. The dispute over how powerful the national government should be and how powerful the state governments should be has still not been entirely resolved. Disputes on that score continue to this day.
Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #39 to give context to the excerpts laid out above.
FEDERALIST NO. 39
The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
For the Independent Journal.
Author: James Madison
To the People of the State of New York:
THE last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking.
The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.
What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this question to be sought, not by recurring to principles, but in the application of the term by political writers, to the constitution of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme authority is derived from the people, has passed almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The same title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute power over the great body of the people is exercised, in the most absolute manner, by a small body of hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and of monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified with the same appellation. The government of England, which has one republican branch only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has, with equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of republics. These examples, which are nearly as dissimilar to each other as to a genuine republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in political disquisitions.
If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic. It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other popular government that has been or can be well organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican character. According to the constitution of every State in the Union, some or other of the officers of government are appointed indirectly only by the people. According to most of them, the chief magistrate himself is so appointed. And according to one, this mode of appointment is extended to one of the co-ordinate branches of the legislature. According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instances, both within the legislative and executive departments, to a period of years. According to the provisions of most of the constitutions, again, as well as according to the most respectable and received opinions on the subject, the members of the judiciary department are to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good behavior.
On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the most rigid sense, conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the people. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the example in most of the States. Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves, the duration of the appointments is equally conformable to the republican standard, and to the model of State constitutions The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to continue in office for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware, the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election is annual. In several of the States, however, no constitutional provision is made for the impeachment of the chief magistrate. And in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the State constitutions.
Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter.
"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, "for the convention to adhere to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States." And it is asked by what authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The handle which has been made of this objection requires that it should be examined with some precision.
Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, first, to ascertain the real character of the government in question; secondly, to inquire how far the convention were authorized to propose such a government; and thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could supply any defect of regular authority.
First. In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced.
On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL act.
That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union, nor from that of a MAJORITY of the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these rules have been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL constitution.
The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived. The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL. The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many FEDERAL as NATIONAL features.
The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the national countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government.
But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.
If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.
The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.
PUBLIUS.
Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:
The Federalist Papers #1: Alexander Hamilton's Plea for Reasoned Debate
The Federalist Papers #3: United, the 13 States are Less Likely to Stumble into War
The Federalist Papers #4 B: National Defense Will Be Stronger if the States are United
The Federalist Papers #5: Unless United, the States Will Be at Each Others' Throats
The Federalist Papers #6 A: Alexander Hamilton on the Many Human Motives for War
The Federalist Papers #11 A: United, the States Can Get a Better Trade Deal—Alexander Hamilton
The Federalist Papers #12: Union Makes it Much Easier to Get Tariff Revenue—Alexander Hamilton
The Federalist Papers #13: Alexander Hamilton on Increasing Returns to Scale in National Government
The Federalist Papers #14: A Republic Can Be Geographically Large—James Madison
The Federalist Papers #21 A: Constitutions Need to be Enforced—Alexander Hamilton
The Federalist Papers #24: The United States Need a Standing Army—Alexander Hamilton
The Federalist Papers #27: People Will Get Used to the Federal Government—Alexander Hamilton
The Federalist Papers #30: A Robust Power of Taxation is Needed to Make a Nation Powerful
The Federalist Papers #35 A: Alexander Hamilton as an Economist
The Federalist Papers #35 B: Alexander Hamilton on Who Can Represent Whom
The Federalist Papers #36: Alexander Hamilton on Regressive Taxation
Hendrik Sybrandy Interview of Miles Kimball about the Fed and the Pandemic, August 23, 2021
Hendrik Sybrandy interviewed me on August 23, 2021, a few days before the beginning of this year’s “Jackson Hole” monetary policy conference, which actually took place remotely this year. At the top of this post is what actually aired on CGTN. Hendrik was also good enough to send me the second video (just above) which gives my answers in full, but unfortunately doesn’t include Hendrik’s questions. I think you can understand what I am saying anyway, though, especially if you listen to the shorter clip up at the top first.
With the second video (just above) that gives my answers but not the questions, I decided to experiment with getting a transcription from the freemium transcription website otter.ai I had to use Quicktime to export to an audio-only file first, but then otter.ai made the transcript below. So you could see exactly what quality I got from otter.ai, I didn’t edit what is below at all.
Oh, no, I know. Yeah, yeah. Oh, okay. on top. Okay. That's a great question. I'm not? I'm not sure I know I been once and I, one of the purposes is for central bankers around the world to have a chance to get to know one another. So this is this is the gathering where central bankers from all around the world are in a large number are in one place?
Well, it, it depends a little bit on which aspect of things. But in terms of monetary policy, I think it's most mostly a myth that you need monetary policy coordination across countries, each country can keep aggregate demand at the level that it wants to all by itself, if it if it uses the full range of policy tools. Of course, I'm a big advocate of negative interest rate policy. And things get more complicated if you kind of irrationally avoid negative interest rate policy. But basically, each country can each central bank can get aggregate demand at the right level, there's a little more reason for coordination on financial stability rules there. If If banks fail in one country, they can cause banks to fail in another country. But what's most important, though, is the exchange of ideas. So you have, you know, you have innovations in central banking, like, like negative interest rate policy that's been innovation in, in Europe and Japan, and it's in there other innovations in monetary policy that Fed is, is inching in the direction of price level targeting, as opposed to two inflation targeting, which is, in some ways is a fairly technical thing, but can matter, potentially can matter a lot. So, so it's, it's the exchange of ideas, if you have a new idea of how to do central banking, better, it's good for them to be rubbing shoulders so that all the good ideas get passed around. Yeah, exactly. I realized that that's not literally true this year.
I don't know what they'll talk about this week, there's, I mean, inflation, there's a real question of how permanent and the effects of inflation are going to be there. The pandemic has messed up a lot of things. And so there's everything, all of the economics is different with the, with the pandemic. And so when when we get that under control, then inflation could be very, very different than it is. And, you know, at this moment, in the pandemic, one of the things that, I think, is, ironically, economists really realized that I think other governments didn't pay enough attention to was that controlling the pandemic, it was the key thing for all the economic issues and we we should have been throwing a lot more money that we should have taken a small fraction of the money we took to bail people out. It's can be appropriate to bail people out during the pandemic, but we should have taken a small fraction of that money to just fight the virus directly. And we would have been way ahead. So I think Economists were very aware of just how many trillions of dollars, it's, it's worth, you know, every every month that the pandemic goes on longer, it has a huge dollar cost to the economy. And so throwing enormous amounts of money at pandemic control is a good idea. We, we didn't throw enough money at trying to tamp down the pandemic.
Well, by mine, a lot of my knowledge is just from reading, reading the newspaper, but they're, they're far from the newspaper. There's some very good reporters who dig into this. And if they're not talking about raising the interest rates for quite some time, maybe not till, maybe not even until 2023. But they're probably going to slow down later this year, they're probably going to slow down their purchases of long term, long term bonds and long term mortgage bonds. So that they'll they'll go very slowly. And by the way, that that's partly it, things are complicated, because of the extra supply problems that you have with with COVID. that's causing inflation to be so high at the moment. But the Fed believes that the underlying inflation rate, once we get out of the pandemic, is is not so high, but nobody knows how high that'll be until we get out of the pandemic. So, if we get out of the pandemic, the Fed, the Fed has said it wants to be slow to raise interest rates, until they see inflation running like two and a half percent or something like that. So. So it used to be that that's partly what price level targeting means that it's if inflation is running below 2%, for a while, then they want it to run above 2% for a while. And so inflation, certainly, you know, like a year or two ago, was running below 2%. And so they're still happy to have it run above and the way they think about this, they, they always tend to abstract from what they think of as temporary movements in inflation. So, you know, folks who are not in central banks, look at whatever inflation is at the moment, but the Fed is trying to look at the underlying inertia of inflation, if you will, you know, if you think about, if you think of spinning and uncooked egg, and then you and then you stop it, and then it keeps going, that that the sloshing around of the liquid in the egg in the middle, that's the inertia of inflation. This is this is a little bit the opposite where the egg is spinning especially fast. But but the Fed is thinking it's on the outside of the egg that spinning fast. The inside is spinning a little slower.
Yeah. Absolutely. Yeah. And so they are judging a lot by the low levels of inflation that were there before the pandemic. So they nobody, nobody knows whether the inflation caused by the pandemic is going to be keep on after the pandemic. I mean, we just don't have I mean, this is this is very unusual situation. And so I think the Fed is looking at, well, inflation was pretty low before the pandemic, but besides, they're much worried more worried about low inflation and high inflation these days. And that has to do with their resistance to negative interest rate policy. So the Fed, unlike some other central banks, has been very, very, they they've said very, very, you know, they've been very loath to go to negative interest rate policy, which is unfortunate because what negative interest rate policy allows you to do is to have lower inflation. I mean, the main, the main reason the Fed wants inflation is because they want to have inflation instead of negative interest rates. If If, I mean, some people hate negative interest rates directly, but if you hate them inflation, if you mostly Hate inflation, then you're better off with the willingness to do negative interest rates. Because if you are willing to use negative interest rates, you can have zero inflation and still stay, you know, stimulate the economy when there's a recession. But because what, you know, there's a concept economists have of the real interest rate, basically, it's the interest rate minus inflation that matters. And so it's like an interest rate looks lower, you have to look at interest rates in comparison with inflation. And so interest rates really act like lower interest rates when there's a higher rate of inflation. So, so that's so the Fed is forcing inflation on us because they're afraid to use negative interest rates.
Oh, boy, I mean. Well, I think you I think we just pointed that that I mean, whatever the official program is, how do we read things? When with this EAD pandemic, affecting everything so much?
Oh, yeah, absolutely. Well, actually, that's where I, that's where I think actually economists should be brought into fighting the pandemic more, because it's not just it's not, it's not that what's required is more to see how large systems work, which is something that that economists are trained at so many economists have actually written papers using epidemiological models. And, you know, economists have been at the forefront of saying, Oh, we should have gotten in fast, cheap tests earlier on, we now know, the emphasis has shifted towards vaccination, appropriately, but early on, if we had fast, cheap tests and use them very broadly, it could have it could have helped a lot. So I actually think that economists should have been brought into directly fighting the pandemic more. I mean, they, they economics helps you understand the urgency, it's not just a matter of controlling the pandemic, it's like getting it to end one month, sooner or safety, you know, is is crucial. And that Need for Speed is something that I think, was obvious to economists and in some of the public government policies, we're less focused on speed and controlling the pandemic.
Oh, well, we're in the thick of things. I mean, this it, this delta variant is is causing a lot of economic disruptions. And I think we're still at the stage where it will probably get worse before it gets better. I mean, this delta variant has, I think, I read that it has a reproduction ratio of six. So it spreads about, it spreads incredibly fast. And I think, again, I I think the big issue really is the pandemic itself, and they're useful insights. They're basically it's we're at the stage where, here's, here's one of the bits of perspective. I mean, the point of slowing down the pandemic, was to give everybody a chance to be vaccinated. Once everybody has a chance to be vaccinated, and some people, of course, will refuse, then there's not a big reason to slow down the pandemic anymore. And except for overwhelming hospitals, they're kind of those two issues. You want to get people to get a chance to be vaccinated before the before they're exposed. And, boy, you better get vaccinated soon, or you're you because it's really hard to not get exposed to this delta barrier because it's moving so fast. So it's very urgent for people to get vaccinated if they want to protect themselves. There's the issue of giving kids a chance to get vaccinated, and there's the issue of overwhelming the hospital system. But at some point, people have had a chance to get vaccinated. And other than slowing things down a little to not overwhelm the hospital system, you got to figure this delta variant this so, so spread so easily that everybody's going to be exposed. It's just whether you're going to be protected by vaccination before you're exposed or not. And so the crushing the economy by by trying to do social distancing, I think, at some point is, is a fool's errand because this delta variant is so aggressive, everybody's going to be exposed unless they take really, really extreme measures to isolate themselves. And that, but the point was mainly to get people a chance to be vaccinated first. And it were within a couple of months of saying, people have had their chance. Now, we should. Now Now, we can't afford this shutdown the father me anymore. I mean, we get to get the kids vaccinated if their parents are willing. And let's not hurt the economy too much more beyond that. But so notice, I, again, I think that it's the pandemic policy, and not that, you know, the mitigating economic policy, that's the key issue.
Oh, I think the Fed is, I think the Fed is doing an okay job on its on its immediate decisions. What I really liked them to do is I think the key issue on the Fed is really the appointments to the Fed, who is going to be appointed to the Fed. I wrote a blog post about that. I think that it, I think that it matters, I think that the I, who is if I don't know if this will happen again. But in the past, the vice chair has led these committee meetings to determine the what they call the framework for monetary policy. And that framework, the last time was was very anti negative interest rates, which I think is a problem in emergencies we might face in the future. And so it matters who the new to the new vice chair is whether they're kind of irrationally against negative interest rates or whether they allow us to kind of start moving towards the negative interest rate policy that will allow us to bring down inflation. Several I don't, I don't remember exactly. But they're, they're, you know, they need to appoint a chair. I want one. So what I one thing I said in my blog post is, even though other people would also be good shares, I favor reappointing Jerome Powell, simply to try to depoliticize the fed a little bit more. I mean, I think that if if you have presidents of different parties, you know, nominating the same Fed chair that, that ends up sending a good message that we want to depoliticize the Fed. And so I think, as I say, I think there are many other people who could be good Fed chair. So it's not it's not a disaster to appoint some of the other candidates that people are talking about. It's just that if every time there's a new president, you have a new Fed Chair, I think that politicizes the Fed somewhat more than if you if you have some fed chairs reappointed by presidents of the other party, and everybody thinks Jerome Powell has done a good job on that monetary policy, pretty much I'm sure there. Everybody's way too strong. But there's a pretty good consensus that he's done a good job on that. I think there's a reasonable argument that he could have been tougher on on in having high equity requirements for banks. These are sometimes called capital requirements. But the issue is, if banks are if banks have a decent fraction of financing from stockholders, then the stockholders or people who signed up if the bank gets in trouble, they then accept a lower stock value. If If not, you end up if you don't have enough stock financing of banks, then you wind up with bailouts. And so we should all be quite concerned to have high equity requirements for banks. I think Jerome Powell could have done better on that. But on the other hand, I think that If I think he might well get the message that he should be tougher on that in the future if he's, if he's reappointed. So I think it's great to talk about that. But I think I've talked about that and kind of give Jerome Powell the message, he ought to be tougher in terms of saying bank should be financed a little more by stock holders and a little less by borrowing, then then what he's done in the past. And but I think you'll probably be responsive to that.
Well, I, you know, there, I've got to say, if they did try to convey a message to the Fed, it would be mostly grandstanding, because as far as monetary policy goes, each country can do its own monetary button can do its own aggregate demand management, regardless of what the other central banks are doing. There. There are some countries that are think, in a troubling way trying to keep fixed exchange rates. And I think there there should probably be less of that. And anyway, countries complain about the Fed said other central banks complain about the Fed to hide their own problems and their own failings. That's my view on that.
No, I think I think that's pretty good. There are I these are all important issues. And I hope well, I mean, I guess there's one other issue that's come up, which is a central bank, digital currencies, I think that's a good evolution, it has to be done. Right. And it and one of the things that actually, let me let me highlight a technical issue, which is, I think it's a very good thing that the Fed is regularizing and, and institutionalizing a little bit more. Its use of the its use of the repo markets. Because I think in the evolution of monetary policy, this will be important in the future. So one of the things in terms of so in the middle of writing a paper about us negative interest rate law, which is very interesting. And the the feds repo facilities are actually very important in the legality in insurance, ensuring that negative interest rates are legal under current law, you don't need new law to be passed to make negative interest rates legal because the the the you don't, that you don't need negative interest rates and reserves, you can have the reserve accounts, if the reserve accounts or caps then you have these repo facilities take on some of the functions that have previously been taken on by by the reserves. And these repo facilities clearly are allowed in law to have whatever interest rate you want. The reserves may not be able to have a negative interest rate, but you don't need negative interest rates on reserves if you kept them and use the Reapers facilities. There's there's a lot of flexibility there. And so I think people should keep their eye on these repo facilities. They're going in both directions. Now, both repo and reverse repo where the Fed is letting people lend to the Fed and the Fed is lending to other people. You're having both now. That's it. That's it very, very important development. Keep your eye on those. I think they'll grow in importance over time.
Well, I, I, I think that there are many things that are a distraction for the Fed. I mean, I don't think I think it's a distraction. Maybe this is an unpopular thing to say, but I think the Fed has so many jobs already with monetary policy and financial stability. regulation. I think it'd be better to let them focus on that job and not insist that They they be. I mean, I think we should work a lot on social justice. But I don't think the Fed is the appropriate spearhead for trying to work on social justice, I don't think the Fed is the appropriate, I mean, we should have carbon taxes to deal with global warming. I mean, that's not, that's not a Fed thing. That's it, that's a treasury thing. And that's a matter of getting the political consensus together. And we should be doing research on, you know, put more money into research on solar power, and, and so on. I think this idea that every institution in society has to be involved in those particular fights is a mistake, the Fed, if the Fed does its job on, it messes up all of this stuff, if the Fed puts us into a big recession, because it's unwilling to use negative interest rates, that's really bad for social justice, the Fed should be concentrating on getting its act together on negative interest rate policy, rather than which will help his social justice way more than doing you know, direct stuff on that. And it'll even help in terms of you know, probably even help in terms of climate policy because if we had a giant recession because the Fed wouldn't do negative interest rate policy that would distract the government from making progress on climate policy. So I just think the Fed can contribute way more to climate policy and to social justice by doing it's for mission that it can by directly working on those things. Oh, yeah, so just if you look at them and by the way, I'm on Twitter at at Miles Kimball and also my blog is Confessions of a supply side liberal and you can you can find it there blog dot supply side liberal calm Okay. Great, thank you, you. Right. Oh, yeah. And do do send me do send me all the links and stuff. I'd like to post these these links to this on my blog. Great. See you later.