Jordan Peterson: No One Gets Away with Anything

The Book of Mormon says 4 times that “no unclean thing” can “dwell with God”/“inherit the kingdom of heaven”/“enter into his kingdom”:

• Wherefore, if ye have sought to do wickedly in the days of your probation, then ye are found unclean before the judgment-seat of God; and no unclean thing can dwell with God; wherefore, ye must be cast off forever. (1 Nephi 10:21)

• And I say unto you again that he cannot save them in their sins; for I cannot deny his word, and he hath said that no unclean thing can inherit the kingdom of heaven; therefore, how can ye be saved, except ye inherit the kingdom of heaven? Therefore, ye cannot be saved in your sins. (Alma 11:27)

• But behold, an awful death cometh upon the wicked; for they die as to things pertaining to things of righteousness; for they are unclean, and no unclean thing can inherit the kingdom of God; but they are cast out, and consigned to partake of the fruits of their labors or their works, which have been evil; and they drink the dregs of a bitter cup. (Alma 40:26)

• And no unclean thing can enter into his kingdom; therefore nothing entereth into his rest save it be those who have washed their garments in my blood, because of their faith, and the repentance of all their sins, and their faithfulness unto the end. (3 Nephi 27:19)

(Thanks to https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/mormon/simple.html for enabling this simple search of the Book of Mormon.) When I was a believing Mormon, this scared me—in a way that probably had good effects on my behavior.

On a lot of fronts, Jordan Peterson has done a brilliant job of giving powerful nonsupernaturalist interpretation of sacred texts. His book Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief goes into the most detail on that front. But his other books, 12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos and Beyond Order: 12 More Rules for Life do a fair bit of this. In everything I am aware of (which also includes many YouTube videos, though a small fraction of his total stock), he has not touched on the Book of Mormon. Yet, he gives a good nonsupernaturalist interpretation of “no unclean thing can inherit the kingdom of heaven” when he says “No one gets away with anything.”

In this post I have two different versions of his bit elaborating on “No one gets away with anything.” The video at the top of this post is a 3-and-a-half minute clip. The other version is last 14 minutes of his lecture on meaning for moderns of the story of Abraham is the other. That starts at the 46:00 mark, where he is saying “You wake up in the morning, and what do you have in front of you?” (The 14 minutes are followed by a Q&A that is also interesting, but deals with different topics.)

Now I’m scared again.

You can see links to many of my other posts on religion here.

The Federalist Papers #46: Cities and States Have a Strong Position in Struggles with the Federal Government—James Madison

image source; Wikipedia article “Sanctuary city”

link to full text of The Federalist Papers #46

Because of the Civil War, the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution, the Great Depression and the great wars of the 20th century, the US federal government is much stronger now than it was between the ratification of the US Constitution and the US Civil War. Yet state and local governments still have a fighting chance in many battles with the federal government. People often deplore the governments of other states and localities resisting the federal government, but support the government of their state or locality resisting the federal government. On the one hand, Republican-dominated states have gone to court to see which bits of Obamacare they could get away with skipping. On the other hand, Democrat-dominated states and cities have gone to court to see how much more welcoming they could be to undocumented immigrants than the spirit of federal immigration law indicates.

In the Federalist Papers #46, James Madison points to some of the wellsprings of popular support for state and local governments in their struggles with the federal government. He writes:

I proceed to inquire whether the federal government or the State governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people.

First, the source of the authority of state and local governments is every bit as lofty as the source of federal government authority. In both cases, their authority derives from the people:

The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes. … the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone, and that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other.

Seeing federal, state and local government all as agents for the people predicts that the levels of government that promote the policies people like best will have an advantage in the intergovernmental contest for power. To the extent different parts of the country want different things, the ability of state and local governments to tailor the policies they promote to the desires of those in a given area gives them an advantage. To the extent people in a large part of the country want to compel those in a small part of the country to do things a certain way (often because of what is seen as a moral issue), the federal government will have an advantage. More generally, different levels of government may at any given time be more in tune with the people. James Madison says this about what he saw historically and what might happen in the future:

It was, nevertheless, invariably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment of the people were turned anew to their own particular governments; that the federal council was at no time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to proposed enlargements of its powers and importance was the side usually taken by the men who wished to build their political consequence on the prepossessions of their fellow-citizens. If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due …

Second, state and local governments employ more people. (In 2020, the federal government employed 2.93 million people. State and local governments employed 19.77 million people.) This means that professionally, more people have the interests of state and local governments at heart than the number who professionally have the interests of the federal government at heart. And those who professionally have the interest of a given government at heart are likely to influence their family, friends and acquaintances:

Into the administration of these [the state and local governments] a greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these, the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members of these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments; on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to incline.

Third, there are some things that are simply difficult for the federal government to do—in part because of the larger number of employees of state and local governments than of the federal government:

… it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered. … members of the federal will be more dependent on the members of the State governments, than the latter will be on the former.

When thinking of other countries where the national government seems to take over many of the jobs that in the US are done by state and local governments, it is important to realize that many other countries only have the population of a US state.

Fourth, a great deal of evidence shows that people who belong to a smaller and a larger group often identify more with the interests of the smaller group. I have spent many hours in meetings demonstrating that academic economists care more about the interests of their Economics department than about the interests of the university as a whole—though they also tend to believe that the interests of the university as a whole would be best served by what the Economics department as a body wants. And typically the economists in each field care more about the interests of their field interests than the interests of the Economics department. James Madison describes this tendency to identify with the local in this way:

A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government, the objects of their affections and consultations? For the same reason that the members of the State legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the federal legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the latter what counties and towns are to the former. … members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations, to the aggrandizement of the federal government, the great interests of the nation have suffered on a hundred, from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular States.

James Madison goes so far as to use the word “defalcation,” meaning “misappropriate of funds,” to describe how strong an influence state interests can have in federal congressional deliberations:

The motives on the part of the State governments, to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the federal government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members.

This is the well-known phenomenon of pork-barrel spending.

By contrast, the interests of the national government are no strongly represented in state legislatures and executives. James Madison writes:

If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the national government, be generally popular in that State and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State alone. The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty.

Fifth, states have many levers of power to resist a measure of the federal government:

… should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter.

Sixth, if the federal government tried to go against not just the interests of the people in one state, or several, but the interests of the people in almost all the states, the states combined could put up a very strong resistance to the federal government. James Madison explores this case at length. Here are some highlights of that long discussion:

A few representatives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves; or rather one set of representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter. The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. …

Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. … To these would be opposed a militia … officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms.

To back up James Madison’s argument, imagine the Civil War if twice or almost twice as many states as the Confederacy had arrayed themselves against the federal government. Even now it is hard to see the federal government defeating a coalition of 40 states in armed conflict given how many in the federally-controlled armed forces would desert to the coalition of 40 states.

Some might lament the strength of state and local governments to resist the federal government. But that strength is real, even now.

Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #46 to provide the context for each quotation above:

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FEDERALIST NO. 46

The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared

From the New York Packet
Tuesday, January 29, 1788.

Author: James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

RESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether the federal government or the State governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people. Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States.

I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving the proofs for another place. The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone, and that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other. Truth, no less than decency, requires that the event in every case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common constituents. Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective States.

Into the administration of these a greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these, the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members of these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments; on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to incline. Experience speaks the same language in this case. The federal administration, though hitherto very defective in comparison with what may be hoped under a better system, had, during the war, and particularly whilst the independent fund of paper emissions was in credit, an activity and importance as great as it can well have in any future circumstances whatever.

It was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for their object the protection of everything that was dear, and the acquisition of everything that could be desirable to the people at large. It was, nevertheless, invariably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment of the people were turned anew to their own particular governments; that the federal council was at no time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to proposed enlargements of its powers and importance was the side usually taken by the men who wished to build their political consequence on the prepossessions of their fellow-citizens. If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due; but even in that case the State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered. The remaining points on which I propose to compare the federal and State governments, are the disposition and the faculty they may respectively possess, to resist and frustrate the measures of each other. It has been already proved that the members of the federal will be more dependent on the members of the State governments, than the latter will be on the former. It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of the people, on whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State governments, than of the federal government. So far as the disposition of each towards the other may be influenced by these causes, the State governments must clearly have the advantage.

But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage will lie on the same side. The prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the federal government, will generally be favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members of the State governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the general government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government, the objects of their affections and consultations? For the same reason that the members of the State legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the federal legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the latter what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States. What is the spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations, to the aggrandizement of the federal government, the great interests of the nation have suffered on a hundred, from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate, that the new federal government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy than the existing government may have pursued; much less, that its views will be as confined as those of the State legislatures; but only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their governments. The motives on the part of the State governments, to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the federal government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members. Were it admitted, however, that the Federal government may feel an equal disposition with the State governments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the national government, be generally popular in that State and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State alone. The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty.

On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter. But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same combinations, in short, would result from an apprehension of the federal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the federal government to such an extremity. In the contest with Great Britain, one part of the empire was employed against the other.

The more numerous part invaded the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt was unjust and unwise; but it was not in speculation absolutely chimerical. But what would be the contest in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few representatives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves; or rather one set of representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter. The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. The reasonings contained in these papers must have been employed to little purpose indeed, if it could be necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger. That the people and the States should, for a sufficient period of time, elect an uninterupted succession of men ready to betray both; that the traitors should, throughout this period, uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension of the military establishment; that the governments and the people of the States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism.

Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it. Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment, by a blind and tame submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it. The argument under the present head may be put into a very concise form, which appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which the federal government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent on the people, or it will not. On the first supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents. On the other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the people, and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State governments, who will be supported by the people. On summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper, they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged in the federal government are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union; and that all those alarms which have been sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation of the State governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them.

PUBLIUS.

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Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

• The Federalist Papers #1: Alexander Hamilton's Plea for Reasoned Debate

• The Federalist Papers #2 A: John Jay on the Idea of America

• The Federalist Papers #2 B: You Trusted the Continental Congress; Trust the Constitutional Convention

• The Federalist Papers #3: United, the 13 States are Less Likely to Stumble into War

• The Federalist Papers #4 A: The States Must Be Prepared to Defend against Aggression by Other Nations

• The Federalist Papers #4 B: National Defense Will Be Stronger if the States are United

• The Federalist Papers #5: Unless United, the States Will Be at Each Others' Throats

• The Federalist Papers #6 A: Alexander Hamilton on the Many Human Motives for War

• The Federalist Papers #6 B: Commercial Republics Also Start Wars with Their Neighbors—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 A: Divided, the States Would Fall into Territorial Disputes Likely to Lead to War Between the States—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 B: Without Union, Economic Disagreements Would Drive the States to Conflict with One Another—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #8: Without Union, the States Would Either Be Subject to Devastating Wars with Each Other or Would Have Liberty Endangered by their Own Standing Armies—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 A: There Has Been Technological Progress in Practical Principles of Republican Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 B: A Large Confederation May Be More Politically Stable Than a Small Nation—Alexander Hamilton Cites Montesquieu

• The Federalist Papers #10 A: Conflicts Arising from Differences of Opinion Are an Inevitable Accompaniment of Liberty—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #10 B: The Larger the Republic, the Easier It is to Find Thoughtful Legislators and the Harder It is to Put Together a Majority to do Unjust Things—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #11 A: United, the States Can Get a Better Trade Deal—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #11 B: Union Will Make Possible a Strong Navy, Allowing America to Chart Its Own Destiny—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #12: Union Makes it Much Easier to Get Tariff Revenue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #13: Alexander Hamilton on Increasing Returns to Scale in National Government

• The Federalist Papers #14: A Republic Can Be Geographically Large—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #15: A Government, to be Worthy of the Name, Must Govern Its Citizens, Not Just Its Subordinate Jurisdictions—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #16: Authority of the Federal Government Directly over Individuals Means States Can Only Thwart the Federal Government by Active and Obvious Resistance—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #17: Three Levels of Federal Power

• The Federalist Papers #18: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison Point to the Weakness of Confederations of Cities in Ancient Greece to Argue for a Strong Federal Government

• The Federalist Papers #19: The Weakness of the German Empire, Poland and Switzerland up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #20: The Weakness of the United Netherlands up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #21 A: Constitutions Need to be Enforced—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #21 B: Alexander Hamilton Complains of the Lack of a Measure Such as GDP Suitable for Apportioning Taxes to the States

• The Federalist Papers #22 A: The Articles of Confederation Lead to Uncoordinated Trade Policy and Military Free-Riding—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 B: Supermajority Rules Aren't an Adequate Fix for Departures from One-Person One-Vote—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 C: Pillars of Democracy—The Judicial System, Military Loyal to the Constitution, and Police Loyal to the Constitution

• The Federalist Papers #23: The Federal Government Must Be Given Sufficient Power to Accomplish Whatever We Expect the Federal Government to Do—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #24: The United States Need a Standing Army—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #25: Prohibiting a Standing Army in Time of Peace Would Be a Mistake—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #26: Some Part of the Government Must Be Able to Authorize an Army Whenever Necessary, after Being Forced to Fully Debate the Issue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #27: People Will Get Used to the Federal Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #28: The Federal Government and States Can Check One Another’s Power, Reducing the Chance of Abuses—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #29: State Militias such as the National Guard are Not Attractive Tools for Tyrants—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #30: A Robust Power of Taxation is Needed to Make a Nation Powerful

• The Federalist Papers #31: Alexander Hamilton's Attempt at a Formal Argument for a Robust Federal Power of Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #32: The States Retain All Powers Not Explicitly Taken Away by the Constitution—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #33: The 'Necessary and Proper' and Supremacy Clauses Only Make Explicit What the Specified Powers Imply—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #34: War is Expensive. To Defend the Union, the Federal Government Needs an Ample Power of Taxation—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #35 A: Alexander Hamilton as an Economist

• The Federalist Papers #35 B: Alexander Hamilton on Who Can Represent Whom

• The Federalist Papers #36: Alexander Hamilton on Regressive Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #37: Why the Constitution Isn't Perfect—And Why No Constitution Could Be. James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #38—James Madison Analyzes the Proposed Constitution Using the Principle of Opportunity Cost: What is the Alternative to the Consensus of the Constitutional Convention?

• The Federalist Papers #39: James Madison Downplays How Radical the Proposed Constitution Is

• The Federalist Papers #40: James Madison Argues the Constitutional Convention Had the Warrant to Make Its Proposal—and Its Advice Should Be Taken Even If Not

• The Federalist Papers #41: James Madison on Tradeoffs—You Can't Have Everything You Want

• The Federalist Papers #42: Every Power of the Federal Government Must Be Justified—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #43: The United States Constitution as a Commitment to Democracy at the State Level—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #44: Constitutional Limitations on the Powers of the States—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #45: James Madison Predicts a Small Federal Government

New Year's Gratitude on the Occasion of the Marshall Fire

image source

It is said that, on average, Olympic winners of a bronze medal feel happier than winners of a silver medal. For a bronze medal, the salient alternative is no medal at all, while for a silver medal, the salient alternative is a gold medal.

Our house in Superior is in the subdivision just south of the southeast end of the Marshall Fire that has raged in Superior and Louisville Colorado the last few days. Valiant efforts of firefighters to contain the fire mostly kept it from reaching as far as our house. And finally snow has put an end to the fire. My heart goes out to all the people who did lose their homes. And I know that we could easily have been among them had the wind pushed the fire a little further south to our home instead of pushing the fire almost due east.

We have felt no grumpiness at all about having to evacuate to a comfortable Hampton Inn in Lakewood (west of Denver and east of Golden, quite a bit south of the fire), because we feel so lucky that our house is still standing and intact, unlike the houses of so many of our fellow citizens of Superior and its twin city of Louisville.

Because the snow would have made driving dangerous from our distance, we have not yet seen our house again. Our wonderful next-door neighbor Bob went in to turn the water off and run what was then left in the pipes out in order to avoid frozen pipes.

Our son Jordan and his fiancee evacuated with us to Lakewood. We are enjoying their company here instead of in Superior. It is mostly safe to go back, but we might hold off a while from concern over all the exotic chemicals that burning buildings would have put into the air.

I usually read the news rather than watching it, but yesterday morning and the night before that I spent a lot of time watching the news trying to learn exactly how far the fire would go. One scene memorable to me had the Safeway we shop at on Coalton road in the foreground with giant flames a few blocks behind. In the end, the fire came right up to the strip mall that Safeway is in. Now I am grateful to be worrying about what other places we usually shop at still stand or how soon they can be repaired instead of worrying about all the many idiosyncratic useful things about our house or things in our house.

For the community as a whole, there is great reason to be grateful that no one lost their life as a result of this fire. With a few horrible exceptions, insurance will spread out the financial losses over tens of millions of people around the country who have an ownership interest in insurance companies (often the policy-holders themselves). But a lot of the emotional and time burden of rebuilding and replacing what was lost falls on the residents of the destroyed houses and workers in the destroyed commercial buildings. That is a heavy burden my wife Gail and I had reason to contemplate, but are spared. We will try to be conscious of that burden on others in our town that we interact with in the coming months and years. We will be reminded of that burden for a long time by the long tail of visible effects of the fire.

Update, January 3, 2022: The fire began on Thursday, January 30. On Friday, January 31, our neighbor turned off our water to avoid ice damage to the pipes and in the process verified our house was fine. On Saturday, New Year’s Day, Gail and I returned to a cold house because we knew we had to be present to let the natural gas people in to restart our gas. Fortunately, we did have electricity and could use electric heaters. I took a walk as far as Coalton road and saw the destroyed houses in the front row facing Coalton from the north. Our neighborhood south of Coalton was spared. On Sunday, January 2, we did get our gas restored and learned that it would be a loooooong time before those who have intact houses in blasted neighborhoods will be able to have gas restored because of the damage to the gas infrastructure in those neighborhoods. Today, Monday, January 3, we had internet access restored. (Before that, cellular was iffy enough we mostly couldn’t get phone-based wifi hotspots to work.) We are very grateful that personally we now only face a “boil water” advisory and wondering which of the businesses we patronize are now gone or how long they will be offline for repairs. The more relieved we are about our personal situation, the sadder we feel for everyone who has suffered more grievous harm.

Today was a beautiful sunny day. I went on a walk and saw neighbors talking to each other on the street—something I haven’t seen on my many previous walks. Those who have been through a tragedy together can bond over that tragedy.

Update, January 6, 2022: Our tap water was declared safe without boiling today. Maps have come out showing where homes were destroyed or damaged. It is saddening.

The Gods of Science and of Speculation

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Soon after I began attending the Unitarian Universalist Congregation of Ann Arbor in 2000, I took Ken Phifer’s “Building Your Own Theology Course.” One product of that class was a talk I gave that Fall that I posted two weeks ago: “Miles Kimball: Leaving Mormonism.” Another product is the document that you see below, entitled “The Gods of Science and Speculation,” dated November 18, 2000.

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I believe that the truth is very big---much bigger than any human conception of it.  Through the progress of science, I expect the coming centuries to bring astounding revelations about the nature of the Universe, and through the progress of the human spirit, I expect the coming centuries to bring astounding freely chosen visions of the place we will take in the Universe.  

Despite the limitations of current knowledge, I want to make meaning out of the best of current science and to speculate about things that might be true given current science. 

I take my view of current science from Isaac Asimov, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Steven Pinker, Randy Nesse, Jared Diamond, E.O. Wilson, Alan Guth, Carl Sagan, John Lewis, Stephen Drury and Julian Barbour, among others---and recently, also from my reading of The Skeptical Inquirer magazine. 

While science tells us something about the way things are, our attitude towards those things is up to us.  Despite all of its pain and imperfection, I think it is a wonderful Universe.  If the Universe is empty and meaningless, I see that as an opportunity for us to freely create our own meanings, individually and collectively. 

At some risk of misunderstanding, I will use the word “god” and “gods” freely to talk about certain wondrous aspects of the Universe and to talk about any being who attains a high enough level of intelligence, wisdom and goodness.  All of the “gods” I will talk about now are either part of the fabric of the Universe or are located squarely within the Universe.   

Traditional Christian theology attempts to unite in one God the Creator, God Who Speaks To Us, and the God of Perfection.  I believe these are separate aspects of the Universe.  I will call these aspects of the Universe the gods of the past, the gods of the present and the gods of the future. 

The gods of the past are the creative principles of the universe.  Science has come upon at least three incredibly powerful creative principles.  The best documented is evolution---the power of life itself to replicate itself, with inevitable variation and selection of those patterns that replicate best.  Carbon-based life on our planet is now in the process of begetting silicon-based life, with likely momentous consequences, for either good or ill.  But in the long-run of billions of years, I believe that evolution will inevitably create love, because I believe love is stronger than the absence of love and so will ultimately flourish once it gets a good start.  I believe that love of that which is different from oneself is higher than love of that which is identical to oneself.  Other-oriented love is hard to come by initially, but it is very strong once it arises. 

The second creative principle is the intricacy of quantum mechanics.  I believe in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, which says that each possible outcome of quantum branching exists.  Because of its quantum-mechanical aspect, the Universe has an extraordinary fecundity.   The multiplication of different possible worlds, side by side as coexistent, almost-entirely-non-interacting components of the wave function, means it was inevitable that life would arise somewhere in the universe on some branch of the quantum tree.  This indeed is the tree of life.

The third creative principle is eternal inflation.  In his book The Inflationary Universe, Alan Guth describes the principle of cosmic inflation that he co-discovered.  Cosmic inflation helps to explain why the galaxies we can see through our telescopes look so similar in all directions.  Inflation allows a patch of space smaller than a pinhead to expand to a sphere billions of light-years across in a fraction of a second.  False vacuum is the name of the magical substance that can create more and more of itself from nothing at the speed of dark, then decay into the cauldron of energy that we later see as the start of the Big Bang.  Something can come from nothing despite the law of conservation of energy because inside the false vacuum, the pressure of space itself has enough negative energy to balance out the positive energy that is the source of all of the matter and energy we see around us.  Eternal inflation is the idea that the false vacuum generates more of itself faster than it decays into ordinary vacuum plus ordinary energy.  As a result, the true Universe is an infinite sea of false vacuum with an infinite sprinkling of islands that look like the visible Universe we see in our telescopes, (plus, perhaps other, stranger types of islands).   Most of the Universe is invisible, simply because with the false vacuum expanding at the speed of dark, trillions of times faster than the speed of light, there has not been time for light to reach us from more than an infinitesimal fraction of the Universe.   Even were it not for the fecundity of quantum branching, the vastness of the Universe created by eternal inflation makes it inevitable that life would arise somewhere. 

The god of the present is the god within.  When we pray, or meditate, perform rituals, or do good deeds, every once in a while at least, we get in touch with an inner wisdom that is so much greater than our ordinary level of wisdom that many humans down through the millennia have exclaimed that this wisdom must come from a source beyond themselves.  For many years, I thought my own spiritual experiences of this type pointed to a God beyond myself who heard and answered prayers.  Now, based on my understanding of science, I find it hard to locate the source of my experienced inspiration outside of my own brain and emotional processing systems, but I remain awed by the contrast with my usual level of intellectual and emotional processing.  Sometimes I wonder if those experiences of inspiration looked so remarkable not because they were anything remarkable in the context of human experience in general, but only because my normal level of functioning is emotionally stunted in crucial ways.  Even if this is so, I feel a great deal of gratitude that I have been able to access that higher level of functioning through prayer, long before that future day when I may have a more straightforward access to that higher level.  Looking beyond my own experience, I believe that prayer, meditation, rituals and good deeds are important ways to access our higher selves—the god within.  I believe even more firmly that all people should respect the power of spiritual experience as a human fact, even if we cannot agree on where that power comes from.  This fact deserves more scientific study as well as respect. 

The god of the future is our hopes and dreams and intentions, and the possibilities to which those hopes and dreams and intentions point.   We collectively create the future. 

For myself, as my part in that collective creation of the future, I choose to be one of those who represent the possibility of all people being joined together in discover and wonder. 

Five elements of my picture of all people being joined together in discover and wonder are (1) fun, (2) adventure into the unknown, (3) all people being empowered by tools of understanding, (4) human connection and justice and welfare, and (5) profound relationship.  Also, I believe that groups of interacting full-scale human beings, each fulfilling human potential, can be as much more intelligent and greater than an individual human being as the whole brain is more intelligent and greater than an individual neuron.   Full freedom and deep community are both necessary for this great thing we cannot fully comprehend to come to pass.  Sometimes, when a conversation takes on a life of its own, I think I begin to glimpse what can be. 

I have tried to be relatively sober in what I have said so far.  Let me now be more speculative.  If there is anything that could conceivably be distinct from the Universe that deserves to be called God, it is Consciousness itself.  Scientists have no trouble imagining how people could appear to have consciousness when looked at from the outside—this is the “easy problem of consciousness.”   The hard problem of consciousness, discussed by Colin McGuinn in his book ``The Mysterious Flame,’’ is how I appear to myself to be conscious, seen from the inside.  I like the idea that there is a single Consciousness---one light of Brahman shining through the many windows of individual selves.  In his book, The End of Time, Julian Barbour conceives of a timeless Universe of all possible configurations of matter and energy with a mist of quantum probability hovering over it.  It is the mist of quantum probability that creates the perception of time.  Could this mist of quantum probability be Consciousness itself?  It would be consistent with the one light of Brahman shining through the many windows of individual selves.  Among other things, this is a story I tell myself to quiet my fears of death. 

Is there any room for a personal god outside myself in the Universe?  I believe there is such a possibility, though it is not something I have any way of knowing to be true.  Having grown up reading science fiction, I thrill to the recent discoveries of planets orbiting other stars. Our galaxy is large enough I think it likely intelligent life has arisen more than once in the Milky Way.  If so, we are probably not the first, since our own sun and solar system is only about 5 billion years old, compared with a galaxy that is more than 10 billion years old.  Our galaxy is small enough---about 100,000 light-years across, that even at a tenth the speed of light, intelligent aliens from anywhere in our galaxy could reach us in less than a million years.  There need be no particular problem of finding us, since the power of replication mentioned above in connection with Evolution makes it easy for aliens to spread throughout the galaxy until they meet some other intelligent race.  The fact that they have not destroyed us, and do not seem to have enslaved us, gives us some warrant to hope that they have good intentions toward us.  One reason for these good intentions may be the very scarcity of intelligent life.  If there are only a few intelligent species arising in each galaxy, each one would seem valuable to another that had been searching for thousands and thousands of years for other intelligent life. 

The greatest objection to the idea of intelligent aliens in our galaxy has always been Enrico Fermi’s question ``Where are they?’’---meaning ``If they are there, why don’t we already know about them?’’  To me, the easiest answer to this question is that they are already here but they value our free development so much that are keeping themselves hidden.  Traditional monotheistic religions all have reasons to tell why their version of God has not already appeared in the public square, obviating the need for faith.  To the extent these reasons make any sense, they work just as well for beneficent intelligent aliens as for the one true God. 

Going out on a limb with speculation, in a version of the theodicy, how could beneficent intelligent aliens ethically put up with all of horrors we visit upon each other on this planet and the horrors that come to us from disease and other disasters?  First, they may avert some disasters, especially those that would utterly destroy all higher life on our world.  They may even go so far as to act to foster freedom, by, say, helping the founders of our own nation in the series of unlikely events that allowed us to separate from England and form a new type of nation.  Second, they may compensate for their hands-off policy by using high technology to save our memories and all that makes us individual egos into a cybernetic after-life.  This is another story I tell myself sometimes to quiet my fear of death. 

I do not know that these beneficent aliens exist.  What I do know, is that if they don’t and if we do not destroy ourselves, human beings in some far future have the potential to become that kind of guardian angels toward other intelligent species that we find in this and other galaxies. The hardest part will be learning how to live in harmony with each other for the millions of years on end it will require to reach these others.  So at the same time we reach out to establish ourselves throughout the solar system as the first step toward the stars, we must find it in ourselves to be good and just and peaceful.  I believe that free religion that is consistent with reason and science, along with art, music, literature and the like, are necessary in the endeavor to raise humanity to the level that it will some day be appropriate in every sense---goodness and wisdom as well as knowledge and power---to call our descendants gods. 

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Don’t miss my 12 Unitarian-Universalist sermons:

1. Leaving Mormonism

2. UU Visions

3. Godless Religion

4. Teleotheism and the Purpose of Life (video here)

5. The Egocentric Illusion (video here)

6. Sharing Epiphanies (including the video)

7. A Spiritual Autobiography

8. The Message of Mormonism for Atheists Who Want to Stay Atheists (video here)

9. So You Want to Save the World (video here)

10. The Mystery of Consciousness

11. The Message of Jesus for Non-Supernaturalists (video here)

12. Us and Them

Posts on Jesus:

• How the Historical Jesus Set the Oppressed Free

• That Baby Born in Bethlehem Should Inspire Society to Keep Redeeming Itself

• The Message of Jesus for Non-Supernaturalists

• The Teleotheistic Achievement of the New Testament

• What If Jesus Was Really Resurrected?

• The Mormon View of Jesus

• Jesus’ Upside-Down Kingdom

Posts on Mormonism:

• The Message of Mormonism for Atheists Who Want to Stay Atheists

• How Conservative Mormon America Avoided the Fate of Conservative White America

• Inside Mormonism: The Home Teachers Come Over

• Will Women Ever Get the Mormon Priesthood?

• The Mormon Church Decides to Treat Gay Marriage as Rebellion on a Par with Polygamy

• Flexible Dogmatism: The Mormon Position on Infallibility

• David Holland on the Mormon Church During the February 3, 2008–January 2, 2018 Monson Administration

• New Mormon Prophet Russell Nelson Shakes Things Up

• Less is More in Mormon Church Meetings

• Hal Boyd: The Ignorance of Mocking Mormonism

• Mormonism Wanted to Show It Was American. Now What It Means to Be American Is Up for Grabs—McKay Coppins

Other Posts on Religion:

• Easter Skepticism

• Sam Brown and Miles Kimball on Teleotheism

• An Agnostic Grace

• An Agnostic Prayer for Strength

• An Agnostic Prayer for Awareness

• An Agnostic Invocation

Posts on Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral Compass:

• Co-Active Coaching as a Tool for Maximizing Utility—Getting Where You Want in Life

• On Human Potential

• How Economists Can Enhance Their Scientific Creativity, Engagement and Impact

• Virtues for Economists

• 'Everything Happens for a Reason' for Nonsupernaturalists

• My Life will be Good When ...

• On Perfectionism

• Open Skepticism and Closed Skepticism

• Forgive Yourself

• Fatal Flaws Don't Have To Be Fatal

• Only What is in Our Power is Our Duty

• The Devil of Getting Criticized

• Improving Your User Illusion

• Judson Brewer, Elizabeth Bernstein and Mitchell Kaplan on Finding Inner Calm

• Gratitude for Challenges

• The Four Horsemen of Relationship Destruction

• The Golden Mean as Concavity of Objective Functions

• Glennon Doyle on Wild Humanity

• 'The Four Agreements' by Don Miguel Ruiz (with Janet Mills) and `The Fifth Agreement' by Don Miguel Ruiz and Don Jose Ruiz (with Janet Mills)

• How I Became Optimistic

• Believe in Yourself

• Breaking the Chains

• Leaving a Legacy

• My Objective Function

• The Unmaking

• A Personal Mission Statement: Keep It Short

• John Locke on the Mandate of Heaven

• Tom Gauld's Sympathy Cards for Scientists

• The Expanding Shoreline of Ignorance

• Contrasted Faults Through All Their Manners Reign

• On Altruism, Externalities and Bossiness

• Bex's Rules for Life

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: How Crises Make Us Rethink Our Lives

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: The Lost Art of Curiosity

• Recognizing Opportunity: The Case of the Golden Raspberries—Taryn Laakso

• Taryn Laakso: Battery Charge Trending to 0% — Time to Recharge

• Taryn Laakso: Righting Your Ship Before You Capsize

• Kristeen Barth: We Don't Have to Be for Everyone

• Dave Baillie: Calibrate Your Compass

• Gerard Theoret: 3 Turns of the Screw

• Savannah Taylor: Lessons of the Labyrinth and Tapping Into Your Inner Wisdom
  

The Federalist Papers #45: James Madison Predicts a Small Federal Government

Lee’s letter to Winfield Scott, explaining his resignation from the US Army, saying he needed to defend his native state of Virginia

link to full text of The Federalist Papers #45

In the Federalist Papers #45, James Madison answers the charge that the proposed Constitution will reduce the power of the states by arguing:

1. That if reduced state power had to follow unavoidably from the necessary powers of the federal government laid out in the proposed constitution, then so be it—the welfare of the people mattered more than the status of the states.

2. That the federal government would, in fact, be relatively small.

3. That history showed that people tended to have more loyalty to governments nearer to them.

4. Because state legislatures choose the senators and the electors who choose the president, the states have a lot of influence over the federal government.

5. The Articles of Confederation gave the national government most of the powers that the proposed Constitution would—but for real, not just on paper. So if the states meant what they said when they adopted the Articles of Confederation, then that any reduction in state power is something the states already promised.

The fifth argument is an exhortation to people to tell the truth: anyone who admits that a power is necessary should be OK with what it takes to make that power operative for real, or they don’t mean what they say.

The fourth argument was true for quite a while, but there was a conscious change much later to reduce state power. The 17th amendment to the Constitution provided for the direct election of senators; but it was not adopted until 1913. The choice of electors by popular vote also reduced state power, but not by a constitutional change. This is a matter of state choice. A state, if it so chooses, can revert to choosing electors by vote of its legislature. The main limitation is that a state legislature has to decide how it will choose its electors before election day. There is currently a move to reassert more state power over the choice of electors. In any case, if a state legislature goes the other way, as almost all did in the past, and chooses to reduce its own power by providing that presidential electors be chosen by popular vote, one should not cry about that voluntary reduction in state power.

The force of the third argument was shown by the US Civil War. For example, Robert E. Lee famously felt a greater duty toward the state of Virginia than he did toward the United States.

On the second argument, the victory of the North in the Civil War under the slogan that the Union must be preserved, followed by the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution greatly strengthened federal power and correspondingly weakened state power. In the 20th century, the Great Depression, World War II and the Cold War greatly strengthened federal power. but for many decades after the US Constitution was ratified, James Madison’s prediction of a relatively small federal government held true.

The first argument, that the welfare of the people matters more than preserving state power continues just as valid today. Civil rights have been enforced by an exertion of federal power against certain states. So much the better for federal power. James Madison writes eloquently:

… the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object.

On the margin, whether we should cheer for greater federal power or greater state power depends on which level of government is most likely to advance the “real welfare of the great body of the people,” without inappropriately privileging some people above others.

Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #45.

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FEDERALIST NO. 45

The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered

For the Independent Journal.

Author: James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

HAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States. The adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of considering in the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the federal government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power to the governments of the particular States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be essential to the security of the people of America against foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against contentions and wars among the different States; if it be essential to guard them against those violent and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of liberty, and against those military establishments which must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of America, is it not preposterous, to urge as an objection to a government, without which the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a government may derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual States? Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the government of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were the plan of the convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, Reject the plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be,

Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is necessary, has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue will be endangered, is the question before us. Several important considerations have been touched in the course of these papers, which discountenance the supposition that the operation of the federal government will by degrees prove fatal to the State governments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale. We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies, the strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the members, to despoil the general government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroachments. Although, in most of these examples, the system has been so dissimilar from that under consideration as greatly to weaken any inference concerning the latter from the fate of the former, yet, as the States will retain, under the proposed Constitution, a very extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly disregarded. In the Achaean league it is probable that the federal head had a degree and species of power, which gave it a considerable likeness to the government framed by the convention. The Lycian Confederacy, as far as its principles and form are transmitted, must have borne a still greater analogy to it. Yet history does not inform us that either of them ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one consolidated government. On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the federal authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities. These cases are the more worthy of our attention, as the external causes by which the component parts were pressed together were much more numerous and powerful than in our case; and consequently less powerful ligaments within would be sufficient to bind the members to the head, and to each other. In the feudal system, we have seen a similar propensity exemplified. Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns and the people, and the sympathy in some instances between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that the local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments.

Had no external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination, and particularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the people, the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of as many independent princes as there were formerly feudatory barons. The State government will have the advantage of the Federal government, whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the one on the other; to the weight of personal influence which each side will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them; to the predilection and probable support of the people; to the disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other. The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures. Even the House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will be chosen very much under the influence of that class of men, whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them. On the other side, the component parts of the State governments will in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members. The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much smaller than the number employed under the particular States.

There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town officers, for three millions and more of people, intermixed, and having particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people, must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description who will be employed in the administration of the federal system. Compare the members of the three great departments of the thirteen States, excluding from the judiciary department the justices of peace, with the members of the corresponding departments of the single government of the Union; compare the militia officers of three millions of people with the military and marine officers of any establishment which is within the compass of probability, or, I may add, of possibility, and in this view alone, we may pronounce the advantage of the States to be decisive. If the federal government is to have collectors of revenue, the State governments will have theirs also. And as those of the former will be principally on the seacoast, and not very numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over the face of the country, and will be very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the same side.

It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue; that an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed it is extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union.

Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue should be appointed under the federal government, the influence of the whole number would not bear a comparison with that of the multitude of State officers in the opposite scale.

Within every district to which a federal collector would be allotted, there would not be less than thirty or forty, or even more, officers of different descriptions, and many of them persons of character and weight, whose influence would lie on the side of the State. The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State. The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments, in times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over the governments of the particular States. If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained. The powers relating to war and peace, armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other more considerable powers, are all vested in the existing Congress by the articles of Confederation. The proposed change does not enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them. The change relating to taxation may be regarded as the most important; and yet the present Congress have as complete authority to REQUIRE of the States indefinite supplies of money for the common defense and general welfare, as the future Congress will have to require them of individual citizens; and the latter will be no more bound than the States themselves have been, to pay the quotas respectively taxed on them. Had the States complied punctually with the articles of Confederation, or could their compliance have been enforced by as peaceable means as may be used with success towards single persons, our past experience is very far from countenancing an opinion, that the State governments would have lost their constitutional powers, and have gradually undergone an entire consolidation. To maintain that such an event would have ensued, would be to say at once, that the existence of the State governments is incompatible with any system whatever that accomplishes the essential purposes of the Union.

PUBLIUS.

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Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

• The Federalist Papers #1: Alexander Hamilton's Plea for Reasoned Debate

• The Federalist Papers #2 A: John Jay on the Idea of America

• The Federalist Papers #2 B: You Trusted the Continental Congress; Trust the Constitutional Convention

• The Federalist Papers #3: United, the 13 States are Less Likely to Stumble into War

• The Federalist Papers #4 A: The States Must Be Prepared to Defend against Aggression by Other Nations

• The Federalist Papers #4 B: National Defense Will Be Stronger if the States are United

• The Federalist Papers #5: Unless United, the States Will Be at Each Others' Throats

• The Federalist Papers #6 A: Alexander Hamilton on the Many Human Motives for War

• The Federalist Papers #6 B: Commercial Republics Also Start Wars with Their Neighbors—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 A: Divided, the States Would Fall into Territorial Disputes Likely to Lead to War Between the States—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 B: Without Union, Economic Disagreements Would Drive the States to Conflict with One Another—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #8: Without Union, the States Would Either Be Subject to Devastating Wars with Each Other or Would Have Liberty Endangered by their Own Standing Armies—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 A: There Has Been Technological Progress in Practical Principles of Republican Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 B: A Large Confederation May Be More Politically Stable Than a Small Nation—Alexander Hamilton Cites Montesquieu

• The Federalist Papers #10 A: Conflicts Arising from Differences of Opinion Are an Inevitable Accompaniment of Liberty—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #10 B: The Larger the Republic, the Easier It is to Find Thoughtful Legislators and the Harder It is to Put Together a Majority to do Unjust Things—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #11 A: United, the States Can Get a Better Trade Deal—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #11 B: Union Will Make Possible a Strong Navy, Allowing America to Chart Its Own Destiny—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #12: Union Makes it Much Easier to Get Tariff Revenue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #13: Alexander Hamilton on Increasing Returns to Scale in National Government

• The Federalist Papers #14: A Republic Can Be Geographically Large—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #15: A Government, to be Worthy of the Name, Must Govern Its Citizens, Not Just Its Subordinate Jurisdictions—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #16: Authority of the Federal Government Directly over Individuals Means States Can Only Thwart the Federal Government by Active and Obvious Resistance—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #17: Three Levels of Federal Power

• The Federalist Papers #18: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison Point to the Weakness of Confederations of Cities in Ancient Greece to Argue for a Strong Federal Government

• The Federalist Papers #19: The Weakness of the German Empire, Poland and Switzerland up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #20: The Weakness of the United Netherlands up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #21 A: Constitutions Need to be Enforced—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #21 B: Alexander Hamilton Complains of the Lack of a Measure Such as GDP Suitable for Apportioning Taxes to the States

• The Federalist Papers #22 A: The Articles of Confederation Lead to Uncoordinated Trade Policy and Military Free-Riding—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 B: Supermajority Rules Aren't an Adequate Fix for Departures from One-Person One-Vote—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 C: Pillars of Democracy—The Judicial System, Military Loyal to the Constitution, and Police Loyal to the Constitution

• The Federalist Papers #23: The Federal Government Must Be Given Sufficient Power to Accomplish Whatever We Expect the Federal Government to Do—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #24: The United States Need a Standing Army—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #25: Prohibiting a Standing Army in Time of Peace Would Be a Mistake—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #26: Some Part of the Government Must Be Able to Authorize an Army Whenever Necessary, after Being Forced to Fully Debate the Issue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #27: People Will Get Used to the Federal Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #28: The Federal Government and States Can Check One Another’s Power, Reducing the Chance of Abuses—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #29: State Militias such as the National Guard are Not Attractive Tools for Tyrants—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #30: A Robust Power of Taxation is Needed to Make a Nation Powerful

• The Federalist Papers #31: Alexander Hamilton's Attempt at a Formal Argument for a Robust Federal Power of Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #32: The States Retain All Powers Not Explicitly Taken Away by the Constitution—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #33: The 'Necessary and Proper' and Supremacy Clauses Only Make Explicit What the Specified Powers Imply—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #34: War is Expensive. To Defend the Union, the Federal Government Needs an Ample Power of Taxation—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #35 A: Alexander Hamilton as an Economist

• The Federalist Papers #35 B: Alexander Hamilton on Who Can Represent Whom

• The Federalist Papers #36: Alexander Hamilton on Regressive Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #37: Why the Constitution Isn't Perfect—And Why No Constitution Could Be. James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #38—James Madison Analyzes the Proposed Constitution Using the Principle of Opportunity Cost: What is the Alternative to the Consensus of the Constitutional Convention?

• The Federalist Papers #39: James Madison Downplays How Radical the Proposed Constitution Is

• The Federalist Papers #40: James Madison Argues the Constitutional Convention Had the Warrant to Make Its Proposal—and Its Advice Should Be Taken Even If Not

• The Federalist Papers #41: James Madison on Tradeoffs—You Can't Have Everything You Want

• The Federalist Papers #42: Every Power of the Federal Government Must Be Justified—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #43: The United States Constitution as a Commitment to Democracy at the State Level—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #44: Constitutional Limitations on the Powers of the States—James Madison

Miles Kimball: Leaving Mormonism

First Unitarian Universalist Congregation of Ann Arbor

I am a Unitarian-Universalist lay preacher. I gave 12 sermons—annually from 2005 to 2016—to the Community Unitarian Universalists in Brighton. (In 2016 I moved to Colorado.) This post was the first of those, which in turn reprised the same account of what I believed at that point that I spoke in Fall 2000 to the First Unitarian Universalist Congregation of Ann Arbor. (Actually, it was “Church” rather than “Congregation” back then.) That talk in Fall 2000 came after I had taken Ken Phifer’s course “Building Your Own Theology” and three weeks after I officially joined the First Unitarian Universality Congregation of Ann Arbor by “signing the book.” I date my change in self-identification as a Mormon to self-identification as a Unitarian-Universalist to that moment. What you see below is very lightly edited from what I said in Fall 2000.

This now completes on my blog the full set of 12 Unitarian Universalist sermons that I have given. Here are the links in chronological order of when I gave each sermon:

• Leaving Mormonism

• UU Visions

• Godless Religion

• Teleotheism and the Purpose of Life (video here)

• The Egocentric Illusion (video here)

• Sharing Epiphanies (including the video)

• A Spiritual Autobiography

• The Message of Mormonism for Atheists Who Want to Stay Atheists (video here)

• So You Want to Save the World (video here)

• The Mystery of Consciousness

• The Message of Jesus for Non-Supernaturalists (video here)

• Us and Them

I also have three of Ken Phifer’s sermons on my blog:

• Kenneth W. Phifer: My Sermon

• Kenneth W. Phifer: The Faith of a Humanist

• Kenneth W. Phifer: Is Death Meaningful?

At the bottom of this post are links to some of my other posts on religion.

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Hi, my name is Miles Kimball. I wish you could have heard all of the credos that I heard in the latest Building Your Own Theology course, but I may be the only one foolhardy enough to get up here at the pulpit to give mine. In any case, my credo is not in any way representative of the wonderful variety of different things people had to say. But here it is. 

I grew up in the Mormon Church. All of my ancestors for many generations have belonged to the Mormon Church and my grandfather was the President of the entire Mormon Church until he died in 1985. So why am I a Unitarian-Universalist now?

When I was young, Mormonism seemed true to me just like science is true and I reveled in the intellectual playground of Mormon doctrine. In addition to some standard Christian doctrines about Jesus, Mormonism has a set of doctrines that sound a lot like modern science fiction, despite being developed in the first half of the 19th century. It is no accident that Utah is now a kind of Mecca for science fiction writers. It is a common speculation among Mormons that God the Father is only one of a long line of gods, each of whom went off to create a new planet, had billions of literal spirit children and sent those spirit children down into physical bodies to gain experience and prove their worthiness to themselves become gods. What is official doctrine is that we can go on to become gods who create new worlds if we are totally faithful and valiant in adhering to the tenets of Mormonism.   

When I went off to college at Harvard, I vigorously defended Mormonism to my curious classmates. I soon realized that in the East, Mormonism to my classmates was whatever I told them it was. So in defending my religion, I started bit by bit to smooth off the sharp edges and modifying things to make Mormonism more consistent with what I knew of science and social justice. One of the most embarrassing things about Mormonism was its refusal to let African Americans be priests, when it made all faithful men of other races priests (including me). Even though my grandfather changed that racist policy in 1978, it still took a lot of explaining to rationalize why it had been there in the first place. 

On the side of science, the biggest issue was evolution, but without ever having studied evolution I was able to convince myself that the sequence of fossils in the fossil record would make plenty of sense as the way God would have done things. 

When I was 19, I took time off from college and spent two years as a Mormon missionary in Japan and had a positive experience with that, except for the constant pressure to work harder. I saw that Mormonism had a positive effect on the lives of those who chose to join it because they saw something valuable in it for them. 

I got married a year after I had started a Ph.D. program in Economics. Encouraged by the Mormon teachings about the importance of children, we immediately dived into childbearing. Of our five children, two died in infancy. The priesthood powers I held that were supposed to allow me, I thought, to heal by the power of God did not work in my case. Those losses drove me to a deeper searching for spiritual truth---or maybe it was psychological truth. I had four arenas to explore my religion in depth. I had many talks with my wife who was on her own religious journey; I talked on a regular basis to a group of Mormon men who had an uncompromising commitment to the truth; I led an adult Sunday School class that become more and more emotionally honest as time went on; and I taught a course on evolution at the University of Michigan, using Daniel Dennett’s hard-hitting book Darwin’s Dangerous Idea as the main text. I worked hard to spell out each new emotional and intellectual insight as a part of Mormonism. At first I felt I could successfully encompass my new insights within Mormonism, using texts from the large array of Mormon scriptures and quasi-scriptures. But I began to get an inkling that the leaders of the Mormon Church did not share my view of the doctrine when they began to excommunicate leading historians, intellectuals and feminists in the Mormon Church and fire others from their jobs at Brigham Young University (BYU).  Amazingly, I did not fully believe my ears and eyes about the thinking of the Church leaders until I had occasion to interview for a job at BYU and had a long talk with one of the Church’s apostles, my father’s cousin, who was himself the son of an eminent chemist. One of the main threads I heard in that conversation was the thought-control the apostle used on himself in order to not think too deeply about his own disagreements with his more senior colleagues. Along the way, they effectively made a decision that I was not orthodox enough for a job at BYU, though there was still some hope for my reformation. My growing knowledge of evolution and a greater awareness of the limitations of physics combined with this final loss of faith in the institution of the Mormon Church to erode my belief in miracles and in the afterlife. A year and a half ago, I was disturbed to realize I was no longer a Christian when I started to wonder at what terrible force could have created the necessity for him to suffer and die for our sins.

I wanted to have someplace where I could wrestle with thorny questions about God, Christ, the afterlife etc., without being scolded for raising such issues. I started attending the First Unitarian Universality Church of Ann Arbor at the beginning of 2000.  Not long after, my local bishop officially decided that I was unfit to teach or speak in the Mormon Church any more.  That made the transition much easier.  I feel very lucky to have had my whole family make the same transition, though as part of their own, very different, individual religious journeys.  For me, signing the book three weeks ago represented the start of a new life. 

I still can’t help the Mormon influences on my thinking about the Universe. I find myself trying to give a theological meaning to the science I read. For example, I wonder if the creative powers of evolution, cosmic inflation and quantum mechanics in its many worlds interpretation can be considered Creator Gods. I ponder the subjective spiritual experiences I read and hear about and that I have had myself and ask myself whether they point to a God within us, even if it that God within can ultimately be explained as the result of the laws of physics. I marvel at the emotional and intellectual depth of groups of human beings sharing the thoughts and feelings of their hearts and think I see the shape of a God arising from free human beings interacting that is as much greater than those individual free human beings as our brains are more intelligent than an individual neuron. 

These are now my Gods of the past, present and future. 

No one knows the future, but I know the kind of future that I would like to take part in building. I want to stand for all people being joined together in discovery and wonder. 

I want to stand for humanity going beyond just solving its problems. I hope to see humanity reach for the stars, not only in the science fiction sense that I have loved so well but in every dimension of the human heart and soul. 

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Don't miss these posts on Mormonism:

• The Message of Mormonism for Atheists Who Want to Stay Atheists

• How Conservative Mormon America Avoided the Fate of Conservative White America

• Inside Mormonism: The Home Teachers Come Over

• Will Women Ever Get the Mormon Priesthood?

• The Mormon Church Decides to Treat Gay Marriage as Rebellion on a Par with Polygamy

• Flexible Dogmatism: The Mormon Position on Infallibility

• The Mormon View of Jesus

• David Holland on the Mormon Church During the February 3, 2008–January 2, 2018 Monson Administration

• New Mormon Prophet Russell Nelson Shakes Things Up

• Less is More in Mormon Church Meetings

• Hal Boyd: The Ignorance of Mocking Mormonism

• Mormonism Wanted to Show It Was American. Now What It Means to Be American Is Up for Grabs—McKay Coppins

Other Posts on Religion:

• What If Jesus Was Really Resurrected?

• Easter Skepticism

• Sam Brown and Miles Kimball on Teleotheism

• The Teleotheistic Achievement of the New Testament

• An Agnostic Grace

• An Agnostic Prayer for Strength

• An Agnostic Prayer for Awareness

• An Agnostic Invocation

Posts on Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral Compass:

• Co-Active Coaching as a Tool for Maximizing Utility—Getting Where You Want in Life

• On Human Potential

• How Economists Can Enhance Their Scientific Creativity, Engagement and Impact

• Virtues for Economists

• 'Everything Happens for a Reason' for Nonsupernaturalists

• My Life will be Good When ...

• On Perfectionism

• Open Skepticism and Closed Skepticism

• Forgive Yourself

• Fatal Flaws Don't Have To Be Fatal

• Only What is in Our Power is Our Duty

• The Devil of Getting Criticized

• Improving Your User Illusion

• Judson Brewer, Elizabeth Bernstein and Mitchell Kaplan on Finding Inner Calm

• Gratitude for Challenges

• The Four Horsemen of Relationship Destruction

• The Golden Mean as Concavity of Objective Functions

• Glennon Doyle on Wild Humanity

• 'The Four Agreements' by Don Miguel Ruiz (with Janet Mills) and `The Fifth Agreement' by Don Miguel Ruiz and Don Jose Ruiz (with Janet Mills)

• How I Became Optimistic

• Believe in Yourself

• Breaking the Chains

• Leaving a Legacy

• My Objective Function

• The Unmaking

• A Personal Mission Statement: Keep It Short

• John Locke on the Mandate of Heaven

• Tom Gauld's Sympathy Cards for Scientists

• The Expanding Shoreline of Ignorance

• Contrasted Faults Through All Their Manners Reign

• On Altruism, Externalities and Bossiness

• Bex's Rules for Life

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: How Crises Make Us Rethink Our Lives

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: The Lost Art of Curiosity

• Recognizing Opportunity: The Case of the Golden Raspberries—Taryn Laakso

• Taryn Laakso: Battery Charge Trending to 0% — Time to Recharge

• Taryn Laakso: Righting Your Ship Before You Capsize

• Kristeen Barth: We Don't Have to Be for Everyone

• Dave Baillie: Calibrate Your Compass

• Gerard Theoret: 3 Turns of the Screw

• Savannah Taylor: Lessons of the Labyrinth and Tapping Into Your Inner Wisdom

The Federalist Papers #44: Constitutional Limitations on the Powers of the States—James Madison

image source

link to full text of The Federalist Papers #44

The 13th, 14th and 15th amendments to the US Constitution transformed the Constitution by (ultimately) coming close to making the states subject to the Bill of Rights, as well as specifically declaring that states could not treat certain races as second-class citizens (a prohibition on the states that was not enforced for a long time). But there were some key limitations on state power in the original text of the US Constitution even before any amendments. Most obviously, the supremacy clause made null and void in court any state attempt to contravene a legitimate federal exercise of power:

This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

As a key support structure for the supremacy of the Constitution, state officials are required to swear allegiance and obedience to it:

The Senators and Representatives, and the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution.

And there is a reminder that the enumerated powers in the Constitution are for real by the declaration that they are accompanied by everything logically necessary to their performance:

… power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

States were also required to adhere to some basic republican principles—the rule of law, the sanctity of contract and social equality:

No State shall … pass any bill of attainder, ex-post-facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility

The Constitution gave the federal government a monopoly over foreign policy, over conduct of war (except in exigent situations) and over monetary policy:

No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts …

And the Constitution gave the federal government a monopoly over trade policy:

No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws, and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.

The requirement that the states adhere to basic republican principles and give the federal government a monopoly over foreign policy, conduct of war, monetary policy and trade policy were not controversial. What was controversial was a transition from what was in many cases only a theoretical power of the national government to a genuine power of the national government under the Constitutions supremacy and “necessary and proper” clauses and the required oaths by state officials to uphold the Constitution.

In the Federalist Papers #44, James Madison argues that these controversial clauses giving genuine as opposed to fictive power to the national government was absolutely necessary. He writes in the Federalist Papers #44:

The question, therefore, whether this amount of power shall be granted or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or not a government commensurate to the exigencies of the Union shall be established; or, in other words, whether the Union itself shall be preserved.

James Madison also references several previous numbers in saying:

We have now reviewed, in detail, all the articles composing the sum or quantity of power delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no part of the power is unnecessary or improper for accomplishing the necessary objects of the Union.

The full text of the Federalist Papers #44 is immediately below. And below that is a set of links to posts on all the earlier Federalist Papers, including those of his own that James Madison was referring to.

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FEDERALIST NO. 44

Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States

From the New York Packet
Friday, January 25, 1788.

Author: James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

A FIFTH class of provisions in favor of the federal authority consists of the following restrictions on the authority of the several States:1. "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex-post-facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility. "The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations makes a part of the existing articles of Union; and for reasons which need no explanation, is copied into the new Constitution. The prohibition of letters of marque is another part of the old system, but is somewhat extended in the new. According to the former, letters of marque could be granted by the States after a declaration of war; according to the latter, these licenses must be obtained, as well during war as previous to its declaration, from the government of the United States. This alteration is fully justified by the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers; and of immediate responsibility to the nation in all those for whose conduct the nation itself is to be responsible.

The right of coining money, which is here taken from the States, was left in their hands by the Confederation, as a concurrent right with that of Congress, under an exception in favor of the exclusive right of Congress to regulate the alloy and value. In this instance, also, the new provision is an improvement on the old. Whilst the alloy and value depended on the general authority, a right of coinage in the particular States could have no other effect than to multiply expensive mints and diversify the forms and weights of the circulating pieces. The latter inconveniency defeats one purpose for which the power was originally submitted to the federal head; and as far as the former might prevent an inconvenient remittance of gold and silver to the central mint for recoinage, the end can be as well attained by local mints established under the general authority.

The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit must give pleasure to every citizen, in proportion to his love of justice and his knowledge of the true springs of public prosperity. The loss which America has sustained since the peace, from the pestilent effects of paper money on the necessary confidence between man and man, on the necessary confidence in the public councils, on the industry and morals of the people, and on the character of republican government, constitutes an enormous debt against the States chargeable with this unadvised measure, which must long remain unsatisfied; or rather an accumulation of guilt, which can be expiated no otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice, of the power which has been the instrument of it. In addition to these persuasive considerations, it may be observed, that the same reasons which show the necessity of denying to the States the power of regulating coin, prove with equal force that they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper medium in the place of coin. Had every State a right to regulate the value of its coin, there might be as many different currencies as States, and thus the intercourse among them would be impeded; retrospective alterations in its value might be made, and thus the citizens of other States be injured, and animosities be kindled among the States themselves. The subjects of foreign powers might suffer from the same cause, and hence the Union be discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member. No one of these mischiefs is less incident to a power in the States to emit paper money, than to coin gold or silver. The power to make any thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, is withdrawn from the States, on the same principle with that of issuing a paper currency. Bills of attainder, ex-post-facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the State constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the convention added this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights; and I am much deceived if they have not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the undoubted interests of their constituents. The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more-industrious and lessinformed part of the community. They have seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the business of society. The prohibition with respect to titles of nobility is copied from the articles of Confederation and needs no comment. 2. "No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws, and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. "The restraint on the power of the States over imports and exports is enforced by all the arguments which prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of trade to the federal councils. It is needless, therefore, to remark further on this head, than that the manner in which the restraint is qualified seems well calculated at once to secure to the States a reasonable discretion in providing for the conveniency of their imports and exports, and to the United States a reasonable check against the abuse of this discretion.

The remaining particulars of this clause fall within reasonings which are either so obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may be passed over without remark. The SIXTH and last class consists of the several powers and provisions by which efficacy is given to all the rest. 1. Of these the first is, the "power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. "Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more intemperance than this; yet on a fair investigation of it, no part can appear more completely invulnerable. Without the SUBSTANCE of this power, the whole Constitution would be a dead letter. Those who object to the article, therefore, as a part of the Constitution, can only mean that the FORM of the provision is improper. But have they considered whether a better form could have been substituted? There are four other possible methods which the Constitution might have taken on this subject. They might have copied the second article of the existing Confederation, which would have prohibited the exercise of any power not EXPRESSLY delegated; they might have attempted a positive enumeration of the powers comprehended under the general terms "necessary and proper"; they might have attempted a negative enumeration of them, by specifying the powers excepted from the general definition; they might have been altogether silent on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper powers to construction and inference. Had the convention taken the first method of adopting the second article of Confederation, it is evident that the new Congress would be continually exposed, as their predecessors have been, to the alternative of construing the term "EXPRESSLY" with so much rigor, as to disarm the government of all real authority whatever, or with so much latitude as to destroy altogether the force of the restriction.

It would be easy to show, if it were necessary, that no important power, delegated by the articles of Confederation, has been or can be executed by Congress, without recurring more or less to the doctrine of CONSTRUCTION or IMPLICATION. As the powers delegated under the new system are more extensive, the government which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of betraying the public interests by doing nothing, or of violating the Constitution by exercising powers indispensably necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not EXPRESSLY granted. Had the convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which the Constitution relates; accommodated too, not only to the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce; for in every new application of a general power, the PARTICULAR POWERS, which are the means of attaining the OBJECT of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that object, and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same.

Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not necessary or proper for carrying the general powers into execution, the task would have been no less chimerical; and would have been liable to this further objection, that every defect in the enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of authority. If, to avoid this consequence, they had attempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions, and described the residue by the general terms, NOT NECESSARY OR PROPER, it must have happened that the enumeration would comprehend a few of the excepted powers only; that these would be such as would be least likely to be assumed or tolerated, because the enumeration would of course select such as would be least necessary or proper; and that the unnecessary and improper powers included in the residuum, would be less forcibly excepted, than if no partial enumeration had been made. Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the general powers would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included. Had this last method, therefore, been pursued by the convention, every objection now urged against their plan would remain in all its plausibility; and the real inconveniency would be incurred of not removing a pretext which may be seized on critical occasions for drawing into question the essential powers of the Union. If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall misconstrue this part of the Constitution, and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning, I answer, the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as if the general power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to be violated; the same, in short, as if the State legislatures should violate the irrespective constitutional authorities. In the first instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last resort a remedy must be obtained from the people who can, by the election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimate redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the federal than of the State legislatures, for this plain reason, that as every such act of the former will be an invasion of the rights of the latter, these will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to sound the alarm to the people, and to exert their local influence in effecting a change of federal representatives. There being no such intermediate body between the State legislatures and the people interested in watching the conduct of the former, violations of the State constitutions are more likely to remain unnoticed and unredressed. 2. "This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. "The indiscreet zeal of the adversaries to the Constitution has betrayed them into an attack on this part of it also, without which it would have been evidently and radically defective. To be fully sensible of this, we need only suppose for a moment that the supremacy of the State constitutions had been left complete by a saving clause in their favor. In the first place, as these constitutions invest the State legislatures with absolute sovereignty, in all cases not excepted by the existing articles of Confederation, all the authorities contained in the proposed Constitution, so far as they exceed those enumerated in the Confederation, would have been annulled, and the new Congress would have been reduced to the same impotent condition with their predecessors. In the next place, as the constitutions of some of the States do not even expressly and fully recognize the existing powers of the Confederacy, an express saving of the supremacy of the former would, in such States, have brought into question every power contained in the proposed Constitution. In the third place, as the constitutions of the States differ much from each other, it might happen that a treaty or national law, of great and equal importance to the States, would interfere with some and not with other constitutions, and would consequently be valid in some of the States, at the same time that it would have no effect in others. In fine, the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government; it would have seen the authority of the whole society every where subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members. 3. "The Senators and Representatives, and the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution. "It has been asked why it was thought necessary, that the State magistracy should be bound to support the federal Constitution, and unnecessary that a like oath should be imposed on the officers of the United States, in favor of the State constitutions. Several reasons might be assigned for the distinction. I content myself with one, which is obvious and conclusive. The members of the federal government will have no agency in carrying the State constitutions into effect. The members and officers of the State governments, on the contrary, will have an essential agency in giving effect to the federal Constitution. The election of the President and Senate will depend, in all cases, on the legislatures of the several States. And the election of the House of Representatives will equally depend on the same authority in the first instance; and will, probably, forever be conducted by the officers, and according to the laws, of the States. 4. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the federal powers might be added those which belong to the executive and judiciary departments: but as these are reserved for particular examination in another place, I pass them over in this. We have now reviewed, in detail, all the articles composing the sum or quantity of power delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no part of the power is unnecessary or improper for accomplishing the necessary objects of the Union. The question, therefore, whether this amount of power shall be granted or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or not a government commensurate to the exigencies of the Union shall be established; or, in other words, whether the Union itself shall be preserved.

PUBLIUS.

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Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

• The Federalist Papers #1: Alexander Hamilton's Plea for Reasoned Debate

• The Federalist Papers #2 A: John Jay on the Idea of America

• The Federalist Papers #2 B: You Trusted the Continental Congress; Trust the Constitutional Convention

• The Federalist Papers #3: United, the 13 States are Less Likely to Stumble into War

• The Federalist Papers #4 A: The States Must Be Prepared to Defend against Aggression by Other Nations

• The Federalist Papers #4 B: National Defense Will Be Stronger if the States are United

• The Federalist Papers #5: Unless United, the States Will Be at Each Others' Throats

• The Federalist Papers #6 A: Alexander Hamilton on the Many Human Motives for War

• The Federalist Papers #6 B: Commercial Republics Also Start Wars with Their Neighbors—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 A: Divided, the States Would Fall into Territorial Disputes Likely to Lead to War Between the States—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 B: Without Union, Economic Disagreements Would Drive the States to Conflict with One Another—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #8: Without Union, the States Would Either Be Subject to Devastating Wars with Each Other or Would Have Liberty Endangered by their Own Standing Armies—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 A: There Has Been Technological Progress in Practical Principles of Republican Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 B: A Large Confederation May Be More Politically Stable Than a Small Nation—Alexander Hamilton Cites Montesquieu

• The Federalist Papers #10 A: Conflicts Arising from Differences of Opinion Are an Inevitable Accompaniment of Liberty—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #10 B: The Larger the Republic, the Easier It is to Find Thoughtful Legislators and the Harder It is to Put Together a Majority to do Unjust Things—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #11 A: United, the States Can Get a Better Trade Deal—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #11 B: Union Will Make Possible a Strong Navy, Allowing America to Chart Its Own Destiny—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #12: Union Makes it Much Easier to Get Tariff Revenue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #13: Alexander Hamilton on Increasing Returns to Scale in National Government

• The Federalist Papers #14: A Republic Can Be Geographically Large—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #15: A Government, to be Worthy of the Name, Must Govern Its Citizens, Not Just Its Subordinate Jurisdictions—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #16: Authority of the Federal Government Directly over Individuals Means States Can Only Thwart the Federal Government by Active and Obvious Resistance—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #17: Three Levels of Federal Power

• The Federalist Papers #18: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison Point to the Weakness of Confederations of Cities in Ancient Greece to Argue for a Strong Federal Government

• The Federalist Papers #19: The Weakness of the German Empire, Poland and Switzerland up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #20: The Weakness of the United Netherlands up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #21 A: Constitutions Need to be Enforced—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #21 B: Alexander Hamilton Complains of the Lack of a Measure Such as GDP Suitable for Apportioning Taxes to the States

• The Federalist Papers #22 A: The Articles of Confederation Lead to Uncoordinated Trade Policy and Military Free-Riding—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 B: Supermajority Rules Aren't an Adequate Fix for Departures from One-Person One-Vote—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 C: Pillars of Democracy—The Judicial System, Military Loyal to the Constitution, and Police Loyal to the Constitution

• The Federalist Papers #23: The Federal Government Must Be Given Sufficient Power to Accomplish Whatever We Expect the Federal Government to Do—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #24: The United States Need a Standing Army—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #25: Prohibiting a Standing Army in Time of Peace Would Be a Mistake—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #26: Some Part of the Government Must Be Able to Authorize an Army Whenever Necessary, after Being Forced to Fully Debate the Issue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #27: People Will Get Used to the Federal Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #28: The Federal Government and States Can Check One Another’s Power, Reducing the Chance of Abuses—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #29: State Militias such as the National Guard are Not Attractive Tools for Tyrants—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #30: A Robust Power of Taxation is Needed to Make a Nation Powerful

• The Federalist Papers #31: Alexander Hamilton's Attempt at a Formal Argument for a Robust Federal Power of Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #32: The States Retain All Powers Not Explicitly Taken Away by the Constitution—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #33: The 'Necessary and Proper' and Supremacy Clauses Only Make Explicit What the Specified Powers Imply—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #34: War is Expensive. To Defend the Union, the Federal Government Needs an Ample Power of Taxation—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #35 A: Alexander Hamilton as an Economist

• The Federalist Papers #35 B: Alexander Hamilton on Who Can Represent Whom

• The Federalist Papers #36: Alexander Hamilton on Regressive Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #37: Why the Constitution Isn't Perfect—And Why No Constitution Could Be. James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #38—James Madison Analyzes the Proposed Constitution Using the Principle of Opportunity Cost: What is the Alternative to the Consensus of the Constitutional Convention?

• The Federalist Papers #39: James Madison Downplays How Radical the Proposed Constitution Is

• The Federalist Papers #40: James Madison Argues the Constitutional Convention Had the Warrant to Make Its Proposal—and Its Advice Should Be Taken Even If Not

• The Federalist Papers #41: James Madison on Tradeoffs—You Can't Have Everything You Want

• The Federalist Papers #42: Every Power of the Federal Government Must Be Justified—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #43: The United States Constitution as a Commitment to Democracy at the State Level—James Madison

Pro Lowell Bennion

Link to the Amazon page for The Best of Lowell Bennion edited by Eugene England

Link to the Amazon page for Lowell Bennion: Teacher, Counselor, Humanitarian

Link to a podcast with the Mary Lythgoe Bradley about the book shown just above

It is good to praise and give thanks for those we have looked up to and admired. Lowell Bennion was one of those for me. I spent 8 weeks in each of the summers of 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1978 at the Teton Valley Boys’ Ranch that Lowell Bennion established, first as one of the boys and in 1978 as a counselor. The Teton Valley Boys’ Ranch did a lot to help me grow up. Though Dr. Bennion, we called him, was quite cerebral and led thoughtful discussions in the evenings, the ranch helped me balance out bookishness with a wide variety of manual labor in the weekday mornings (for which the boys were paid $2.50 for 4 hours out of the camp fees their parents had paid in the first place) with physical activities such as hiking, horseback riding, trampoline and competitive sports, and time with many new friends in the afternoons and on the weekends. (The Teton Valley Boys’ Ranch had a big enough impact on those who attended that alumni of the ranch have made sure that even a quarter century after Lowell Bennion’s death in 1996, a successor to the Teton Valley Boys’ Ranch exists.)

During the first few weeks I was at the ranch in 1972, I got sick and missed some workdays and asked Dr. Bennion what I should do. He suggested I work with him in the garden on some of the afternoons. So I got to know him well early on. He told me about his dissertation on Max Weber (the first book on Max Weber in English) and communicated wordlessly his love of gardening. He taught the principle of continuing to try to improve throughout life by apologizing for very mild profanity (“golly,” “by Jove”) and saying he was trying stop.

To the boys more generally, he said other memorable things. When we were building a barn, he talked about his hope that it would be beautiful. Combining a humanitarian lesson with an invocation of God, he said that painting widows’ fences as a way to get the favor of God was a substitute for the fire insurance he couldn’t buy for the ranch. With a largely Mormon context of trying to steer us toward avoiding premarital sex, he recommended not “going steady” with one woman until one was ready to marry.

Dr. Bennion communicated one key value by having the ranch quite literally take on at least one juvenile delinquent each summer to try to help them reform. This was costly in many ways, but he didn’t want to give up on people.

But beyond any of these specifics, it was Dr. Bennion’s presence that was most impressive. His soft-spoken, articulate wisdom was backed up by a calm centeredness. That example has provided me with a clear picture of what it looks like to be a good man. My Dad has some of that, but it was even more striking in Lowell Bennion.

I wish everyone were as lucky as I have been to have clear examples of deeply good men and deeply good women in their lives. Those of us who have been that lucky should tell stories about our heroes to bolster everyone’s faith in human potential.

Postscript: I’d love to connect with old friends from the Teton Valley Boys’ Ranch I have lost track of. Contact me on Facebook! I wish it had existed back then so we wouldn’t have fallen out of touch.

The Federalist Papers #43: The United States Constitution as a Commitment to Democracy at the State Level—James Madison

image source

source for the full text of The Federalist Papers #43

In the The Federalist Papers #43, James Madison defends a continuity-of-debt-obligations principle and gives a justification for miscellaneous powers of the federal government in the proposed constitution, such as establishing a federal district (which became Washington D.C.), owning property within states, patent law, establishing new states (but only with the permission of states whose territory is involved, if any) and establishing treason law within limits. And he addresses four very interesting provisions of the proposed constitution:

1. It is ratified by the people, not by state legislatures. James Madison writes that that is important because otherwise:

   • It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the Confederation, that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification.

   • A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties.

   • … a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty ..

2. The constitution can be amended. Here James Madison may underestimate how difficult it will be to amend the constitution:

   • It guards equally against that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the other.

3. The amendment process cannot touch the non-population-based, two senators per state rule. This untouchable rule has been criticized lately as counter to democracy.

4. States would be committing through the proposed constitution to democratic government at the state level, with the federal government empowered to intervene if democratic state government should ever be in peril in a state. James Madison argues:

   • In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be SUBSTANTIALLY maintained.

   • In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States, not heated by the local flame?

   • Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that should a popular insurrection happen in one of the States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound."

   • Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it.

   • Is it true that force and right are necessarily on the same side in republican governments? May not the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword?

Awkwardly or worse from a modern point of view, James Madison also argues that the federal government might need to defend a minority with voting rights against a disenfranchised majority:

• May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of regular government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves.

Thus, in James Madison’s interpretation, the preservation of a “republican form of government” can include the preservation of an aristocracy of a minority who have voting rights.

James Madison underestimated the likelihood of a civil war pervading a large chunk of the United States:

• … it is fortunately not within the compass of human probability …

But he had it right that, as John Locke would say, such things must be given over to the determination of military arms and to heaven:

• Should it be asked, what is to be the redress for an insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a superiority of the entire force, though not a constitutional right? the answer must be, that such a case, as it would be without the compass of human remedies … it is a sufficient recommendation of the federal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity for which no possible constitution can provide a cure.

In some sense, the US Civil War—and more fundamentally its internal contradiction of slavery—broke the Constitution; then it was put back together in a new form. The key 13th, 14th and 15th amendments would never have been ratified without the formerly Confederate states being conquered and required to ratify as a condition of coming back into good standing. Even then, the internal contradiction between a belief in equality and racism continued to infect the body politic—for a long time in the very obvious blot of Jim Crow.

Nevertheless, it was quite an accomplishment to get the original, quite flawed, Constitution adopted at all. It isn’t good to let the perfect be the enemy of the better. The Constitution was better than the Articles of Confederation. And it set the stage for the yet better Constitution we have today. The Constitution only became minimally consistent with justice after the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments. Even then, that basic level of justice was only on paper; it required most of a century for those amendments to take on anything approaching the full force they should have.

Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #43.

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FEDERALIST NO. 43

The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered

For the Independent Journal.

Author: James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

THE FOURTH class comprises the following miscellaneous powers:1. A power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. "The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.

The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provisions for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress. 2. "To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States; and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislatures of the States in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings. "The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of government, carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity; but a dependence of the members of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of the government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the Confederacy. This consideration has the more weight, as the gradual accumulation of public improvements at the stationary residence of the government would be both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and would create so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as still further to abridge its necessary independence. The extent of this federal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it; as the State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it; as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to become willing parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in the election of the government which is to exercise authority over them; as a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as the authority of the legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it, to concur in the cession, will be derived from the whole people of the State in their adoption of the Constitution, every imaginable objection seems to be obviated. The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines, etc. , established by the general government, is not less evident. The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, requires that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend, to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples are here also obviated, by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned, in every such establishment. 3. "To declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attained. "As treason may be committed against the United States, the authority of the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free government, have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with great judgment, opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for conviction of it, and restraining the Congress, even in punishing it, from extending the consequences of guilt beyond the person of its author. 4. "To admit new States into the Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress. "In the articles of Confederation, no provision is found on this important subject. Canada was to be admitted of right, on her joining in the measures of the United States; and the other COLONIES, by which were evidently meant the other British colonies, at the discretion of nine States. The eventual establishment of NEW STATES seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of that instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of this omission, and the assumption of power into which Congress have been led by it. With great propriety, therefore, has the new system supplied the defect. The general precaution, that no new States shall be formed, without the concurrence of the federal authority, and that of the States concerned, is consonant to the principles which ought to govern such transactions. The particular precaution against the erection of new States, by the partition of a State without its consent, quiets the jealousy of the larger States; as that of the smaller is quieted by a like precaution, against a junction of States without their consent. 5. "To dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States, with a proviso, that nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State. "This is a power of very great importance, and required by considerations similar to those which show the propriety of the former. The proviso annexed is proper in itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necessary by jealousies and questions concerning the Western territory sufficiently known to the public. 6. "To guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence. "In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be SUBSTANTIALLY maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution? Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. "As the confederate republic of Germany," says Montesquieu, "consists of free cities and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland. " "Greece was undone," he adds, "as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons. " In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical form, of the new confederate, had its share of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered, that if the general government should interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course, bound to pursue the authority. But the authority extends no further than to a GUARANTY of a republican form of government, which supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for antirepublican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.

A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression here used seems to secure each State, not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The history, both of ancient and modern confederacies, proves that the weaker members of the union ought not to be insensible to the policy of this article. Protection against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss cantons, which, properly speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this object; and the history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded; and as well by the most democratic, as the other cantons. A recent and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be prepared for emergencies of a like nature. At first view, it might seem not to square with the republican theory, to suppose, either that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will have the force, to subvert a government; and consequently, that the federal interposition can never be required, but when it would be improper. But theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if the authority of the State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the former, to support the State authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other.

Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it. Is it true that force and right are necessarily on the same side in republican governments? May not the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the scale on the same side, against a superior number so situated as to be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election!

May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of regular government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves. In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges, they would unite the affection of friends. Happy would it be if such a remedy for its infirmities could be enjoyed by all free governments; if a project equally effectual could be established for the universal peace of mankind! Should it be asked, what is to be the redress for an insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a superiority of the entire force, though not a constitutional right? the answer must be, that such a case, as it would be without the compass of human remedies, so it is fortunately not within the compass of human probability; and that it is a sufficient recommendation of the federal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity for which no possible constitution can provide a cure. Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that should a popular insurrection happen in one of the States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. "7. "To consider all debts contracted, and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, as being no less valid against the United States, under this Constitution, than under the Confederation. "This can only be considered as a declaratory proposition; and may have been inserted, among other reasons, for the satisfaction of the foreign creditors of the United States, who cannot be strangers to the pretended doctrine, that a change in the political form of civil society has the magical effect of dissolving its moral obligations. Among the lesser criticisms which have been exercised on the Constitution, it has been remarked that the validity of engagements ought to have been asserted in favor of the United States, as well as against them; and in the spirit which usually characterizes little critics, the omission has been transformed and magnified into a plot against the national rights. The authors of this discovery may be told, what few others need to be informed of, that as engagements are in their nature reciprocal, an assertion of their validity on one side, necessarily involves a validity on the other side; and that as the article is merely declaratory, the establishment of the principle in one case is sufficient for every case. They may be further told, that every constitution must limit its precautions to dangers that are not altogether imaginary; and that no real danger can exist that the government would DARE, with, or even without, this constitutional declaration before it, to remit the debts justly due to the public, on the pretext here condemned. 8. "To provide for amendments to be ratified by three fourths of the States under two exceptions only. "That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could not but be foreseen. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the convention seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the other. The exception in favor of the equality of suffrage in the Senate, was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, implied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the legislature; and was probably insisted on by the States particularly attached to that equality. The other exception must have been admitted on the same considerations which produced the privilege defended by it. 9. "The ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States, ratifying the same. "This article speaks for itself.

The express authority of the people alone could give due validity to the Constitution. To have required the unanimous ratification of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essential interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single member. It would have marked a want of foresight in the convention, which our own experience would have rendered inexcusable. Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves on this occasion: 1. On what principle the Confederation, which stands in the solemn form of a compact among the States, can be superseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it? 2. What relation is to subsist between the nine or more States ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do not become parties to it? The first question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed. PERHAPS, also, an answer may be found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the Confederation, that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification. The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, committed by either of the parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT infractions with which they may be confronted? The time has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives dictate. The second question is not less delicate; and the flattering prospect of its being merely hypothetical forbids an overcurious discussion of it. It is one of those cases which must be left to provide for itself. In general, it may be observed, that although no political relation can subsist between the assenting and dissenting States, yet the moral relations will remain uncancelled. The claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be in force, and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually respected; whilst considerations of a common interest, and, above all, the remembrance of the endearing scenes which are past, and the anticipation of a speedy triumph over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain MODERATION on one side, and PRUDENCE on the other.

PUBLIUS.

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Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

• The Federalist Papers #1: Alexander Hamilton's Plea for Reasoned Debate

• The Federalist Papers #2 A: John Jay on the Idea of America

• The Federalist Papers #2 B: You Trusted the Continental Congress; Trust the Constitutional Convention

• The Federalist Papers #3: United, the 13 States are Less Likely to Stumble into War

• The Federalist Papers #4 A: The States Must Be Prepared to Defend against Aggression by Other Nations

• The Federalist Papers #4 B: National Defense Will Be Stronger if the States are United

• The Federalist Papers #5: Unless United, the States Will Be at Each Others' Throats

• The Federalist Papers #6 A: Alexander Hamilton on the Many Human Motives for War

• The Federalist Papers #6 B: Commercial Republics Also Start Wars with Their Neighbors—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 A: Divided, the States Would Fall into Territorial Disputes Likely to Lead to War Between the States—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 B: Without Union, Economic Disagreements Would Drive the States to Conflict with One Another—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #8: Without Union, the States Would Either Be Subject to Devastating Wars with Each Other or Would Have Liberty Endangered by their Own Standing Armies—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 A: There Has Been Technological Progress in Practical Principles of Republican Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 B: A Large Confederation May Be More Politically Stable Than a Small Nation—Alexander Hamilton Cites Montesquieu

• The Federalist Papers #10 A: Conflicts Arising from Differences of Opinion Are an Inevitable Accompaniment of Liberty—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #10 B: The Larger the Republic, the Easier It is to Find Thoughtful Legislators and the Harder It is to Put Together a Majority to do Unjust Things—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #11 A: United, the States Can Get a Better Trade Deal—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #11 B: Union Will Make Possible a Strong Navy, Allowing America to Chart Its Own Destiny—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #12: Union Makes it Much Easier to Get Tariff Revenue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #13: Alexander Hamilton on Increasing Returns to Scale in National Government

• The Federalist Papers #14: A Republic Can Be Geographically Large—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #15: A Government, to be Worthy of the Name, Must Govern Its Citizens, Not Just Its Subordinate Jurisdictions—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #16: Authority of the Federal Government Directly over Individuals Means States Can Only Thwart the Federal Government by Active and Obvious Resistance—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #17: Three Levels of Federal Power

• The Federalist Papers #18: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison Point to the Weakness of Confederations of Cities in Ancient Greece to Argue for a Strong Federal Government

• The Federalist Papers #19: The Weakness of the German Empire, Poland and Switzerland up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #20: The Weakness of the United Netherlands up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #21 A: Constitutions Need to be Enforced—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #21 B: Alexander Hamilton Complains of the Lack of a Measure Such as GDP Suitable for Apportioning Taxes to the States

• The Federalist Papers #22 A: The Articles of Confederation Lead to Uncoordinated Trade Policy and Military Free-Riding—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 B: Supermajority Rules Aren't an Adequate Fix for Departures from One-Person One-Vote—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 C: Pillars of Democracy—The Judicial System, Military Loyal to the Constitution, and Police Loyal to the Constitution

• The Federalist Papers #23: The Federal Government Must Be Given Sufficient Power to Accomplish Whatever We Expect the Federal Government to Do—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #24: The United States Need a Standing Army—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #25: Prohibiting a Standing Army in Time of Peace Would Be a Mistake—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #26: Some Part of the Government Must Be Able to Authorize an Army Whenever Necessary, after Being Forced to Fully Debate the Issue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #27: People Will Get Used to the Federal Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #28: The Federal Government and States Can Check One Another’s Power, Reducing the Chance of Abuses—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #29: State Militias such as the National Guard are Not Attractive Tools for Tyrants—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #30: A Robust Power of Taxation is Needed to Make a Nation Powerful

• The Federalist Papers #31: Alexander Hamilton's Attempt at a Formal Argument for a Robust Federal Power of Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #32: The States Retain All Powers Not Explicitly Taken Away by the Constitution—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #33: The 'Necessary and Proper' and Supremacy Clauses Only Make Explicit What the Specified Powers Imply—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #34: War is Expensive. To Defend the Union, the Federal Government Needs an Ample Power of Taxation—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #35 A: Alexander Hamilton as an Economist

• The Federalist Papers #35 B: Alexander Hamilton on Who Can Represent Whom

• The Federalist Papers #36: Alexander Hamilton on Regressive Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #37: Why the Constitution Isn't Perfect—And Why No Constitution Could Be. James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #38—James Madison Analyzes the Proposed Constitution Using the Principle of Opportunity Cost: What is the Alternative to the Consensus of the Constitutional Convention?

• The Federalist Papers #39: James Madison Downplays How Radical the Proposed Constitution Is

• The Federalist Papers #40: James Madison Argues the Constitutional Convention Had the Warrant to Make Its Proposal—and Its Advice Should Be Taken Even If Not

• The Federalist Papers #41: James Madison on Tradeoffs—You Can't Have Everything You Want

• The Federalist Papers #42: Every Power of the Federal Government Must Be Justified—James Madison

Zen Koan Practice with Miles Kimball: 'I Don't Know What All This Is'

Link to wakingup.com

I have heard that instruction in Zen is often hardcore. Some Zen instructors may well be like drill sergeants, but Henry Shukman’s course within Sam Harris’s “Waking Up” app is wonderful. I highly recommend it. Henry Shukman does give some instruction on proper Zen posture, but I simply ignore that, and pay attention to everything else.

A Zen koan is a word, a phrase, a sentence or a little story designed to have a revelatory effect on the mind, without necessarily making any literal sense. Paradox is a way to knock the mind out of its accustomed ruts without ever needing to find a solution to the paradox.

Henry Shukman is great at explaining some of the principles of Zen that are reasonably easy to explain. For example, Zen encourages you to identify with your entire sensorium—everything they see, hear, taste, smell or feel at any given moment—rather than the human-shaped object within your sensorium. (“Who Am I?” is a koan that gets at that fairly directly.) That is only a fraction of what Zen reveals; that much all by it self is a great liberation. What seems to be “out there” is really inside your mind—not because there are no “things-in-themselves,” but because what you actually perceive are highly processed in-your-mind representations of those things. “Mind is nothing but the rivers, the mountains, and the whole wide earth; the sun, the moon and the stars.” Rather than being isolated Cartesian minds, our minds naturally connect us to all of the things around us that matter to us, where what matters to us (both animate and inaminate) has a long evolutionary history going back through millions of years of interaction.

Another key principle of Zen is “ordinary mind” and its emphasis on the transcendent beauty of ordinary objects. As such, Zen can easily fit within one’s regular life: whatever your days are like already, in any outward sense, there is transcendent beauty to be seen within that day.

Closely related to the principle of “ordinary mind” is the principle of “beginner’s mind.” I used to think “beginner’s mind” referred to the kind of openness I discuss in “Open Skepticism and Closed Skepticism.” It is something else. It is experiencing each moment as if it were the first time you had ever experienced anything like it. Instead of anticipating what is coming a second ahead of it’s happening and overlaying that expectation on what is happening, just see what is there. It may be much different, much more intricate and hence much more beautiful than anything you had imagined. (This might be hard to do without listening to some instruction in Zen from someone like Henry Shukman.)

“Beginner’s mind” reminds me of a principle I learned in a Landmark Education Communication Course of listening to someone like you don’t know what they are going to say. That simple practice can be surprisingly powerful.

In addition to listening to Henry Shukman’s course in the “Waking Up” app for the 3d time now, and buying one of the many collections of koans out there (I bought Entangling Vines), Henry is so clear in explaining how koans work that I feel I can invent koans of my own. Fortunately, as far as I know, Colorado has no occupational licensing laws for an upstart internet Zen master :)

The koan I have in mind today is one that works great when you are out and about doing whatever you normally do in your life. I have been using it on my daily walks, but you could use it during many other activities as well. It is an encouragement to beginner’s mind. I say to myself repeatedly:

I don’t know what all this is.

A variation on the theme of trying to see everything new that I also say to myself is:

I know what my feet should do, but I don’t know where I am.

With Zen koans, you don’t have to try to think or feel any particular way, just say the koan to yourself repeatedly and see what happens. These particular koans are intended to go along with other activities rather than to be used in any kind of sitting meditation. They are working for me, but I don’t know whether or not they will work as entry-level koans, without other koan practice first. Try them and see!

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Posts on Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral Compass:

• Co-Active Coaching as a Tool for Maximizing Utility—Getting Where You Want in Life

• On Human Potential

• How Economists Can Enhance Their Scientific Creativity, Engagement and Impact

• Virtues for Economists

• 'Everything Happens for a Reason' for Nonsupernaturalists

• My Life will be Good When ...

• On Perfectionism

• Open Skepticism and Closed Skepticism

• Forgive Yourself

• Fatal Flaws Don't Have To Be Fatal

• Only What is in Our Power is Our Duty

• The Devil of Getting Criticized

• Improving Your User Illusion

• Judson Brewer, Elizabeth Bernstein and Mitchell Kaplan on Finding Inner Calm

• The Four Horsemen of Relationship Destruction

• The Golden Mean as Concavity of Objective Functions

• Glennon Doyle on Wild Humanity

• 'The Four Agreements' by Don Miguel Ruiz (with Janet Mills) and `The Fifth Agreement' by Don Miguel Ruiz and Don Jose Ruiz (with Janet Mills)

• How I Became Optimistic

• Believe in Yourself

• Breaking the Chains

• Leaving a Legacy

• My Objective Function

• The Unmaking

• A Personal Mission Statement: Keep It Short

• John Locke on the Mandate of Heaven

• Tom Gauld's Sympathy Cards for Scientists

• The Expanding Shoreline of Ignorance

• Contrasted Faults Through All Their Manners Reign

• On Altruism, Externalities and Bossiness

• Bex's Rules for Life

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: How Crises Make Us Rethink Our Lives

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: The Lost Art of Curiosity

• Recognizing Opportunity: The Case of the Golden Raspberries—Taryn Laakso

• Taryn Laakso: Battery Charge Trending to 0% — Time to Recharge

• Taryn Laakso: Righting Your Ship Before You Capsize

• Kristeen Barth: We Don't Have to Be for Everyone

• Dave Baillie: Calibrate Your Compass

• Gerard Theoret: 3 Turns of the Screw

• Savannah Taylor: Lessons of the Labyrinth and Tapping Into Your Inner Wisdom

The Federalist Papers #42: Every Power of the Federal Government Must Be Justified—James Madison

image source

Link to the full text of The Federalist Papers #42

The most important message of the Federalist Papers #42 is subtext: James Madison shows he believes that each individual power of the federal government in the proposed constitution needs to be justified. Not only is the federal government limited to a small, finite list of powers, the rationale for each power needs to be carefully examined.

Actually, that is a bit of an overstatement: James Madison felt certain powers for the federal government were uncontroversial. Separating quotations from the Federalist Papers #42 with added bullets, here are what James Madison thought were uncontroversial powers:

• The powers to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors, speak their own propriety.

• … The power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations, belongs with equal propriety to the general government

• The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen within several views which have been taken of this subject, has been too fully discussed to need additional proofs here of its being properly submitted to the federal administration.

• All that need be remarked on the power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, is, that by providing for this last case, the Constitution has supplied a material omission in the articles of Confederation.

• The punishment of counterfeiting the public securities, as well as the current coin, is submitted of course to that authority which is to secure the value of both.

• The regulation of weights and measures is transferred from the articles of Confederation, and is founded on like considerations with the preceding power of regulating coin.

• The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.

• The power of prescribing by general laws, the manner in which the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other States, is an evident and valuable improvement on the clause relating to this subject in the articles of Confederation.

• The power of establishing post roads must, in every view, be a harmless power, and may, perhaps, by judicious management, become productive of great public conveniency.

  Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse between the States can be deemed unworthy of the public care.

James Madison considered some of these so uncontroversial that he had to make the case that they were still important:

… the most minute provisions become important when they tend to obviate the necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved usurpations of power. A list of the cases in which Congress have been betrayed, or forced by the defects of the Confederation, into violations of their chartered authorities, would not a little surprise those who have paid no attention to the subject; and would be no inconsiderable argument in favor of the new Constitution, which seems to have provided no less studiously for the lesser, than the more obvious and striking defects of the old.

By contrast, James Madison felt certain other power were quite controversial:

• It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not difficult to account, either for this restriction on the general government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed…. [James Madison then goes on to make a “Half a loaf is better than none” argument.] …

  Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America.

• The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members, is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience. [James Madison follows this with an extensive and detailed argument.]

• [There is also a long argument supporting this claim:] The new Constitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision … authorizing the general government to establish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States.

Of course, the design of limited enumerated powers that helped the framers of the US Constitution get that constitution ratified has not survived the centuries that have passed since then. The power to regulate interstate commerce, for example, has become close to an unlimited power. Very occasionally, the Supreme Court has put some limit on this power, but almost anything the federal government wants to do domestically is considered a legitimate regulation of interstate commerce. The now eliminated requirement for everyone to get health insurance in the original Obamacare legislation was one exception. Nonpurchase of insurance was deemed not “commerce” by the Supreme Court. The penalty for nonpurchase of insurance was, however, justified as an exercise of the power to levy a wide variety of taxes ever since the 16th Amendment was ratified.

The currently ascendant “Public Meaning Originalism” in constitutional interpretation maintains that the words of the US Constitution should be interpreted according to what those words would have meant to the people who ratified the Constitution, and the words of each amendment should be interpreted according to what those words would have meant to the people who ratified that amendment. Because it is the meaning of the words to those who read them and ratified them, not the meaning of the words to those who wrote them, it doesn’t require any psychologizing of those who wrote them.

I have a lot of sympathy for Public Meaning Originalism. It is important that we have a Constitution that is treated as constraining government actions rather than having a meaning so flexible that the government is allowed to do anything it decides to do. Without some fidelity to the original public meaning, it seems unlikely that that Constitution can keep constraining government actions.

Of course, there is the difficulty of knowing what the words in the Constitution and its amendments would mean to those ratifiers in relation to new things that have arisen since then if a representative sample of ratifiers were transported hundreds of years into their future, to the year 2021. For example, how would they want to apply those words to computer activities?

And what about cases in which the ratifiers would think they understood something that arose long after their deaths, but in fact wouldn’t understand it very well? I am thinking here of the Fed as the US central bank. Folks transported from the past might think of it as a version of the Bank of the United States. But the Fed is a dramatically different creature.

One more big issue in constitutional interpretation is that whenever the Supreme Court has gone against original public meaning in the past, it creates a conflict in the present between the original public meaning and the desire for continuity embodied in the principle of following precedents. Do we really want to make ourselves worse off by destroying key institutions we have been used to for a long time through declaring them unconstitutional? Yet there is a lot of wisdom in the original constitutional design that should presumably have some gradually-applied influence even as against precedent.

All of these issues of constitutional interpretation come up when thinking of enumerated powers since that is an area where, arguably, what we do now has strayed the furthest from what people thought they were ratifying when they ratified the US Constitution and what people thought they were ratifying when they ratified relevant amendments to the US Constitution.

Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #42:

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FEDERALIST NO. 42

The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered

From the New York Packet
Tuesday, January 22, 1788.

Author: James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

THE SECOND class of powers, lodged in the general government, consists of those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, to wit: to make treaties; to send and receive ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations; to regulate foreign commerce, including a power to prohibit, after the year 1808, the importation of slaves, and to lay an intermediate duty of ten dollars per head, as a discouragement to such importations. This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of the federal administration. If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations. The powers to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors, speak their own propriety. Both of them are comprised in the articles of Confederation, with this difference only, that the former is disembarrassed, by the plan of the convention, of an exception, under which treaties might be substantially frustrated by regulations of the States; and that a power of appointing and receiving "other public ministers and consuls," is expressly and very properly added to the former provision concerning ambassadors. The term ambassador, if taken strictly, as seems to be required by the second of the articles of Confederation, comprehends the highest grade only of public ministers, and excludes the grades which the United States will be most likely to prefer, where foreign embassies may be necessary. And under no latitude of construction will the term comprehend consuls. Yet it has been found expedient, and has been the practice of Congress, to employ the inferior grades of public ministers, and to send and receive consuls. It is true, that where treaties of commerce stipulate for the mutual appointment of consuls, whose functions are connected with commerce, the admission of foreign consuls may fall within the power of making commercial treaties; and that where no such treaties exist, the mission of American consuls into foreign countries may PERHAPS be covered under the authority, given by the ninth article of the Confederation, to appoint all such civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States. But the admission of consuls into the United States, where no previous treaty has stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere provided for. A supply of the omission is one of the lesser instances in which the convention have improved on the model before them. But the most minute provisions become important when they tend to obviate the necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved usurpations of power. A list of the cases in which Congress have been betrayed, or forced by the defects of the Confederation, into violations of their chartered authorities, would not a little surprise those who have paid no attention to the subject; and would be no inconsiderable argument in favor of the new Constitution, which seems to have provided no less studiously for the lesser, than the more obvious and striking defects of the old. The power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations, belongs with equal propriety to the general government, and is a still greater improvement on the articles of Confederation. These articles contain no provision for the case of offenses against the law of nations; and consequently leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations. The provision of the federal articles on the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these offenses. The definition of piracies might, perhaps, without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations; though a legislative definition of them is found in most municipal codes.

A definition of felonies on the high seas is evidently requisite. Felony is a term of loose signification, even in the common law of England; and of various import in the statute law of that kingdom. But neither the common nor the statute law of that, or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for the proceedings of this, unless previously made its own by legislative adoption. The meaning of the term, as defined in the codes of the several States, would be as impracticable as the former would be a dishonorable and illegitimate guide. It is not precisely the same in any two of the States; and varies in each with every revision of its criminal laws. For the sake of certainty and uniformity, therefore, the power of defining felonies in this case was in every respect necessary and proper.

The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen within several views which have been taken of this subject, has been too fully discussed to need additional proofs here of its being properly submitted to the federal administration. It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not difficult to account, either for this restriction on the general government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; that within that period, it will receive a considerable discouragement from the federal government, and may be totally abolished, by a concurrence of the few States which continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has been given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy would it be for the unfortunate Africans, if an equal prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren!

Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I mention these misconstructions, not with a view to give them an answer, for they deserve none, but as specimens of the manner and spirit in which some have thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed government. The powers included in the THIRD class are those which provide for the harmony and proper intercourse among the States. Under this head might be included the particular restraints imposed on the authority of the States, and certain powers of the judicial department; but the former are reserved for a distinct class, and the latter will be particularly examined when we arrive at the structure and organization of the government. I shall confine myself to a cursory review of the remaining powers comprehended under this third description, to wit: to regulate commerce among the several States and the Indian tribes; to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin; to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the current coin and secureties of the United States; to fix the standard of weights and measures; to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws of bankruptcy, to prescribe the manner in which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other States; and to establish post offices and post roads. The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members, is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience. To the proofs and remarks which former papers have brought into view on this subject, it may be added that without this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of regulating foreign commerce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the relief of the States which import and export through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it must be foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the former. We may be assured by past experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances; and both by that and a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity. To those who do not view the question through the medium of passion or of interest, the desire of the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their uncommercial neighbors, must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party, by resentment as well as interest, to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned, before public bodies as well as individuals, by the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain. The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of confederated States, has been illustrated by other examples as well as our own. In Switzerland, where the Union is so very slight, each canton is obliged to allow to merchandises a passage through its jurisdiction into other cantons, without an augmentation of the tolls. In Germany it is a law of the empire, that the princes and states shall not lay tolls or customs on bridges, rivers, or passages, without the consent of the emperor and the diet; though it appears from a quotation in an antecedent paper, that the practice in this, as in many other instances in that confederacy, has not followed the law, and has produced there the mischiefs which have been foreseen here. Among the restraints imposed by the Union of the Netherlands on its members, one is, that they shall not establish imposts disadvantageous to their neighbors, without the general permission. The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of Confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is there restrained to Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State within its own limits. What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is not yet settled, and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in the federal councils. And how the trade with Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is not the only case in which the articles of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and letting the whole remain. All that need be remarked on the power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, is, that by providing for this last case, the Constitution has supplied a material omission in the articles of Confederation. The authority of the existing Congress is restrained to the regulation of coin STRUCK by their own authority, or that of the respective States. It must be seen at once that the proposed uniformity in the VALUE of the current coin might be destroyed by subjecting that of foreign coin to the different regulations of the different States. The punishment of counterfeiting the public securities, as well as the current coin, is submitted of course to that authority which is to secure the value of both. The regulation of weights and measures is transferred from the articles of Confederation, and is founded on like considerations with the preceding power of regulating coin.

The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has long been remarked as a fault in our system, and as laying a foundation for intricate and delicate questions. In the fourth article of the Confederation, it is declared "that the FREE INHABITANTS of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice, excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of FREE CITIZENS in the several States; and THE PEOPLE of each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and commerce," etc. There is a confusion of language here, which is remarkable. Why the terms FREE INHABITANTS are used in one part of the article, FREE CITIZENS in another, and PEOPLE in another; or what was meant by superadding to "all privileges and immunities of free citizens," "all the privileges of trade and commerce," cannot easily be determined. It seems to be a construction scarcely avoidable, however, that those who come under the denomination of FREE INHABITANTS of a State, although not citizens of such State, are entitled, in every other State, to all the privileges of FREE CITIZENS of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than they may be entitled to in their own State: so that it may be in the power of a particular State, or rather every State is laid under a necessity, not only to confer the rights of citizenship in other States upon any whom it may admit to such rights within itself, but upon any whom it may allow to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction. But were an exposition of the term "inhabitants" to be admitted which would confine the stipulated privileges to citizens alone, the difficulty is diminished only, not removed. The very improper power would still be retained by each State, of naturalizing aliens in every other State. In one State, residence for a short term confirms all the rights of citizenship: in another, qualifications of greater importance are required. An alien, therefore, legally incapacitated for certain rights in the latter, may, by previous residence only in the former, elude his incapacity; and thus the law of one State be preposterously rendered paramount to the law of another, within the jurisdiction of the other. We owe it to mere casualty, that very serious embarrassments on this subject have been hitherto escaped. By the laws of several States, certain descriptions of aliens, who had rendered themselves obnoxious, were laid under interdicts inconsistent not only with the rights of citizenship but with the privilege of residence. What would have been the consequence, if such persons, by residence or otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under the laws of another State, and then asserted their rights as such, both to residence and citizenship, within the State proscribing them? Whatever the legal consequences might have been, other consequences would probably have resulted, of too serious a nature not to be provided against. The new Constitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision against them, and all others proceeding from the defect of the Confederation on this head, by authorizing the general government to establish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States. The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question. The power of prescribing by general laws, the manner in which the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other States, is an evident and valuable improvement on the clause relating to this subject in the articles of Confederation. The meaning of the latter is extremely indeterminate, and can be of little importance under any interpretation which it will bear. The power here established may be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated, in any stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction. The power of establishing post roads must, in every view, be a harmless power, and may, perhaps, by judicious management, become productive of great public conveniency.

Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse between the States can be deemed unworthy of the public care.

PUBLIUS.

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Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

• The Federalist Papers #1: Alexander Hamilton's Plea for Reasoned Debate

• The Federalist Papers #2 A: John Jay on the Idea of America

• The Federalist Papers #2 B: You Trusted the Continental Congress; Trust the Constitutional Convention

• The Federalist Papers #3: United, the 13 States are Less Likely to Stumble into War

• The Federalist Papers #4 A: The States Must Be Prepared to Defend against Aggression by Other Nations

• The Federalist Papers #4 B: National Defense Will Be Stronger if the States are United

• The Federalist Papers #5: Unless United, the States Will Be at Each Others' Throats

• The Federalist Papers #6 A: Alexander Hamilton on the Many Human Motives for War

• The Federalist Papers #6 B: Commercial Republics Also Start Wars with Their Neighbors—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 A: Divided, the States Would Fall into Territorial Disputes Likely to Lead to War Between the States—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 B: Without Union, Economic Disagreements Would Drive the States to Conflict with One Another—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #8: Without Union, the States Would Either Be Subject to Devastating Wars with Each Other or Would Have Liberty Endangered by their Own Standing Armies—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 A: There Has Been Technological Progress in Practical Principles of Republican Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 B: A Large Confederation May Be More Politically Stable Than a Small Nation—Alexander Hamilton Cites Montesquieu

• The Federalist Papers #10 A: Conflicts Arising from Differences of Opinion Are an Inevitable Accompaniment of Liberty—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #10 B: The Larger the Republic, the Easier It is to Find Thoughtful Legislators and the Harder It is to Put Together a Majority to do Unjust Things—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #11 A: United, the States Can Get a Better Trade Deal—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #11 B: Union Will Make Possible a Strong Navy, Allowing America to Chart Its Own Destiny—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #12: Union Makes it Much Easier to Get Tariff Revenue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #13: Alexander Hamilton on Increasing Returns to Scale in National Government

• The Federalist Papers #14: A Republic Can Be Geographically Large—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #15: A Government, to be Worthy of the Name, Must Govern Its Citizens, Not Just Its Subordinate Jurisdictions—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #16: Authority of the Federal Government Directly over Individuals Means States Can Only Thwart the Federal Government by Active and Obvious Resistance—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #17: Three Levels of Federal Power

• The Federalist Papers #18: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison Point to the Weakness of Confederations of Cities in Ancient Greece to Argue for a Strong Federal Government

• The Federalist Papers #19: The Weakness of the German Empire, Poland and Switzerland up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #20: The Weakness of the United Netherlands up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #21 A: Constitutions Need to be Enforced—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #21 B: Alexander Hamilton Complains of the Lack of a Measure Such as GDP Suitable for Apportioning Taxes to the States

• The Federalist Papers #22 A: The Articles of Confederation Lead to Uncoordinated Trade Policy and Military Free-Riding—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 B: Supermajority Rules Aren't an Adequate Fix for Departures from One-Person One-Vote—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 C: Pillars of Democracy—The Judicial System, Military Loyal to the Constitution, and Police Loyal to the Constitution

• The Federalist Papers #23: The Federal Government Must Be Given Sufficient Power to Accomplish Whatever We Expect the Federal Government to Do—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #24: The United States Need a Standing Army—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #25: Prohibiting a Standing Army in Time of Peace Would Be a Mistake—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #26: Some Part of the Government Must Be Able to Authorize an Army Whenever Necessary, after Being Forced to Fully Debate the Issue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #27: People Will Get Used to the Federal Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #28: The Federal Government and States Can Check One Another’s Power, Reducing the Chance of Abuses—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #29: State Militias such as the National Guard are Not Attractive Tools for Tyrants—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #30: A Robust Power of Taxation is Needed to Make a Nation Powerful

• The Federalist Papers #31: Alexander Hamilton's Attempt at a Formal Argument for a Robust Federal Power of Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #32: The States Retain All Powers Not Explicitly Taken Away by the Constitution—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #33: The 'Necessary and Proper' and Supremacy Clauses Only Make Explicit What the Specified Powers Imply—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #34: War is Expensive. To Defend the Union, the Federal Government Needs an Ample Power of Taxation—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #35 A: Alexander Hamilton as an Economist

• The Federalist Papers #35 B: Alexander Hamilton on Who Can Represent Whom

• The Federalist Papers #36: Alexander Hamilton on Regressive Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #37: Why the Constitution Isn't Perfect—And Why No Constitution Could Be. James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #38—James Madison Analyzes the Proposed Constitution Using the Principle of Opportunity Cost: What is the Alternative to the Consensus of the Constitutional Convention?

• The Federalist Papers #39: James Madison Downplays How Radical the Proposed Constitution Is

• The Federalist Papers #40: James Madison Argues the Constitutional Convention Had the Warrant to Make Its Proposal—and Its Advice Should Be Taken Even If Not

• The Federalist Papers #41: James Madison on Tradeoffs—You Can't Have Everything You Want

A Spiritual Autobiography—Miles Kimball

Miles Kimball as a young man

I am a Unitarian-Universalist lay preacher. I gave 12 sermons—annually from 2005 to 2016—to the Community Unitarian Universalists in Brighton. This post is my April 3, 2011 sermon “A Spiritual Autobiography.” This brings to 11 those that are posted on this blog. The others are:

• UU Visions

• Godless Religion

• Teleotheism and the Purpose of Life (video here)

• The Egocentric Illusion (video here)

• Sharing Epiphanies (including the video)

• A Spiritual Autobiography

• The Message of Mormonism for Atheists Who Want to Stay Atheists (video here)

• So You Want to Save the World (video here)

• The Mystery of Consciousness

• The Message of Jesus for Non-Supernaturalists (video here)

• Us and Them

Below is the newly edited text. This sermon only gives my spiritual journey from my birth in 1960 to 2011.

At the bottom of this post are links to some of my other posts on religion. I began blogging in 2012; a large part of my spiritual journey since I gave this sermon is laid out here on my blog.

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In line with the democratic spirit of Unitarian-Universalism, I believe that it would be a good thing for Unitarian-Universalist congregations to increase the number of opportunities, and the encouragement, for members of the congregation to speak to the congregation. In addition to giving everyone a chance to hear many viewpoints, this has the benefit of allowing everyone to get to know each other better. 

One problem with this idea of rotating speaking opportunities and assignments among congregation members is that many people are terrified of public speaking. So it is important to develop patterns for talks that are both reasonably interesting and easy to prepare and give. One example of an easy form of talk to give is the “spiritual autobiography”: a more or less chronological account of one’s religious quest that draws a few morals along the way. At least, as long as one’s memory is reasonably intact, a spiritual autobiography does not require a lot of outside research! And so many Unitarian-Universalists are refugees from some other religious tradition, or have faced deep soul-searching within this religious tradition, that there are many fascinating stories to be told.

In giving an account of my own spiritual journey, there are at least four thematic threads to follow along the way: us versus them, mystical experience, the spiritual affects of ambition, and the quest for hidden wisdom. 

I grew up in Madison, Wisconsin, far from the center of the Mormon Church to which my family belonged. When I was young, I had only a dim awareness of any religious difference between my family and others in Madison—partly because, outside of church, people didn’t talk about religion very much.  I remember being surprised when listening to “Jesus Christ Superstar” at my friend’s house to learn that, as a Jew, he didn’t believe in Jesus Christ as the Son of God. It simply hadn’t occurred to me that not everyone believed that. 

One practical religious difference was that, as Mormons, we had more meetings than most other religions. I remember being embarrassed to explain to my friends about a weekday children’s meeting, not because it was religious, but because I felt I was almost too old to be going to that meeting. 

I would not make it very far on American Idol, but I was not very old when my mother got me to sing a solo in Church. The song was called “A Mormon Boy,” and it had the refrain “I might be envied by a King, for I am a Mormon boy.” Of course there was no reason for any king to envy a Mormon boy, since Mormons would welcome any king who wanted to convert to Mormonism. When I look back, the interesting thing about that song is the sense of social inferiority it hints at. Mormonism is considered a weird, fringe religion that most Americans look down on, however much they may like individual Mormons. The awareness, at some level, that others look down on Mormons causes Mormons to have an inferiority complex they are not fully aware of, and to be very proud of those Mormons who are successful in the world at large, especially celebrities. If you don’t believe me, you only have to Google the website famousmormons.net, which scratches this itch. 

When I was eight years old, my father, who like almost all Mormon men, had been ordained a Priest and Elder of the Mormon Church, baptized me by dunking me totally under the water off of Picnic Point, a thin peninsula in Madison’s Lake Mendota. Since that was my chance to get my sins washed away, I felt I could safely steal some cheese from our refrigerator before that, but not after. After I was baptized, my father laid his hands on my head along with several other men to confirm me a member of the Mormon Church and give me the Gift of the Holy Ghost. In Mormonism, all members of the Church can get personal messages from God through the Holy Ghost. Also, in the Mormon scriptures, it talks of one reward of righteousness as having the Holy Ghost as a constant companion. So I was brought up to believe, and did believe, that I had the moral equivalent of a personal genie following me around to answer my questions and give me guidance. Indeed, Mormon scriptures explain in some detail how to do this. With God speaking, they say “… you must study it out in your mind; then you must ask me if it be right, and if it is right I will cause that your bosom shall burn within you; therefore, you shall feel that it is right.  But if it be not right you shall have no such feelings, but you shall have a stupor of thought that shall cause you to forget the thing which is wrong …”   In other words, as I understood it, if I prayed and asked God a question, all I had to do was to keep talking about different aspects of the question and asking the question in different ways until I either felt a warm sensation in my heart—which meant YES or felt a little stupid and confused, which meant NO.  Or if there were two possible courses of action I was thinking about, I could talk about each alternative in my prayer and notice which one left me feeling warm and good and which one left me feeling confused and not-so-good. 

A great deal of the first 40 years of my spiritual autobiography was determined by the fact that this procedure for asking God questions seemed to work very well for me.  Mormon teenagers are very strongly encouraged to “get a testimony,” which means to have a spiritual experience that confirms that Mormonism is the one true religion. For me, getting a testimony was a straightforward matter of reading the Book of Mormon and following its advice to pray and ask God if it was true.  Precisely as predicted, I felt a burning in my heart on cue. I interpreted that spiritual experience as telling me that the Book of Mormon and Mormonism in general were both true. Not only that, I could essentially reproduce that experience if I prayed and asked the question again. I didn’t just grow up in Mormonism. I believed it, through and through, because of my own spiritual experiences, of this type. 

When I was thirteen, my family moved from Madison Wisconsin to Provo, Utah.  Just a few months after we moved to Utah, my grandfather became the head of the Mormon Church—analogous to the Pope, except that there a lot fewer Mormons than there are Catholics. My grandfather became President of the Mormon Church by being appointed as one of the twelve apostles of the Mormon Church at a reasonably young age and then living a long time so that he became the most senior apostle. He had been appointed as an apostle when he was working as an unpaid local church leader while making a living selling insurance and real estate in southern Arizona. As President of the Mormon Church, often called “The Prophet,” millions of people would listen with rapt attention to his speeches at church conferences that occurred twice a year, looking up to him as God’s representative on the Earth. Without my fully realizing it, watching all of this happen to my grandfather nurtured an outsized ambition in my heart. Since my grandfather had been, I thought, chosen by God out of relative obscurity to be an apostle, I imagined God having some great task for me to do someday, and resolved to be prepared. Since any great religious task would have to wait on God’s appointment, I needed to do something else in the meantime and decided to be some sort of scientist like great uncle Henry Eyring, who was a world-renowned chemist and had an equation named after him, though he didn’t quite win a Nobel Prize. 

During my thirties, this outsized ambition caused me a lot of psychological pain, and a fair amount of anger, when my relatively successful career as an economist was not as successful as I thought it should be. As a result, I returned to psychotherapy, and have been in psychotherapy most of the time ever since.  (An earlier stint of psychotherapy had been occasioned by the death of one of our baby girls.) I think of psychotherapy as its own kind of religion and an important step on my religious quest.  More particularly, I think of helping people to get the right amount of ambition as a key service that religion should provide.  Too little ambition, and you don’t reach your potential. Too much ambition, and you are in great danger of either cutting ethical corners, ignoring your family and friends, or making yourself miserable. I don’t claim to be cured of my outsized ambition, but I am no longer in such great psychological pain on that front.

I encountered at least two other quasi-religions in my thirties. My sister got me into Transcendental Meditation, which I still try to find time to do at least once every day.  As a form of meditation, the great virtue of Transcendental Meditation is that it is easy—much easier, for example, than the Buddhist Insight Meditation that I later took a class in. The way I do it, all I need to do is to sit in a chair for twenty minutes and say a mantra—or not—as my mind wanders. I think of it as some combination of cleaning out the closets of my mind and just plain resting. 

The other quasi-religion was the courses of the Landmark Educational Corporation.  My friend Kim Leavitt got me into those. The Landmark Educational Corporation has a set of personal growth workshops that use Existentialist philosophy and Deconstruction in a pragmatic way to teach how to let go of grudges, repair relationships, and envision and work toward a positive future for one’s life and for the world. I found those workshops quite powerful and valuable and persuaded many friends to do them as well. Most of them had a good experience. The Landmark courses I took have helped me to have a can-do attitude in my life, and gave me great models of how to be a good teacher and to be persuasive. But I have found most valuable the philosophy they taught about life as something that has the meaning we decide to give to it. 

[We tried to get a video of this sermon, but only got the last third, from about here on. See immediately below.]

My last thematic thread is hidden wisdom. Let me backtrack some.  For a young boy, Mormonism has a lot of cool ideas in it that sound like Science Fiction: other worlds, God living in the Kolob solar system, and God creating the world by scientific means. It is not an accident that Utah is a Mecca for Science Fiction.  I had the sense growing up that there were endless things to be learned and discovered in Mormonism. As a teenager, I was fascinated by the work of Hugh Nibley, who managed to read Mormonism into ancient documents, including Egyptian papyri. That was heady stuff. I later dated Hugh Nibley’s daughter Martha Nibley briefly but intensely before she went on to marry my friend John Beck, write several best-sellers and write a column in Oprah’s magazine, among many other adventures she has chronicled. She has the same kind of free-wheeling intellectual creativity that her father had. (Here is her Amazon page.)

When I arrived at college, I realized that my classmates knew so little about Mormonism that Mormonism to them was whatever I told them it was. So without stretching things too much, I tried hard to make my account of Mormonism as attractive and as consistent with scientific and historical facts as I could. Later on, in my thirties, every other week I got together with a group of Mormon men who were, by and large, quite skeptical of Mormonism. At first, I imagined myself to be a missionary to these skeptics, and continued my efforts to give an attractive account of Mormonism consistent with scientific and historical facts. Over time, we exhaustively discussed the relationship of Mormonism to every relevant scientific and historical fact we could think of. In order to continue to make sense of Mormonism, I had to gradually modify my idea of Mormonism, but I was still able to believe. During this same time, I was happily teaching an adult Sunday School class in the Mormon Church as well as periodically teaching some of the adult men in what was called a “Priesthood Meeting.” The modified version of Mormonism I had come up with crept into this teaching, but even more, I delighted in letting those who came to my Sunday School class talk freely about what they thought and their concerns, including Mormonism’s unequal treatment of women.  By the time I was almost forty, local Mormon leaders had stopped me from teaching Sunday school and finally stopped me from teaching in “Priesthood Meeting” as well. To put it bluntly, I felt I could defend Mormonism in the face of scientific and historical and social issues, but by the time I had modified Mormonism enough to feel good about defending it, many other Mormons didn’t recognize it as Mormonism anymore. 

One of the luckiest things in my life is that while very different in its details, my wife Gail’s religious journey and my religious journeys were synchronized well enough that we left Mormonism together in 2000. At that time I began my association with Unitarian Universalism. It is nice to be able to be myself and say what I think without any fear in Unitarian Universalism.    

Psychologically, leaving Mormonism was quite wrenching. I had to rethink a lot of things.  For one thing, without any need to try to make sense of Mormonism any more, I decided in fairly short order that I didn’t believe in God. That made it hard to believe in an afterlife either, which was a real blow. Like most Americans, I had assumed I would go to heaven, so nothingness after death was a great come-down.  I grieved the afterlife I now believed I would never have.

After the difficult adjustments of leaving Mormonism, my spiritual life has revolved around my men’s circle in the First Unitarian-Universalist Congregation of Ann Arbor, my annual visits to the Community Unitarian Universalists of Brighton, my study of happiness as an economist, my psychotherapy, and continuing to wrestle with the reality of death. 

Besides the double-edged sword of ambition, and the irrational sense I still have of a personal genie watching out for me, two big legacies of my experience in Mormonism are the desire for hidden wisdom and the love of talking about religion. At this point, I don’t think I know what religion is all about. Most of the time these days I think of religion as a grab-bag of many different things, some incredibly valuable and some utterly worthless or even harmful. But if we can sort through the items in the grab-bag carefully enough, we can keep the good and throw away the bad. I believe that if talk to one another about our views on each item in the grab-bag, we can do a better job of sorting than if we try to do our sorting alone. Each person’s spiritual autobiography can give us extra insight in that task. Thank you for giving me this chance to share mine.

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Don't miss these posts on Mormonism:

• The Message of Mormonism for Atheists Who Want to Stay Atheists

• How Conservative Mormon America Avoided the Fate of Conservative White America

• Inside Mormonism: The Home Teachers Come Over

• Will Women Ever Get the Mormon Priesthood?

• The Mormon Church Decides to Treat Gay Marriage as Rebellion on a Par with Polygamy

• Flexible Dogmatism: The Mormon Position on Infallibility

• The Mormon View of Jesus

• David Holland on the Mormon Church During the February 3, 2008–January 2, 2018 Monson Administration

• New Mormon Prophet Russell Nelson Shakes Things Up

• Less is More in Mormon Church Meetings

• Hal Boyd: The Ignorance of Mocking Mormonism

• Mormonism Wanted to Show It Was American. Now What It Means to Be American Is Up for Grabs—McKay Coppins

Other Posts on Religion:

• What If Jesus Was Really Resurrected?

• Easter Skepticism

• Sam Brown and Miles Kimball on Teleotheism

• The Teleotheistic Achievement of the New Testament

• An Agnostic Grace

• An Agnostic Prayer for Strength

• An Agnostic Prayer for Awareness

• An Agnostic Invocation

Posts on Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral Compass:

• Co-Active Coaching as a Tool for Maximizing Utility—Getting Where You Want in Life

• On Human Potential

• How Economists Can Enhance Their Scientific Creativity, Engagement and Impact

• Virtues for Economists

• 'Everything Happens for a Reason' for Nonsupernaturalists

• My Life will be Good When ...

• On Perfectionism

• Forgive Yourself

• Fatal Flaws Don't Have To Be Fatal

• Only What is in Our Power is Our Duty

• The Devil of Getting Criticized

• Improving Your User Illusion

• Judson Brewer, Elizabeth Bernstein and Mitchell Kaplan on Finding Inner Calm

• The Four Horsemen of Relationship Destruction

• The Golden Mean as Concavity of Objective Functions

• Glennon Doyle on Wild Humanity

• 'The Four Agreements' by Don Miguel Ruiz (with Janet Mills) and `The Fifth Agreement' by Don Miguel Ruiz and Don Jose Ruiz (with Janet Mills)

• How I Became Optimistic

• Believe in Yourself

• Breaking the Chains

• Leaving a Legacy

• My Objective Function

• The Unmaking

• A Personal Mission Statement: Keep It Short

• John Locke on the Mandate of Heaven

• Tom Gauld's Sympathy Cards for Scientists

• The Expanding Shoreline of Ignorance

• Contrasted Faults Through All Their Manners Reign

• On Altruism, Externalities and Bossiness

• Bex's Rules for Life

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: How Crises Make Us Rethink Our Lives

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: The Lost Art of Curiosity

• Recognizing Opportunity: The Case of the Golden Raspberries—Taryn Laakso

• Taryn Laakso: Battery Charge Trending to 0% — Time to Recharge

• Taryn Laakso: Righting Your Ship Before You Capsize

• Kristeen Barth: We Don't Have to Be for Everyone

• Dave Baillie: Calibrate Your Compass

• Gerard Theoret: 3 Turns of the Screw

• Savannah Taylor: Lessons of the Labyrinth and Tapping Into Your Inner Wisdom

The Federalist Papers #41: James Madison on Tradeoffs—You Can't Have Everything You Want

image source

link to the full text of the Federalist Papers #41

In the Federalist Papers #41, James Madison expresses the essence of tradeoffs beautifully:

… the purest of human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them; that the choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the GREATER, not the PERFECT, good …

Applied to constitutional design, this becomes:

… in every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused.

Not recognizing tradeoffs is a serious logical fallacy:

It cannot have escaped those who have attended with candor to the arguments employed against the extensive powers of the government, that the authors of them have very little considered how far these powers were necessary means of attaining a necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all political advantages; and on the possible abuses which must be incident to every power or trust, of which a beneficial use can be made.

That doesn’t mean that downsides of a given choice should be glossed over. They may outweight the upsides of that choice. And even if the upsides outweigh the downsides of the choice, the downsides need to be seen clearly so that they can be mitigated:

… in all cases where power is to be conferred, the point first to be decided is, whether such a power be necessary to the public good; as the next will be, in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the power to the public detriment.

In the Federalist Papers #41, James Madison turns in particular to the power to maintain an army and a navy:

… was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in PEACE, as well as in war?

Without directly quoting it, James Madison riffs on something George Washington reportedly said at the Constitutional Convention. Joe Carter says this in his blog post “5 Facts About the U.S. Constitution”:

There was a proposal at the Constitutional Convention to limit the standing army for the country to 5,000 men. George Washington sarcastically agreed with this proposal as long as a stipulation was added that no invading army could number more than 3,000 troops.

James Madison’s version of this point is:

How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules, and by no others. … If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to take corresponding precautions.

In the same paragraph James Madison makes the telling point that fear of being conquered in war is such a strong motivation that leaders of a nation would be likely to disobey any constitution that, if obeyed, would doom them to being conquered. Thus, any constitution that tried to impose such limits would invite disrespect:

It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions.

In the remainder of the Federalist Papers #41, James Madison suggests later numbers will deal with other issues besides national defense and makes a few other key points about national defense:

• European powers present a great danger to the United States—as indeed they have presented to one another for a long time.

• The states would present a great danger to one another if they each had their own army. Hence the total burden maintaining army and navy is likely to be much less if the main military force is a united one for the United States.

• If the states are united, the wide Atlantic coupled with a strong navy can do a lot to keep them safe from European powers.

• The navy is less dangerous to the liberty of the people than the army. Hence it is a good thing that a strong navy can go a long way in protecting the United States. (“The batteries most capable of repelling foreign enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can never be turned by a perfidious government against our liberties.”)

• Though the proposed constitution allows Congress to authorize funds for army and navy for a two-year period, it does not prevent Congress from making such authorizations for only one year at a time.

• The clause “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States” is only talking about the power of taxation, while pointing generally to some of the appropriate purposes of taxation. It does not contain a separate unlimited power to “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” The most nearly relevant powers are detailed later on in that section of the proposed constitution and are all subject to limits.

Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #41 to give context:

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FEDERALIST NO. 41

General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution

For the Independent Journal.

Author: James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

THE Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under two general points of view. The FIRST relates to the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government, including the restraints imposed on the States. The SECOND, to the particular structure of the government, and the distribution of this power among its several branches. Under the FIRST view of the subject, two important questions arise: 1. Whether any part of the powers transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several States? Is the aggregate power of the general government greater than ought to have been vested in it? This is the FIRST question. It cannot have escaped those who have attended with candor to the arguments employed against the extensive powers of the government, that the authors of them have very little considered how far these powers were necessary means of attaining a necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all political advantages; and on the possible abuses which must be incident to every power or trust, of which a beneficial use can be made. This method of handling the subject cannot impose on the good sense of the people of America. It may display the subtlety of the writer; it may open a boundless field for rhetoric and declamation; it may inflame the passions of the unthinking, and may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: but cool and candid people will at once reflect, that the purest of human blessings must have a portion of alloy in them; that the choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the GREATER, not the PERFECT, good; and that in every political institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused. They will see, therefore, that in all cases where power is to be conferred, the point first to be decided is, whether such a power be necessary to the public good; as the next will be, in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of the power to the public detriment. That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, it will be proper to review the several powers conferred on the government of the Union; and that this may be the more conveniently done they may be reduced into different classes as they relate to the following different objects: 1. Security against foreign danger; 2. Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations; 3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of the States from certain injurious acts; 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers. The powers falling within the FIRST class are those of declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying and borrowing money. Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal councils. Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power in the most ample form. Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets necessary? This is involved in the foregoing power. It is involved in the power of self-defense. But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in PEACE, as well as in war? The answer to these questions has been too far anticipated in another place to admit an extensive discussion of them in this place. The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such a discussion in any place. With what color of propriety could the force necessary for defense be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offense? If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its own government, and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety.

How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules, and by no others. It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to take corresponding precautions.

The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establishments in the time of peace. They were introduced by Charles VII. of France. All Europe has followed, or been forced into, the example. Had the example not been followed by other nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a universal monarch. Were every nation except France now to disband its peace establishments, the same event might follow. The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined valor of all other nations and rendered her the mistress of the world. Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome proved the final victim to her military triumphs; and that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price of her military establishments. A standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties. The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, which it cements and secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous. America united, with a handful of troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition than America disunited, with a hundred thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, on a former occasion, that the want of this pretext had saved the liberties of one nation in Europe. Being rendered by her insular situation and her maritime resources impregnable to the armies of her neighbors, the rulers of Great Britain have never been able, by real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an extensive peace establishment. The distance of the United States from the powerful nations of the world gives them the same happy security. A dangerous establishment can never be necessary or plausible, so long as they continue a united people. But let it never, for a moment, be forgotten that they are indebted for this advantage to the Union alone. The moment of its dissolution will be the date of a new order of things. The fears of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger States, or Confederacies, will set the same example in the New, as Charles VII. did in the Old World. The example will be followed here from the same motives which produced universal imitation there. Instead of deriving from our situation the precious advantage which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of America will be but a copy of that of the continent of Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The fortunes of disunited America will be even more disastrous than those of Europe. The sources of evil in the latter are confined to her own limits. No superior powers of another quarter of the globe intrigue among her rival nations, inflame their mutual animosities, and render them the instruments of foreign ambition, jealousy, and revenge. In America the miseries springing from her internal jealousies, contentions, and wars, would form a part only of her lot. A plentiful addition of evils would have their source in that relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, and which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe. This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, every man who loves his country, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a due attachment to the Union of America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it.

Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the best possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to their support. This precaution the Constitution has prudently added. I will not repeat here the observations which I flatter myself have placed this subject in a just and satisfactory light. But it may not be improper to take notice of an argument against this part of the Constitution, which has been drawn from the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said that the continuance of an army in that kingdom requires an annual vote of the legislature; whereas the American Constitution has lengthened this critical period to two years. This is the form in which the comparison is usually stated to the public: but is it a just form? Is it a fair comparison? Does the British Constitution restrain the parliamentary discretion to one year? Does the American impose on the Congress appropriations for two years? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown to the authors of the fallacy themselves, that the British Constitution fixes no limit whatever to the discretion of the legislature, and that the American ties down the legislature to two years, as the longest admissible term. Had the argument from the British example been truly stated, it would have stood thus: The term for which supplies may be appropriated to the army establishment, though unlimited by the British Constitution, has nevertheless, in practice, been limited by parliamentary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great Britain, where the House of Commons is elected for seven years; where so great a proportion of the members are elected by so small a proportion of the people; where the electors are so corrupted by the representatives, and the representatives so corrupted by the Crown, the representative body can possess a power to make appropriations to the army for an indefinite term, without desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond a single year, ought not suspicion herself to blush, in pretending that the representatives of the United States, elected FREELY by the WHOLE BODY of the people, every SECOND YEAR, cannot be safely intrusted with the discretion over such appropriations, expressly limited to the short period of TWO YEARS? A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this truth, the management of the opposition to the federal government is an unvaried exemplification. But among all the blunders which have been committed, none is more striking than the attempt to enlist on that side the prudent jealousy entertained by the people, of standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully the public attention to that important subject; and has led to investigations which must terminate in a thorough and universal conviction, not only that the constitution has provided the most effectual guards against danger from that quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution fully adequate to the national defense and the preservation of the Union, can save America from as many standing armies as it may be split into States or Confederacies, and from such a progressive augmentation, of these establishments in each, as will render them as burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liberties of the people, as any establishment that can become necessary, under a united and efficient government, must be tolerable to the former and safe to the latter. The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure, which has spared few other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered among the greatest blessings of America, that as her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a principal source of her security against danger from abroad. In this respect our situation bears another likeness to the insular advantage of Great Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling foreign enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can never be turned by a perfidious government against our liberties. The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply interested in this provision for naval protection, and if they have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds; if their property has remained safe against the predatory spirit of licentious adventurers; if their maritime towns have not yet been compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders, these instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing government for the protection of those from whom it claims allegiance, but to causes that are fugitive and fallacious. If we except perhaps Virginia and Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on their eastern frontiers, no part of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on this subject than New York. Her seacoast is extensive. A very important district of the State is an island. The State itself is penetrated by a large navigable river for more than fifty leagues. The great emporium of its commerce, the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of events, and may almost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations, not only on that element, but every part of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous. In the present condition of America, the States more immediately exposed to these calamities have nothing to hope from the phantom of a general government which now exists; and if their single resources were equal to the task of fortifying themselves against the danger, the object to be protected would be almost consumed by the means of protecting them. The power of regulating and calling forth the militia has been already sufficiently vindicated and explained. The power of levying and borrowing money, being the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the national defense, is properly thrown into the same class with it. This power, also, has been examined already with much attention, and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be necessary, both in the extent and form given to it by the Constitution. I will address one additional reflection only to those who contend that the power ought to have been restrained to external taxation by which they mean, taxes on articles imported from other countries. It cannot be doubted that this will always be a valuable source of revenue; that for a considerable time it must be a principal source; that at this moment it is an essential one. But we may form very mistaken ideas on this subject, if we do not call to mind in our calculations, that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign commerce must vary with the variations, both in the extent and the kind of imports; and that these variations do not correspond with the progress of population, which must be the general measure of the public wants. As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor, the importation of manufactures must increase as the consumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures are begun by the hands not called for by agriculture, the imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers of people increase. In a more remote stage, the imports may consist in a considerable part of raw materials, which will be wrought into articles for exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of bounties, than to be loaded with discouraging duties. A system of government, meant for duration, ought to contemplate these revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to them. Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation, have grounded a very fierce attack against the Constitution, on the language in which it is defined. It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States," amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction. Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for the general welfare. "But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter. The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the language used by the convention is a copy from the articles of Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States, as described in article third, are "their common defense, security of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare. " The terms of article eighth are still more identical: "All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury," etc. A similar language again occurs in article ninth. Construe either of these articles by the rules which would justify the construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest in the existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases whatsoever.

But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had exercised an unlimited power of providing for the common defense and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves, whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning in justification of Congress as they now make use of against the convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own condemnation!

PUBLIUS.

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Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

• The Federalist Papers #1: Alexander Hamilton's Plea for Reasoned Debate

• The Federalist Papers #2 A: John Jay on the Idea of America

• The Federalist Papers #2 B: You Trusted the Continental Congress; Trust the Constitutional Convention

• The Federalist Papers #3: United, the 13 States are Less Likely to Stumble into War

• The Federalist Papers #4 A: The States Must Be Prepared to Defend against Aggression by Other Nations

• The Federalist Papers #4 B: National Defense Will Be Stronger if the States are United

• The Federalist Papers #5: Unless United, the States Will Be at Each Others' Throats

• The Federalist Papers #6 A: Alexander Hamilton on the Many Human Motives for War

• The Federalist Papers #6 B: Commercial Republics Also Start Wars with Their Neighbors—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 A: Divided, the States Would Fall into Territorial Disputes Likely to Lead to War Between the States—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 B: Without Union, Economic Disagreements Would Drive the States to Conflict with One Another—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #8: Without Union, the States Would Either Be Subject to Devastating Wars with Each Other or Would Have Liberty Endangered by their Own Standing Armies—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 A: There Has Been Technological Progress in Practical Principles of Republican Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 B: A Large Confederation May Be More Politically Stable Than a Small Nation—Alexander Hamilton Cites Montesquieu

• The Federalist Papers #10 A: Conflicts Arising from Differences of Opinion Are an Inevitable Accompaniment of Liberty—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #10 B: The Larger the Republic, the Easier It is to Find Thoughtful Legislators and the Harder It is to Put Together a Majority to do Unjust Things—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #11 A: United, the States Can Get a Better Trade Deal—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #11 B: Union Will Make Possible a Strong Navy, Allowing America to Chart Its Own Destiny—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #12: Union Makes it Much Easier to Get Tariff Revenue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #13: Alexander Hamilton on Increasing Returns to Scale in National Government

• The Federalist Papers #14: A Republic Can Be Geographically Large—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #15: A Government, to be Worthy of the Name, Must Govern Its Citizens, Not Just Its Subordinate Jurisdictions—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #16: Authority of the Federal Government Directly over Individuals Means States Can Only Thwart the Federal Government by Active and Obvious Resistance—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #17: Three Levels of Federal Power

• The Federalist Papers #18: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison Point to the Weakness of Confederations of Cities in Ancient Greece to Argue for a Strong Federal Government

• The Federalist Papers #19: The Weakness of the German Empire, Poland and Switzerland up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #20: The Weakness of the United Netherlands up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #21 A: Constitutions Need to be Enforced—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #21 B: Alexander Hamilton Complains of the Lack of a Measure Such as GDP Suitable for Apportioning Taxes to the States

• The Federalist Papers #22 A: The Articles of Confederation Lead to Uncoordinated Trade Policy and Military Free-Riding—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 B: Supermajority Rules Aren't an Adequate Fix for Departures from One-Person One-Vote—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 C: Pillars of Democracy—The Judicial System, Military Loyal to the Constitution, and Police Loyal to the Constitution

• The Federalist Papers #23: The Federal Government Must Be Given Sufficient Power to Accomplish Whatever We Expect the Federal Government to Do—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #24: The United States Need a Standing Army—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #25: Prohibiting a Standing Army in Time of Peace Would Be a Mistake—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #26: Some Part of the Government Must Be Able to Authorize an Army Whenever Necessary, after Being Forced to Fully Debate the Issue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #27: People Will Get Used to the Federal Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #28: The Federal Government and States Can Check One Another’s Power, Reducing the Chance of Abuses—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #29: State Militias such as the National Guard are Not Attractive Tools for Tyrants—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #30: A Robust Power of Taxation is Needed to Make a Nation Powerful

• The Federalist Papers #31: Alexander Hamilton's Attempt at a Formal Argument for a Robust Federal Power of Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #32: The States Retain All Powers Not Explicitly Taken Away by the Constitution—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #33: The 'Necessary and Proper' and Supremacy Clauses Only Make Explicit What the Specified Powers Imply—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #34: War is Expensive. To Defend the Union, the Federal Government Needs an Ample Power of Taxation—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #35 A: Alexander Hamilton as an Economist

• The Federalist Papers #35 B: Alexander Hamilton on Who Can Represent Whom

• The Federalist Papers #36: Alexander Hamilton on Regressive Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #37: Why the Constitution Isn't Perfect—And Why No Constitution Could Be. James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #38—James Madison Analyzes the Proposed Constitution Using the Principle of Opportunity Cost: What is the Alternative to the Consensus of the Constitutional Convention?

• The Federalist Papers #39: James Madison Downplays How Radical the Proposed Constitution Is

• The Federalist Papers #40: James Madison Argues the Constitutional Convention Had the Warrant to Make Its Proposal—and Its Advice Should Be Taken Even If Not

Open Skepticism and Closed Skepticism

image source

I am a believer. I am also a skeptic—an open skeptic. For almost 40 years, I believed Mormonism. Toward the end of that time I also believed critics of Mormonism and believed in evolution as something so important, it should play a more central role in my vision of life and the universe than it did in Mormonism. Now I have come to a good place as a nonsupernaturalist who appreciates the important truths that traditional religions—including Mormonism—have to offer.

My spiritual journey taught me something valuable for every domain of life, not just for religion: that there are two sides of skepticism as different as day and night.

Open skepticism listens to everyone it comes across, expecting to find at least 10% truth in what almost anyone says, as well as expecting at least 10% falsehood. That expectation of 10% falsehood in most everything it encounters makes it eager to hear what the next person will have to say.

Closed skepticism shuts out ideas that come from the wrong source, are expressed using the wrong terminology, contain an obvious error along with useful insights, or bear the trappings of an alien worldview.

Open skepticism feels like curiosity. Closed skepticism feels like an intellectual version of self-righteousness.

As I touch on in “The Unavoidability of Faith,” we are forced to live by faith simply because there is so much that is unknown, yet we must make decisions. It is much better to face the unknown with the reward for having been an open skeptic—a mind full of the ideas from many sources—than with the intellectual impoverishment that is the comeuppance of a closed skeptic.

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Don’t miss my Unitarian-Universalist sermons on my blog

• UU Visions

• Godless Religion

• Teleotheism and the Purpose of Life (video here)

• The Egocentric Illusion (video here)

• Sharing Epiphanies (including the video)

• The Message of Mormonism for Atheists Who Want to Stay Atheists (video here)

• So You Want to Save the World (video here)

• The Mystery of Consciousness

• The Message of Jesus for Non-Supernaturalists (video here)

• Us and Them

Also, don’t miss Noah Smith’s religion posts:

1. God and SuperGod

2. You Are Already in the Afterlife

3. Go Ahead and Believe in God

4. Mom in Hell

5. Buddha Was Wrong About Desire

6. Noah Smith: Judaism Needs to Get Off the Shtetl

7. Why Do Americans Like Jews and Dislike Mormons?

8. Render Unto Ceasar

9. Original Sin

10. Islam Needs To Separate Church and State

11. Noah Smith—Jews: The Parting of the Ways

12. Noah Smith: You With the Fro

13. The Fight of the Ages: Pain and Death

14. Noah Smith: Sunni Islam is Failing

Other Posts on Religion:

• How Conservative Mormon America Avoided the Fate of Conservative White America

• Inside Mormonism: The Home Teachers Come Over

• What If Jesus Was Really Resurrected?

• Easter Skepticism

• The Mormon View of Jesus

• Sam Brown and Miles Kimball on Teleotheism

• The Teleotheistic Achievement of the New Testament

• An Agnostic Grace

• An Agnostic Prayer for Strength

• An Agnostic Prayer for Awareness

• An Agnostic Invocation

• Redemption for Nonsupernaturalists

• The Unavoidability of Faith

Posts on Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral Compass:

• Co-Active Coaching as a Tool for Maximizing Utility—Getting Where You Want in Life

• On Human Potential

• How Economists Can Enhance Their Scientific Creativity, Engagement and Impact

• Virtues for Economists

• 'Everything Happens for a Reason' for Nonsupernaturalists

• My Life will be Good When ...

• On Perfectionism

• Forgive Yourself

• Fatal Flaws Don't Have To Be Fatal

• Only What is in Our Power is Our Duty

• The Devil of Getting Criticized

• Improving Your User Illusion

• Judson Brewer, Elizabeth Bernstein and Mitchell Kaplan on Finding Inner Calm

• The Four Horsemen of Relationship Destruction

• The Golden Mean as Concavity of Objective Functions

• Glennon Doyle on Wild Humanity

• 'The Four Agreements' by Don Miguel Ruiz (with Janet Mills) and `The Fifth Agreement' by Don Miguel Ruiz and Don Jose Ruiz (with Janet Mills)

• How I Became Optimistic

• Believe in Yourself

• Breaking the Chains

• Leaving a Legacy

• My Objective Function

• The Unmaking

• A Personal Mission Statement: Keep It Short

• John Locke on the Mandate of Heaven

• Tom Gauld's Sympathy Cards for Scientists

• The Expanding Shoreline of Ignorance

• Contrasted Faults Through All Their Manners Reign

• On Altruism, Externalities and Bossiness

• Bex's Rules for Life

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: How Crises Make Us Rethink Our Lives

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: The Lost Art of Curiosity

• Recognizing Opportunity: The Case of the Golden Raspberries—Taryn Laakso

• Taryn Laakso: Battery Charge Trending to 0% — Time to Recharge

• Taryn Laakso: Righting Your Ship Before You Capsize

• Kristeen Barth: We Don't Have to Be for Everyone

• Dave Baillie: Calibrate Your Compass

• Gerard Theoret: 3 Turns of the Screw

• Savannah Taylor: Lessons of the Labyrinth and Tapping Into Your Inner Wisdom

The Federalist Papers #40: James Madison Argues the Constitutional Convention Had the Warrant to Make Its Proposal—and Its Advice Should Be Taken Even If Not

James Madison, portrait by James Sharples. Image source: Wikipedia article “James Madison.”

Link to the full text of the Federalist Papers #40

Having now read forty of the Federalist Papers in order to blog about them, I find myself agreeing with a common opinion that James Madison is a more incisive writer than Alexander Hamilton. the Federalist Papers #40 is a good example of James Madison’s clear writing and thinking.

The Federalist Papers #40 responds to the criticism that the Constitutional Convention exceeded its authority in proposing a constitution so dramatically different from the Articles of Confederation it was tasked to amend. James Madison makes the following arguments:

1. The charge given to the Constitutional Convention from two different meetings urging such a convention was, in fact, quite broad, and urged a substantial change, using the following language (with, presumably, emphasis by James Madison):

   • … such convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these States A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT …

   • REVISING THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

   • ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS THEREIN, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION

   • SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS

2. To the extent the charge to the Constitutional Convention was ambiguous, priority should be giving to the statement of the ends to be achieved over the means to that end; hence, for example, “alterations and provisions therein” should be interpreted liberally if necessary to further the aim of a “firm national government” “adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the union.”

3. The proposed constitution keeps the fundamental principles of the Articles of Confederation—with the exception of the rules for the ratification of the constitution, which are not raising much objection. In particular, these aspects of the proposed Constitution have precedent in what was happening under the Articles of Confederation:

   • “the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns”

   • “members of the government should derive their appointment from the legislatures, not from the people of the States? One branch of the new government is to be appointed by these legislatures; and under the Confederation, the delegates to Congress MAY ALL be appointed immediately by the people, and in two States [Connecticut and Rhode Island] are actually so appointed.”

   • “Do they require that the powers of the government should act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective characters. In some instances, also, those of the existing government act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture; of piracy; of the post office; of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of land by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials by courts-marshal in the army and navy, by which death may be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil magistrate; in all these cases the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens.”

   • “Do these fundamental principles require, particularly, that no tax should be levied without the intermediate agency of the States? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the post office. The power of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source also. But pretermitting these instances, was it not an acknowledged object of the convention and the universal expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general revenue? Had not Congress repeatedly recommended this measure as not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Confederation?”

   • “… in the new government, as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction.”

4. Making the stated principles and aims of the Articles of Confederation actually effective was inevitably going to look like a radical transformation:

   • “The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles of Confederation. The misfortune under the latter system has been, that these principles are so feeble and confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it, and to require a degree of enlargement which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old.”

5. As proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, there is an inherent right of the people to frame a government for themselves that supersedes any particular set of established forms. Moreover, there is ample precedent for innovations that bend the established forms where there is a consensus that it is the right thing to do. Indeed, the establishment of the Continental Congress must be seen as an example of this.

6. The Constitutional Convention did not adopt, it merely recommended. Surely, any group is at liberty to recommend something. The legitimacy of the Constitution rests on its ratification, not on the manner in which it was proposed. And there is relatively little dispute that ratification by the people of nine states would be a legitimate way to establish a compact between those nine states.

7. The members of the Constitutional Convention had a duty to make the best recommendation they could, trusting the people to judge whether that was, in fact, a good recommendation.

These text behind these points is not confined to this order. But each of these points is clearly stated. Judge for yourself the power of James Madison’s prose. Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #40:

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FEDERALIST NO. 40

The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained

From the New York Packet
Friday, January 18, 1788.

Author: James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

THE SECOND point to be examined is, whether the convention were authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitution. The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents. As all of these, however, had reference, either to the recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in September, 1786, or to that from Congress, in February, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these particular acts. The act from Annapolis recommends the "appointment of commissioners to take into consideration the situation of the United States; to devise SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF THE UNION; and to report such an act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every State, will effectually provide for the same. "The recommendatory act of Congress is in the words following:"WHEREAS, There is provision in the articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, for making alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the United States, and of the legislatures of the several States; and whereas experience hath evinced, that there are defects in the present Confederation; as a mean to remedy which, several of the States, and PARTICULARLY THE STATE OF NEW YORK, by express instructions to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a convention for the purposes expressed in the following resolution; and such convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these States A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:"Resolved, That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient, that on the second Monday of May next a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose OF REVISING THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS THEREIN, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION. "From these two acts, it appears, 1st, that the object of the convention was to establish, in these States, A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; 2d, that this government was to be such as would be ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT and THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION; 3d, that these purposes were to be effected by ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS IN THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, as it is expressed in the act of Congress, or by SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS AS SHOULD APPEAR NECESSARY, as it stands in the recommendatory act from Annapolis; 4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be reported to Congress, and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the former and confirmed by the latter. From a comparison and fair construction of these several modes of expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the convention acted. They were to frame a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, adequate to the EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT, and OF THE UNION; and to reduce the articles of Confederation into such form as to accomplish these purposes.

There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. The one is, that every part of the expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to some common end. The other is, that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important should give way to the more important part; the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the means. Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the authority of the convention were irreconcilably at variance with each other; that a NATIONAL and ADEQUATE GOVERNMENT could not possibly, in the judgment of the convention, be affected by ALTERATIONS and PROVISIONS in the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION; which part of the definition ought to have been embraced, and which rejected? Which was the more important, which the less important part? Which the end; which the means? Let the most scrupulous expositors of delegated powers; let the most inveterate objectors against those exercised by the convention, answer these questions. Let them declare, whether it was of most importance to the happiness of the people of America, that the articles of Confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate government be provided, and the Union preserved; or that an adequate government should be omitted, and the articles of Confederation preserved. Let them declare, whether the preservation of these articles was the end, for securing which a reform of the government was to be introduced as the means; or whether the establishment of a government, adequate to the national happiness, was the end at which these articles themselves originally aimed, and to which they ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed. But is it necessary to suppose that these expressions are absolutely irreconcilable to each other; that no ALTERATIONS or PROVISIONS in THE ARTICLES OF THE CONFEDERATION could possibly mould them into a national and adequate government; into such a government as has been proposed by the convention? No stress, it is presumed, will, in this case, be laid on the TITLE; a change of that could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted power. ALTERATIONS in the body of the instrument are expressly authorized. NEW PROVISIONS therein are also expressly authorized. Here then is a power to change the title; to insert new articles; to alter old ones. Must it of necessity be admitted that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the old articles remain? Those who maintain the affirmative ought at least to mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innovations; between that degree of change which lies within the compass of ALTERATIONS AND FURTHER PROVISIONS, and that which amounts to a TRANSMUTATION of the government. Will it be said that the alterations ought not to have touched the substance of the Confederation? The States would never have appointed a convention with so much solemnity, nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some SUBSTANTIAL reform had not been in contemplation. Will it be said that the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES of the Confederation were not within the purview of the convention, and ought not to have been varied? I ask, What are these principles? Do they require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the Constitution proposed. Do they require that the members of the government should derive their appointment from the legislatures, not from the people of the States? One branch of the new government is to be appointed by these legislatures; and under the Confederation, the delegates to Congress MAY ALL be appointed immediately by the people, and in two States [Connecticut and Rhode Island] are actually so appointed. Do they require that the powers of the government should act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective characters. In some instances, also, those of the existing government act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture; of piracy; of the post office; of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of land by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials by courts-marshal in the army and navy, by which death may be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil magistrate; in all these cases the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens. Do these fundamental principles require, particularly, that no tax should be levied without the intermediate agency of the States? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the post office. The power of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source also. But pretermitting these instances, was it not an acknowledged object of the convention and the universal expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general revenue? Had not Congress repeatedly recommended this measure as not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Confederation? Had not every State but one; had not New York herself, so far complied with the plan of Congress as to recognize the PRINCIPLE of the innovation? Do these principles, in fine, require that the powers of the general government should be limited, and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of their sovereignty and independence? We have seen that in the new government, as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction. The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles of Confederation. The misfortune under the latter system has been, that these principles are so feeble and confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it, and to require a degree of enlargement which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old. In one particular it is admitted that the convention have departed from the tenor of their commission. Instead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation OF THE LEGISLATURES OF ALL THE STATES, they have reported a plan which is to be confirmed by the PEOPLE, and may be carried into effect by NINE STATES ONLY. It is worthy of remark that this objection, though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the publications which have swarmed against the convention. The forbearance can only have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth; from the example of inflexible opposition given by a MAJORITY of one sixtieth of the people of America to a measure approved and called for by the voice of twelve States, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the people an example still fresh in the memory and indignation of every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and prosperity of his country. As this objection, therefore, has been in a manner waived by those who have criticised the powers of the convention, I dismiss it without further observation. The THIRD point to be inquired into is, how far considerations of duty arising out of the case itself could have supplied any defect of regular authority. In the preceding inquiries the powers of the convention have been analyzed and tried with the same rigor, and by the same rules, as if they had been real and final powers for the establishment of a Constitution for the United States. We have seen in what manner they have borne the trial even on that supposition. It is time now to recollect that the powers were merely advisory and recommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and so understood by the convention; and that the latter have accordingly planned and proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more consequence than the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed. This reflection places the subject in a point of view altogether different, and will enable us to judge with propriety of the course taken by the convention. Let us view the ground on which the convention stood. It may be collected from their proceedings, that they were deeply and unanimously impressed with the crisis, which had led their country almost with one voice to make so singular and solemn an experiment for correcting the errors of a system by which this crisis had been produced; that they were no less deeply and unanimously convinced that such a reform as they have proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their appointment. It could not be unknown to them that the hopes and expectations of the great body of citizens, throughout this great empire, were turned with the keenest anxiety to the event of their deliberations. They had every reason to believe that the contrary sentiments agitated the minds and bosoms of every external and internal foe to the liberty and prosperity of the United States. They had seen in the origin and progress of the experiment, the alacrity with which the PROPOSITION, made by a single State (Virginia), towards a partial amendment of the Confederation, had been attended to and promoted. They had seen the LIBERTY ASSUMED by a VERY FEW deputies from a VERY FEW States, convened at Annapolis, of recommending a great and critical object, wholly foreign to their commission, not only justified by the public opinion, but actually carried into effect by twelve out of the thirteen States. They had seen, in a variety of instances, assumptions by Congress, not only of recommendatory, but of operative, powers, warranted, in the public estimation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent than those by which their conduct was to be governed. They must have reflected, that in all great changes of established governments, forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former, would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the people to "abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness," [Declaration of Independence] since it is impossible for the people spontaneously and universally to move in concert towards their object; and it is therefore essential that such changes be instituted by some INFORMAL AND UNAUTHORIZED PROPOSITIONS, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or number of citizens. They must have recollected that it was by this irregular and assumed privilege of proposing to the people plans for their safety and happiness, that the States were first united against the danger with which they were threatened by their ancient government; that committees and congresses were formed for concentrating their efforts and defending their rights; and that CONVENTIONS were ELECTED in THE SEVERAL STATES for establishing the constitutions under which they are now governed; nor could it have been forgotten that no little ill-timed scruples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary forms, were anywhere seen, except in those who wished to indulge, under these masks, their secret enmity to the substance contended for. They must have borne in mind, that as the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted TO THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, the disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it forever; its approbation blot out antecedent errors and irregularities. It might even have occurred to them, that where a disposition to cavil prevailed, their neglect to execute the degree of power vested in them, and still more their recommendation of any measure whatever, not warranted by their commission, would not less excite animadversion, than a recommendation at once of a measure fully commensurate to the national exigencies. Had the convention, under all these impressions, and in the midst of all these considerations, instead of exercising a manly confidence in their country, by whose confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished, and of pointing out a system capable, in their judgment, of securing its happiness, taken the cold and sullen resolution of disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing substance to forms, of committing the dearest interests of their country to the uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events, let me ask the man who can raise his mind to one elevated conception, who can awaken in his bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought to have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen, on the conduct and character of this assembly? Or if there be a man whose propensity to condemn is susceptible of no control, let me then ask what sentence he has in reserve for the twelve States who USURPED THE POWER of sending deputies to the convention, a body utterly unknown to their constitutions; for Congress, who recommended the appointment of this body, equally unknown to the Confederation; and for the State of New York, in particular, which first urged and then complied with this unauthorized interposition? But that the objectors may be disarmed of every pretext, it shall be granted for a moment that the convention were neither authorized by their commission, nor justified by circumstances in proposing a Constitution for their country: does it follow that the Constitution ought, for that reason alone, to be rejected? If, according to the noble precept, it be lawful to accept good advice even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends? The prudent inquiry, in all cases, ought surely to be, not so much FROM WHOM the advice comes, as whether the advice be GOOD. The sum of what has been here advanced and proved is, that the charge against the convention of exceeding their powers, except in one instance little urged by the objectors, has no foundation to support it; that if they had exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted, but required, as the confidential servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed, to exercise the liberty which they assume; and that finally, if they had violated both their powers and their obligations, in proposing a Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the people of America. How far this character is due to the Constitution, is the subject under investigation.

PUBLIUS.

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Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

• The Federalist Papers #1: Alexander Hamilton's Plea for Reasoned Debate

• The Federalist Papers #2 A: John Jay on the Idea of America

• The Federalist Papers #2 B: You Trusted the Continental Congress; Trust the Constitutional Convention

• The Federalist Papers #3: United, the 13 States are Less Likely to Stumble into War

• The Federalist Papers #4 A: The States Must Be Prepared to Defend against Aggression by Other Nations

• The Federalist Papers #4 B: National Defense Will Be Stronger if the States are United

• The Federalist Papers #5: Unless United, the States Will Be at Each Others' Throats

• The Federalist Papers #6 A: Alexander Hamilton on the Many Human Motives for War

• The Federalist Papers #6 B: Commercial Republics Also Start Wars with Their Neighbors—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 A: Divided, the States Would Fall into Territorial Disputes Likely to Lead to War Between the States—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 B: Without Union, Economic Disagreements Would Drive the States to Conflict with One Another—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #8: Without Union, the States Would Either Be Subject to Devastating Wars with Each Other or Would Have Liberty Endangered by their Own Standing Armies—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 A: There Has Been Technological Progress in Practical Principles of Republican Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 B: A Large Confederation May Be More Politically Stable Than a Small Nation—Alexander Hamilton Cites Montesquieu

• The Federalist Papers #10 A: Conflicts Arising from Differences of Opinion Are an Inevitable Accompaniment of Liberty—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #10 B: The Larger the Republic, the Easier It is to Find Thoughtful Legislators and the Harder It is to Put Together a Majority to do Unjust Things—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #11 A: United, the States Can Get a Better Trade Deal—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #11 B: Union Will Make Possible a Strong Navy, Allowing America to Chart Its Own Destiny—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #12: Union Makes it Much Easier to Get Tariff Revenue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #13: Alexander Hamilton on Increasing Returns to Scale in National Government

• The Federalist Papers #14: A Republic Can Be Geographically Large—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #15: A Government, to be Worthy of the Name, Must Govern Its Citizens, Not Just Its Subordinate Jurisdictions—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #16: Authority of the Federal Government Directly over Individuals Means States Can Only Thwart the Federal Government by Active and Obvious Resistance—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #17: Three Levels of Federal Power

• The Federalist Papers #18: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison Point to the Weakness of Confederations of Cities in Ancient Greece to Argue for a Strong Federal Government

• The Federalist Papers #19: The Weakness of the German Empire, Poland and Switzerland up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #20: The Weakness of the United Netherlands up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #21 A: Constitutions Need to be Enforced—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #21 B: Alexander Hamilton Complains of the Lack of a Measure Such as GDP Suitable for Apportioning Taxes to the States

• The Federalist Papers #22 A: The Articles of Confederation Lead to Uncoordinated Trade Policy and Military Free-Riding—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 B: Supermajority Rules Aren't an Adequate Fix for Departures from One-Person One-Vote—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 C: Pillars of Democracy—The Judicial System, Military Loyal to the Constitution, and Police Loyal to the Constitution

• The Federalist Papers #23: The Federal Government Must Be Given Sufficient Power to Accomplish Whatever We Expect the Federal Government to Do—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #24: The United States Need a Standing Army—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #25: Prohibiting a Standing Army in Time of Peace Would Be a Mistake—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #26: Some Part of the Government Must Be Able to Authorize an Army Whenever Necessary, after Being Forced to Fully Debate the Issue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #27: People Will Get Used to the Federal Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #28: The Federal Government and States Can Check One Another’s Power, Reducing the Chance of Abuses—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #29: State Militias such as the National Guard are Not Attractive Tools for Tyrants—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #30: A Robust Power of Taxation is Needed to Make a Nation Powerful

• The Federalist Papers #31: Alexander Hamilton's Attempt at a Formal Argument for a Robust Federal Power of Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #32: The States Retain All Powers Not Explicitly Taken Away by the Constitution—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #33: The 'Necessary and Proper' and Supremacy Clauses Only Make Explicit What the Specified Powers Imply—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #34: War is Expensive. To Defend the Union, the Federal Government Needs an Ample Power of Taxation—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #35 A: Alexander Hamilton as an Economist

• The Federalist Papers #35 B: Alexander Hamilton on Who Can Represent Whom

• The Federalist Papers #36: Alexander Hamilton on Regressive Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #37: Why the Constitution Isn't Perfect—And Why No Constitution Could Be. James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #38—James Madison Analyzes the Proposed Constitution Using the Principle of Opportunity Cost: What is the Alternative to the Consensus of the Constitutional Convention?

• The Federalist Papers #39: James Madison Downplays How Radical the Proposed Constitution Is

An Example of How Mormons Teach Personal Responsibility

In “Mormonism Has More Important Things to Preach than the Purported Evils of Gay Marriage,” I write:

Mormonism is one of the key reservoirs of belief in personal responsibility these days—that by dint of effort, one can make one’s own life better and contribute to making the world a better place.

Jordan Peterson tells the story of giving a talk about personal responsibility to students at Harvard—who had to be quite accomplished to get admitted—and having many come up afterward to tell him how meaningful that message was to them and how no one had ever given them that message of personal responsibility like that. I got that message of personal responsibility growing up in Mormonism. I am grateful for that. This is the kind of message that Mormonism should be telling the world, going up against the tide that emphasizes injuries and rights without sufficiently balancing that emphasis by also talking about responsibility and personal agency.

At the top of this post is a recent example of Mormon’s being taught personal responsibility—that they can make a difference in their own lives and for the world. It isn’t exactly how I would teach personal responsibility, but it does a good job of getting the basic message across.

Redemption for Nonsupernaturalists

Link to “The Wondrous Cross,” performed by Christy Nockels, on YouTube

People sometimes ask me if I believe in God. I answer that I am a nonsupernaturalist, and believe in God as a nonsupernaturalist can. To define “nonsupernaturalist,” see my post “What Do You Mean by 'Supernatural'?” In effect, it makes physicists the arbiter of what counts as supernatural.

If you google “Teleotheism” you will go straight to my blog post “Teleotheism and the Purpose of Life” which gives the basics of my belief in God—or as I prefer to say: “the God or Gods Who May Be.” (See my bare beginning of a prayerbook in “The Book of Uncommon Prayer.”) In 2021, I elaborate that to these dimensions of god:

1. God Within: our highest and best self (even when nascent).

2. God Between: what emerges when the highest and best selves of more than one person interact.

3. God Ahead: the best that we can build together; or as I put it in “Teleotheism and the Purpose of Life,” the greatest of all things that can come true.

As time goes on, I come across more and more strands of nonsupernaturalist religion. In my sermons, I recommend Unitarian-Universalism as an institutional framework, though recently other aspects of its religious mission have begun to be overtaken by wokeness. Liberal Judaism and very liberal Christianity are congenial to nonsupernaturalists. There has always been a strong nonsupernaturalist strain in Buddhism, especially in Zen. (For Zen, I highly recommend the Zen koan practice sequence in Sam Harris’s Waking Up app.) And Jordan Peterson is digging deep into religion from a psychological and essentially nonsupernaturalist point of view—though he is careful to express agnosticism, allowing for the possibility of the supernatural. (See for example Jordan Peterson’s talks on the Bible.) I also see a strong strand of nonsupernaturalist religion in resurgent Stoicism and in the Human Potential movement. (See “On Human Potential” and other links at the very bottom of this post.)

Today, I want to talk about the need nonsupernaturalists, just as supernaturalists, have for redemption. A big barrier to positive change in our lives is the pain we experience in beholding the badness in our lives and the badness we see right now when we look inside our hearts. By “redemption” I mean help in coming to terms with our own badness in a way that doesn’t paralyze us.

For those who can simultaneously retain and temporarily suspend disbelief, I think the Christian supernaturalist narrative has a lot to offer even the nonsupernaturalist. As for any religion trying to claim that the divine is all good, Christianity has difficulty explaining the evil in the world. (See the Wikipedia article “Theodicy.”) But for the purpose of understanding redemption, take the existence of evil as an unexplained given. As well, take as a given that our own personal badness will cause serious disruptions in the world, that especially effect us individually because we are at the center of those disruptions. Then, starting from that point, dive into the Christian narrative of a being who loves us so much that he is willing to die a horrible death and suffer in other ways to help us deal with our own personal badness. Jesus preaches forgiveness and dies and suffers to further forgiveness—our forgiving others and our forgiving ourselves. We desperately need to forgive others and to forgive ourselves. So the Christian narrative brings hope. I am a nonsupernaturalist witness that, simultaneously retaining and suspending disbelief, this narrative still helps me to face my own personal badness.

To see what I mean about the Christian narrative helping you to face your own personal badness, try an experiment. Contemplate for a few minutes some of the ways in which you have been genuinely bad in your life—things you regret from an ethical point of view. Once you feel the weight of it emotionally, try listening to Christy Nockels’s video at the top of this post “The Wondrous Cross,” and see what that does for you psychologically. It may not work as well for you as it does for me, but if there is any lifting at all of the paralysis that often comes from contemplating one’s own badness, that backs up my claim of the redemptive value of at least some parts of the Christian narrative, even for a nonsupernaturalist.

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Don’t miss my Unitarian-Universalist sermons on my blog

• UU Visions

• Godless Religion

• Teleotheism and the Purpose of Life (video here)

• The Egocentric Illusion (video here)

• Sharing Epiphanies (including the video)

• The Message of Mormonism for Atheists Who Want to Stay Atheists (video here)

• So You Want to Save the World (video here)

• The Mystery of Consciousness

• The Message of Jesus for Non-Supernaturalists (video here)

• Us and Them

Also, don’t miss Noah Smith’s religion posts:

1. God and SuperGod

2. You Are Already in the Afterlife

3. Go Ahead and Believe in God

4. Mom in Hell

5. Buddha Was Wrong About Desire

6. Noah Smith: Judaism Needs to Get Off the Shtetl

7. Why Do Americans Like Jews and Dislike Mormons?

8. Render Unto Ceasar

9. Original Sin

10. Islam Needs To Separate Church and State

11. Noah Smith—Jews: The Parting of the Ways

12. Noah Smith: You With the Fro

13. The Fight of the Ages: Pain and Death

14. Noah Smith: Sunni Islam is Failing

Other Posts on Religion:

• How Conservative Mormon America Avoided the Fate of Conservative White America

• Inside Mormonism: The Home Teachers Come Over

• What If Jesus Was Really Resurrected?

• Easter Skepticism

• The Mormon View of Jesus

• Sam Brown and Miles Kimball on Teleotheism

• The Teleotheistic Achievement of the New Testament

• An Agnostic Grace

• An Agnostic Prayer for Strength

• An Agnostic Prayer for Awareness

• An Agnostic Invocation

Posts on Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral Compass:

• Co-Active Coaching as a Tool for Maximizing Utility—Getting Where You Want in Life

• On Human Potential

• How Economists Can Enhance Their Scientific Creativity, Engagement and Impact

• Virtues for Economists

• 'Everything Happens for a Reason' for Nonsupernaturalists

• My Life will be Good When ...

• On Perfectionism

• Forgive Yourself

• Fatal Flaws Don't Have To Be Fatal

• Only What is in Our Power is Our Duty

• The Devil of Getting Criticized

• Improving Your User Illusion

• Judson Brewer, Elizabeth Bernstein and Mitchell Kaplan on Finding Inner Calm

• The Four Horsemen of Relationship Destruction

• The Golden Mean as Concavity of Objective Functions

• Glennon Doyle on Wild Humanity

• 'The Four Agreements' by Don Miguel Ruiz (with Janet Mills) and `The Fifth Agreement' by Don Miguel Ruiz and Don Jose Ruiz (with Janet Mills)

• How I Became Optimistic

• Believe in Yourself

• Breaking the Chains

• Leaving a Legacy

• My Objective Function

• The Unmaking

• A Personal Mission Statement: Keep It Short

• John Locke on the Mandate of Heaven

• Tom Gauld's Sympathy Cards for Scientists

• The Expanding Shoreline of Ignorance

• Contrasted Faults Through All Their Manners Reign

• On Altruism, Externalities and Bossiness

• Bex's Rules for Life

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: How Crises Make Us Rethink Our Lives

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: The Lost Art of Curiosity

• Recognizing Opportunity: The Case of the Golden Raspberries—Taryn Laakso

• Taryn Laakso: Battery Charge Trending to 0% — Time to Recharge

• Taryn Laakso: Righting Your Ship Before You Capsize

• Kristeen Barth: We Don't Have to Be for Everyone

• Dave Baillie: Calibrate Your Compass

• Gerard Theoret: 3 Turns of the Screw

• Savannah Taylor: Lessons of the Labyrinth and Tapping Into Your Inner Wisdom

The Federalist Papers #39: James Madison Downplays How Radical the Proposed Constitution Is

The Roman Senate. Image source

Link to the full text of the Federalist Papers #39

James Madison was aware that the Constitutional Convention had done something radical. Therefore, he was at pains to argue in the Federalist Papers #39 that the proposed Constitution was not that radical. First, he argued that the proposed Constitution did followed the pattern of state constitutions. Second, to reassure those who thought that the Constitution gave too much power to the national government, he pointed to all the ways in which states still mattered.

As an introduction to the Federalist Papers #39, James Madison gives this definition of a “republic”:

… a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic. It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; …

To a modern reader, the restriction back then of the vote to white males with some amount of property betrays the republican stipulation that

It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; …

But of course many governments back then and even now have a narrower basis than even that:

Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter.

Here are some of the points by which James Madison reassures his readers by saying that the proposed Constitution follows the same pattern as state constitutions. I have added bullets to separate passages:

• The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people.

• The Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the people.

• The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the example in most of the States.

• Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves, …

• The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina.

• The Senate is elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia.

• The President is to continue in office for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware, the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election is annual.

• The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior.

After emphasizing on many points the similarity of the proposed constitution to the existing state constitutions, James Madison argues that it is in one respect more republican than many of the state constitutions: by making more provision for impeachment of the president:

• In several of the States, however, no constitutional provision is made for the impeachment of the chief magistrate. And in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office.

But the most important purpose of the Federalist Papers #39 was to answer the charge that the proposed constitution centralized power in the national government. James Madison lays out the charge he is answering as follows:

"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, "for the convention to adhere to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States."

There is also a charge that the Constitutional Convention exceeded its authority; the answer to that charge is left to another number in the Federalist Papers.

James Madison concedes the following ways in which the central government is given great power under the proposed constitution:

• The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL.

• … the operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government.

• It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; …

Note particularly the third bullet, which claims a power of the central government against “dissolution of the compact.” This, claim, of course, became important during the Civil War.

But James Madison points to these ways in which the proposed constitution preserves substantial state power:

• the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL act.

  That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union, nor from that of a MAJORITY of the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves.

• The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL.

• The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic.

• In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.

• If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. … In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.

James Madison ends with the conclusion that the proposed constitution is somewhere between federal and national:

The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.

Given his goal of getting the constitution ratified, I think James Madison was right to think he should try to display the proposed constitution in as reassuring a light as possible, trying to make it look less radical than it definitely looked from some angles. The dispute over how powerful the national government should be and how powerful the state governments should be has still not been entirely resolved. Disputes on that score continue to this day.

Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #39 to give context to the excerpts laid out above.

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FEDERALIST NO. 39

The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles

For the Independent Journal.

Author: James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

THE last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking.

The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.

What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this question to be sought, not by recurring to principles, but in the application of the term by political writers, to the constitution of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme authority is derived from the people, has passed almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The same title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute power over the great body of the people is exercised, in the most absolute manner, by a small body of hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and of monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified with the same appellation. The government of England, which has one republican branch only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has, with equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of republics. These examples, which are nearly as dissimilar to each other as to a genuine republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in political disquisitions.

If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic. It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other popular government that has been or can be well organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican character. According to the constitution of every State in the Union, some or other of the officers of government are appointed indirectly only by the people. According to most of them, the chief magistrate himself is so appointed. And according to one, this mode of appointment is extended to one of the co-ordinate branches of the legislature. According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instances, both within the legislative and executive departments, to a period of years. According to the provisions of most of the constitutions, again, as well as according to the most respectable and received opinions on the subject, the members of the judiciary department are to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good behavior.

On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the most rigid sense, conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the people. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the example in most of the States. Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves, the duration of the appointments is equally conformable to the republican standard, and to the model of State constitutions The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to continue in office for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware, the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election is annual. In several of the States, however, no constitutional provision is made for the impeachment of the chief magistrate. And in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the State constitutions.

Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter.

"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, "for the convention to adhere to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States." And it is asked by what authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The handle which has been made of this objection requires that it should be examined with some precision.

Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, first, to ascertain the real character of the government in question; secondly, to inquire how far the convention were authorized to propose such a government; and thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could supply any defect of regular authority.

First. In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced.

On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL act.

That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union, nor from that of a MAJORITY of the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these rules have been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL constitution.

The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived. The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL. The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many FEDERAL as NATIONAL features.

The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the national countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government.

But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.

If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.

The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.

PUBLIUS.

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Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

• The Federalist Papers #1: Alexander Hamilton's Plea for Reasoned Debate

• The Federalist Papers #2 A: John Jay on the Idea of America

• The Federalist Papers #2 B: You Trusted the Continental Congress; Trust the Constitutional Convention

• The Federalist Papers #3: United, the 13 States are Less Likely to Stumble into War

• The Federalist Papers #4 A: The States Must Be Prepared to Defend against Aggression by Other Nations

• The Federalist Papers #4 B: National Defense Will Be Stronger if the States are United

• The Federalist Papers #5: Unless United, the States Will Be at Each Others' Throats

• The Federalist Papers #6 A: Alexander Hamilton on the Many Human Motives for War

• The Federalist Papers #6 B: Commercial Republics Also Start Wars with Their Neighbors—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 A: Divided, the States Would Fall into Territorial Disputes Likely to Lead to War Between the States—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 B: Without Union, Economic Disagreements Would Drive the States to Conflict with One Another—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #8: Without Union, the States Would Either Be Subject to Devastating Wars with Each Other or Would Have Liberty Endangered by their Own Standing Armies—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 A: There Has Been Technological Progress in Practical Principles of Republican Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 B: A Large Confederation May Be More Politically Stable Than a Small Nation—Alexander Hamilton Cites Montesquieu

• The Federalist Papers #10 A: Conflicts Arising from Differences of Opinion Are an Inevitable Accompaniment of Liberty—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #10 B: The Larger the Republic, the Easier It is to Find Thoughtful Legislators and the Harder It is to Put Together a Majority to do Unjust Things—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #11 A: United, the States Can Get a Better Trade Deal—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #11 B: Union Will Make Possible a Strong Navy, Allowing America to Chart Its Own Destiny—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #12: Union Makes it Much Easier to Get Tariff Revenue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #13: Alexander Hamilton on Increasing Returns to Scale in National Government

• The Federalist Papers #14: A Republic Can Be Geographically Large—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #15: A Government, to be Worthy of the Name, Must Govern Its Citizens, Not Just Its Subordinate Jurisdictions—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #16: Authority of the Federal Government Directly over Individuals Means States Can Only Thwart the Federal Government by Active and Obvious Resistance—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #17: Three Levels of Federal Power

• The Federalist Papers #18: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison Point to the Weakness of Confederations of Cities in Ancient Greece to Argue for a Strong Federal Government

• The Federalist Papers #19: The Weakness of the German Empire, Poland and Switzerland up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #20: The Weakness of the United Netherlands up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #21 A: Constitutions Need to be Enforced—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #21 B: Alexander Hamilton Complains of the Lack of a Measure Such as GDP Suitable for Apportioning Taxes to the States

• The Federalist Papers #22 A: The Articles of Confederation Lead to Uncoordinated Trade Policy and Military Free-Riding—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 B: Supermajority Rules Aren't an Adequate Fix for Departures from One-Person One-Vote—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 C: Pillars of Democracy—The Judicial System, Military Loyal to the Constitution, and Police Loyal to the Constitution

• The Federalist Papers #23: The Federal Government Must Be Given Sufficient Power to Accomplish Whatever We Expect the Federal Government to Do—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #24: The United States Need a Standing Army—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #25: Prohibiting a Standing Army in Time of Peace Would Be a Mistake—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #26: Some Part of the Government Must Be Able to Authorize an Army Whenever Necessary, after Being Forced to Fully Debate the Issue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #27: People Will Get Used to the Federal Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #28: The Federal Government and States Can Check One Another’s Power, Reducing the Chance of Abuses—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #29: State Militias such as the National Guard are Not Attractive Tools for Tyrants—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #30: A Robust Power of Taxation is Needed to Make a Nation Powerful

• The Federalist Papers #31: Alexander Hamilton's Attempt at a Formal Argument for a Robust Federal Power of Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #32: The States Retain All Powers Not Explicitly Taken Away by the Constitution—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #33: The 'Necessary and Proper' and Supremacy Clauses Only Make Explicit What the Specified Powers Imply—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #34: War is Expensive. To Defend the Union, the Federal Government Needs an Ample Power of Taxation—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #35 A: Alexander Hamilton as an Economist

• The Federalist Papers #35 B: Alexander Hamilton on Who Can Represent Whom

• The Federalist Papers #36: Alexander Hamilton on Regressive Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #37: Why the Constitution Isn't Perfect—And Why No Constitution Could Be. James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #38—James Madison Analyzes the Proposed Constitution Using the Principle of Opportunity Cost: What is the Alternative to the Consensus of the Constitutional Convention?
  
  

The 21st-Century Malaise of Males

Link to the article shown above

While attention has been focused on the dominance of high-end males in our society, low-end males have have been falling behind. Let me quote a few statistics from Douglas Belkin’s September 6, 2021 Wall Street Journal article “A Generation of American Men Give Up on College” (bullets added to separate passages):

• At the close of the 2020-21 academic year, women made up 59.5% of college students, an all-time high, and men 40.5%, according to enrollment data from the National Student Clearinghouse, a nonprofit research group.

• After six years of college, 65% of women in the U.S. who started a four-year university in 2012 received diplomas by 2018 compared with 59% of men during the same period, according to the U.S. Department of Education.

• In the next few years, two women will earn a college degree for every man, if the trend continues, said Douglas Shapiro, executive director of the research center at the National Student Clearinghouse.

• Women increased their lead over men in college applications for the 2021-22 school year—3,805,978 to 2,815,810—by nearly a percentage point compared with the previous academic year, according to Common Application, a nonprofit that transmits applications to more than 900 schools.

Part of this tilt of men away from college may be that higher education has gone off the rails in important ways, especially in serving young men. On that, see “False Advertising for College is Pretty Much the Norm” and “The Coming Transformation of Education: Degrees Won’t Matter Anymore, Skills Will.

Part of the trouble may be that straightforward ways of helping young men are not being taken. Douglas Belkin writes in ““A Generation of American Men Give Up on College”:

No college wants to tackle the issue under the glare of gender politics, said Ms. Delahunty, the enrollment consultant. The conventional view on campuses, she said, is that “men make more money, men hold higher positions, why should we give them a little shove from high school to college?”

I find this an unfortunate attitude. I tweeted this reaction:

An awareness of white male privilege at the high end is keeping help from getting to white males falling behind at the low end. https://t.co/PMW0RGrvc1

— Miles Kimball (@mileskimball) September 8, 2021

But I consider men’s tilt away from college as a symptom of something bigger. As a society, we are failing in our raising of something like a third of our young men. Jordan Peterson reports that when he gives a talk telling young men that life is tough but that by effort they can make their lives better, they are often grateful, saying they hadn’t heard that message before. How could we be failing to get that message across to all of our young men!

It is true that when looking at others, one should be very much aware of how luck, including the accident of what family was born into, affects their lives. But it doesn’t do much good to dwell on the accident of what family one was born into and other dimensions of luck in one’s own life! Everyone, everyone, needs to be taught that effort can better their situation in life.

Noah Smith and I addressed this principle in relation to math in “There's One Key Difference Between Kids Who Excel at Math and Those Who Don't.” (I followed that up with “How to Turn Every Child into a 'Math Person'.”) But the principle is much more general: effort has a major influence on performance.

Awareness of the difficulties others operate under and this principle of personal responsibility can coexist. Throwing out the principle of personal responsibility for fear it will interfere with an awareness of the difficulties others operate under is a terrible mistake. We need to help others and we each need to help ourselves.

It is a pity when basic principles such as personal responsibility get enmeshed in politics in a way that causes them to be intentionally neglected. Perhaps a key to rehabilitating the principle of personal responsibility politically is to realize that it should never be used to scold others or blame others but only to help others diagnose how they are messing up their own lives.

We debate on the margins about exactly how strong the incentives should be for people to get their lives together instead of messing them up. But everything within the scope of the current political debate would still leave someone miserable if they don’t take responsibility for their own life and much better off if they do take responsibility. After all, on top of the after-tax-and-transfer economic consequences of managing one’s life better or worse, there are the dating and relationship consequences of how well one manages one’s life and one’s character. And letting oneself be drawn into pathologies such as drug addiction (legal or illegal) can lead to deep misery. It is doing young people a grave disservice if we downplay the difference they can make by means of effort in bettering life and character.

The time has come to begin worrying more about young men. They are in trouble. This doesn’t have to take away from efforts to help women. At a moment of crisis like this, we can do what it takes to help both men and women with the somewhat distinct issues they face.

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Don’t Miss These Posts Related to Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral Compass:

• Co-Active Coaching as a Tool for Maximizing Utility—Getting Where You Want in Life

• On Human Potential

• How Economists Can Enhance Their Scientific Creativity, Engagement and Impact

• Virtues for Economists

• 'Everything Happens for a Reason' for Nonsupernaturalists

• My Life will be Good When ...

• On Perfectionism

• Forgive Yourself

• Only What is in Our Power is Our Duty

• The Devil of Getting Criticized

• Improving Your User Illusion

• Judson Brewer, Elizabeth Bernstein and Mitchell Kaplan on Finding Inner Calm

• The Four Horsemen of Relationship Destruction

• The Golden Mean as Concavity of Objective Functions

• Glennon Doyle on Wild Humanity

• 'The Four Agreements' by Don Miguel Ruiz (with Janet Mills) and `The Fifth Agreement' by Don Miguel Ruiz and Don Jose Ruiz (with Janet Mills)

• How I Became Optimistic

• Fatal Flaws Don't Have To Be Fatal

• Believe in Yourself

• Breaking the Chains

• Leaving a Legacy

• My Objective Function

• The Unmaking

• A Personal Mission Statement: Keep It Short

• John Locke on the Mandate of Heaven

• Tom Gauld's Sympathy Cards for Scientists

• The Expanding Shoreline of Ignorance

• Contrasted Faults Through All Their Manners Reign

• On Altruism, Externalities and Bossiness

• Bex's Rules for Life

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: How Crises Make Us Rethink Our Lives

• Vicky Biggs Pradhan: The Lost Art of Curiosity

• Recognizing Opportunity: The Case of the Golden Raspberries—Taryn Laakso

• Taryn Laakso: Battery Charge Trending to 0% — Time to Recharge

• Taryn Laakso: Righting Your Ship Before You Capsize

• Kristeen Barth: We Don't Have to Be for Everyone

• Dave Baillie: Calibrate Your Compass

• Gerard Theoret: 3 Turns of the Screw

• Savannah Taylor: Lessons of the Labyrinth and Tapping Into Your Inner Wisdom

The Federalist Papers #38—James Madison Analyzes the Proposed Constitution Using the Principle of Opportunity Cost: What is the Alternative to the Consensus of the Constitutional Convention?

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Link to the full text of the Federalist Papers #38

In the Federalist Papers #38, James Madison implicitly uses the principle of opportunity cost to argue for the proposed constitution. On page 12 of their Principles of Economics, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers define opportunity cost this way:

The opportunity cost of something is the next best alternative you have to give up.

They add:

The true cost of something is what you have to give up to get it.

James Madison uses the principle of opportunity cost in two ways. First, for those who think of the Articles of Confederation as the next best alternative to the proposed constitution, he points out that the Articles of Confederation would either (a) remain too weak to get an adequate job of governing done or (b) be attributed powers as extensive as the proposed constitution, but with fewer checks and balances.

Second, if it isn’t the Articles of Confederation, he asks for a coherent statement of what the next best alternative to the proposed constitution is. He points out that on almost any dimension, some think further in that dimension would be better while others think less far would be better. While in the Federalist Papers #37, James Madison argues in effect that “The best is the mortal enemy of the good” in relation to the proposed constitution, in the Federalist Papers #38, he argues that the ideal that is better than the proposed constitution—and could possibly be agreed upon—is hard to pin down.

On the Articles of Confederation, the heart of James Madison’s argument is this:

… the Confederation is chargeable with the still greater folly of declaring certain powers in the federal government to be absolutely necessary, and at the same time rendering them absolutely nugatory; and, in the next place, that if the Union is to continue, and no better government be substituted, effective powers must either be granted to, or assumed by, the existing Congress …

James Madison then gives as an excellent example of necessity leading to the assumption of extra powers: the Continental Congress exercising power over new territories in the West:

It is now no longer a point of speculation and hope, that the Western territory is a mine of vast wealth to the United States; … Congress have assumed the administration of this stock. They have begun to render it productive. Congress have undertaken to do more: they have proceeded to form new States, to erect temporary governments, to appoint officers for them, and to prescribe the conditions on which such States shall be admitted into the Confederacy. All this has been done; and done without the least color of constitutional authority. Yet no blame has been whispered; no alarm has been sounded.

On other alternatives to the proposed constitution, James Madison contrasts the consensus of the constitutional convention—which he argues is unprecedented in history—to the total lack of consensus on another alternative. Let me rendering James Madison’s examples of the variegated objections to the constitution into bullet points, otherwise quoting directly:

• This one tells us that the proposed Constitution ought to be rejected, because it is not a confederation of the States, but a government over individuals.

• Another admits that it ought to be a government over individuals to a certain extent, but by no means to the extent proposed.

• A third does not object to the government over individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to the want of a bill of rights.

• A fourth concurs in the absolute necessity of a bill of rights, but contends that it ought to be declaratory, not of the personal rights of individuals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their political capacity.

• A fifth is of opinion that a bill of rights of any sort would be superfluous and misplaced, and that the plan would be unexceptionable but for the fatal power of regulating the times and places of election.

• An objector in a large State exclaims loudly against the unreasonable equality of representation in the Senate.

• An objector in a small State is equally loud against the dangerous inequality in the House of Representatives.

• From this quarter, we are alarmed with the amazing expense, from the number of persons who are to administer the new government.

• From another quarter, and sometimes from the same quarter, on another occasion, the cry is that the Congress will be but a shadow of a representation, and that the government would be far less objectionable if the number and the expense were doubled.

• A patriot in a State that does not import or export, discerns insuperable objections against the power of direct taxation.

• The patriotic adversary in a State of great exports and imports, is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of taxes may be thrown on consumption.

• This politician discovers in the Constitution a direct and irresistible tendency to monarchy;

• that is equally sure it will end in aristocracy.

• Another is puzzled to say which of these shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees clearly it must be one or other of them;

• whilst a fourth is not wanting, who with no less confidence affirms that the Constitution is so far from having a bias towards either of these dangers, that the weight on that side will not be sufficient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite propensities.

• With another class of adversaries to the Constitution the language is that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are intermixed in such a manner as to contradict all the ideas of regular government and all the requisite precautions in favor of liberty.

• In the eyes of one the junction of the Senate with the President in the responsible function of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this executive power in the Executive alone, is the vicious part of the organization.

• To another, the exclusion of the House of Representatives, whose numbers alone could be a due security against corruption and partiality in the exercise of such a power, is equally obnoxious.

• With another, the admission of the President into any share of a power which ever must be a dangerous engine in the hands of the executive magistrate, is an unpardonable violation of the maxims of republican jealousy.

• No part of the arrangement, according to some, is more inadmissible than the trial of impeachments by the Senate, which is alternately a member both of the legislative and executive departments, when this power so evidently belonged to the judiciary department.

• "We concur fully," reply others, "in the objection to this part of the plan, but we can never agree that a reference of impeachments to the judiciary authority would be an amendment of the error. Our principal dislike to the organization arises from the extensive powers already lodged in that department."

• Even among the zealous patrons of a council of state the most irreconcilable variance is discovered concerning the mode in which it ought to be constituted. The demand of one gentleman is, that the council should consist of a small number to be appointed by the most numerous branch of the legislature.

• Another would prefer a larger number, and considers it as a fundamental condition that the appointment should be made by the President himself.

James Madison’s arguments in the Federalist Papers #38 are a good example of how the principle of opportunity cost doesn’t always make a proposed choice look worse. Sometimes it makes the proposed choice look better in comparison because the next best alternative, when clearly seen, can be seen to have serious bad points.

I’ll end by quoting James Madison’s own explicit explanation of the opportunity cost principle:

It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect; it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass for silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy in it. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering habitation for a firm and commodious building, because the latter had not a porch to it, or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or the ceilings a little higher or lower than his fancy would have planned them.

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FEDERALIST NO. 38

The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed

From the New York Packet
Tuesday, January 15, 1788.

Author: James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

IT IS not a little remarkable that in every case reported by ancient history, in which government has been established with deliberation and consent, the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men, but has been performed by some individual citizen of preeminent wisdom and approved integrity.

Minos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the government of Crete, as Zaleucus was of that of the Locrians. Theseus first, and after him Draco and Solon, instituted the government of Athens. Lycurgus was the lawgiver of Sparta. The foundation of the original government of Rome was laid by Romulus, and the work completed by two of his elective successors, Numa and Tullius Hostilius. On the abolition of royalty the consular administration was substituted by Brutus, who stepped forward with a project for such a reform, which, he alleged, had been prepared by Tullius Hostilius, and to which his address obtained the assent and ratification of the senate and people. This remark is applicable to confederate governments also. Amphictyon, we are told, was the author of that which bore his name. The Achaean league received its first birth from Achaeus, and its second from Aratus.

What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have in their respective establishments, or how far they might be clothed with the legitimate authority of the people, cannot in every instance be ascertained. In some, however, the proceeding was strictly regular. Draco appears to have been intrusted by the people of Athens with indefinite powers to reform its government and laws. And Solon, according to Plutarch, was in a manner compelled, by the universal suffrage of his fellow-citizens, to take upon him the sole and absolute power of new-modeling the constitution. The proceedings under Lycurgus were less regular; but as far as the advocates for a regular reform could prevail, they all turned their eyes towards the single efforts of that celebrated patriot and sage, instead of seeking to bring about a revolution by the intervention of a deliberative body of citizens.

Whence could it have proceeded, that a people, jealous as the Greeks were of their liberty, should so far abandon the rules of caution as to place their destiny in the hands of a single citizen? Whence could it have proceeded, that the Athenians, a people who would not suffer an army to be commanded by fewer than ten generals, and who required no other proof of danger to their liberties than the illustrious merit of a fellow-citizen, should consider one illustrious citizen as a more eligible depositary of the fortunes of themselves and their posterity, than a select body of citizens, from whose common deliberations more wisdom, as well as more safety, might have been expected? These questions cannot be fully answered, without supposing that the fears of discord and disunion among a number of counsellors exceeded the apprehension of treachery or incapacity in a single individual. History informs us, likewise, of the difficulties with which these celebrated reformers had to contend, as well as the expedients which they were obliged to employ in order to carry their reforms into effect. Solon, who seems to have indulged a more temporizing policy, confessed that he had not given to his countrymen the government best suited to their happiness, but most tolerable to their prejudices. And Lycurgus, more true to his object, was under the necessity of mixing a portion of violence with the authority of superstition, and of securing his final success by a voluntary renunciation, first of his country, and then of his life. If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire the improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and establishing regular plans of government, they serve not less, on the other, to admonish us of the hazards and difficulties incident to such experiments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily multiplying them.

Is it an unreasonable conjecture, that the errors which may be contained in the plan of the convention are such as have resulted rather from the defect of antecedent experience on this complicated and difficult subject, than from a want of accuracy or care in the investigation of it; and, consequently such as will not be ascertained until an actual trial shall have pointed them out? This conjecture is rendered probable, not only by many considerations of a general nature, but by the particular case of the Articles of Confederation. It is observable that among the numerous objections and amendments suggested by the several States, when these articles were submitted for their ratification, not one is found which alludes to the great and radical error which on actual trial has discovered itself. And if we except the observations which New Jersey was led to make, rather by her local situation, than by her peculiar foresight, it may be questioned whether a single suggestion was of sufficient moment to justify a revision of the system. There is abundant reason, nevertheless, to suppose that immaterial as these objections were, they would have been adhered to with a very dangerous inflexibility, in some States, had not a zeal for their opinions and supposed interests been stifled by the more powerful sentiment of selfpreservation. One State, we may remember, persisted for several years in refusing her concurrence, although the enemy remained the whole period at our gates, or rather in the very bowels of our country. Nor was her pliancy in the end effected by a less motive, than the fear of being chargeable with protracting the public calamities, and endangering the event of the contest. Every candid reader will make the proper reflections on these important facts.

A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse, and that an efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme danger, after coolly revolving his situation, and the characters of different physicians, selects and calls in such of them as he judges most capable of administering relief, and best entitled to his confidence. The physicians attend; the case of the patient is carefully examined; a consultation is held; they are unanimously agreed that the symptoms are critical, but that the case, with proper and timely relief, is so far from being desperate, that it may be made to issue in an improvement of his constitution. They are equally unanimous in prescribing the remedy, by which this happy effect is to be produced. The prescription is no sooner made known, however, than a number of persons interpose, and, without denying the reality or danger of the disorder, assure the patient that the prescription will be poison to his constitution, and forbid him, under pain of certain death, to make use of it. Might not the patient reasonably demand, before he ventured to follow this advice, that the authors of it should at least agree among themselves on some other remedy to be substituted? And if he found them differing as much from one another as from his first counsellors, would he not act prudently in trying the experiment unanimously recommended by the latter, rather than be hearkening to those who could neither deny the necessity of a speedy remedy, nor agree in proposing one?

Such a patient and in such a situation is America at this moment. She has been sensible of her malady. She has obtained a regular and unanimous advice from men of her own deliberate choice. And she is warned by others against following this advice under pain of the most fatal consequences. Do the monitors deny the reality of her danger? No. Do they deny the necessity of some speedy and powerful remedy? No. Are they agreed, are any two of them agreed, in their objections to the remedy proposed, or in the proper one to be substituted? Let them speak for themselves. This one tells us that the proposed Constitution ought to be rejected, because it is not a confederation of the States, but a government over individuals. Another admits that it ought to be a government over individuals to a certain extent, but by no means to the extent proposed. A third does not object to the government over individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to the want of a bill of rights. A fourth concurs in the absolute necessity of a bill of rights, but contends that it ought to be declaratory, not of the personal rights of individuals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their political capacity. A fifth is of opinion that a bill of rights of any sort would be superfluous and misplaced, and that the plan would be unexceptionable but for the fatal power of regulating the times and places of election. An objector in a large State exclaims loudly against the unreasonable equality of representation in the Senate. An objector in a small State is equally loud against the dangerous inequality in the House of Representatives. From this quarter, we are alarmed with the amazing expense, from the number of persons who are to administer the new government. From another quarter, and sometimes from the same quarter, on another occasion, the cry is that the Congress will be but a shadow of a representation, and that the government would be far less objectionable if the number and the expense were doubled. A patriot in a State that does not import or export, discerns insuperable objections against the power of direct taxation. The patriotic adversary in a State of great exports and imports, is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of taxes may be thrown on consumption. This politician discovers in the Constitution a direct and irresistible tendency to monarchy; that is equally sure it will end in aristocracy. Another is puzzled to say which of these shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees clearly it must be one or other of them; whilst a fourth is not wanting, who with no less confidence affirms that the Constitution is so far from having a bias towards either of these dangers, that the weight on that side will not be sufficient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite propensities. With another class of adversaries to the Constitution the language is that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are intermixed in such a manner as to contradict all the ideas of regular government and all the requisite precautions in favor of liberty. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and general expressions, there are but a few who lend their sanction to it. Let each one come forward with his particular explanation, and scarce any two are exactly agreed upon the subject. In the eyes of one the junction of the Senate with the President in the responsible function of appointing to offices, instead of vesting this executive power in the Executive alone, is the vicious part of the organization. To another, the exclusion of the House of Representatives, whose numbers alone could be a due security against corruption and partiality in the exercise of such a power, is equally obnoxious. With another, the admission of the President into any share of a power which ever must be a dangerous engine in the hands of the executive magistrate, is an unpardonable violation of the maxims of republican jealousy. No part of the arrangement, according to some, is more inadmissible than the trial of impeachments by the Senate, which is alternately a member both of the legislative and executive departments, when this power so evidently belonged to the judiciary department. "We concur fully," reply others, "in the objection to this part of the plan, but we can never agree that a reference of impeachments to the judiciary authority would be an amendment of the error. Our principal dislike to the organization arises from the extensive powers already lodged in that department." Even among the zealous patrons of a council of state the most irreconcilable variance is discovered concerning the mode in which it ought to be constituted. The demand of one gentleman is, that the council should consist of a small number to be appointed by the most numerous branch of the legislature. Another would prefer a larger number, and considers it as a fundamental condition that the appointment should be made by the President himself.

As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the plan of the federal Constitution, let us suppose, that as they are the most zealous, so they are also the most sagacious, of those who think the late convention were unequal to the task assigned them, and that a wiser and better plan might and ought to be substituted. Let us further suppose that their country should concur, both in this favorable opinion of their merits, and in their unfavorable opinion of the convention; and should accordingly proceed to form them into a second convention, with full powers, and for the express purpose of revising and remoulding the work of the first. Were the experiment to be seriously made, though it required some effort to view it seriously even in fiction, I leave it to be decided by the sample of opinions just exhibited, whether, with all their enmity to their predecessors, they would, in any one point, depart so widely from their example, as in the discord and ferment that would mark their own deliberations; and whether the Constitution, now before the public, would not stand as fair a chance for immortality, as Lycurgus gave to that of Sparta, by making its change to depend on his own return from exile and death, if it were to be immediately adopted, and were to continue in force, not until a BETTER, but until ANOTHER should be agreed upon by this new assembly of lawgivers.

It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect; it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass for silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy in it. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering habitation for a firm and commodious building, because the latter had not a porch to it, or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or the ceilings a little higher or lower than his fancy would have planned them. But waiving illustrations of this sort, is it not manifest that most of the capital objections urged against the new system lie with tenfold weight against the existing Confederation? Is an indefinite power to raise money dangerous in the hands of the federal government? The present Congress can make requisitions to any amount they please, and the States are constitutionally bound to furnish them; they can emit bills of credit as long as they will pay for the paper; they can borrow, both abroad and at home, as long as a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to raise troops dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that power also; and they have already begun to make use of it. Is it improper and unsafe to intermix the different powers of government in the same body of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole depositary of all the federal powers. Is it particularly dangerous to give the keys of the treasury, and the command of the army, into the same hands? The Confederation places them both in the hands of Congress. Is a bill of rights essential to liberty? The Confederation has no bill of rights. Is it an objection against the new Constitution, that it empowers the Senate, with the concurrence of the Executive, to make treaties which are to be the laws of the land? The existing Congress, without any such control, can make treaties which they themselves have declared, and most of the States have recognized, to be the supreme law of the land. Is the importation of slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it is permitted forever.

I shall be told, that however dangerous this mixture of powers may be in theory, it is rendered harmless by the dependence of Congress on the State for the means of carrying them into practice; that however large the mass of powers may be, it is in fact a lifeless mass. Then, say I, in the first place, that the Confederation is chargeable with the still greater folly of declaring certain powers in the federal government to be absolutely necessary, and at the same time rendering them absolutely nugatory; and, in the next place, that if the Union is to continue, and no better government be substituted, effective powers must either be granted to, or assumed by, the existing Congress; in either of which events, the contrast just stated will hold good. But this is not all. Out of this lifeless mass has already grown an excrescent power, which tends to realize all the dangers that can be apprehended from a defective construction of the supreme government of the Union. It is now no longer a point of speculation and hope, that the Western territory is a mine of vast wealth to the United States; and although it is not of such a nature as to extricate them from their present distresses, or for some time to come, to yield any regular supplies for the public expenses, yet must it hereafter be able, under proper management, both to effect a gradual discharge of the domestic debt, and to furnish, for a certain period, liberal tributes to the federal treasury. A very large proportion of this fund has been already surrendered by individual States; and it may with reason be expected that the remaining States will not persist in withholding similar proofs of their equity and generosity. We may calculate, therefore, that a rich and fertile country, of an area equal to the inhabited extent of the United States, will soon become a national stock. Congress have assumed the administration of this stock. They have begun to render it productive. Congress have undertaken to do more: they have proceeded to form new States, to erect temporary governments, to appoint officers for them, and to prescribe the conditions on which such States shall be admitted into the Confederacy. All this has been done; and done without the least color of constitutional authority. Yet no blame has been whispered; no alarm has been sounded. A GREAT and INDEPENDENT fund of revenue is passing into the hands of a SINGLE BODY of men, who can RAISE TROOPS to an INDEFINITE NUMBER, and appropriate money to their support for an INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. And yet there are men, who have not only been silent spectators of this prospect, but who are advocates for the system which exhibits it; and, at the same time, urge against the new system the objections which we have heard. Would they not act with more consistency, in urging the establishment of the latter, as no less necessary to guard the Union against the future powers and resources of a body constructed like the existing Congress, than to save it from the dangers threatened by the present impotency of that Assembly?

I mean not, by any thing here said, to throw censure on the measures which have been pursued by Congress. I am sensible they could not have done otherwise. The public interest, the necessity of the case, imposed upon them the task of overleaping their constitutional limits. But is not the fact an alarming proof of the danger resulting from a government which does not possess regular powers commensurate to its objects? A dissolution or usurpation is the dreadful dilemma to which it is continually exposed.

PUBLIUS.

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Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

• The Federalist Papers #1: Alexander Hamilton's Plea for Reasoned Debate

• The Federalist Papers #2 A: John Jay on the Idea of America

• The Federalist Papers #2 B: You Trusted the Continental Congress; Trust the Constitutional Convention

• The Federalist Papers #3: United, the 13 States are Less Likely to Stumble into War

• The Federalist Papers #4 A: The States Must Be Prepared to Defend against Aggression by Other Nations

• The Federalist Papers #4 B: National Defense Will Be Stronger if the States are United

• The Federalist Papers #5: Unless United, the States Will Be at Each Others' Throats

• The Federalist Papers #6 A: Alexander Hamilton on the Many Human Motives for War

• The Federalist Papers #6 B: Commercial Republics Also Start Wars with Their Neighbors—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 A: Divided, the States Would Fall into Territorial Disputes Likely to Lead to War Between the States—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #7 B: Without Union, Economic Disagreements Would Drive the States to Conflict with One Another—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #8: Without Union, the States Would Either Be Subject to Devastating Wars with Each Other or Would Have Liberty Endangered by their Own Standing Armies—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 A: There Has Been Technological Progress in Practical Principles of Republican Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #9 B: A Large Confederation May Be More Politically Stable Than a Small Nation—Alexander Hamilton Cites Montesquieu

• The Federalist Papers #10 A: Conflicts Arising from Differences of Opinion Are an Inevitable Accompaniment of Liberty—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #10 B: The Larger the Republic, the Easier It is to Find Thoughtful Legislators and the Harder It is to Put Together a Majority to do Unjust Things—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #11 A: United, the States Can Get a Better Trade Deal—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #11 B: Union Will Make Possible a Strong Navy, Allowing America to Chart Its Own Destiny—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #12: Union Makes it Much Easier to Get Tariff Revenue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #13: Alexander Hamilton on Increasing Returns to Scale in National Government

• The Federalist Papers #14: A Republic Can Be Geographically Large—James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #15: A Government, to be Worthy of the Name, Must Govern Its Citizens, Not Just Its Subordinate Jurisdictions—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #16: Authority of the Federal Government Directly over Individuals Means States Can Only Thwart the Federal Government by Active and Obvious Resistance—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #17: Three Levels of Federal Power

• The Federalist Papers #18: Alexander Hamilton and James Madison Point to the Weakness of Confederations of Cities in Ancient Greece to Argue for a Strong Federal Government

• The Federalist Papers #19: The Weakness of the German Empire, Poland and Switzerland up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #20: The Weakness of the United Netherlands up to the 18th Century is Evidence for the Weakness of Confederations—Alexander Hamilton and James Madison

• The Federalist Papers #21 A: Constitutions Need to be Enforced—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #21 B: Alexander Hamilton Complains of the Lack of a Measure Such as GDP Suitable for Apportioning Taxes to the States

• The Federalist Papers #22 A: The Articles of Confederation Lead to Uncoordinated Trade Policy and Military Free-Riding—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 B: Supermajority Rules Aren't an Adequate Fix for Departures from One-Person One-Vote—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #22 C: Pillars of Democracy—The Judicial System, Military Loyal to the Constitution, and Police Loyal to the Constitution

• The Federalist Papers #23: The Federal Government Must Be Given Sufficient Power to Accomplish Whatever We Expect the Federal Government to Do—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #24: The United States Need a Standing Army—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #25: Prohibiting a Standing Army in Time of Peace Would Be a Mistake—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #26: Some Part of the Government Must Be Able to Authorize an Army Whenever Necessary, after Being Forced to Fully Debate the Issue—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #27: People Will Get Used to the Federal Government—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #28: The Federal Government and States Can Check One Another’s Power, Reducing the Chance of Abuses—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #29: State Militias such as the National Guard are Not Attractive Tools for Tyrants—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #30: A Robust Power of Taxation is Needed to Make a Nation Powerful

• The Federalist Papers #31: Alexander Hamilton's Attempt at a Formal Argument for a Robust Federal Power of Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #32: The States Retain All Powers Not Explicitly Taken Away by the Constitution—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #33: The 'Necessary and Proper' and Supremacy Clauses Only Make Explicit What the Specified Powers Imply—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #34: War is Expensive. To Defend the Union, the Federal Government Needs an Ample Power of Taxation—Alexander Hamilton

• The Federalist Papers #35 A: Alexander Hamilton as an Economist

• The Federalist Papers #35 B: Alexander Hamilton on Who Can Represent Whom

• The Federalist Papers #36: Alexander Hamilton on Regressive Taxation

• The Federalist Papers #37: Why the Constitution Isn't Perfect—And Why No Constitution Could Be. James Madison