The Federalist Papers #54: Defending the Indefensible—How Attempting to Justify the 3/5 Rule for Slaves Digs the Hole Deeper

The Federalist Papers #54 provides some evidence for those who want to argue that—to an important but not total extent—the United States of America was founded on slavery. And what the Federalist Papers #54 says about slavery is only part of its horror. Below, let me lay out some of the passages that are rightly shocking to modern sensibilities, separated passages by added bullets. On slavery:

  • All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said; but does it follow, from an admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of persons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force.

  • … representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of this distinction to the case of our slaves.

  • But we must deny the fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake of both these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects as property.

  • In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another, the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others, the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property. The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character of persons and of property. This is in fact their true character.

  • Could it be reasonably expected, that the Southern States would concur in a system, which considered their slaves in some degree as men, when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in the same light, when advantages were to be conferred?

  • Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the MAN.

  • Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern interests might employ on this subject; and although it may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet, on the whole, I must confess that it fully reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention have established.

Saying that wealth or “property” is a legitimate basis of political power:

  • Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of the persons, of individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who are charged with the government. Upon this principle it is, that in several of the States, and particularly in the State of New York, one branch of the government is intended more especially to be the guardian of property, and is accordingly elected by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of government.

  • It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution, that as the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself may designate. The qualifications on which the right of suffrage depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two States. In some of the States the difference is very material. In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by the constitution of the State, who will be included in the census by which the federal Constitution apportions the representatives.

  • Nor will the representatives of the larger and richer States possess any other advantage in the federal legislature, over the representatives of other States, than what may result from their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation.

Not every idea in the Federalist Papers #54 is bad. This bit—logically separable from the horrifying bits—one can agree with:

In one respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in a considerable degree on the disposition, if not on the co-operation, of the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel as little bias as possible, to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the States will have opposite interests, which will control and balance each other, and produce the requisite impartiality.

Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #54, to show that I have not misrepresented the thrust of this number, which is quite willing to accommodate slavery for the sake of having states that are into slavery in a big way assent to union with the other states. The author of this number (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) is sometimes putting an argument of another imagined interlocutor, but everything I quote above about slavery is treated by the author as a reasonable argument with no hint of strong disagreement. The author actually distances himself most from anti-slavery attitudes—as you can see from this bit:

Might not some surprise also be expressed, that those who reproach the Southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as property a part of their human brethren …

FEDERALIST NO. 54

The Apportionment of Members Among the States

From the New York Packet
Tuesday, February 12, 1788.

Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates to the appointment of its members to the several States which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct taxes. It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the people of each State. The establishment of the same rule for the appointment of taxes, will probably be as little contested; though the rule itself in this case, is by no means founded on the same principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection.

In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least objectionable among the practicable rules, and had too recently obtained the general sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with the convention. All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said; but does it follow, from an admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of persons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force. I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side. "We subscribe to the doctrine," might one of our Southern brethren observe, "that representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake of both these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects as property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another, the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others, the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property. The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character of persons and of property. This is in fact their true character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live; and it will not be denied, that these are the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property, that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted, that if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants. "This question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as they are the only proper scale of representation. Would the convention have been impartial or consistent, if they had rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when the shares of representation were to be calculated, and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected, that the Southern States would concur in a system, which considered their slaves in some degree as men, when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in the same light, when advantages were to be conferred? Might not some surprise also be expressed, that those who reproach the Southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as property a part of their human brethren, should themselves contend, that the government to which all the States are to be parties, ought to consider this unfortunate race more completely in the unnatural light of property, than the very laws of which they complain? "It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States possessing them. They neither vote themselves nor increase the votes of their masters. Upon what principle, then, ought they to be taken into the federal estimate of representation? In rejecting them altogether, the Constitution would, in this respect, have followed the very laws which have been appealed to as the proper guide. "This objection is repelled by a single observation. It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution, that as the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself may designate. The qualifications on which the right of suffrage depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two States. In some of the States the difference is very material. In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by the constitution of the State, who will be included in the census by which the federal Constitution apportions the representatives.

In this point of view the Southern States might retort the complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down by the convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of particular States towards their own inhabitants; and consequently, that the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the census according to their full number, in like manner with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is waived by those who would be gainers by it. All that they ask is that equal moderation be shown on the other side. Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the MAN. "After all, may not another ground be taken on which this article of the Constitution will admit of a still more ready defense? We have hitherto proceeded on the idea that representation related to persons only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea?

Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of the persons, of individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who are charged with the government. Upon this principle it is, that in several of the States, and particularly in the State of New York, one branch of the government is intended more especially to be the guardian of property, and is accordingly elected by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of government. In the federal Constitution, this policy does not prevail. The rights of property are committed into the same hands with the personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore, to be paid to property in the choice of those hands. "For another reason, the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the people of each State, ought to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth of the States. States have not, like individuals, an influence over each other, arising from superior advantages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen but a single vote in the choice of his representative, the respect and consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his choice; and through this imperceptible channel the rights of property are conveyed into the public representation. A State possesses no such influence over other States. It is not probable that the richest State in the Confederacy will ever influence the choice of a single representative in any other State. Nor will the representatives of the larger and richer States possess any other advantage in the federal legislature, over the representatives of other States, than what may result from their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation. The new Constitution is, in this respect, materially different from the existing Confederation, as well as from that of the United Netherlands, and other similar confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of the federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary resolutions of the states composing the union. Hence the states, though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an unequal influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed Constitution, the federal acts will take effect without the necessary intervention of the individual States. They will depend merely on the majority of votes in the federal legislature, and consequently each vote, whether proceeding from a larger or smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner as the votes individually given in a State legislature, by the representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have each a precise equality of value and effect; or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds from the difference in the personal character of the individual representative, rather than from any regard to the extent of the district from which he comes. "Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern interests might employ on this subject; and although it may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet, on the whole, I must confess that it fully reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention have established. In one respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in a considerable degree on the disposition, if not on the co-operation, of the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel as little bias as possible, to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the States will have opposite interests, which will control and balance each other, and produce the requisite impartiality.

PUBLIUS.

Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

How to Get Abundant Affordable Housing

The way to have abundant affordable housing is to have abundant housing. That means making it easy to add residential units. I want to propose a simple, if radical policy that can guarantee abundant affordable housing: state or federal laws requiring mandatory permitting of trailer parks that meet a few basic standards.

There is little worry that trailer parks will spring up in a long-lasting way in totally inappropriate places, because any place land is worth too much, a trailer park operator can’t earn a profit. On the other hand, a trailer park gives a developer a nice threat point to persuade a neighborhood to allow more appropriate (and profitable) high-density housing.

Where land is cheaper—perhaps because of noise, or simply by being further out from the city center, a trailer park might make a lot of sense.

As “Do Trailer Parks and Mobile Homes Have a Future As Affordable Housing?” suggests, there is also no reason a trailer park can’t stay a trailer park but go upscale. The legal definition would be that it would have to be the locational home to manufactured housing—at least in the sense that large pieces were made in a factory. This would give an extra boost to home manufacturing, which is desperately needed. As I discuss in “Why Housing is So Expensive,” construction has shown almost no productivity growth by the usual measures. I suspect a lot of that is because most homes don’t have large pieces made in factories. It is hard to improve production if it doesn’t have some degree of centralization and standardization—or at least modularity. The bigger the percentage of homes that have large manufactured pieces, the faster total factor productivity in housing production will improve.

Note that with a state or federal law requiring mandatory permitting of trailer parks that meet a few basic standards you can get affordable housing in most places without subsidies. It is market rate affordable housing—which should be considered the Holy Grail, while subsidized affordable housing is typically just tokenism. I’d like to suggest one place to put the budgetary savings from not subsidizing housing: instead, subsidize convenient, frequent bus service to any sufficiently large concentration of trailers. This helps make sure that the affordable trailer-park housing will work for people. The residents have to be able to get to their jobs, after all—and those with low income often own unreliable cars or no car. (Note that trailer parks have full-scale house rentals as well as people who own the house and only pay plot rent and home-owner’s association fees.)

Also, nearby current residents shouldn’t have to suffer from an increase in crime when a trailer park is created next door. And those in the trailer parks themselves shouldn’t have to suffer with high crime rates, whether many felonies or many small misdemeanors. If this is a genuine danger, we need to be brutally honest about it—and if a genuine danger, it is a legitimate concern. Thus, in addition to subsidizing good bus service to new trailer parks, I suggest state and federal subsidies for extra police to police the new trailer parks and surrounding areas.

Let me give you a challenge: when you hear someone talking about affordable housing without offering a radical scheme that moves at least 10% toward what I am saying, you can know they aren’t serious about affordable housing beyond tokenism. Let’s get real about affordable housing. It is a huge part of the typical individual’s or families budget. So the poor get much less poor when housing gets cheaper. And the rich or middle class whose property values suffer some because the scarcity value is less—or because now they can’t have as much residential segregation can afford the hit.

By the way, people often talk about “systemic racism” without pointing to what it is actually made of. Barriers to residential construction are a big part of structural racism by perpetuating residential segregation that helps the rich and middle class to not care about the poor because they are out of sight, out of mind, and deprives talented children from poor families of mentors they desperately need. (If the poor living near the rich and sending their kids to the local schools makes the rich hate the poor more, rather than caring about them more, then we have worse problems.)

Being Less Controlling by Softening Attachment

image source

As one of the few economists who is also a life coach, I offer free Positive Intelligence training for economists:

The first step in that training is taking the saboteur assessment. The saboteur assessment is very quick and very revealing. When I took this assessment, the Hyper-Rational, Hyper-Achiever and Victim saboteurs were no surprise to me. But I learned something from my high score for the Controller saboteur. I am working on being less controlling.

To explain what it means to be controlling or not, Shirzad Chamine, the author of the book Positive Intelligence and the originator of the Positive Intelligence curriculum gives the analogy of vainly trying to control the wind and the waves or alternatively, surfing on whatever winds and waves come along.

Another helpful way of thinking about what the alternatives to being controlling are is to think about attachment. Here I use the word in the sense Buddhist’s use it: attachment is not rolling well with the punches that life lands, living in fear of those punches, or acting in fear. A basic principle of Buddhism is that the root of suffering is attachment.

I find the description of different levels of attachment in Don Miguel Ruiz Jr.’s brief book “The Five Levels of Attachment” useful. This book is billed in its subtitle as “Toltec Wisdom for the Modern Age.” To the extent that it actually reflects ancient Toltec wisdom, there is a convergence between Toltec wisdom and Buddhism.

Here are Don Miguel Ruiz Jr.’s 5 levels of attachment, as he describes them using the example of soccer fandom:

Level One: The Authentic Self

Imagine that you like soccer, and you can go to a game at any stadium in the world. It could be a magnificent stadium or a dirt-filled field. The players could be great or mediocre. You are not rooting for or against a side. It doesn't matter who is playing. As soon as you see a game, you sit, watch, and enjoy it for those ninety minutes. You simply enjoy watching the game for what it is. The players could even be kicking around a tin can, and you still enjoy the ups and downs of the sport! The moment the referee blows the whistle that ends the game—win or lose—you leave the game behind. You walk out of the stadium and continue on with your life. …

Level Two: Preference

This time, you attend a game—again, at any stadium in the world, with any teams playing—but now you root for one of the teams. … You created a story of victory or defeat that shaped the experience, but the story had nothing to do with you personally, because the story was about the team. You engaged with the event and the people around you, but at the end of the game, you simply say, “That was fun,” and let go of the attachment. …

Level Three: Identity

This time, you are a committed fan of a particular team. Their colors strike an emotional chord inside of you. When the referee blows the whistle, the result of the game affects you on an emotional level. … You feel elated when your team wins; when your team loses, you feel disappointed. But still, your team's performance is not a condition of your own self-acceptance. And if your team loses, you're able to accept the defeat as you congratulate the other side. … if your team loses, you might have a bad day at work, argue with someone about what or who is responsible for the team losing, or feel sad despite the good things going on around you. No matter what the effect is, you've let an attachment change your persona. Your attachment bleeds into a world that has nothing to do with it.

Level Four: Internalization

… at Level Four your association with your favorite team has now become an intrinsic part of your identity. The story of victory and defeat is now about you. Your team's performance affects your self-worth. When reading the stats, you admonish players for making us look bad. If the opponent team wins, you get angry that they beat you. You feel disconsolate when your team loses, and may even create excuses for the defeat. Of course you would never sit down with one of their fans in a pub for a friendly chat! …

Level Five: Fanaticism

At this level, you worship your team! Your blood bleeds their colors! If you see an opposing team's fan, they are automatically your enemy, because this shield must be defended! This is your land, and others must be subjugated so that they, too, can see that your team is the real team; others are just frauds. What happens on the field says everything about you. Winning championships makes you a better person, and there is always a conspiracy theory that allows you to never accept a loss as legitimate. There is no longer a separation between you and your attachment of any kind. You are a committed to your team through and through, a fan 365 days a year. Your family is going to wear the jersey, and they better be fans of your team. If any of your kids become a fan of an opposing team, you will disinherit them. … at Level Five you don't waste your time with people who don't love the sport.

The real power in this idea of attachment is in applying it to areas of life far beyond sports. Here are some areas in which I notice a lot of attachment by people I know (a set that includes me):

  • political party

  • particular political issues such as climate change or animal rights

  • academic discipline

  • field within economics

  • style of research within a field in economics

  • having particular technical skills

  • having particular social and organizational skills

There is a subtle distinction to be made between devoting oneself to a project or a cause and becoming attached to it. One can devote oneself to a cause and do one’s utmost to advance that cause without your heart being occupied with anger at those who don’t see the importance of that cause or even work against it and without your heart being occupied by the bad things that might happen that are completely beyond your control.

To use a military analogy, Napoleon kept some of his forces in reserve to send into battle at the crucial place a the crucial moment. If all of his forces were in the thick of the fight from the beginning—attached to a particular part of the battle already, with little ability to extricate themselves—he couldn’t have taken advantage of opportunities that arose.

Decision of how long to persist in a particular direction of action and when to do a course correction are crucial in life. Attachment interferes with making those decisions well. You might be too attached to a particular course of action that you persist to long or you might be so attached to winning that you quit too soon when the chance of failure gets to the same order of magnitude as the chance of success.

The more you spy out excesses of attachment and notice the temptations you face to try to control things beyond what is gracefully possible, the more calm and effective you will be. People differ in how big a problem attachment and being controlling is in their lives, but this is an issue at some level for almost everyone.

Posts on Positive Mental Health and Maintaining One’s Moral Compass:

On the DSM (Clinical Psychology's 'Diagnostic Statistical Manual')

In the talk shown above about the nature of clinical psychology, Jordan Peterson spends most of his time persuasively making the case that values are an unavoidably central part of clinical psychology. That is very useful.

But I want to focus on the beginning of the talk, about how psychological diagnostic categories are “family resemblance” categories, in Wittgenstein’s terms. Jordan gives the example of a category with a list of 10 symptoms, any 5 of which suffice to declare someone to have that disorder. That means two people could share no symptoms and be diagnosed as having the same disorder.

Let me try top clear up the issues conceptually. What is fundamentally at issue is the efficacy (good effects minus bad side effects) of various types of treatment. Although enough data may not be available to do this for real, conceptually this is a matter of regressing the efficacy of a particular treatment (let’s say by a randomized trial) on a list of symptoms and other indicators. Labeling something as a particular syndrome could mean at least two different things (or could simply be incoherent). It could mean that a set of symptoms strongly co-move so that there seems to be a strong factor in the factor-analytic sense. In that case, taking an average over many symptoms (which amounts to counting if one is only assessing symptoms at the 0 or 1 level of discrimination) makes sense. The other thing labeling something as a syndrome could mean is that there are significant interaction terms in the regression, so that two or more symptoms co-occurring is more predictive than just the sum of the symptoms would predict.

The bottom-line is that if one can specify what they are for (in this case, guiding treatment), family resemblance categories can be thought of in terms of a regression with the individual characteristics as regressors.

In Praise of Buckwheat Pillows

For many years, my wife Gail and I have happily used buckwheat pillows. We had a chiropractor in Ann Arbor who got us into them. The great thing about buckwheat pillows is that you can squish around the buckwheat inside so that they perfectly support your neck will leaving your head in full alignment with your spine.

The buckwheat pillow above is small enough to easily take on trips, while being big enough for comfortable use at home as well. (It comes with a travel case.)

When you first get a buckwheat pillow, it’s a good idea to remove several cups of the buckwheat and put them in ziplock bags. You can always add it back if the pillow feels like it needs it.

What we love about buckwheat pillows is:

  1. Fewer headaches caused by a sore neck!

  2. As mentioned above, you can rearrange the buckwheat to provide support only for your neck. (You can have your head nearly flat on the mattress after you rearrange the buckwheat). You can change the arrangement (don’t worry, you get really fast at this and it comes naturally) when you are ready to roll on your side or onto your back.

  3. Buckwheat pillows stays cooler than regular pillows.

When Gail and I were part of a wildfire evacuation a few months ago (see “New Year's Gratitude on the Occasion of the Marshall Fire”), Gail remembered to bring her buckwheat pillow. I forgot. I regretted that. I could feel the difference in my neck after just a few days without.

Acknowledgement: Gail contributed to this post.

Trends in NBER Working Papers

I received an email from Jim Poterba this morning on the occasion of the 30,000th NBER working paper. Excerpting, it said:

The NBER reached a milestone this morning with the distribution of our 30,000th working paper.  The series was launched in 1973 by labor economist Robert Michael to disseminate research prior to journal publication and to facilitate distribution of data appendices and related supplemental material.  Working paper number 1 was Education, Information, and Efficiency by Finis Welch.

The series began on a modest scale, reflecting the small number of NBER affiliates at the time.  There were 41 working papers in the first year, and it took 12 years to reach the 1000 paper mark.  Originally, working papers were printed and had bright yellow covers. Packets of papers were mailed occasionally to libraries, leading economics departments, and research institutes. As the number of NBER researchers expanded, the volume of working papers rose.  Eventually, a shift to digital distribution became essential for accommodating the expanding number of studies.

In 2020, when many economists ratcheted up their research output to address the many new questions posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, a record 1,713 working papers were distributed.  The annual average for the last five years was 1,322. More than 25,000 subscribers receive the “New This Week” email each Monday, and there were more than 2.9 million paper downloads in 2021. Twitter has become an increasingly important channel for calling attention to working paper content. 

The NBER working papers provide some insights on the changing structure of economic research. For example, 60 percent of the papers distributed during the series’ first decade had a single author, while 35 percent were coauthored and 5 percent had more than two authors.  In the last decade, only 11 percent had a single author; 56 percent had three or more.  The number of working papers per NBER affiliate per year, which was more than 1.7 in 1980, has trended down.  It averaged about 0.95 at the turn of the century, and was 0.78 in most recent five years excluding 2020.

In the image at the top of this post, you can see that there exist some older retrospectives on NBER working papers.

The most interesting trend is that people seem to be involved in about as many papers per year as they were before, but with more coauthors, so that papers on CV has not had a big trend, but if only fractional credit were given for papers with coauthors, it would look like productivity had gone down. But I think that papers are more ambitious than they used to be, in rough proportion to the increased number of coauthors. (In the cross-section, I think the number of citations goes up roughly with the square root of the number of coauthors, but the time-series trends would be different from that.)


The Federalist Papers #53: The Wide Knowledge Required for Federal Legislation Makes Biennial Elections to the House of Representatives Better than Annual Elections

The Federalist Papers #53, authored by either Alexander Hamilton or James Madison, continues the argument of #52 that elections to the House of Representatives every two years strikes a reasonable balance.

First, after pointing out that the exact period between elections is somewhat arbitrary—

No man will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists between the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can bear the temptations of power.

—the author argues that the maxim “where annual elections end, tyranny begins" arose where constitutions were unwritten and more mutable than the difficult-to-amend, written Constitution being proposed for the US. In those contexts, the year as a salient length of time had to make up for lesser tensile strength of the relevant constitutions:

The important distinction so well understood in America, between a Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the government and alterable by the government, seems to have been little understood and less observed in any other country. … An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of free government, of which frequency of elections is the corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty, against the danger to which it is exposed. … Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security would the case admit, than that of selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time, as a standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing the national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exertions?

That argument only says that two years between elections to the federal House of Representatives is not a danger to liberty. But why would it be superior to annual elections? Here, the argument is that being a member of the US House of Representatives is more difficult than being in a state legislature (for which annual elections were common), and so benefits more from experience:

No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate. … The period of service, ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of the service. The period of legislative service established in most of the States for the more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be put into this simple form: does the period of two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation?

Most of the rest of the Federalist Papers #53 elaborates on these arguments. In addition, there is some consideration of how a high probability of reelection or reappointment can make shorter formal terms of office consistent with having the requisite experience and how on the other hand slow resolution of election disputes makes short terms problematic.

Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #53.

FEDERALIST NO. 53

The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives

From the New York Packet
Tuesday, February 12, 1788.

Author: Alexander Hamilton or James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, "that where annual elections end, tyranny begins. " If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once established, they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists between the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be required by the various situations and circumstances of civil society. The election of magistrates might be, if it were found expedient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; and if circumstances may require a deviation from the rule on one side, why not also on the other side? Turning our attention to the periods established among ourselves, for the election of the most numerous branches of the State legislatures, we find them by no means coinciding any more in this instance, than in the elections of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the other States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South Carolina they are biennial as is proposed in the federal government. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to show, that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that either the one or the other of these States is distinguished in these respects, and by these causes, from the States whose elections are different from both. In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important distinction so well understood in America, between a Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the government and alterable by the government, seems to have been little understood and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of the government. Even in Great Britain, where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the most fundamental articles of the government. They have in particular, on several occasions, changed the period of election; and, on the last occasion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial elections, but by the same act, continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the people. An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of free government, of which frequency of elections is the corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty, against the danger to which it is exposed. Where no Constitution, paramount to the government, either existed or could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to that established in the United States, was to be attempted. Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security would the case admit, than that of selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time, as a standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing the national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exertions? The most simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to the subject was that of a year; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited government, that the advance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of annual elections. But what necessity can there be of applying this expedient to a government limited, as the federal government will be, by the authority of a paramount Constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of the people of America will not be more secure under biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those of any other nation would be, where elections were annual, or even more frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the government? The second question stated is, whether biennial elections be necessary or useful. The propriety of answering this question in the affirmative will appear from several very obvious considerations. No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of men in private as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it. The period of service, ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of the service. The period of legislative service established in most of the States for the more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be put into this simple form: does the period of two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for State legislation? The very statement of the question, in this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to it. In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing laws which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all the citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conversation of every class of people. The great theatre of the United States presents a very different scene. The laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in every State; whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very extensive region, and are extremely diversified by the local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any other place than in the central councils to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws, of all the States, ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulations of the different States? How can the trade between the different States be duly regulated, without some knowledge of their relative situations in these and other respects? How can taxes be judiciously imposed and effectually collected, if they be not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects in the different States? How can uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided, without a similar knowledge of many internal circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each other? These are the principal objects of federal legislation, and suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the representatives ought to acquire. The other interior objects will require a proportional degree of information with regard to them. It is true that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the government and the primeval formation of a federal code. Improvements on the first draughts will every year become both easier and fewer. Past transactions of the government will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members. The affairs of the Union will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse among those of different States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws. But with all these abatements, the business of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State, as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are to transact it. A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal representative, and which has not been mentioned is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce he ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations. He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law of nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation, is submitted to the federal government.

And although the House of Representatives is not immediately to participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public affairs, those particular branches will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legislation, and will sometimes demand particular legislative sanction and co-operation. Some portion of this knowledge may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can only be derived from the public sources of information; and all of it will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the subject during the period of actual service in the legislature.

There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but which are not unworthy of notice. The distance which many of the representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements rendered necessary by that circumstance, might be much more serious objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a single year, than if extended to two years. No argument can be drawn on this subject, from the case of the delegates to the existing Congress. They are elected annually, it is true; but their re-election is considered by the legislative assemblies almost as a matter of course. The election of the representatives by the people would not be governed by the same principle. A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent reelections, become members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of the members the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. This remark is no less applicable to the relation which will subsist between the House of Representatives and the Senate. It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent elections even in single States, where they are large, and hold but one legislative session in a year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining irregular returns. Were elections for the federal legislature to be annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in the more distant States. Each house is, as it necessarily must be, the judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its members; and whatever improvements may be suggested by experience, for simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would be little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat. All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming, that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberty of the people.

PUBLIUS.

Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far: