The Devil of Getting Criticized

April 18, 2021 by Miles Kimball

“Untitled (Devil)” by Jean-Michel Basquiat. Link to the Wikipedia article on “Untitled (Devil)” painting — *“Untitled (Devil)” by Jean-Michel Basquiat.*
*Link to the Wikipedia article on “Untitled (Devil)”* painting

For most people, criticism is hard to take. I find myself wishing sometimes that I could impose a rule on the universe that no one ever gets to criticize me about anything.

I find the anonymous criticism in referee reports and from student evaluations especially difficult to take. If I knew who was saying the criticism, I might be able to see how little authority that criticism had. But anonymous sentences on a page seem like scripture—as if they were the word of God.

A big part of the reason criticism hurts so much is that most of us internally amplify the criticism we hear, when there are many reasons to take even the level of criticism actually proffered with a grain of salt. (It is not uncommon for someone to seem as if criticism is sliding off them without any effect, but who take it hard internally.)

Here are some of the reasons almost all criticism should be treated as at best a source of partial truths:

Many people offering criticism are simply off-base or mistaken in their criticism.
Often, criticism is a true statement of what someone sees, but what they see tells a lot more about them than the person being criticized.
Often, the one criticizing knows that something bothers them, but don’t know what it is. That is, even if there is a good reason for given less than a five-star rating, they may misdiagnose what was wrong.
Sometimes those criticizing are even more inarticulate, making it very difficult to get useful feedback from what they are saying.
Even when someone has something useful to say in criticism, they are often emotionally clueless in how they deliver the information.
People often give criticism when angry, which may make them want to wound with the criticism. Then whatever useful feedback there might be is tinged with emotional poison.

Inside your own mind, rather than apply all of these caveats to criticism you receive, it is likely you amplify criticism:

It is common to focus on negative information and ignore positive information. If there are ten bits of praise and one criticism, guess which one you will remember.
Rumination can keep the words of criticism (or images of nonverbal signals you take to be critical) running in an endless loop in your brain.
Your brain may well rummage around for odds and ends in your memory that seem to provide evidence for the criticism.
You may well catastrophize and simply imagine something several times worse than what was said—even if you can’t find a lot of supporting evidence in your memory banks.
You may imagine not only that the truth about you is worse than what was said, but also that the potential consequences are much worse than they really are. If you have an flaws, surely that means the world will end, doesn’t it? :(
The criticism may remind you of some past trauma or past fear.

It isn’t pretty. But good luck getting people to stop criticizing you. The only reliable way to avoid an awful experience is to take criticism with a grain of salt rather than amplifying it. That will require seeing things clearly and having a high level of mental fitness. My hope is that some of the blog posts flagged below will be helpful in getting you to a higher level of mental fitness.

Don’t Miss These Other Posts Related to Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral Compass:

The Federalist Papers #28: The Federal Government and States Can Check One Another’s Power, Reducing the Chance of Abuses—Alexander Hamilton

April 11, 2021 by Miles Kimball

image sourcelink to the full text of the Federalist Papers #28 — *image source*
*link to the full text of the Federalist Papers #2*8

Alexander Hamilton’s key argument in the Federalist Papers #28 is in this passage:

Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate.

He contrasts the difficulty of dealing with an evil federal government with the difficult of dealing with an evil state government if a state was a nation unto itself. If a state was a nation unto itself, it is hard to defeat tyrants running the state:

In a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct government in each, can take no regular measures for defense. The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult will it be for the people to form a regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their early efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and movements, and the military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.

By contrast, states have many resources to deal with an evil federal government. Alexander Hamilton overstates the case somewhat in this passage, but his basic idea is sound:

State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The legislatures will have better means of information. They can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty.

Alexander Hamilton also argues that the geographical extent of the Union will afford an advantage to states vis a vis the federal government should it turn tyrannical:

The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign power. And it would have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious rulers in the national councils. If the federal army should be able to quell the resistance of one State, the distant States would have it in their power to make head with fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue the opposition in others; and the moment the part which had been reduced to submission was left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.

I view the American Civil War as a good test of Alexander Hamilton’s claims. It was indeed easy for a group of states to organize against the federal government. Had their cause been just, they probably would have prevailed—perhaps most likely by a different result in the 1864 presidential election. The injustice of the cause Confederacy tipped the balance against it; therefore the Confederacy lost. It is not as if this equation is absolute, but democratic traditions and organized governments on both sides of a conflict tend to give an advantage to the side that has more right on its side, at least in the eyes of the majority of the people.

Much of the rest of Alexander Hamilton’s argument boils down pointing out that the arguments of critics of the power of a federal government to raise an army apply at least equally to the states. But the states did in fact raise armies to quell rebellions within themselves, and most people could see the necessity of that.

Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #28, to give the full context. (I have put the content of the footnote in square brackets at the location where it appears.)

FEDERALIST NO. 28

The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered

For the Independent Journal.

Author: Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may be necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body; that the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we have been told is the only admissible principle of republican government), has no place but in the reveries of those political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction.

Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it should be a slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the residue would be adequate to its suppression; and the national presumption is that they would be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate cause, eventually endangers all government. Regard to the public peace, if not to the rights of the Union, would engage the citizens to whom the contagion had not communicated itself to oppose the insurgents; and if the general government should be found in practice conducive to the prosperity and felicity of the people, it were irrational to believe that they would be disinclined to its support.

If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole State, or a principal part of it, the employment of a different kind of force might become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to raise troops for repressing the disorders within that State; that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of commotions among a part of her citizens, has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose the State of New York had been inclined to re-establish her lost jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont, could she have hoped for success in such an enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone? Would she not have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular force for the execution of her design? If it must then be admitted that the necessity of recurring to a force different from the militia, in cases of this extraordinary nature, is applicable to the State governments themselves, why should the possibility, that the national government might be under a like necessity, in similar extremities, be made an objection to its existence? Is it not surprising that men who declare an attachment to the Union in the abstract, should urge as an objection to the proposed Constitution what applies with tenfold weight to the plan for which they contend; and what, as far as it has any foundation in truth, is an inevitable consequence of civil society upon an enlarged scale? Who would not prefer that possibility to the unceasing agitations and frequent revolutions which are the continual scourges of petty republics?

Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose, in lieu of one general system, two, or three, or even four Confederacies were to be formed, would not the same difficulty oppose itself to the operations of either of these Confederacies? Would not each of them be exposed to the same casualties; and when these happened, be obliged to have recourse to the same expedients for upholding its authority which are objected to in a government for all the States? Would the militia, in this supposition, be more ready or more able to support the federal authority than in the case of a general union? All candid and intelligent men must, upon due consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is equally applicable to either of the two cases; and that whether we have one government for all the States, or different governments for different parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire separation of the States, there might sometimes be a necessity to make use of a force constituted differently from the militia, to preserve the peace of the community and to maintain the just authority of the laws against those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections and rebellions.

Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full answer to those who require a more peremptory provision against military establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the people. This is the essential, and, after all, only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the people, which is attainable in civil society.[Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.]

If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no resource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of government, and which against the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual state. In a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no distinct government in each, can take no regular measures for defense. The citizens must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except in their courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult will it be for the people to form a regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their early efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their preparations and movements, and the military force in the possession of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part where the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the popular resistance.

The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with the increased extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend them. The natural strength of the people in a large community, in proportion to the artificial strength of the government, is greater than in a small, and of course more competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a tyranny. But in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized!

It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The legislatures will have better means of information. They can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the protection of their common liberty.

We should recollect that the extent of the military force must, at all events, be regulated by the resources of the country. For a long time to come, it will not be possible to maintain a large army; and as the means of doing this increase, the population and natural strength of the community will proportionably increase. When will the time arrive that the federal government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great body of the people of an immense empire, who are in a situation, through the medium of their State governments, to take measures for their own defense, with all the celerity, regularity, and system of independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a disease, for which there can be found no cure in the resources of argument and reasoning.

PUBLIUS.

Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

Easter Skepticism

April 04, 2021 by Miles Kimball

A few Easters ago, I posted “What If Jesus Was Really Resurrected?” giving the pro-resurrection case for non-supernaturalists. This Easter, I’ll give a more skeptical take.

In his April 2, 2021 essay “Recovering the Strangeness of Easter” in the Wall Street Journal, Robert Barron objects to watering down the Resurrection by treating it as a metaphor:

Especially today, it is imperative that Christians recover the sheer strangeness of the Resurrection of Jesus and stand athwart all attempts to domesticate it. There were a number of prominent theologians during the years that I was going through the seminary who watered down the Resurrection, arguing that it was a symbol for the conviction that the cause of Jesus goes on, or a metaphor for the fact that his followers, even after his horrific death, felt forgiven by their Lord.

But this is utterly incommensurate with the sheer excitement on display in the Resurrection narratives and in the preaching of the first Christians.

To understand what it means to treat the Resurrection of Jesus as literal, rather than as a metaphor, John Updike’s poem “Seven Stanzas at Easter” is eloquent:

Seven Stanzas at Easter

John Updike

“Seven Stanzas at Easter
Make no mistake: if He rose at all
it was as His body;
if the cells’ dissolution did not reverse, the molecules
reknit, the amino acids rekindle,
the Church will fall.

It was not as the flowers,
each soft Spring recurrent;
it was not as His Spirit in the mouths and fuddled
eyes of the eleven apostles;
it was as His flesh: ours.

The same hinged thumbs and toes,
the same valved heart
that—pierced—died, withered, paused, and then
regathered out of enduring Might
new strength to enclose.

Let us not mock God with metaphor,
analogy, sidestepping, transcendence;
making of the event a parable, a sign painted in the
faded credulity of earlier ages:
let us walk through the door.

The stone is rolled back, not papier-mache,
not a stone in a story,
but the vast rock of materiality that in the slow
grinding of time will eclipse for each of us
the wide light of day.

And if we will have an angel at the tomb,
make it a real angel,
weighty with Max Planck’s quanta, vivid with hair,
opaque in the dawn light, robed in real linen
spun on a definite loom.

Let us not seek to make it less monstrous,
for our own convenience, our own sense of beauty,
lest, awakened in one unthinkable hour, we are
embarrassed by the miracle,
and crushed by remonstrance.”

To those who explain the Resurrection account as myth, Robert Barron brings in C. S. Lewis’s argument that the specificity of the account of the Resurrection is not much like a myth:

The problem with these modes of explanation was well articulated by C.S. Lewis: Those who think that the New Testament is a myth just haven’t read many myths. Precisely because they have to do with timeless verities and the great natural and psychological constants, mythic narratives are situated “once upon a time,” or to bring things up to date, “a long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away.” No one wonders who was Pharaoh during Osiris’s time or during which era of Greek history Heracles performed his labors, for these tales are not historically specific.

But the Gospel writers are keen to tell us that Jesus’ birth, for instance, took place while Quirinius was governor of Syria and Augustus the Emperor of Rome—that is to say, at a definite moment of history and in reference to readily identifiable figures. The Nicene Creed, recited regularly by Catholics and Orthodox Christians as part of their Sunday worship, states that Jesus was “crucified under Pontius Pilate,” a Roman official whose image is stamped on coins that we can examine today.

My reaction to this is that the accounts of Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism, being directed to gold plates by an angel and then miraculously translating them are similarly specific, concrete and non-mythlike. For Mormons who believe in both the Resurrection and the Gold Plates with an account of Israelites who came to the Americas around 600 BC, that is no problem. But for those Christians who want to believe in the Resurrection but not in the Gold Plates, it demonstrates that C. S. Lewis’s argument is not fully decisive. (For more on Joseph Smith, see “Michael Coe on Joseph Smith the Shaman.”)

It matters whether claims are in principle falsifiable or not. But falsifiable claims are sometimes falsified. So having a claim be concrete and falsifiable is not enough to ensure that it is true.

Curiously, in addition to citing C. S. Lewis’s argument for the literal reality of the Resurrection that works for Mormonism as well, Robert Barron also cites the early Christian Fathers (that is, Christian writers in the first few hundred years after the crucifixion) laying out an idea that is central to Mormonism:

One of the favorite phrases in the writings of the Fathers of the Church is Deus fit homo ut homo fieret Deus, which means, God became man that man might become God. No religion or philosophy has ever proclaimed a more radical humanism than that.

As with Joseph Smith, some low-probability events occurred surrounding Jesus. But I am struck by the extent to which Christians and the world more generally benefit from aspects of Jesus’ life that didn’t require miracles. His teachings have important effects that can operate through non-miraculous means. Even belief in miracles can have whatever effects it has through non-miraculous means. A large share of the value people derive from religion comes quite apart from any miracles. Indeed, many believers that miracles are possible see relatively few laws-of-physics-defying miracles in their own lives, and yet feel that religion has made a big difference for good in their lives. Conversely, even if there were laws-of-physics-defying miracles, it is not clear that these are what would make our lives deep and rich.

Admittedly, without modern technology and wisdom, miracles would seem more important for human happiness. We desperately want healing when we are messed up physically or mentally. When miracles were the only way to hope for healing in a large share of cases, they looked crucial to the good life. But where we stand now, is it miracles we need, or is it human goodness and meaning?

Don’t miss these Unitarian-Universalist sermons by Miles:

By self-identification, I left Mormonism for Unitarian Universalism in 2000, at the age of 40. I have had the good fortune to be a lay preacher in Unitarian Universalism. I have posted many of my Unitarian-Universalist sermons on this blog.

And don't miss these posts on Mormonism:

Also see the links in "Hal Boyd: The Ignorance of Mocking Mormonism."

Judson Brewer, Elizabeth Bernstein and Mitchell Kaplan on Finding Inner Calm

March 28, 2021 by Miles Kimball

Link to the Amazon page for Unwinding Anxiety by Judson Brewer — *Link to the Amazon page for* Unwinding Anxiety *by Judson Brewer*

Elizabeth Bernstein has a column on positive mental health in the Wall Street Journal named “Bonds.” The two columns shown above given hints about how to get more inner calm.

“New Strategies for Calming Your Pandemic Anxiety” is an interview with Judson Brewer, author of Unwinding Anxiety. Elizabeth asked Judson “So how can we learn to stop fueling our anxiety?” Judson said this:

There’s a three-step process. The first step is to recognize anxiety habit loops. Recognize that you’re worrying. Ask yourself: “Is this helping me solve the problem?”

Step two is to … see how unrewarding worrying is. Ask yourself: “What am I getting from this? When I worry, does it keep my family safe? Or is this making me feel worse and not better?”

Step three is … to give your brain something more rewarding to do than worrying. … You can be curious about your experience. And you can be kind. Anxiety and worry feel closed and contracted. Curiosity and kindness open you up.

Judson also made these useful and non-obvious points (bullets added to separate passages):

Curiosity feels better than anxiety. It helps us focus on the moment rather than worrying about the future. And it helps us gather accurate information, which is what our brain needs to be able to think and plan.
One of my patients has a mantra she uses when she starts to feel anxious, to remind her that she is not in danger: “Oh, this is just my brain.”
When we are stressed or anxious, our shoulders tense, our jaws clench and our eyes narrow. You can bring awareness to this: “Oh, my eyes are narrowed.” Then open your eyes really wide. This helps trigger curiosity, because of the association in our mind between eyes wide open and curiosity. Wide-eyed wonder is the epitome of curiosity. It’s not called narrow-eyed wonder.
Anxiety triggers procrastination, especially for perfectionists, because we worry our solution to the problem won’t be good enough. Procrastination feels better than being anxious or trying to come up with a solution.
Habit loops have three elements: a trigger, a behavior and a reward. Anxiety … becomes a habit when the feeling of anxiety triggers us to worry and that worry results in us feeling like we are in control …

In “The Therapeutic Value of Reading,” Elizabeth says this:

Books are good for the brain. And their benefits are particularly vital now. Books expand our world, providing an escape and offering novelty, surprise and excitement, which boost dopamine. They broaden our perspective and help us empathize with others. And they can improve our social life, giving us something to connect over.

Books can also distract us and help reduce our mental chatter.

She also quotes bookstore owner Mitchell Kaplan saying this:

There’s so much noise in the world right now and the very act of reading is a kind of meditation. You disconnect from the chaos around you. You reconnect with yourself when you are reading. And there’s no more noise.

These are all excellent insights. Beyond these insights, what has been working for me to find inner calm is mindfulness meditations apps such as 10% Happier and the Positive Intelligence tools I talk about in these posts:

Both mindfulness and the other tools of Positive Intelligence is that your inner critic and other chatter fueled by the survival part of your brain are constantly saying things that aren’t very helpful. It is possible to recognize this chatter for what it is and get it to quiet down by exercises such as getting into your body more by focusing on bodily sensations. Methods for awakening power such as empathy, curiosity, and a can-do attitude can also help.

Here is what I think is going on from an evolutionary perspective. The abilities to talk garrulously to both ourselves and other humans and to think at length about the past and the future are very recent in our evolutionary history. We know that because our abilities in those regards go far beyond all the extant species we know of on earth. Even aside from the issue that what is good for our genes may not alway be what makes us happy, genetic evolution hasn’t had time to work out all the kinks in what talking to ourselves and thinking about the past and future does to our psychology.

Fortunately, the ability to talk to one another—and the later invention of writing—kicked off the much speedier process of memetic evolution as useful or otherwise catchy ideas spread and evolve in a soup of minds. (On memetics, see my posts “How Did Evolution Give Us Religion?” and “Jonah Berger: Going Viral.”) A few thousand years is the blink of an eye relative to genetic evolution, but it is a long time in the arena of memetic evolution once we had writing and a large human population size. We are finally homing in on best practice for being happy. But within your lifetime, you will still have to be an early adopter in order to get the benefits for your own happiness.

Don’t Miss These Other Posts Related to Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral Compass:

The Federalist Papers #27: People Will Get Used to the Federal Government—Alexander Hamilton

March 21, 2021 by Miles Kimball

image sourcelink to the full text of the Federalist Papers #27 — *image source*
*link to the full text of the Federalist Papers #27*

In the Federalist Papers #27, Alexander Hamilton argues that the federal government is likely to be acceptable enough to the people that it will seldom need to resort to full-out military force to establish its authority. In hindsight, the US Civil War and the Utah War (see “The Federalist Papers #17: Three Levels of Federal Power”) demonstrated that the federal government did, sometimes, take up war against a part of the United States. Nevertheless, there is a lot of merit to Alexander Hamilton’s arguments. Here is the Federalist Papers #27 in outline form:

Why should the attitude toward the federal government be much different than to a state government? Won’t it depend on the quality of government?
The federal government is likely to be of higher quality than state government because it can draw on a larger talent pool. Also, it is easier for a truly corrupt faction to take control of a smaller unit of government than a larger unit of government.
The federal government is an important guarantor that state governments will follow their own constitutions.
If the federal government interacts directly with all the people, rather than just with the state governments, the people will get used to it through those interactions.
The federal government will be so powerful it will seldom need to actually use force against a part of the United States; the threat of force alone will typically be enough.
People will see state government and federal government as being on par. And the power of state government and federal government will often be employed jointly, further impressing upon people the legitimacy of federal power.

I find the 4th point especially interesting. In 2021, people have one image of the federal government from news reports of decision-making in Washington, and another image from the parts of the federal government they directly interact or watch fictional enactments of: the FBI, the post office, the national parks, the Social Security Administration, the local Federal court, etc. I sense a lot of respect for the majority of those parts of the federal government people directly interact with. (The Internal Revenue Service—IRS—and Immigration and Customs Enforcement—ICE—are exceptions.) One of the more entertaining evidences of the gap between the perception of Washington DC decision-making and the perception of another arm of the federal government has been the signs saying “Government, keep your hands of my Medicare!”

All of this, in practice, increases deference to Federal government authority. We do not, in fact, see the federal government as one monolith (even if we think we do). We get used to the authority of different pieces of the federal government separately.

Despite the times when the federal government has had to take up arms against a part of the US, I think Alexander Hamilton could rightly feel vindicated in the how solid the perception of—and deference to—federal authority is in the United States.

To see how Alexander Hamilton lays out his argument in detail, below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #27, with my outline interspersed as headings in bold italics (and one footnote included where it appears in the text within square brackets).

FEDERALIST NO. 27

The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered

From the New York Packet
Tuesday, December 25, 1787.

Author: Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

1. Why should the attitude toward the federal government be much different than to a state government? Won’t it depend on the quality of government?

IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise of federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground there is to presuppose that disinclination in the people. Unless we presume at the same time that the powers of the general government will be worse administered than those of the State government, there seems to be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that their confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles and maxims.

2. The federal government is likely to be of higher quality than state government because it can draw on a larger talent pool. Also, it is easier for a truly corrupt faction to take control of a smaller unit of government than a larger unit of government.

Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to induce a probability that the general government will be better administered than the particular governments; the principal of which reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election will present a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people; that through the medium of the State legislatures which are select bodies of men, and which are to appoint the members of the national Senate there is reason to expect that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge and more extensive information in the national councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those occasional ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently contaminate the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a part of the community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust. Several additional reasons of considerable force, to fortify that probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a more critical eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited to erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to render it odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular members.

3. The federal government is an important guarantor that state governments will follow their own constitutions.

The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power, can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy, be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment and to inspire the LATTER, than that of a single State, which can only command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State may easily suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the government in that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the Union. If this reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that of a single member.

4. If the federal government interacts directly with all the people, rather than just with the state governments, the people will get used to it through those interactions.

I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the less just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more the operations of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life, the more it is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings, the further it enters into those objects which touch the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs of the human heart, the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses will generally have but little influence upon his mind. A government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be expected to interest the sensations of the people. The inference is, that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension to what are called matters of internal concern; and will have less occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through those channls and currents in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of compulsion.

5. The federal government will be so powerful it will seldom need to actually use force against a part of the United States; the threat of force alone will typically be enough.

One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force, than that species of league contend for by most of its opponents; the authority of which should only operate upon the States in their political or collective capacities. It has been shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members are the natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as often as these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by war and violence.

6. People will see state government and federal government as being on par. And the power of state government and federal government will often be employed jointly, further impressing upon people the legitimacy of federal power.

The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction between the sources from which they might proceed; and will give the federal government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State, in addition to the influence on public opinion which will result from the important consideration of its having power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the whole Union. It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the ENUMERATED and LEGITIMATE objects of its jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY EXTENDS; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.[The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will tend to the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will, in its proper place, be fully detected.] Any man who will pursue, by his own reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive that there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may deduce any inferences we please from the supposition; for it is certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of the best government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to provoke and precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But though the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume that the national rulers would be insensible to the motives of public good, or to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them how the interests of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be promoted by such a conduct?

PUBLIUS.

Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

On the Oppression of Women

March 14, 2021 by Miles Kimball

Link to the Amazon page for The Moment of LIft, by Melinda Gates — *Link to the Amazon page for* The Moment of LIft, *by Melinda Gates*

Melinda Gates’s book The Moment of Lift comes under criticism from Lily Meyer in her NPR blog post “'The Moment Of Lift' Is More Of A Whisper Than A Call To Action” for not being strident enough—and for focusing on other dimensions of women’s empowerment than abortion rights. But I, for one, am glad to have a book that tries to speak to those with a wide range of different political and religious views.

And, in addition to her message that women need to be treated better (the stories about the horrors of child marriage are especially powerful), Melinda Gates has another crucial message that should not be missed: individuals and communities have to be deeply understood in order to be deeply helped. Let me illustrate with a few quotations from The Moment of Lift.

I’ll start with two simple examples of a cultural fact that those from European-derived cultures might not guess: in many cultures, work that requires a lot of brute force and physical strength is women’s work. Here is Hans Rosling’s story:

Hans Rosling once told me [Melinda] a story that helps make the point. He was working with several women in a village in the Congo to test the nutritional value of cassava roots. They were harvesting the roots, marking them with a number, and putting them into baskets to take them down to the pond to soak. They filled three baskets. One woman carried off the first basket, another woman carried the second basket, and Hans carried the third. They walked single file down the path, and a minute later, as they all put down their baskets, one of the women turned around, saw Hans’s basket, and shrieked as if she’d seen a ghost. “How did this get here?!”

“I carried it,” Hans said.

“You can’t carry it!” she shouted. “You’re a man!”

Congolese men don’t carry baskets.

Importantly, in many extremely poor countries, a large share of the farming is done by women, who are hobbled in that endeavor by their cultures:

A landmark 2011 study from the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization showed that women farmers in developing countries achieve 20–30 percent lower yields than men even though they are just as good at farming. The women underproduce because they do not have the access to the resources and information that men do. If they had the same resources, they would have the same yields.

Melinda tells the story of how a careful program of community discussion and persuasion did more to end genital cutting of young women in one region than coming from a stance of outrage would have done:

Molly Melching has spent her life proving that point. Molly is another one of my teachers. I told you about her earlier. We met in the summer of 2012, and she showed me one of the best approaches I’ve ever seen for challenging long-standing cultural practices.

I joined Molly in a town in Senegal, and we drove out together to a rural area to see the community empowerment program she runs there. As we spent an hour or so on the drive, Molly told me about coming to Senegal as an exchange student to refine her French in the 1970s. She quickly fell in love with the Senegalese people and culture—so much so that she decided to learn the local language, Wolof, as well.

Even while she loved the country, though, she noticed how difficult it was to be a girl there. Many girls in Senegal have their genitals cut very young—usually between 3 and 5 years of age. Many are married very young and are encouraged to have children quickly and often. Outside groups had tried to change these practices, but no one succeeded, and Molly found herself in a position to see why.

She became a translator for development programs, serving as the link between villagers and outsiders who wanted to help. She quickly saw that there was more than a language barrier dividing these two groups. There was an empathy barrier. The outsiders showed little skill in projecting themselves into the lives of the people they wanted to help, and they had little interest in trying to understand why something was being done in a certain way. They didn’t even have the patience to explain to villagers why they thought something should change.

On our drive out, Molly explained to me that the empathy barrier stymies all efforts in development. Agricultural equipment that had been donated was rusting out, health clinics were sitting empty, and customs like female genital cutting and child marriage continued unchanged. Molly told me that people often get outraged by certain practices in developing countries and want to rush in and say, “This is harmful! Stop it!’” But that’s the wrong approach. Outrage can save one girl or two, she told me. Only empathy can change the system.

Also, those being helped often have a different—and because it is their lives, more authoritative—ranking of priorities than those who want to help. The Gates foundation began by wanting to get sex workers in India to use condoms in order to slow the spread of AIDS. Here is the reaction they received:

“We don’t need your help with condoms,” they said, almost laughing. “We’ll teach you about condoms. We need help preventing violence.”

“But that’s not what we do,” our people said. And the sex workers answered, “Well, then you don’t have anything interesting to tell us, because that’s what we need.”

So our team held debates about what to do. Some said, “Either we rethink our approach or we shut this down.” Others said, “No, this is mission creep—we have no expertise in this area, and we shouldn’t get involved.”

Eventually, our team met again with the sex workers and listened intently as they talked about their lives, and the sex workers emphasized two things: One, preventing violence is their first and most urgent concern; two, fear of violence keeps them from using condoms.

Clients would beat up the women if they insisted on condoms. The police would beat them up if they were carrying condoms—because it proved they were sex workers. So to avoid getting beaten up, they wouldn’t carry condoms. Finally we saw the connection between preventing violence and preventing HIV. The sex workers couldn’t address the long-term threat of dying from AIDS unless they could address the near-term threat of being beaten, robbed, and raped.

So instead of saying, “It’s beyond our mandate,” we said, “We want to help protect you from violence. How can we do that?”

They said, “Today or tomorrow, one of us is going to get raped or beaten up by the police. It happens all the time. If we can get a dozen women to come running whenever this happens, the police will stop doing it.” So our team and the sex workers set up a system. If a woman is attacked by the police, she dials a three-digit code, the code rings on a central phone, and twelve to fifteen women come to the police station yelling and shouting. And they come with a pro bono lawyer and a media person. If a dozen women show up shouting, “We want her out now or there’s going to be a story in the news tomorrow!” the police will back down. They will say, “We didn’t know. We’re sorry.”

That was the plan, and that’s what the sex workers did. They set up a speed-dial network, and when it was triggered, the women came running. It worked brilliantly. One sex worker reported that she had been beaten up and raped in a police station a year before. After the new system was in place, she went back to the same police station and the policeman offered her a chair and a cup of tea. Once word of this program got out, sex workers in the next town came and said, “We want to join that violence prevention program, not the HIV thing,” and soon the program spread all over India.

Unlike Lily Meyer, I think Melinda’s book uses the quiet statement of horrific facts to powerful effect. The truth about the oppression of women is so stark that it doesn’t have to be shouted if someone is reading the book. And more of the people whose eyes would be opened by reading it are likely to read the book because it isn’t strident.

The Federalist Papers #26: Some Part of the Government Must Be Able to Authorize an Army Whenever Necessary, after Being Forced to Fully Debate the Issue—Alexander Hamilton

March 07, 2021 by Miles Kimball

image sourcelink to the full text of the Federalist Papers #26 — *image source*
*link to the full text of the Federalist Papers #26*

In the Federalist Papers #26, Alexander Hamilton argues there is little precedent for limiting a legislature’s authority to raise an army whenever it sees a necessity to do that. There is indeed good precedent for not allowing the executive to authorize an army; that is very different from not allowing the legislature to authorize an army whenever necessary.

Alexander Hamilton also goes a bit overboard in arguing for the constitutional provision that the legislature must reauthorize funding for an army at least every two years as a protection against an army designed to overthrow the legitimate order of government. Here is the passage where Alexander Hamilton makes a claim that does not ring true with modern experience:

Even if the US had a period with no active wars, it would have a large military given all the potential dangers in the world and the vast responsibilities it has taken upon itself in the world. And unless the US military were much smaller than it is now, it could easily “awe the people into submission.” The key safeguard of our constitutional order now is not a small miliitary, but inculcating in the members of our military a loyalty to the US Constitution above their loyalty to their commander in chief. (I also talk about this in “The Federalist Papers #22 C: Pillars of Democracy—The Judicial System, Military Loyal to the Constitution, and Police Loyal to the Constitution.”)

Here is the full text of the Federalist Papers #26:

FEDERALIST NO. 26

The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered

For the Independent Journal.

Author: Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of government with the security of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we may travel from one chimerical project to another; we may try change after change; but we shall never be likely to make any material change for the better.

The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the national defense, is one of those refinements which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened. We have seen, however, that it has not had thus far an extensive prevalency; that even in this country, where it made its first appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the only two States by which it has been in any degree patronized; and that all the others have refused to give it the least countenance; wisely judging that confidence must be placed somewhere; that the necessity of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating power; and that it is better to hazard the abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and endanger the public safety by impolitic restrictions on the legislative authority. The opponents of the proposed Constitution combat, in this respect, the general decision of America; and instead of being taught by experience the propriety of correcting any extremes into which we may have heretofore run, they appear disposed to conduct us into others still more dangerous, and more extravagant. As if the tone of government had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are calculated to induce us to depress or to relax it, by expedients which, upon other occasions, have been condemned or forborne. It may be affirmed without the imputation of invective, that if the principles they inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as to become the popular creed, they would utterly unfit the people of this country for any species of government whatever. But a danger of this kind is not to be apprehended. The citizens of America have too much discernment to be argued into anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if experience has not wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater energy of government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the community.

It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin and progress of the idea, which aims at the exclusion of military establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it may arise from a contemplation of the nature and tendency of such institutions, fortified by the events that have happened in other ages and countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must be traced to those habits of thinking which we derive from the nation from whom the inhabitants of these States have in general sprung.

In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority of the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads were gradually made upon the prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by the barons, and afterwards by the people, till the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions became extinct. But it was not till the revolution in 1688, which elevated the Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was completely triumphant. As incident to the undefined power of making war, an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles II. had, by his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular troops. And this number James II. increased to 30,000; who were paid out of his civil list. At the revolution, to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bill of Rights then framed, that "the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, UNLESS WITH THE CONSENT OF PARLIAMENT, was against law."

In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch, no security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite, beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by the mere authority of the executive magistrate. The patriots, who effected that memorable revolution, were too temperate, too wellinformed, to think of any restraint on the legislative discretion. They were aware that a certain number of troops for guards and garrisons were indispensable; that no precise bounds could be set to the national exigencies; that a power equal to every possible contingency must exist somewhere in the government: and that when they referred the exercise of that power to the judgment of the legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point of precaution which was reconcilable with the safety of the community.

From the same source, the people of America may be said to have derived an hereditary impression of danger to liberty, from standing armies in time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution quickened the public sensibility on every point connected with the security of popular rights, and in some instances raise the warmth of our zeal beyond the degree which consisted with the due temperature of the body politic. The attempts of two of the States to restrict the authority of the legislature in the article of military establishments, are of the number of these instances. The principles which had taught us to be jealous of the power of an hereditary monarch were by an injudicious excess extended to the representatives of the people in their popular assemblies. Even in some of the States, where this error was not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought not to be kept up, in time of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE. I call them unnecessary, because the reason which had introduced a similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable to any of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies at all, under those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to reside anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it was superfluous, if not absurd, to declare that a matter should not be done without the consent of a body, which alone had the power of doing it. Accordingly, in some of these constitutions, and among others, in that of this State of New York, which has been justly celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one of the best of the forms of government established in this country, there is a total silence upon the subject.

It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of peace, the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than prohibitory. It is not said, that standing armies SHALL NOT BE kept up, but that they OUGHT NOT to be kept up, in time of peace. This ambiguity of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict between jealousy and conviction; between the desire of excluding such establishments at all events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be unwise and unsafe.

Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of public affairs was understood to require a departure from it, would be interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition, and would be made to yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State? Let the fact already mentioned, with respect to Pennsylvania, decide. What then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision, if it cease to operate the moment there is an inclination to disregard it?

Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of efficacy, between the provision alluded to and that which is contained in the new Constitution, for restraining the appropriations of money for military purposes to the period of two years. The former, by aiming at too much, is calculated to effect nothing; the latter, by steering clear of an imprudent extreme, and by being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and powerful operation.

The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not AT LIBERTY to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit of party, in different degrees, must be expected to infect all political bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in the national legislature willing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the views of the majority. The provision for the support of a military force will always be a favorable topic for declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition; and if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it. Independent of parties in the national legislature itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the State legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens against encroachments from the federal government, will constantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the VOICE, but, if necessary, the ARM of their discontent.

Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community REQUIRE TIME to mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations; which would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive variations in a representative body, which biennial elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant he took his seat in the national Senate or House of Representatives, would commence a traitor to his constituents and to his country? Can it be supposed that there would not be found one man, discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise his constituents of their danger? If such presumptions can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority. The people should resolve to recall all the powers they have heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are counties, in order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in person.

If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable. It would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the army to so great an extent in time of profound peace. What colorable reason could be assigned, in a country so situated, for such vast augmentations of the military force? It is impossible that the people could be long deceived; and the destruction of the project, and of the projectors, would quickly follow the discovery.

It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation of money for the support of an army to the period of two years would be unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large enough to awe the people into submission, would find resources in that very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from the acts of the legislature. But the question again recurs, upon what pretense could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence of some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the principles of the objection; for this is levelled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so visionary as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an invasion; and if the defense of the community under such circumstances should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those calamaties for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of government; it might even result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it should ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common defense.

But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is not easy to conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough to place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if we take into our view the aid to be derived from the militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion (as has been fully shown in another place), the contrary of this supposition would become not only probable, but almost unavoidable.

PUBLIUS.

Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

My Sister-in-Law Becky Porter Kimball

February 28, 2021 by Miles Kimball

*Joseph Kimball and Becky Porter Kimball*

My sister Sarah died a little over a month ago from complications from a car accident. (See “My Sister Sarah.”) Now my sister-in-law Becky has died after a long battle with cancer. (Here is a link to her obituary.) My brother Chris expresses my feelings better than I could. Below are Chris’s words:

My sister-in-law Becky died Friday morning. The day and time is always a surprise, but the event was not. Becky was on palliative care already, having reached the end of all possible treatments for a cancer she fought for several years.

We were 14. Seven children of Ed and Bee Kimball and seven spouses. With my youngest sister Sarah's death a month ago, and now Becky today, we are 12. The youngest two of the 14 were the first to go.

Jana Riess posted an article the other day about grief at a child's death, referring to Joy Jones' lack of outward grief or mourning in her Mormon General Conference talk in October 2017. I saw some thoughtful push-back to Jana's piece, arguing that we should be slow to judge and should allow everybody their own space and time to mourn. And that cuts both ways. Both about Jana's piece, and about Joy Jones in a position of authority suggesting a right way.

Here I am with my own:

First, I am deeply sorrowing. I feel a loss. Most of all, I am weighed down by a sense of finality. The last time. No more ever. I know all the "wonderful reunion in the hereafter" thoughts and meant-to-be-comforting statements. But at the moment, all issues of doctrine and belief aside, those thoughts are meaningless. They fall like a stone at my feet. The never again, final and forever, it's over, feeling is where I sit right now and I will not be comforted.

Second, I feel almost rage about "work it out in the eternities" move the Mormon Church has made. I don't want to hear about maybe someday. Instead, I have a bright awareness of the importance of now, here, this life.

As often happens, the poet-prophets say it best. Here, from Mary Oliver:

WHEN DEATH COMES

When death comes

like the hungry bear in autumn;

when death comes and takes all the bright coins from his purse

to buy me, and snaps the purse shut;

when death comes

like the measle-pox

when death comes

like an iceberg between the shoulder blades,

I want to step through the door full of curiosity, wondering:

what is it going to be like, that cottage of darkness?

And therefore I look upon everything

as a brotherhood and a sisterhood,

and I look upon time as no more than an idea,

and I consider eternity as another possibility,

and I think of each life as a flower, as common

as a field daisy, and as singular,

and each name a comfortable music in the mouth,

tending, as all music does, toward silence,

and each body a lion of courage, and something

precious to the earth.

When it's over, I want to say all my life

I was a bride married to amazement.

I was the bridegroom, taking the world into my arms.

When it's over, I don't want to wonder

if I have made of my life something particular, and real.

I don't want to find myself sighing and frightened,

or full of argument.

I don't want to end up simply having visited this world.

--Mary Oliver

The Avett brothers speak to some of the same in their "No Hard Feelings," imagining ways a person could make peace with dying. About the popularity of the song, Scott is recorded as saying "It's weird to be congratulated on the mining of the soul." I echo the sentiment, as I put these thoughts of mine out in the public.

I have tributes for my Mother and my Dad and my sister Sarah here:

Here is my wife Gail’s tribute for my son Spencer:

The Shards of My Heart

And here is my niece Emily’s take on Sarah’s and Becky’s deaths

The Federalist Papers #25: Prohibiting a Standing Army in Time of Peace Would Be a Mistake—Alexander Hamilton

February 21, 2021 by Miles Kimball

Before its ratification, one of the big objections to the proposed Constitution of the United States was that it allowed a standing army in time of peace. Superficially, the idea of prohibiting a standing army in time of peace was attractive. Having begun to address the issue in previous numbers of the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton continues the argument against such a prohibition in the Federalist Papers #25. There are two main parts to his argument in #25, with subparts:

State militias are not an adequate substitute for a national military
- Some states would provide inadequately for defense
- Some states would maintain large enough militias to scare the other states—with reason
- States are less likely to put adequate political safeguards on their militias than the Union is to put adequate political safeguards on the national army
A prohibition against a standing army would be unenforceable; it is a bad idea to have unenforceable provisions
- The definition of something like “imminent danger” is quite elastic, but any prohibition of maintaining an army that did not allow an exception like this would be foolhardy
- Not having a national army is a big military disadvantage
- Even when legal provisions are clear, they tend to be flouted when survival is at stake
- Having provisions likely to be flouted encourages disrespect for a constitution

Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #25, with my headings added in bold italics, and the main two heading centered:

FEDERALIST NO. 25

The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

From the New York Packet
Friday, December 21, 1787.

Author: Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

1. State militias are not an adequate substitute for a national military.

IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided for by the State governments, under the direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an inversion of the primary principle of our political association, as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defense from the federal head to the individual members: a project oppressive to some States, dangerous to all, and baneful to the Confederacy.

Some states would provide inadequately for defense. The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore common. And the means of guarding against it ought, in like manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a common treasury. It happens that some States, from local situation, are more directly exposed. New York is of this class. Upon the plan of separate provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole weight of the establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the mediate or ultimate protection of her neighbors. This would neither be equitable as it respected New York nor safe as it respected the other States. Various inconveniences would attend such a system. The States, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary establishments, would be as little able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burden of competent provisions. The security of all would thus be subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part. Some states would maintain large enough militias to scare the other states—with reason. If the resources of such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its provisions should be proportionally enlarged, the other States would quickly take the alarm at seeing the whole military force of the Union in the hands of two or three of its members, and those probably amongst the most powerful. They would each choose to have some counterpoise, and pretenses could easily be contrived. In this situation, military establishments, nourished by mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper size; and being at the separate disposal of the members, they would be engines for the abridgment or demolition of the national authcrity.

Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the Union, the foundation of which will be the love of power; and that in any contest between the federal head and one of its members the people will be most apt to unite with their local government. If, in addition to this immense advantage, the ambition of the members should be stimulated by the separate and independent possession of military forces, it would afford too strong a temptation and too great a facility to them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the constitutional authority of the Union. States are less likely to put adequate political safeguards on their militias than the Union is to put adequate political safeguards on the national army. On the other hand, the liberty of the people would be less safe in this state of things than in that which left the national forces in the hands of the national government. As far as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had better be in those hands of which the people are most likely to be jealous than in those of which they are least likely to be jealous. For it is a truth, which the experience of ages has attested, that the people are always most in danger when the means of injuring their rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion.

Some states would maintain large enough militias to scare the other states—with reason (reprise). The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the danger to the Union from the separate possession of military forces by the States, have, in express terms, prohibited them from having either ships or troops, unless with the consent of Congress. The truth is, that the existence of a federal government and military establishments under State authority are not less at variance with each other than a due supply of the federal treasury and the system of quotas and requisitions.

2. A prohibition against a standing army would be unenforceable; it is a bad idea to have unenforceable provisions

There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which the impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the national legislature will be equally manifest. The definition of something like “imminent danger” is quite elastic, but any prohibition of maintaining an army that did not allow an exception like this would be foolhardy. The design of the objection, which has been mentioned, is to preclude standing armies in time of peace, though we have never been informed how far it is designed the prohibition should extend; whether to raising armies as well as to KEEPING THEM UP in a season of tranquillity or not. If it be confined to the latter it will have no precise signification, and it will be ineffectual for the purpose intended. When armies are once raised what shall be denominated "keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the Constitution? What time shall be requisite to ascertain the violation? Shall it be a week, a month, a year? Or shall we say they may be continued as long as the danger which occasioned their being raised continues? This would be to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF PEACE, against threatening or impending danger, which would be at once to deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce an extensive latitude of construction. Who shall judge of the continuance of the danger? This must undoubtedly be submitted to the national government, and the matter would then be brought to this issue, that the national government, to provide against apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise troops, and might afterwards keep them on foot as long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community was in any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive that a discretion so latitudinary as this would afford ample room for eluding the force of the provision.

The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a combination between the executive and the legislative, in some scheme of usurpation. Should this at any time happen, how easy would it be to fabricate pretenses of approaching danger! Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain or Britain, would always be at hand. Provocations to produce the desired appearances might even be given to some foreign power, and appeased again by timely concessions. If we can reasonably presume such a combination to have been formed, and that the enterprise is warranted by a sufficient prospect of success, the army, when once raised, from whatever cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to the execution of the project.

If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the prohibition to the RAISING of armies in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defense, before it was actually invaded. As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant to the government to begin its levies of men for the protection of the State. We must receive the blow, before we could even prepare to return it. All that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the gathering storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of a free government. We must expose our property and liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness to seize the naked and defenseless prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its preservation.

Not having a national army is a big military disadvantage. Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United States that might have been saved. The facts which, from our own experience, forbid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy, not less than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The American militia, in the course of the late war, have, by their valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to their fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of their country could not have been established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most other things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perserverance, by time, and by practice.

Even when legal provisions are clear, they tend to be flouted when survival is at stake. All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced course of human affairs, defeats itself. Pennsylvania, at this instant, affords an example of the truth of this remark. The Bill of Rights of that State declares that standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace. Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time of profound peace, from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of her counties, has resolved to raise a body of troops; and in all probability will keep them up as long as there is any appearance of danger to the public peace. The conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the same subject, though on different ground. That State (without waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the articles of the Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell a domestic insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a revival of the spirit of revolt. The particular constitution of Massachusetts opposed no obstacle to the measure; but the instance is still of use to instruct us that cases are likely to occur under our government, as well as under those of other nations, which will sometimes render a military force in time of peace essential to the security of the society, and that it is therefore improper in this respect to control the legislative discretion. It also teaches us, in its application to the United States, how little the rights of a feeble government are likely to be respected, even by its own constituents. And it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public necessity.

It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that the post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the same person. The Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before served with success in that capacity, to command the combined fleets. The Lacedaemonians, to gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient institutions, had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander with the real power of admiral, under the nominal title of vice-admiral. This instance is selected from among a multitude that might be cited to confirm the truth already advanced and illustrated by domestic examples; which is, that nations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to run counter to the necessities of society. Having provisions likely to be flouted encourages disrespect for a constitution. Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.

PUBLIUS.

Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

The Four Horsemen of Relationship Destruction

February 14, 2021 by Miles Kimball

Source: John and Julie Gottman. Link to the Wikipedia article “John Gottman.” Link to the Wikipedia article “Julie Schwartz Gottman”Link to the Amazon page for John Gottman’s book “Why Marriages Succeed or Fail.”To understand John Gottman’s allusion… — *Source: John and Julie Gottman*.
*Link to the Wikipedia article “John Gottman*.” *Link to the Wikipedia article “Julie Schwartz Gottman”*
*Link to the Amazon page for John Gottman’s book “Why Marriages Succeed or Fail.*”
*To understand John Gottman’s allusion, see the Wikipedia article “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse”*

I have often devoted my Valentine’s Day posts to ideas I think might help relationships. John Gottman is one of the foremost experts on the scientific evidence about relationships. From what he and his colleagues observed in the “Love Lab,” they identified the “Four Horseman” shown on the left in the graphic above as especially dangerous to relationships. But each of the four horsemen has an antidote, shown on the right in the graphic above. With this few words, it would be hard to do more for relationships than this.

Other Valentine’s Day Posts:

The Federalist Papers #24: The United States Need a Standing Army—Alexander Hamilton

February 07, 2021 by Miles Kimball

Link to the Wikipedia article “United States Army”Link to the full text of the Federalist Papers #24 — *Link to the Wikipedia article “United States Army”*
Link to the full text of the Federalist Papers #24

In the Federalist Papers #24, Alexander Hamilton makes three arguments in favor of the proposed constitution’s provisions in relation to a standing army:

The Articles of Confederation and almost all the state constitutions also allowed for a standing army.
A standing army that needs legislative approval is less of a problem than a standing army that the executive branch can raise without legislative approval.
The United States face enough military dangers that an army (and a navy) is needed.

I think Alexander Hamilton underplays the danger of the President of the United States, using the military, and his position as commander in chief, to take over the government of the United States. But the third point, that it would hard for us to do without a standing army, is a strong one. It is then important that the legislative branch—in part through its power over the military budget—insist that those in the military be rigorously trained that their highest loyalty is to the Constitution, not to the commander in chief (while stressing the importance of obedience to the commander in chief when that obedience doesn’t contradict the constitution or the basic morality of avoiding war crimes). I talk more about that in “The Federalist Papers #22 C: Pillars of Democracy—The Judicial System, Military Loyal to the Constitution, and Police Loyal to the Constitution.”

Part of Alexander Hamilton’s first argument is disingenuous. Although the Articles of Confederation allowed for a standing army, the weakness of the Articles of Confederation were likely to leave any standing army seriously underfunded. That would make the standing army weaker relative to local militias. The very strength of the proposed Constitution was likely to lead, in practice, to a stronger standing army. That was a big deal. I do think that stronger standing army was necessary, however.

Here is the full text of Alexander Hamilton’s arguments in the Federalist Papers #24.

FEDERALIST NO. 24

The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered

For the Independent Journal.

Author: Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

To THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is this, that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.

It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form, supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of argument; without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to the practice of other free nations, and to the general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing constitutions. The proprietory of this remark will appear, the moment it is recollected that the objection under consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE authority of the nation, in the article of military establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our State constitutions, and rejected in all the rest.

A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan reported by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two conclusions: either that it contained a positive injunction, that standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the control of the legislature.

If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be surprised to discover, that neither the one nor the other was the case; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be found, in respect to this object, an important qualification even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer period than two years a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops without evident necessity.

Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed would be apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic declamation can be without some colorable pretext. It must needs be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have, in all the preceding models of the constitutions which they have established, inserted the most precise and rigid precautions on this point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has given birth to all this apprehension and clamor.

If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several State constitutions, how great would be his disappointment to find that TWO ONLY of them 1 contained an interdiction of standing armies in time of peace; that the other eleven had either observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express terms admitted the right of the Legislature to authorize their existence.

Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would never be able to imagine, while any source of information remained unexplored, that it was nothing more than an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that he would be likely to find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive compact between the States. Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, the existing Confederation must contain the most explicit provisions against military establishments in time of peace; and a departure from this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the discontent which appears to influence these political champions.

If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery, that these articles, instead of containing the prohibition he looked for, and though they had, with jealous circumspection, restricted the authority of the State legislatures in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint on that of the United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper, he could now no longer refrain from regarding these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to a plan which ought at least to receive a fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their country! How else, he would say, could the authors of them have been tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a point in which it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of America as declared in its different forms of government, and in which it has even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If, on the contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and would lament, that in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true merits of the question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right determination. Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an intention to mislead the people by alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments addressed to their understandings.

But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will appear that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be observed.

Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there are various considerations that warn us against an excess of confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain. On the other side, and extending to meet the British settlements, are colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain. This situation and the vicinity of the West India Islands, belonging to these two powers create between them, in respect to their American possessions and in relation to us, a common interest. The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to fear from us, and most to hope from them. The improvements in the art of navigation have, as to the facility of communication, rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbors. Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A future concert of views between these nations ought not to be regarded as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity is every day diminishing the force of the family compact between France and Spain. And politicians have ever with great reason considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of political connection. These circumstances combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger.

Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it should only be against the ravages and depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and the loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of the government amounts to a standing army in time of peace; a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being small. Here is a simple view of the subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and prudence of the legislature.

In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their military establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be willing to be exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to their insults and encroachments, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements might be annoyed. There are, and will be, particular posts, the possession of which will include the command of large districts of territory, and facilitate future invasions of the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it would be wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act this part would be to desert all the usual maxims of prudence and policy.

If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy. To this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and for the defense of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but where naval establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security against descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.

PUBLIUS.

This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collection of State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the two which contain the interdiction in these words: "As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up." This is, in truth, rather a CAUTION than a PROHIBITION. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland have, in each of their bils of rights, a clause to this effect: "Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE"; which is a formal admission of the authority of the Legislature. New York has no bills of rights, and her constitution says not a word about the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions of the other States, except the foregoing, and their constitutions are equally silent. I am told, however that one or two States have bills of rights which do not appear in this collection; but that those also recognize the right of the legislative authority in this respect.

Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

My Sister Sarah

January 31, 2021 by Miles Kimball

*Sarah Camilla Kimball Whisenant (January 14, 1968—January 23, 2021) on the left. Then Joseph, Jordan, Miles, Mary, Paula and Chris.*

My youngest sister Sarah died on January 23, 2021 of complications of a terrible car crash eight days before that. For her funeral, my sisters and brothers and I wrote these tributes in honor of her. I follow those tributes with a life sketch that my sisters-in-law Linda Hoffman Kimball and Rebecca England and my sister Mary crafted.

JOSEPH: Sarah was number 7 in our family’s children, and I was number 6. There are 22 months between our birthdays. While most of the year she was “two years” younger, she always enjoyed the two months when she was just “one year” younger.

Sarah and I interacted a lot. The year I turned eight our family moved to Provo, Utah, to a house on Oak Lane. Sarah and I had rooms next to each other in the downstairs.

Sarah often wanted to join me and my friends when they came to play, and was disappointed when I said no. I shut her out in other ways, too—often literally. I remember going into my room and putting my foot against the bottom of my door so she couldn’t get in. (The lock didn’t work.) She would bang on the door and yell at me whatever she had wanted to say.

Though a boundary change sent us to different junior high schools, we spent two years together at Provo High. By that time, we had become friends.

One time in our teenage years Sarah called me out when I didn’t know the answer to a question and made something up. She said if I didn’t know something, I should admit I didn’t know. I took that to heart. It made a big impact on my life.

While I was on my mission, Sarah managed apartments a block away from the U of U, and when she went on her mission, I took over the managing from her. The tenants enjoyed her management. She also learned a lot about maintenance from our brother-in-law Teryl, who had managed the apartments before her. She took that hands-on maintenance mindset with her as she remodeled a house on 300 South in Provo and did most of the work herself where she could, and helped the people doing the work when she couldn’t do it by herself.

Sarah loved being involved in the lives of her nieces and nephews as they grew up. I was sad that we never lived close enough for her to interact with my children much beyond family gatherings, but she was a highly-involved aunt bringing her particular brand of good cheer to the lives of Paula’s and Mary’s children.

JORDAN: My sister Sarah would ask so, so, so many questions. When I was younger Sarah's questioning sometimes annoyed me. Over the decades I’ve recognized that her curiosity was a gift. Sarah had an insatiable thirst for the details of our lives and thoughts and opinions of the world at large. Over time I came to believe that in her own way Sarah just wanted to know people as well as she could, with a special attention to family. I recognize it now as one of the ways I can see her love for others, including me.

The day after the terrible freeway accident a couple of weeks ago, I visited Sarah in the intensive care. Sarah had asked that I assist Kevin in giving her a blessing before major surgery to stabilize her fractured spine. Sarah looked so fragile in the ICU bed. I was grateful she had survived such a violent collision. Her scans showed fractures in her spine, ribs, and ankle. Sarah was lying perfectly flat on her back in the ICU bed, staring at the ceiling unable to move because whenever she did there would be excruciating pain. Her surgery had been delayed so we started visiting, the four of us—Sarah, Mary, Kevin, and I. We started talking about memories of growing up. Our relationship with our parents. When Sarah seemed to slow down Mary and started to talk about Mary’s kids and my kids. I stayed and talked and talked, hoping the conversation would be just what Sarah would find interesting and a comforting distraction. That evening when I arrived home I realized that I’d been at the hospital for 5 hours.

During that visit I told Sarah I looked forward to post pandemic times, when we could gather again as family. Family meant everything to Sarah. The same attention she devoted to me and Rebecca and our three children, she devoted to everyone in our large extended family, especially our parents, Ed and Bee. She was the aunt that remembered birthdays, made piñatas too sturdy to break, celebrated milestones, assisted with home improvements, joined in hikes, made time to listen. I told Sarah two Saturdays ago I thought of her as a Keeper of Memories, that I counted on her to share her insights gained from close attention to people’s lives.

I’m devastated over losing Sarah and that those anticipated conversations with her will never happen in this life. I loved you, Sarah. Thank you for loving me and my family and asking so many questions.

MILES: Since her death last Saturday, I have been thinking about the qualities Sarah and I shared, but in which she surpassed me. Sarah was preternaturally cheerful. She was curious about everything, and willing to try almost anything. She was outgoing and made friends easily. She cared about doing the right thing in realms that matter, but she was a free spirit because she cared remarkably little about what anyone else thought of her in all the areas that don’t matter. Above all, Sarah was always herself and never tried to be anyone else. In a world full of tortured souls plagued by self-doubt, Sarah instead found the straightforward enjoyment each day offered.

Many of us take one role or another as a cog in the great machine of society. Sarah was never a cog. She stood outside of the machine, while offering kindness to those who are a part of it. I can hardly ever remember her angry. She was happy to accept each of us just as we are and treat each human being as a wonderful mystery.

MARY: Sarah was always doing good.

Sarah reminded me several times recently of a thing I did for her when she was about seven years old.

In Madison, Wisconsin, we lived in Mother’s dream house—a Tudor, with three bedrooms—a bedroom each for parents, boys, and girls. However, one of Mother’s goals for her family was for each of her children to have his or her own bedroom. Mother and Dad squeezed two additional bedrooms out of the basement furnace room. When Sarah (child number seven) was born, Chris and Paula each had a basement bedroom, three boys shared a room, and Sarah and I shared another. When Sarah was five, the family moved to Utah where the typical Utah ranch home has three bedrooms upstairs and three down: a total of six bedrooms.

Chris moved out for college. Paula graduated early from high school and went to live with friends at community college. Mother could reach her goal for her children. Now each child could have an “own room.”

Soon, however, Paula moved home to attend BYU. Mother expressed aloud her sadness that two of her children would now need to share a room. Sarah reminded me several times recently that that’s when I piped up and volunteered to share a room with her, my baby sister.

Sarah told me my offer was a defining moment in her life—an older sister accepting a little sister into her space. I tried to clarify that I was not trying to be nice but that I seriously would rather have not been alone. It was Sarah doing me a favor.

All these years she has continued to cling to the thought I was serving her when really she was blessing me.

That’s Sarah.

PAULA: Sarah was full of love and life. She always had enough love to give anyone and everyone. She loved each person individually and so many as a group. Sarah was like the energizer bunny. She enjoyed people, nature, activities, crafts and a bewildering array of other interests. She had an appreciation for everything and everyone around her and wanted to do her part to make things even better.

After I had back surgery, I went to stay at my Dad’s house where Sarah took care of me in addition to caring for Dad. That meant extra laundry, cooking and help with all the other things I couldn’t do for myself then.

Sarah loved family. She was there with us creating memories of many special times.

The day before her accident she turned 53. We got together as sisters and had a good time celebrating with her and just being with each other.

I will miss Sarah.

CHRIS: My little sister Sarah was 5 years old when I went off to college. I barely remember her as a baby and a toddler. It was more than 20 years later when I got to know Sarah. After college, and her mission, in the mid-1990s, she came out to Massachusetts to live with us for a year. She quickly became a beloved aunt to my three children and an always-cheerful member of the household.

I was always suspicious that at first Sarah felt like a naive small-town girl in the big city. But she quickly made friends in the single adult ward and gained confidence in herself. It seemed to me that was an important time for Sarah to become convinced that there was not just one way to be a modern Mormon woman, but room for all types and especially for her to be just the way she wanted to be.

Because of that time in Belmont, Massachusetts, I got to be a big brother again. Sarah would call to process family events and to share things that mattered to her. I am waiting for her call now.

Life Sketch

Sarah Camilla Kimball Whisenant (1968 – 2021)

Sarah Camilla Kimball arrived on January 14, 1968, in Madison, Wisconsin, during the turbulent Viet Nam War era. Hers was somewhat of a celebrity birth. The interns at the hospital flocked to witness what they had never seen before – the birth of a 7th child! Evelyn Bee Madsen and Edward Lawrence Kimball happily welcomed Sarah into their family with her 6 siblings - Christian, Paula (Gardner), Mary (Dollahite), Miles, Jordan, and Joseph.

Sarah spent her first five years in Madison in the affectionate company of her parents and siblings. With them she climbed trees, made mazes with raked leaves, fed ducks, and ice skated on a little frozen pond her father created at the beginning of the winter freeze.

In 1973 Sarah and her family moved to Utah – first to Mapleton, then to Provo. There Sarah’s kindness and sunny temperament blossomed. Her many friendships flourished in the neighborhood and schools. She graduated from Provo High School in 1986. Sarah studied at what was then Utah Valley State College, at Brigham Young University, and at the University of Utah, eventually graduating from the University of Utah in Communications. She was also a certified massage therapist.

During college Sarah studied abroad in Vienna, Austria, where she began learning German. Sarah managed the Evelyn Apartments in Salt Lake City, learning useful skills before her mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints from 1992-1993 in Berlin, Germany. She loved the Gospel, the people of Germany, the culture and their language.

Sarah blessed many lives with her generous spirit and friendships. She worked for twenty years at the Orem Public Library, cheerfully greeting patrons at the front desk or helping behind the scenes repairing books – one of the many artisanal crafts she mastered. Those in her community and church congregations benefitted from her gifts. Among her callings she served as Primary President, Young Women’s President, and teacher. She especially enjoyed her stint as Young Women’s Camp Director.

Sarah married Kevin Dee Whisenant on April 28, 2008, in Salt Lake City. They were later sealed in the Salt Lake Temple. Their home was in Springville, Utah.

Sarah’s life demonstrated the interconnectedness of all of God’s children. Sarah was an avid family historian with her sisters Mary and Paula. She made joyful connections with anyone who could conceivably be considered a “cousin.” She was a particularly fun aunt to her many nieces and nephews.

She was also an advocate for the disadvantaged and a promoter of racial justice and community service.

Sarah’s interest in “interconnectedness” was also quite literal. A lover of fiber and fiber crafts, Sarah was a member of Utah Valley Yarn Spinners in Utah Country for over two decades. She owned her own spinning wheel and loom and demonstrated weaving at historical and community events, including Constitution Day, the 4th of July, and Colonial Days – often in period costume. She also was skilled in knitting, quilting, ceramics, and upholstery.

Sarah’s know-how also included enviable practical skills. She remodeled a house down to the studs. She hired sub-contractors to teach her wiring, plumbing, and hanging sheetrock. She already knew trimming, painting, staining, and tiling. She assembled countless IKEA projects (including at least 2 kitchen remodels) that would stymy lesser souls.

Sarah was a life force of kindness, service, friendship, talent, good humor, and generosity. Her body succumbed to death January 23, 2021, in Murray, Utah, after injuries sustained during a car accident the previous week.

We celebrate her life of enthusiasm, curiosity, love, compassion and service.

I have tributes for my Mother and my Dad here:

And here is my wife Gail’s tribute for my son Spencer:

The Shards of My Heart

Finally, here are my tributes for three economists who died in the last few years:

Death comes for us all.

The Federalist Papers #23: The Federal Government Must Be Given Sufficient Power to Accomplish Whatever We Expect the Federal Government to Do—Alexander Hamilton

January 24, 2021 by Miles Kimball

image sourceLink to the full text for the Federalist Papers #23 — *image source*
*Link to the full text for the Federalist Papers #23*

One of the things that has held back economic growth—as well as hobbling other dimensions of human flourishing—through thousands of years of human history is that it is quite a difficult design problem to make a government strong enough to keep people from stealing from, lying to and threatening each other without that government itself stealing from, lying to and threatening the people. But both sides of this design problem must be faced. It is no good trying to mitigate the danger of a tyrannical government by making that government too weak to do the things we expect that government to do. (Even in a libertarian system a la Robert Nozick, a private security company must be made adequately powerful, and then becomes much like a government.)

Alexander Hamilton makes the argument well in the Federalist Papers #23:

… it is both unwise and dangerous to deny the federal government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects which are intrusted to its management. It will indeed deserve the most vigilant and careful attention of the people, to see that it be modeled in such a manner as to admit of its being safely vested with the requisite powers.

The first sentence quoted above is the point addressed in the rest of the Federalist Papers #23. Alexander Hamilton defers discussion of how to keep the federal government well-behaved (the subject of the second sentence quoted above) to a later number in the Federalist Papers.

What do we expect the federal government to do? At a minimum: national defense, suppressing domestic insurrections, and foreign affairs. The performance of each of these requires considerable power. This list of three is Alexander Hamilton’s. To his list, I would add something for which we have gotten a greater understanding of both means and ends since Alexander Hamilton’s day: stabilizing the business cycle; stabilizing the business cycle is best enabled by giving the federal government the authority to conduct monetary policy. Ideally, that authority to conduct monetary policy would be in the Constitution, but at least it seems to be firmly ensconced not only in legislation, but in the unwritten constitution of our nation, as it is for many other nations.

Importantly, as Alexander Hamilton persuasively argues, the power to accomplish these key objectives of the national government must be direct power over the citizens of the nation. not merely power on paper to command the states. The Articles of Confederation included power on paper to command the states—especially to command them to contribute to the common defense—but in the event the states often ignored those commands.

Below is the full text of Alexander Hamilton’s argument in the Federalist Papers #23:

FEDERALIST NO. 23

The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union

From the New York Packet
Tuesday, December 18, 1787.

Author: Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

THE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived.

This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches the objects to be provided for by the federal government, the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, the persons upon whom that power ought to operate. Its distribution and organization will more properly claim our attention under the succeeding head.

The principal purposes to be answered by union are these the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.

The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation, BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORESEE OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY OF NATIONAL EXIGENCIES, OR THE CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY OF THE MEANS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO SATISFY THEM. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defense.

This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal; the MEANS ought to be proportioned to the END; the persons, from whose agency the attainment of any END is expected, ought to possess the MEANS by which it is to be attained.

Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with the care of the common defense, is a question in the first instance, open for discussion; but the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will follow, that that government ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to complete execution of its trust. And unless it can be shown that the circumstances which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defense and protection of the community, in any matter essential to its efficacy that is, in any matter essential to the FORMATION, DIRECTION, or SUPPORT of the NATIONAL FORCES.

Defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be, this principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers of it; though they have not made proper or adequate provision for its exercise. Congress have an unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men and money; to govern the army and navy; to direct their operations. As their requisitions are made constitutionally binding upon the States, who are in fact under the most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies required of them, the intention evidently was that the United States should command whatever resources were by them judged requisite to the "common defense and general welfare." It was presumed that a sense of their true interests, and a regard to the dictates of good faith, would be found sufficient pledges for the punctual performance of the duty of the members to the federal head.

The experiment has, however, demonstrated that this expectation was ill-founded and illusory; and the observations, made under the last head, will, I imagine, have sufficed to convince the impartial and discerning, that there is an absolute necessity for an entire change in the first principles of the system; that if we are in earnest about giving the Union energy and duration, we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the States in their collective capacities; we must extend the laws of the federal government to the individual citizens of America; we must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions, as equally impracticable and unjust. The result from all this is that the Union ought to be invested with full power to levy troops; to build and equip fleets; and to raise the revenues which will be required for the formation and support of an army and navy, in the customary and ordinary modes practiced in other governments.

If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound instead of a simple, a confederate instead of a sole, government, the essential point which will remain to be adjusted will be to discriminate the OBJECTS, as far as it can be done, which shall appertain to the different provinces or departments of power; allowing to each the most ample authority for fulfilling the objects committed to its charge. Shall the Union be constituted the guardian of the common safety? Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary to this purpose? The government of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them. The same must be the case in respect to commerce, and to every other matter to which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend. Is the administration of justice between the citizens of the same State the proper department of the local governments? These must possess all the authorities which are connected with this object, and with every other that may be allotted to their particular cognizance and direction. Not to confer in each case a degree of power commensurate to the end, would be to violate the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and improvidently to trust the great interests of the nation to hands which are disabled from managing them with vigor and success.

Who is likely to make suitable provisions for the public defense, as that body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided; which, as the centre of information, will best understand the extent and urgency of the dangers that threaten; as the representative of the WHOLE, will feel itself most deeply interested in the preservation of every part; which, from the responsibility implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most sensibly impressed with the necessity of proper exertions; and which, by the extension of its authority throughout the States, can alone establish uniformity and concert in the plans and measures by which the common safety is to be secured? Is there not a manifest inconsistency in devolving upon the federal government the care of the general defense, and leaving in the State governments the EFFECTIVE powers by which it is to be provided for? Is not a want of co-operation the infallible consequence of such a system? And will not weakness, disorder, an undue distribution of the burdens and calamities of war, an unnecessary and intolerable increase of expense, be its natural and inevitable concomitants? Have we not had unequivocal experience of its effects in the course of the revolution which we have just accomplished?

Every view we may take of the subject, as candid inquirers after truth, will serve to convince us, that it is both unwise and dangerous to deny the federal government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects which are intrusted to its management. It will indeed deserve the most vigilant and careful attention of the people, to see that it be modeled in such a manner as to admit of its being safely vested with the requisite powers. If any plan which has been, or may be, offered to our consideration, should not, upon a dispassionate inspection, be found to answer this description, it ought to be rejected. A government, the constitution of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the powers which a free people OUGHT TO DELEGATE TO ANY GOVERNMENT, would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the NATIONAL INTERESTS. Wherever THESE can with propriety be confided, the coincident powers may safely accompany them. This is the true result of all just reasoning upon the subject. And the adversaries of the plan promulgated by the convention ought to have confined themselves to showing, that the internal structure of the proposed government was such as to render it unworthy of the confidence of the people. They ought not to have wandered into inflammatory declamations and unmeaning cavils about the extent of the powers. The POWERS are not too extensive for the OBJECTS of federal administration, or, in other words, for the management of our NATIONAL INTERESTS; nor can any satisfactory argument be framed to show that they are chargeable with such an excess. If it be true, as has been insinuated by some of the writers on the other side, that the difficulty arises from the nature of the thing, and that the extent of the country will not permit us to form a government in which such ample powers can safely be reposed, it would prove that we ought to contract our views, and resort to the expedient of separate confederacies, which will move within more practicable spheres. For the absurdity must continually stare us in the face of confiding to a government the direction of the most essential national interests, without daring to trust it to the authorities which are indispensible to their proper and efficient management. Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, but firmly embrace a rational alternative.

I trust, however, that the impracticability of one general system cannot be shown. I am greatly mistaken, if any thing of weight has yet been advanced of this tendency; and I flatter myself, that the observations which have been made in the course of these papers have served to place the reverse of that position in as clear a light as any matter still in the womb of time and experience can be susceptible of. This, at all events, must be evident, that the very difficulty itself, drawn from the extent of the country, is the strongest argument in favor of an energetic government; for any other can certainly never preserve the Union of so large an empire. If we embrace the tenets of those who oppose the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as the standard of our political creed, we cannot fail to verify the gloomy doctrines which predict the impracticability of a national system pervading entire limits of the present Confederacy.

PUBLIUS.

Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

Peggy Noonan: Bring the Insurrectionists to Justice

January 17, 2021 by Miles Kimball

Peggy Noonan is a Republican Wall Street Journal opinion columnist who has become more and more disgusted with Donald Trump. Like her, some other prominent Republicans have begun putting distance between themselves and Trump since his encouragement of the insurrection against the presidential vote counting in Congress. To me it is a very good thing for the nation if a large part of the Republican party distances itself from Donald Trump. I have certainly had other differences with Donald Trump (see for example “It Isn't OK to Be Anti-Immigrant”), as well as some somewhat common views (particularly on the potential value of negative interest rate policy). But, to put it simply, it is definitely not OK for a president to advocate the violent overthrow of the US government. For, make no mistake, to encourage people to use force to interrupt the constitutionally mandated procedures for determining who won a presidential election is to advocate the violent overthrow of the US government as the US government is defined by the Constitution of the United States. For Donald Trump to send lawyers into court to argue about what the constitution and the election facts on the ground allow is one thing. To inspire an armed mob to attack the Capitol is quite another thing.

I can understand other judgments, but in my view, opposing attempts at the violent overthrow of the US government is not a partisan issue. It is the agreement by both Democrats and Republicans that we should follow constitutional procedures (with the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of disputes about what is a constitutional procedure) that makes our nation a democracy. I am for democracy. Many other systems of government have been tried. Everything else tried so far has been much worse than democracy. (And many things people want to try are much closer to political systems that we have historical evidence on than some people realize.) The democratic power of the electorate to “Throw the bums out,” though not always put in action at the most appropriate moments, is one of the greatest defenses we have against great political ills.

In addition to agreeing with Peggy Noonan’s sentiment that, without hesitation, and without excusing them for what they did, we should bring the insurrectionists to justice, I have flagged her op-ed because of this passage:

True conservatives tend to have a particular understanding of the fragility of things. They understand that every human institution is, in its way, built on sand. It’s all so frail. They see how thin the veil is between civilization and chaos, and understand that we have to go through every day, each in our way, trying to make the veil thicker. And so we value the things in the phrase that others use to disparage us, “law and order.” Yes, always, the rule of law, and order so that the people of a great nation can move freely on the streets and do their work and pursue their lives.

I want to keep living in a free country. Without adhering to constitutional procedures, we won’t stay a free country for long.

Postscript

Let me admit here that I was mistaken in my predictions. I thought Donald Trump would push every possible legal argument he could, but then would grudgingly accept the outcome when the courts said he had lost (while of course saying that he had really won). Donald Trump went a big step beyond that. I was wrong.

Don’t miss these closely related posts:

The Federalist Papers #22 C: Pillars of Democracy—The Judicial System, Military Loyal to the Constitution, and Police Loyal to the Constitution

January 10, 2021 by Miles Kimball

image sourceLink to the Wikipedia article “United States Armed Forces oath of enlistment”Link to the full text for the Federalist Papers #22 — *image source*
*Link to the Wikipedia article “United States Armed Forces oath of enlistment”*
*Link to the full text for the Federalist Papers #22*

Recent events make it worth thinking about what it is that can keep our nation’s government from being overthrown. I want to point to two key elements. First, judges whose partisanship is tempered by caring about the law and the respect for the judicial system that leads many powerful people outside the judicial system to take decisions of the Supreme Court as final. Second, a powerful military loyal to the Constitution, including the role of the Supreme Court in that Constitution.

Going beyond simply avoiding the overthrow of the government, in achieving social justice, a third element is key: police loyal to the Constitution—especially the 14th amendment that makes all equal before the law, regardless of race and other caste markers.

On judges, let me make an analogy. Unlike some, I am not worried about a resurgence of inflation in the United States (and have similar views for many other rich countries) because I know how the economists who staff the Fed are trained. They are all taught about the Great Inflation of the 1970s and how overly stimulative monetary policy caused that Great Inflation. Similarly, I believe that legal training instills a respect for the law that, for a large majority of judges, significantly influences their decisions away from being 100% partisan. Indeed, I believe that the law—the letter of the law and precedents—has at least as big an effect on judges as considerations of the good of the nation (beyond partisan ideology) has on voters.

On the military, I am very grateful that military training puts loyalty to the Constitution ahead of loyalty to the Commander in Chief. The words “I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic” come first, before mention of the President of the United States as Commander in Chief to be obeyed. Under some circumstances, the President of the United States could come within the set of “all enemies, foreign and domestic,” especially at moments of time close to a constitutionally ordained transfer of power. (See “John Locke: If Rebellion is a Sin, It is a Sin Committed Most Often by Those in Power.”)

On the police, I think we fall short in inculcating into them loyalty to the constitution. In particular, in order to carry out the promise of the 14th amendment which made all equal before the law, regardless of race, everything should be done to hire a police force composed of individual significantly less racist than the general population. I don’t think we have achieved this.

Rather than defund the police, I think we should spend more on one specific item: requiring all new hires to the police force to have bachelor’s degrees from rounded curricula at colleges and universities. (For adequate recruiting, I assume this will require somewhat higher average pay for those new hires.) Both sides of the partisan divide seem to agree that colleges and universities have some effect in getting students to try to be more politically correct. In the extreme, there may be some professions for which that is bad training (as when political correctness causes people to distort the truth of social-science findings). But I want the police to be a lot more politically correct than they have been, on average.

I don’t know the percentages, but I suspect that most police forces have at least a substantial minority of officers who have bachelor’s degrees already, so the danger of police forces giving the new, all college educated recruits too hard a time.

The bottom line is that we need to even more than we have in the past to inculcate loyalty to the constitution in those who get legal training, in our military, and in our police. That includes especially (since this seems to be difficult) to the 14th amendment, whose words I find inspiring:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Judges should be—and to an important extent, are in the real world—like priests of the Constitution. Without the judicial system and the respect it is afforded, the Constitution would be in grave danger of being merely words on paper, ignored whenever convenient. Alexander Hamilton made this point in the last five paragraphs of the Federalist Papers #22. In the last two paragraphs, he also points to two other great strengths of the then proposed constitution: first, that it had checks and balances in its structure, and second, that through ratification by a vote of the people it would have a clear supremacy over state governments.

Notice that the spirit of what Alexander Hamilton says about the importance of ratification by the people really goes well beyond ratification: it is of great importance that even in times of great stress, a large majority of people in the United States feels a deep loyalty to the constitution. And it is especially important that those given the heavy guns or the great power that police wield have a deep loyalty to the constitution.

Below is the full text of the last five paragraphs of the Federalist Papers #22:

A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains yet to be mentioned, the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation. The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. To produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves. These ingredients are both indispensable. If there is in each State a court of final jurisdiction, there may be as many different final determinations on the same point as there are courts. There are endless diversities in the opinions of men. We often see not only different courts but the judges of the came court differing from each other. To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to establish one court paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintendence, and authorized to settle and declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice.

This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is so compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being contravened by the laws of the parts. In this case, if the particular tribunals are invested with a right of ultimate jurisdiction, besides the contradictions to be expected from difference of opinion, there will be much to fear from the bias of local views and prejudices, and from the interference of local regulations. As often as such an interference was to happen, there would be reason to apprehend that the provisions of the particular laws might be preferred to those of the general laws; for nothing is more natural to men in office than to look with peculiar deference towards that authority to which they owe their official existence. The treaties of the United States, under the present Constitution, are liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it possible that foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a government? Is it possible that the people of America will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so precarious a foundation?

In this review of the Confederation, I have confined myself to the exhibition of its most material defects; passing over those imperfections in its details by which even a great part of the power intended to be conferred upon it has been in a great measure rendered abortive. It must be by this time evident to all men of reflection, who can divest themselves of the prepossessions of preconceived opinions, that it is a system so radically vicious and unsound, as to admit not of amendment but by an entire change in its leading features and characters.

The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the exercise of those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the Union. A single assembly may be a proper receptacle of those slender, or rather fettered, authorities, which have been heretofore delegated to the federal head; but it would be inconsistent with all the principles of good government, to intrust it with those additional powers which, even the moderate and more rational adversaries of the proposed Constitution admit, ought to reside in the United States. If that plan should not be adopted, and if the necessity of the Union should be able to withstand the ambitious aims of those men who may indulge magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement from its dissolution, the probability would be, that we should run into the project of conferring supplementary powers upon Congress, as they are now constituted; and either the machine, from the intrinsic feebleness of its structure, will moulder into pieces, in spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop it; or, by successive augmentations of its force an energy, as necessity might prompt, we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived. Thus, we should create in reality that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert.

It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal system, that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. Resting on no better foundation than the consent of the several legislatures, it has been exposed to frequent and intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers, and has, in some instances, given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeal. Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it has been contended that the same authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified. However gross a heresy it may be to maintain that a PARTY to a COMPACT has a right to revoke that COMPACT, the doctrine itself has had respectable advocates. The possibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.

Related post:

On Policing: Roland Fryer, William Bratton, John Murad, Scott Thomson and the American People

Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

Only What is in Our Power is Our Duty

January 03, 2021 by Miles Kimball

Link to the Amazon page for The Obstacle is the Way, by Ryan Holiday — *Link to the Amazon page for* The Obstacle is the Way, *by Ryan Holiday*

Too often, we act as if we have control over external things we can’t control—and as if we can’t control our own attitudes, which are well within our control. Seeing the truth of what we control and what we don’t control is a big part of wisdom. Here is how Ryan Holiday puts it in The Obstacle is the Way:

… recovering addicts learn the Serenity Prayer.

God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change

The courage to change the things I can,

And the wisdom to know the difference.

This is how they focus their efforts. It’s a lot easier to fight addiction when you aren’t also fighting the fact that you were born, that your parents were monsters, or that you lost everything. That stuff is done. Delivered. Zero in one hundred chances that you can change it.

So what if you focused on what you can change? That’s where you can make a difference.

Behind the Serenity Prayer is a two-thousand-year-old Stoic phrase: “ta eph’hemin, ta ouk eph’hemin.” What is up to us, what is not up to us.

And what is up to us?

Our emotions
Our judgments
Our creativity
Our attitude
Our perspective
Our desires
Our decisions
Our determination

This is our playing field, so to speak. Everything there is fair game. What is not up to us? Well, you know, everything else. The weather, the economy, circumstances, other people’s emotions or judgments, trends, disasters, et cetera.

…

In its own way, the most harmful dragon we chase is the one that makes us think we can change things that are simply not ours to change. That someone decided not to fund your company, this isn’t up to you. But the decision to refine and improve your pitch? That is. That someone stole your idea or got to it first? No. To pivot, improve it, or fight for what’s yours? Yes.

There are many things beyond your control. For example, for economists, opinions differ so widely on what is good and what is not so good that which referees an editor assigns to read your paper makes a huge difference to whether your paper gets accepted to an economics journal. And unfortunately for you, which particular referees an editor assigns to judge your paper is probably beyond your control. (I call this the “referee lottery.” Understanding the importance of the referee lottery is crucial to the mental health of economists who meet with bad luck when trying to publish. That understanding can also be a source of appropriate humility for those who meet with good luck in trying to publish.)

Many things are beyond your control. But I’m willing to bet that if you look closely enough, you’ll find that at least half of what makes your life pleasant or unpleasant has to do with what is going on within your own brain. This is your domain. It can be tricky to avoid overly self-critical or otherwise unproductive states of mind, but I’m willing to bet that the total amount of effort and consistent practice it takes to be able to intentionally get your mind into a better state is much, much less than the amount of effort and consistent practice that you and others reading my blog put into getting good at changing things in the world outside their heads. For many, then, there is likely to be a serious imbalance between the effort put into learning outward skills and the effort put into learning inward skills.

For the development of inward skills, in addition to using one of the many good meditation apps (in my case, “10% Happier”) I am a fan of the Shirzad Chamine’s pedagogy, which he has branded Positive Intelligence. He lays things out in a no-nonsense way, trying to use the latest neuroscience and findings in psychology. I have been impressed enough with the results from using these Positive Intelligence tools in my own life that I wanted to teach them to economists and their families. On that, see “How Economists Can Enhance Their Scientific Creativity, Engagement and Impact.”

Link to the Amazon page for Positive Intelligence, by Shirzad Chamine — *Link to the Amazon page for* Positive Intelligence, *by Shirzad Chamine*

At a more modest level, I have a set of blog posts about positive mental health and how to maintain your moral compass. I think you will find them useful.

Don’t Miss These Other Posts Related to Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral and Scientific Compass:

The Federalist Papers #22 B: Supermajority Rules Aren't an Adequate Fix for Departures from One-Person One-Vote—Alexander Hamilton

December 27, 2020 by Miles Kimball

image sourceLink to the full text for the Federalist Papers #22 — *image source*
*Link to the full text for the Federalist Papers #22*

How to make the wishes of each person count equally in a social choice problem is a very difficult problem. But sometimes things are skewed far enough in a certain direction that it is clear the opposite direction leads to greater equality in public decision-making. One way to tell might be to think of the hypothetical experiment asking the individuals in two groups in a society whether they would be willing to exchange the political rights and influence they have for the political rights and influence of the other group. But if two groups are unequal in numbers, then one must specify whether it is the political rights and influence per person in each group or the aggregate political rights and influence of each group.

When political rights and influence per person are unequal between two groups, some might claim that is OK if most decisions must be made by consensus or by large supermajorities. In the Federalist Papers #22, Alexander begs to differ. He argues that the power to veto a decision can easily be just as important as the power to get a decision through a legislature. Nations are beset by shocks that require responses if great harm is to be avoided. If a small minority can veto a response it is difficult to make the decision necessary to avoid the harm.

Moreover, Alexander Hamilton argues that if a small minority can veto a measure, it is easier to bribe enough legislators (or offer them other inducements) for corruption to prevent action. This is true even when it is a foreign power that wants to prevent action.

On bribery and other corrupt inducements to national leaders, Alexander Hamilton makes this interesting point:

An hereditary monarch, though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his ambition, has so great a personal interest in the government and in the external glory of the nation, that it is not easy for a foreign power to give him an equivalent for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the state.

There is a broader principle here: if a cohesive group has the power to govern by both pushing through legislation they want and preventing legislation they don’t want, this power is likely valuable enough that it will be hard for a foreign power to bribe them. Two circumstances go away from this case. First, if a group is not cohesive, an individual might be bought off. Second, if a small minority can veto legislation, or otherwise has outsized power in some respects, but not others, then it might be possible to buy off most of that small minority, not just individuals.

(On whether a monarch can be bribed to give foreigners a lot of power, an exception to the principle Alexander Hamilton claims is that a monarch might willingly sign a document giving foreigners power over the monarch’s country, thinking to not deliver on the promise of power to foreigners. In this, the monarch might misjudge how easy it is not to deliver on that promise.)

I have the full text below of Alexander Hamiltons arguments in these regards in the Federalist Papers #22. (I moved a footnote into square brackets within the main text at one point.)

The right of equal suffrage among the States is another exceptionable part of the Confederation. Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York; and to Deleware an equal voice in the national deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Carolina. Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican government, which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a majority of the votes of the States will be a majority of confederated America. But this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the plain suggestions of justice and common-sense. It may happen that this majority of States is a small minority of the people of America [New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, South Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the States, but they do not contain one third of the people.]; and two thirds of the people of America could not long be persuaded, upon the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties, to submit their interests to the management and disposal of one third. The larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due importance in the political scale, would be not merely to be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the last. The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration.

It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine States, or two thirds of the whole number, must consent to the most important resolutions; and it may be thence inferred that nine States would always comprehend a majority of the Union. But this does not obviate the impropriety of an equal vote between States of the most unequal dimensions and populousness; nor is the inference accurate in point of fact; for we can enumerate nine States which contain less than a majority of the people 4; and it is constitutionally possible that these nine may give the vote. Besides, there are matters of considerable moment determinable by a bare majority; and there are others, concerning which doubts have been entertained, which, if interpreted in favor of the sufficiency of a vote of seven States, would extend its operation to interests of the first magnitude. In addition to this, it is to be observed that there is a probability of an increase in the number of States, and no provision for a proportional augmentation of the ratio of votes.

But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in reality, a poison. To give a minority a negative upon the majority (which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision), is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser. Congress, from the nonattendance of a few States, have been frequently in the situation of a Polish diet, where a single VOTE has been sufficient to put a stop to all their movements. A sixtieth part of the Union, which is about the proportion of Delaware and Rhode Island, has several times been able to oppose an entire bar to its operations. This is one of those refinements which, in practice, has an effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory. The necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposition that it would contribute to security. But its real operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto, to the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. In those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the weakness or strength of its government, is of the greatest importance, there is commonly a necessity for action. The public business must, in some way or other, go forward. If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order that something may be done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings. Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public good. And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when such compromises can take place: for upon some occasions things will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures of government must be injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes border upon anarchy.

It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind gives greater scope to foreign corruption, as well as to domestic faction, than that which permits the sense of the majority to decide; though the contrary of this has been presumed. The mistake has proceeded from not attending with due care to the mischiefs that may be occasioned by obstructing the progress of government at certain critical seasons. When the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to the doing of any national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely TO BE DONE, but we forget how much good may be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular periods.

Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction with one foreign nation, against another. Suppose the necessity of our situation demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our ally led him to seek the prosecution of the war, with views that might justify us in making separate terms. In such a state of things, this ally of ours would evidently find it much easier, by his bribes and intrigues, to tie up the hands of government from making peace, where two thirds of all the votes were requisite to that object, than where a simple majority would suffice. In the first case, he would have to corrupt a smaller number; in the last, a greater number. Upon the same principle, it would be much easier for a foreign power with which we were at war to perplex our councils and embarrass our exertions. And, in a commercial view, we may be subjected to similar inconveniences. A nation, with which we might have a treaty of commerce, could with much greater facility prevent our forming a connection with her competitor in trade, though such a connection should be ever so beneficial to ourselves.

Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imaginary. One of the weak sides of republics, among their numerous advantages, is that they afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption. An hereditary monarch, though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his ambition, has so great a personal interest in the government and in the external glory of the nation, that it is not easy for a foreign power to give him an equivalent for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the state. The world has accordingly been witness to few examples of this species of royal prostitution, though there have been abundant specimens of every other kind.

In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community, by the suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great pre-eminence and power, may find compensations for betraying their trust, which, to any but minds animated and guided by superior virtue, may appear to exceed the proportion of interest they have in the common stock, and to overbalance the obligations of duty. Hence it is that history furnishes us with so many mortifying examples of the prevalency of foreign corruption in republican governments. How much this contributed to the ruin of the ancient commonwealths has been already delineated. It is well known that the deputies of the United Provinces have, in various instances, been purchased by the emissaries of the neighboring kingdoms. The Earl of Chesterfield (if my memory serves me right), in a letter to his court, intimates that his success in an important negotiation must depend on his obtaining a major's commission for one of those deputies. And in Sweden the parties were alternately bought by France and England in so barefaced and notorious a manner that it excited universal disgust in the nation, and was a principal cause that the most limited monarch in Europe, in a single day, without tumult, violence, or opposition, became one of the most absolute and uncontrolled.

Here are links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

Forgive Yourself

December 24, 2020 by Miles Kimball

Tomorrow is the traditional date to celebrate the birth of a man who went around telling quite a few people that their sins were forgiven. I wouldn’t be surprised if some of those to whom he told that still couldn’t forgive themselves for things they had done. It can be remarkably hard to forgive yourself for your mistakes and badnesses.

Many of us believe that it would be dangerous to forgive ourselves for our past mistakes and badnesses. But I think there is a difference between

taking responsibility for what you have done and trying to make things right and
beating yourself up about what you have done in the past.

Energy spent on beating yourself up and perhaps on feebly (or strongly) defending yourself from your own attacks is energy you aren’t spending on doing better and trying to repair the damage you have done in the past. It is an empirical matter whether beating yourself up is more helpful than discernment of what you have done wrong minus an emphasis on blame. There is little evidence to show that the very painful strategy of beating yourself up works any better than “blameless discernment” (a phrase I take from Shirzad Chamine, author of Positive Intelligence.

I like the quotation at the top of this post: “Forgiveness is giving up all hope of having had a better past.” (More than one famous person has said something like this.) We can’t change the past. We can only change what we are doing to ourselves now using bits and pieces of what we remember from our past and what is in our heads about the past more generally. Is it really helping you or the world to make yourself miserable using pointed shards from your past?

Unless you want to make what I consider the bad bet that beating yourself up is really helping you, forgiving yourself (while resolving to do better) is a good option to consider. The funny thing about forgiving yourself is that it looks more like stopping something you are doing than like doing something. Just cut the power to your attacks on yourself, and you will probably feel better and do better.

Don’t Miss These Other Posts Related to Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral Compass:

Contrasted Faults Through All Their Manners Reign

December 20, 2020 by Miles Kimball

By modern standards, Oliver Goldsmith’s 18th century poem “The Traveler—Or, a Prospect of Society” is political incorrect four times over: it is not gender neutral; it has at least one sentence that seems racist, it includes a noncondemning mention of slave-holding as a sign of wealth; and it offends national pride in its treatment of various nations. Nevertheless, it has some profound passages. Let me repurpose the following passage as a criticism of our discipline of economics:

Though poor, luxurious; though submissive, vain,

Though grave, yet trifling; zealous, yet untrue;

The first contrast, “Though poor, luxurious” fits least well. But it can apply to many economists—or indeed to any workaholic—if one thinks of “poor” as referring to a life that is not full and rich in nonfinancial ways, while “luxurious” refers to what one has bought.

The second contrast, “though submissive, vain” strikes a more powerful chord. Many economists are are vain about the how many papers they have published in which journals, but submissive to implicit, sometimes arbitrary, rules about what topics one should pursue, what methods one should use, and what things one should say in a paper. They have made themselves unreflective cogs in a machine that sometimes does the right thing and sometimes goes awry.

The third contrast “Though grave, yet trifling” is apt for the seriousness with which many economists approve of and attack dimensions of research that are orthogonal to how much potential the research has for improving the human condition, providing deeper insight into how the world works, or enabling other economists to do their work better.

Being grave in this sense is often connected to the zeal of the fourth contrast: “zealous, yet untrue.” For me, “zealous” points to those who are taught dogmas that they internalize and try to enforce on the rest of the discipline throughout the rest of their careers. “Untrue” points to any willingness to misrepresent one’s results for the sake of either one’s career advancement or to advance an ideology or dogma one adheres to.

All papers should be thought of as teaching documents, and teaching often requires some oversimplification before all the complications are added. But there are ways of doing this that show that one cares about the truth and ways of doing this that show how little one cares about truth.

Here’s to less poverty, less luxuriousness, less submissiveness, less vanity, less of being grave, less of trifling, less zeal and less untruth!

Don’t Miss These Other Posts Related to Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral Compass:

The Federalist Papers #22 A: The Articles of Confederation Lead to Uncoordinated Trade Policy and Military Free-Riding—Alexander Hamilton

December 13, 2020 by Miles Kimball

Link to the Wikipedia Article “Continental Army”Link to the full text for the Federalist Papers #22 — *Link to the Wikipedia Article “Continental Army”*
*Link to the full text for the Federalist Papers #22*

In the absence of subgame-perfect enforcement mechanisms (where “subgame-perfect” means enforcement mechanisms that are OK enough that people are willing to use them), game theory suggests that it is easy to get into an “everyone-out-for-self” equilibrium. In the Federalist Papers #22, Alexander Hamilton begins by saying that the Articles of Confederation led toward an “everyone-out-for-self” equilibrium in both trade policy and in putting together an army.

The lack of a coordinated trade policy led to difficulties in negotiating favorable trade treaties with other countries:

No nation acquainted with the nature of our political association would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the United States, by which they conceded privileges of any importance to them, while they were apprised that the engagements on the part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its members, and while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage they desired in our markets, without granting us any return but such as their momentary convenience might suggest.

Uncoordinated trade policy also presented the danger of destroying a single market for the United States and in that process creating animosity between states:

The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States … if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy.

Lack of coordination in raising an army forfeited the monopsony power the government could otherwise have had in hiring troops (note that Alexander Hamilton seems to assume that a draft is not feasible):

The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions upon the States for quotas of men. This practice … gave birth to a competition between the States which created a kind of auction for men. In order to furnish the quotas required of them, they outbid each other till bounties grew to an enormous and insupportable size.

Moreover, states not immediately threatened by enemy troops shirked in providing troops, thereby “free-riding” on the military efforts of the states closer to the fighting:

The States near the seat of war, influenced by motives of self-preservation, made efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities; while those at a distance from danger were, for the most part, as remiss as the others were diligent, in their exertions.

These arguments seem persuasive, though needing to be combined with many other arguments to make a truly strong case for “a more perfect union” than the weak Articles of Confederation.

Below is the full text of the first part of the Federalist Papers #22. (I have inserted the text of footnotes within brackets in the main text.)

FEDERALIST NO. 22

The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation

From the New York Packet
Friday, December 14, 1787.

Author: Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing federal system, there are others of not less importance, which concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of the affairs of the Union.

The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties allowed to be of the number. The utility of such a power has been anticipated under the first head of our inquiries; and for this reason, as well as from the universal conviction entertained upon the subject, little need be added in this place. It is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. The want of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the States. No nation acquainted with the nature of our political association would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with the United States, by which they conceded privileges of any importance to them, while they were apprised that the engagements on the part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its members, and while they found from experience that they might enjoy every advantage they desired in our markets, without granting us any return but such as their momentary convenience might suggest. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the House of Commons a bill for regulating the temporary intercourse between the two countries, should preface its introduction by a declaration that similar provisions in former bills had been found to answer every purpose to the commerce of Great Britain, and that it would be prudent to persist in the plan until it should appear whether the American government was likely or not to acquire greater consistency. [This, as nearly as I can recollect, was the sense of his speech on introducing the last bill.]

Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibitions, restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that kingdom in this particular, but the want of concert, arising from the want of a general authority and from clashing and dissimilar views in the State, has hitherto frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will continue to do so as long as the same obstacles to a uniformity of measures continue to exist.

The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy. "The commerce of the German empire [Encyclopedia, article "Empire."] is in continual trammels from the multiplicity of the duties which the several princes and states exact upon the merchandises passing through their territories, by means of which the fine streams and navigable rivers with which Germany is so happily watered are rendered almost useless." Though the genius of the people of this country might never permit this description to be strictly applicable to us, yet we may reasonably expect, from the gradual conflicts of State regulations, that the citizens of each would at length come to be considered and treated by the others in no better light than that of foreigners and aliens.

The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions upon the States for quotas of men. This practice in the course of the late war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous and to an economical system of defense. It gave birth to a competition between the States which created a kind of auction for men. In order to furnish the quotas required of them, they outbid each other till bounties grew to an enormous and insupportable size. The hope of a still further increase afforded an inducement to those who were disposed to serve to procrastinate their enlistment, and disinclined them from engaging for any considerable periods. Hence, slow and scanty levies of men, in the most critical emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an unparalleled expense; continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to their discipline and subjecting the public safety frequently to the perilous crisis of a disbanded army. Hence, also, those oppressive expedients for raising men which were upon several occasions practiced, and which nothing but the enthusiasm of liberty would have induced the people to endure.

This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and vigor than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. The States near the seat of war, influenced by motives of self-preservation, made efforts to furnish their quotas, which even exceeded their abilities; while those at a distance from danger were, for the most part, as remiss as the others were diligent, in their exertions. The immediate pressure of this inequality was not in this case, as in that of the contributions of money, alleviated by the hope of a final liquidation. The States which did not pay their proportions of money might at least be charged with their deficiencies; but no account could be formed of the deficiencies in the supplies of men. We shall not, however, see much reason to reget the want of this hope, when we consider how little prospect there is, that the most delinquent States will ever be able to make compensation for their pecuniary failures. The system of quotas and requisitions, whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every view, a system of imbecility in the Union, and of inequality and injustice among the members.

Here are links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far: