The Federalist Papers #4 B: National Defense Will Be Stronger if the States are United
In the first half of The Federalist Papers #4 John Jay argues that the states must be prepared to defend themselves from other nations. (See “The Federalist Papers #4 A: The States Must Be Prepared to Defend against Aggression by Other Nations.”) In the second half he argues that they will be better able to defend themselves if they are united. His main arguments are these:
A larger nation has more military leaders to choose from, and so can typically get better leaders.
Coordinated preparations are valuable.
A united front allows for the internalization of externalities between the states in thinking through war aims (as reflected ultimately in the treaties the resolve wars).
A larger nation can have a larger military that it can concentrate at the most important place at any point in a conflict.
Unity of command is valuable.
In a war, states might well betray one another if they are not under one government.
If not united under one government squabbling among the states could make both the prosecution of war and the establishment of peace much more difficult.
The strength that comes from being united matters not only for victory, but also for deterring war.
I consider the second half of The Federalist Papers #4 to being with these two paragraphs pointing to the value of a strong national defense:
The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country.
As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot be provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the object in question, more competent than any other given number whatever.
Then, John Jay lays out in detail the arguments I list above. Here they are, with my summary of the argument in bold before John Jay’s argument in full on that point:
1. A larger nation has more military leaders to choose from, and so can typically get better leaders.
One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found.
2. Coordinated preparations are valuable.
It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each.
3. A united front allows for the internalization of externalities between the states in thinking through war aims (as reflected ultimately in the treaties the resolve wars).
In the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole.
4. A larger nation can have a larger military that it can concentrate at the most important place at any point in a conflict.
It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system.
5. Unity of command is valuable.
It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent companies.
What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the government of Wales? Suppose an invasion; would those three governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single government of Great Britain would?
We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one national government, had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen--if one national government had not called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet--let Scotland have its navigation and fleet--let Wales have its navigation and fleet--let Ireland have its navigation and fleet--let those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be under four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance.
6. In a war, states might well betray one another if they are not under one government.
Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent governments--what armies could they raise and pay--what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defense? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished? Although such conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds with such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often happened would, under similar circumstances, happen again.
7. If not united under one government squabbling among the states could make both the prosecution of war and the establishment of peace much more difficult.
But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas one government, watching over the general and common interests, and combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of the people.
8. The strength that comes from being united matters not only for victory, but also for deterring war.
But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government (each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and how soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.
PUBLIUS.
There is a direct relevance of John Jay’s arguments to our situation today. China is rising in power. It is important for the world to have an adequate counterweight to that power. Allies are valuable, but John Jay’s arguments point out why it is more valuable to have the United States itself be larger and more powerful so it can act as a better counterweight. Here, “larger” doesn’t mean more territory, it means having a larger population that can support a larger total economy and therefore support a larger military if necessary.
Fortunately, the United States can easily become larger in population because many, many people—including many highly skilled people as well as many out of “your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free” who would gladly serve in the US military in order to be able to become citizens of our fair republic. Unfortunately, in in some quarter, there are low levels of tolerance for the cultural differences of many of those who were born outside the US. I hope that Americans soon wake up to the importance for our national security and world stability of allowing more immigration to the US in order to bolster American power. Of course, assimilation to an important degree is crucial in order to make sure that immigrants do, in fact, bolster American power. But the US has a stellar record of assimilating newcomers and gaining their loyalty. On the value of allowing more immigration in order to keep up with China’s power, see
(There is also a moral dimension to allowing more immigration. On that, see "‘The Hunger Games’ Is Hardly Our Future--It's Already Here” and “The Message of ‘Sal Tlay Ka Siti’.”)
Here are links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far: