Quartz #47—>Meet the Fed's New Intellectual Powerhouse

Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 47th Quartz column, “Meet the Fed’s new intellectual powerhouse,” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on March 24, 2014. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

I wrote this column just in time. On April 3, 2014, Jeremy Stein announced he was resigning from the Fed. But we might see him again in the future in high government office. And this column is at least as much about enduring issues of monetary policy as it is about Jeremy. 

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© March 24, 2014: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2017. All rights reserved.

I have two related columns not directly linked in this piece: “Monetary Policy and Financial Stability“ and my discussion of Janet Yellen’s views: ”Janet Yellen is Hardly a Dove: She Knows the US Economy Needs Some Unemployment.”

What I say in the column about how a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution affects how the Fed should respond to risk premia is informed by the discussion I gave of a paper of Mike Woodford and Vasco Curdia at a Bank of Japan conference (which I mentioned and linked to here.) Claudia Sahm, Matthew Shapiro and I are working on literature review of empirical work on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for our paper on that topic. I will have more to say on that in the future. 


Janet Yellen led her first monetary policy meeting as chair last week. But with Yellen’s emphasis so far on consensus and continuity, the key news from the Fed last week wasn’t anything Janet Yellen said, but what Federal Reserve Board Governor Jeremy Stein said at the International Research Forum on Monetary Policy on Mar. 21.

Jeremy Stein is currently the junior member of the Federal Reserve Board, having served only since May 30, 2012. (Several recent nominees to the Federal Reserve Board have yet to be approved.) But with Ben Bernanke’s departure, Stein now has the most distinguished academic record of anyone currently making decisions about US monetary policy. His background as a Harvard Professor of Economics and former President of the American Finance Association shows. He holds office hours for staff at the Federal Reserve Board, and from the half hour that I once spent with him, I can say that he stands ready to debate the fine points of economic models with anyone. In his speech last Friday, Governor Stein showed how much genuine light an academic approach can shed on practical monetary policy questions in the right hands.

Victoria McGrane and Jon Hilsenrath at the Wall Street Journal summarize Stein’s speech with the headline, “Financial Stability Considerations Should Influence Monetary Policy.” But Stein’s message is subtler than that headline suggests. He asks first: “Should financial stability concerns, in principle, influence monetary policy decisions? … This question is about theory, not empirical magnitudes, and, in my view, the theoretical answer is a clear ‘yes.’”

As he clearly spells out, the key to his argument is his “third and final assumption … that the risks associated with an elevated value of [financial market vulnerability] cannot be fully offset at zero cost with other non-monetary tools, such as financial regulation.” Stein summarizes:

Thus one way to think of my construct of FMV [financial market vulnerability] is that it is a stand-in for the level of financial vulnerabilities that remain after regulation has done the best that it can do, given the existing real-world limitations.

To explain what he is saying, let me make the analogy to cancer treatment. Because the newer targeted chemotherapies are still not 100% effective, they are still often combined with the older chemotherapies that attack any and all growing cells—leading to the all-too-familiar side effects of hair loss, nausea, anemia, and so on. Similarly, if targeted policies such as financial regulation can’t fully prevent financial crises, then it might sometimes make sense to add a bit of tight monetary policy to help rein in financial excesses.

But the same logic says that the better we get at using targeted tools to prevent financial crises, the less we will need to rely on a monetary broadside—with all of its undesirable side effects—as a secondary preventative measure. So it matters when Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig make a careful argument that high equity requirements for banks have very few true social costs or when I argue that a US Sovereign Wealth Fund would not only stabilize the financial system, but also make money for US taxpayers. (I am not alone in advocating for contrarian debt-financed sovereign wealth funds. UCLA Economics Professor Roger Farmer is just as strong an advocate, as well as top-flight economics journalist John Aziz and my fellow Quartz columnist and coauthor Noah Smith.)

Governor Stein, after making the case that financial stability concerns should play at least some role in monetary policy-making, however small, makes an excellent suggestion of how to guess when financial excess is a concern. He suggests focusing on the size of risk premiums in the bond market. If people are willing to pay almost as much—or equivalently, willing to accept interest rates almost as low—for junk bonds as they are for the very safest bonds (still US Treasuries, despite all of our government debt follies), that is the time to worry.

In addition to all the reasons Governor Stein gives for focusing on risk premiums in the bond market as a way to guess the extent of financial dangers, a focus by the Fed on risk premiums in the bond market has another benefit. Too much discussion of monetary policy has proceeded under the fiction that there is only one interest rate. As soon as one recognizes that there are as many different interest rates as there are types of assets, an obvious question arises: “Which interest rates give the best idea of the cost of borrowing for the home-building, consumer spending, and business investment that drive aggregate demand for the economy?” The obvious—and correct—answer is that it is rates for mortgages, consumer loans, and loans to businesses (of which the lending represented by corporate bonds is an important part) that best represent the borrowing costs that matter for aggregate demand.

So even when the Fed states its policy in terms of the safe fed funds rate, it should be looking past that safe rate to the mortgage rates, consumer-loan rates, and corporate borrowing rates that result. Even before considering the risk of a financial crisis, the Fed should react to an increase in bond risk premiums almost one-for-one by a reduction in the safe rate, and should react to a narrowing of bond risk premiums almost one-for-one by an increase in the safe rate. (The reason I write “almost” one-for-one is that the risk premium has an effect on savers as well as on borrowers, but evidence suggests that savers are not very sensitive to interest rates, so it is the effect of the key rates on borrowers that is of greatest concern.)

The metaphor of an ivory tower is used to contrast academia to the “real world.” But differences among academics in how much they understand the real world are just as big as any gap between academics in general and non-academics. The details of Jeremy Stein’s academic publications and government experience indicate that he combines a respect for theory with a practical bent. And the fact that his specialty is finance is a good sign in that regard: the abundance of good financial data anchors the field of finance into the real world, as reflected in the lack of a divide within finance to match the divide in macroeconomics between “Freshwater” and “Saltwater” macroeconomists. In intellectual style, Jeremy Stein reminds me of the brilliant Larry Summers, but Stein is free of the political baggage that led to Summers being passed over for Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. My crystal ball is often cloudy, but if I make no mistake, I see an exhilarating trajectory ahead for Jeremy Stein.

Quartz #46—>One of the Biggest Threats to America's Future Has the Easiest Fix

Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 46th Quartz column, coauthored with Noah Smith, “One of the biggest threats to America’s future has the easiest fix,” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. (I expect Noah will post it on his blog Noahpinionas well.) It was first published on February 4, 2014. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

Writing this column inspired a presentation on capital budgeting I gave at the Congressional Budget Office. See my post “Capital Budgeting: The Powerpoint File.”

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© February 4, 2014: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2015. All rights reserved.

Noah has agreed to allow mirroring of our joint columns on the same terms as I do, after they are posted here.

I talked about some of the issues of capital budgeting addressed in this column a while back in my post “What to Do When the World Desperately Wants to Lend Us Money” and Noah has talked about the importance of infrastructure investment a great deal on his blog .

Other Threats to America’s Future: Our editor wanted to title the column “The biggest threat to America’s future has the easiest fix.” I objected that I didn’t think it was the very biggest threat to America’s future. I worry about nuclear proliferation. Short of that, I believe the biggest threat to America’s future is letting China surpass America in total GDP and ultimately military might by not opening our doors wider to immigration—a threat I discuss in my column “Benjamin Franklin’s Strategy to Make the US a Superpower Worked Once, Why Not Try It Again?”


In the 1990s, with its economy stagnating after a financial crisis, Japan lavished billions on infrastructure investment. The Japanese government lined rivers and beaches with concrete, turned parks into parking lots, and built bridges to nowhere. The splurge of spending may have allowed Japan to limp along without a full-blown depression, but added to the mountain of government debt that remains to this day.

Given Japan’s experience, it may seem odd for us to call for an increase in America’s infrastructure investment. In terms of infrastructure, the US now is not Japan in the 1990s. They didn’t need to build … but we do.

First, the United States is a lot larger than Japan, and larger than the densely populated countries of Europe. We have a lot more ground to cover with highways, bridges, power lines, and broadband infrastructure. We need to be spending a higher fraction of our GDP on these transportation and communication links—but instead, we spend about the same or less.

Second, where Japan’s infrastructure was in good condition when the spending binge started, America’s infrastructure is in hideous disrepair. The American Society of Civil Engineers gives America’s infrastructure a “D+”. Although infrastructure opponents typically dismiss the opinions of civil engineers (who, after all, stand to personally gain from increased infrastructure spending), McKinsey released a recent report saying much the same thing. McKinsey notes that Japan is spending about twice as much as it needs to on infrastructure. But the US is spending only about three-fourths of what we should be spending. The Associated Press piles on, saying that 65,000 American bridges are “structurally deficient.” A former secretary of energy says our power grid is at “Third World” levels. The list of infrastructure woes goes on, and on, and on.

This is not the picture of a country with a healthy infrastructure.

We need to rebuild our infrastructure, and now is the perfect time to do it. Interest rates are at historic lows, but they are unlikely to stay there forever. Our government has a unique opportunity to borrow cheaply to fund infrastructure projects that will generate a positive return for the country. (If the increased spending acts as a Keynesian “stimulus,” so much the better.)

But infrastructure budgets have been cut, not expanded. Why? One reason is that in the race to cut the deficit, infrastructure spending has been lumped in with other types of spending. That is a tragic mistake. Unlike government “transfers,” which simply take money from person A and give it to person B, infrastructure leaves us with something that helps the private sector do business, and thus boosts our GDP growth. Infrastructure is a small percentage of overall federal spending, but tends to be a politically easy target.

One idea to boost infrastructure spending, therefore, is to treat government investments differently from other kinds of government spending by having a separate capital budget.  A separate capital budget has been suggested, but so far, the effort has foundered. There is a lot of confusion over which types of spending represent an “investment in the future.” Some politicians tend to argue that almost anything that helps people is an investment in the future, and so is a legitimate part of a capital budget. But of course everything in the government’s budget is something that someone thinks will help people!  So what is needed is a clear criterion to determine what should be in the capital budget and what should be in the regular budget.

There should be a fairly stringent set of criteria for what belongs in a capital budget. Furthermore, these criteria should appeal to both parties. Here is what we suggest as criteria to keep the capital budget “pure”:

1.     If experts agree that an expenditure will raise future tax revenue by increasing GDP, then it belongs in the capital budget. If it can pay for itself entirely out of extra tax revenue in the future then it should be 100% on the capital budget. If it can pay for half of its cost out of extra tax revenue in the future, than it should be 50% on the capital budget. The provision “experts agree” requires some sort of independent commission doing an economic analysis with appointees from both parties, and with, say, two-thirds of the commissioners needing to agree that the value of future tax revenue is likely to be above a given level.

2.     Even if an expenditure will not raise future tax revenue, it can count as a capital expenditure if it is a one-time expenditure—that is, if it makes sense to have a surge in spending followed by a much lower maintenance level of spending in that area. This will only be true if it pushes the existing stock of infrastructure, other government capital, or knowledge to a higher level than before, not if it just keeps things even. Crucially, by this logic, anything that lets the stock of infrastructure or other government capital decline would count as anegative capital expenditure. This principle enables the capital budget accounting to sound a warning when the nation is letting its infrastructure crumble away, and also allows sensible decisions about shifting funds from older forms of infrastructure toward modern forms of infrastructure needed by a fast-moving economy.

As our mention of the stock of knowledge suggests, a capital budget can also be a good way to make sure that America doesn’t underinvest in basic scientific research. However great the importance of better roads and bridges, it makes sense to weigh the benefits of those roads and bridges against the benefits of research that might someday conquer Alzheimer’s disease, or research on how to make the way math is taught in our public schools so exciting that every high school graduate in America is able to do the math needed to, say, operate computerized machine tools.

With proposals like these on the table, we believe there is a chance that Republicans and Democrats could agree to set infrastructure and other legitimate capital spending aside as an issue that should not be a victim of titanic political battles over the deficit. Of course, someday, if we find ourselves in Japan’s position of spending so much on infrastructure that it starts adding significant amounts to the debt, then the capital budget should become an issue in deficit fights as well. But we are far from that point.

Both Republicans and Democrats want to govern a country that is as rich and prosperous as possible. America’s businesses need good infrastructure to move their goods from place to place—and there is no question that we need the solid new ideas that research can provide. Economists of all stripes will agree that if a nation is under-spending on infrastructure and other legitimate capital spending—as America is right now —then boosting that spending is a win-win. It’s time to look beyond our fights over how to divide America’s pie, and focus on making the pie bigger.


Technical Afterword

There is a very interesting feature to our proposed capital budgeting system that we should highlight. How can the capital budget ever be negative? The capital budget plus the non-capital budget must add up to the total budget. So for a given total budget, a negative capital budget makes the non-capital budget bigger. What is going on is this: regular maintenance is like a quasi-entitlement within the non-capital budget. In any given year, regular maintenance as a component of the non-capital budget is fixed in advance and can’t be altered by the legislature. The only way it changes is that it is gradually reduced if the quantity of capital to be maintained gets lower, or gradually increased if the amount of capital to be maintained gets bigger.

In this lack of discretion about regular maintenance as a component of the non-capital budget, there is no real tying of the hands of the legislature: they could always choose to have a very negative capital budget, which would increase the non-capital budget enough to cover that maintenance. So if the legislature as a whole acted like a fully rational actor, this principle is not a constraint at all. But as political economy, it makes a difference, and a good one. The legislature can increase the non-capital budget and reduce the capital budget. But what the legislature can’t do is get more funds for other things by letting capital decay without it showing up in the accounting as an increase in the regular budget and reduction in the capital budget.

On these technical issues, see also

Quartz #45—>Actually, There Was Some Real Policy in Obama's Speech

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Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 45th Quartz column, “Actually, there was some real policy in Obama’s speech,” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on January 29, 2014. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© January 29, 2014: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2015. All rights reserved.


In National Review Online, Ramesh Ponnuru described last night’s State of the Union speech as “… a laundry list of mostly dinky initiatives, and as such a return to Clinton’s style of State of the Union addresses.” I agree with the comparison to Bill Clinton’s appeal to the country’s political center, but Ponnuru’s dismissal of the new initiatives the president mentioned as “dinky” is short-sighted.

In the storm and fury of the political gridiron, the thing to watch is where the line of scrimmage is. And it is precisely initiatives that seem “dinky” because they might have bipartisan support that best show where the political and policy consensus is moving. Here are the hints I gleaned from the text of the State of the Union that policy and politics might be moving in a helpful direction.

  • The president invoked Michelle Obama’s campaign against childhood obesity as something uncontroversial. But this is actually part of what could be a big shift toward viewing obesity to an important degree as a social problem to be addressed as communities instead of solely as a personal problem.
  • The president pushed greater funding for basic research, saying: “Congress should undo the damage done by last year’s cuts to basic research so we can unleash the next great American discovery.” Although neither party has ever been against support for basic research, budget pressures often get in the way. And limits on the length of State of the Union addresses very often mean that science only gets mentioned when it touches on political bones of contention such as stem-cell research or global warming. So it matters that support for basic research got this level of prominence in the State of the Union address. In the long run, more funding for the basic research could have a much greater effect on economic growth than most of the other economicpolicies debated in Congress.
  • The president had kind words for natural gas and among “renewables” only mentions solar energy. This marks a shift toward a vision of coping with global warming that can actually work: Noah Smith’s vision of using natural gas while we phase out coal and improving solar power until solar power finally replaces most natural gas use as well. It is wishful thinking to think that other forms of renewable energy such as wind power will ever take care of a much bigger share of our energy needs than they do now, but solar power is a different matter entirely. Ramez Naam’s Scientific American blog post “Smaller, cheaper, faster: Does Moore’s law apply to solar cells“ says it all. (Don’t miss his most striking graph, the sixth one in the post.)
  • The president emphasized the economic benefits of immigration. I wish he would go even further, as I urged immediately after his reelection in my column, “Obama could really help the US economy by pushing for more legal immigration.” The key thing is to emphasize increasing legal immigration, in a way designed to maximally help our economy. If the rate of legal immigration is raised enough, then the issue of “amnesty” for undocumented immigrants doesn’t have to be raised: if the line is moving fast enough, it is more reasonable to ask those here against our laws to go to the back of the line. The other way to help politically detoxify many immigration issues is to reduce the short-run partisan impact of more legal immigration by agreeing that while it will be much easier to become a permanent legal resident,citizenship with its attendant voting rights and consequent responsibility to help steer our nation in the right direction is something that comes after many years of living in America and absorbing American values. Indeed, I think it would be perfectly reasonable to stipulate that it should take 18 years after getting a green card before becoming a citizen and getting the right to vote—just as it takes 18 years after being born in America to have the right to vote.
  • With his push for pre-kindergarten education at one end and expanded access to community colleges at the other end, Obama has recognized that we need to increase the quantity as well as the quality of education in America. This is all well and good, but these initiatives are focusing on the most costly ways of increasing the quantity of education. The truly cost-effective way of delivering more education is to expand the school day and school year. (I lay out how to do this within existing school budgets in “Magic Ingredient 1: More K-12 School.”)
  • Finally, the president promises to create new forms of retirement savings accounts (the one idea that Ramesh Ponnuru thought was promising in the State of the Union speech). Though this specific initiative is only a baby step, the idea that we should work toward making it easier from a paperwork point of view for people to start saving for retirement than to not start saving for retirement is an idea whose time has come. And it is much more important than people realize. In a way that takes some serious economic theory to explain, increasing the saving rate by making it administratively easier to start saving effects not only people’s financial security during retirement, but also aids American competitiveness internationally, by making it possible to invest out of American saving instead of having to invest out of China’s saving.

Put together, the things that Barack Obama thought were relatively uncontroversial to propose in his State of the Union speech give me hope that key aspects of US economic policy might be moving in a positive direction, even while other aspects of economic policy stay sadly mired in partisan brawls. I am an optimist about our nation’s future because I believe that, in fits and starts, good ideas that are not too strongly identified with one party or the other tend to make their way into policy eventually. Political combat is noisy, while political cooperation is quiet. But quiet progress counts for a lot. And glimmers of hope are better than having no hope at all.

Quartz #44—>The Case for Gay Marriage is Made in the Freedom of Religion

Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 44th Quartz column, “The case for gay marriage is made in the freedom of religion,” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on January 11, 2014, 2013. (Based on pageviews in a column’s first 30 days, it is currently my 4th most viewed column ever.) Links to all my other columns can be found here.

This column is a followup to my Christmas column “That baby born in Bethlehem should inspire society to keep redeeming itself.”

I want to make it clear that I am not making a narrowly legal argument in this column. It is addressed at least as much to current and future voters and legislators as to lawyers crafting arguments for judges.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© January 11, 2014: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2015. All rights reserved.


Freedom of religion is a hard-won principle. In Europe, the wars of religion raged for over a century before the Peace of Westphalia  solidified freedom of religion for rulers in 1648. Freedom of religion for ordinary citizens was much slower in coming: the Bill of Rights to the US Constitution was a huge advance in that sphere.Then it took the US Civil War for the principle to be firmly established in the 14th amendment that the key provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to state laws as well: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

The reason so much blood was shed before the principle of religious freedom was established is that it’s not a principle that comes naturally to the human mind. If a behavior or belief deeply offends God or the gods, then it doesn’t seem right to tolerate it. And if a behavior or belief will bring eternal damnation down on the heads of those involved (and those they might influence), then doesn’t the solicitous kindness of tough love demand doing whatever it takes to pull them away from that behavior or belief?

Within the United States, ground zero in the battle for freedom of religion is in Utah, where US District Court Judge Richard Shelby Federal judge ruled on Dec. 20, 2013 that Utah could not prohibit gay marriage. Utah is appealing, in a move that could put the case on a fast-track to the Supreme Court.

Gay marriage is a matter of religious freedom for two reasons: First, a substantial component of the opposition to legalizing gay marriage is religious in origin. This is particularly true in Utah, where the Mormon Church has taken a lead role in opposing gay marriage. Leave aside religious objections to gay marriage and what remains would be unlikely to garner much respect. As Judge Shelby reminded us in his opinion, “the regulation of constitutionally protected decisions, such as … whom [a person] shall marry, must be predicated on legitimate state concerns other than disagreement with the choice the individual has made.” It is easy to come up with religious concerns about gay marriage; not so easy to come up with “legitimate state concerns.”

What’s not said as often is that gay marriage is itself an exercise of religious freedom. As many with good marriages know from experience, marriage is one of the most powerful paths toward spiritual growth. A good spouse helps one to see the aspects of oneself that one is too blind to see, and inspires efforts to be a better person. And when two human beings  know each other so well, and interact so thickly, the family they create is something new and wonderful in the world, even when there are no children in the picture. And for those who do choose to have children, but cannot bear their own biologically, adoption is a tried and true path.

To those who would dispute that the freedom to marry the one person you love above all others is a matter of religious freedom, let me argue that if I am wrong that this is a matter of religious freedom, it is a freedom that should be treated in the same way. In his influential book A Theory of Justice (p. 220), John Rawls made this argument:

“This idea that arose historically with religious toleration can be extended to other instances. Thus we can suppose that the persons in the original position know that they have moral convictions although, as the veil of ignorance requires, they do not know what these convictions are. … the principles of justice can adjudicate between opposing moralities just as they regulate the claims of rival religions.”

Rawls’s point is that when something touches on a fundamental liberty—as the choice of whom to marry certainly does—people gain so much from that freedom they would not sell that freedom for anything. Imagine a time before you knew whether you would be gay or not—for many a time within actual childhood memory. Would you trade away the right to marry whom you choose for the right to prevent others from marrying whom they choose? No! Almost none of us would.

At the founding of our nation, we the people struck a bargain to live and let live in matters of religion. That freedom includes the freedom to believe that God frowns on gay marriage. But it does not include the freedom to impose one’s own view of God’s law as the law of the land—unless one can make a compelling argument that speaks to people of the whole range of different religious beliefs—or as John Rawls expresses it, “by reference to a common knowledge and understanding.” I know that my own religious beliefs make legalizing gay marriage an important part of the path toward God ([1,] [2,] [3]). In our republic, the way to arbitrate between warring religious beliefs is to privilege freedom.

I am always moved when I read stories of happy gay couples after legalization of gay marriage in one more state. I wish everyone could feel that way. But that is not the world we live in. For some, allowing a man to marry a man or a woman to marry a woman comes hard. But I ask them to do so in order to maintain the principles that guarantee their own freedom in matters close to their hearts.

Quartz #43—>That Baby Born in Bethlehem Should Inspire Society to Keep Redeeming Itself

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Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 43d Quartz column, “That baby born in Bethlehem should inspire society to keep redeeming itself,” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on December 8, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

I followed up the main theme of this column with my post “The Importance of the Next Generation: Thomas Jefferson Grokked It.” I followed up the gay marriage theme with my column “The Case for Gay Marriage is Made in the Freedom of Religion.” I also have a draft column on abortion policy that is waiting for a news hook as an occasion to publish it.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© December 8, 2013: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2015. All rights reserved.


Among its many other meanings, Christmas points to a central truth of human life: a baby can grow up to change the world. But it is not just that a baby can grow up to change the world; in the human sense, babies are the world: a hundred-odd years from now, all of humanity will be made up of current and future babies.

Babies begin life with the genetic heritage of humankind, then very soon take hold of, reconfigure, and carry on the cultural heritage of humanity. The significance of young human beings as a group is obscured in daily life by the evident power of old human beings. But for anyone who cares about the long run, it is a big mistake to forget that the young are the ultimate judges for the fate of any aspect of culture.

Since those who are now young are the ultimate judges for our culture, it won’t do to neglect instilling in them the kind of morality and ethics that can make them good judges. I have been grateful for the lessons in morality and ethics that I had as a child in a religious context, and with my own children, I saw many of these lessons instilled effectively in short moral lessons at the end of Tae Kwon Do martial arts classes. I don’t see any reason why that kind of secularized moral lessons can’t be taught in our schools, along with practical skills and a deep understanding of academic subjects, especially if we do right by kids by giving them time to learn by lengthening the school day and year.

In at least two controversies, the collective judgments of the young seem on target to me. Robert Putnam of Bowling Alone fame came to the University of Michigan a few years ago to talk about the research behind his more recent book with David Campbell,  American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us. He expressed surprise that many young people are becoming alienated from traditional religion when attitudes toward abortion among the young are similar to attitudes among those who are older. But the alienation from traditional religion did not surprise me at all given another fact he reported: the young are dramatically more accepting and supportive of gay marriage than those who are older. I am glad that the young are troubled by the conflict between reproductive freedom and reverence for the beginnings of human life presented by abortion on the one hand and abortion restrictions on the other. But there is no such conflict in the case of gay marriage, which pits the rights of gay couples to make socially sanctioned commitments to one another and enjoy the dignity and practical benefits of a hallowed institution against ancient custom, theocratic impulses, and misfiring disgust instincts that most of the young rightly reject. In this, the young are (perhaps without knowing it) following the example of that baby born in Bethlehem, who always gave honor to those who had been pushed to the edges of the society in which he became a man.

The hot-button controversy of gay marriage is not the only area of our culture due for full-scale revision. Our nation and the world will soon become immensely richer, stronger, and wiser if young people around the world reject the idea I grew up with that intelligence is a fixed, inborn quantity. The truth that hard work adds enormously to intelligence can set them free. What will make an even bigger difference is if they also enshrine their youthful idealism in a vision of a better world that can not only motivate them when young, but also withstand the cares of middle-age to guide their efforts throughout their lives.

Knowing that those who are now young, or are as yet unborn, will soon hold the future of humanity in their hands should make us alarmed at the number of children who don’t have even the basics of life. By far, the worst cases are abroad. The simplest way to help is to stop exerting such great efforts to put obstacles in the way of a better life for them. But whether or not we are willing to do that, it is a good thing to donate to charities that help those in greatest need. Also, I give great honor to those economists working hard trying to figure out how to make poor countries rich.

For those of us already in the second halves of our lives, the fact that the young will soon replace us gives rise to an important strategic principle: however hard it may seem to change misguided institutions and policies, all it takes to succeed in such an effort is to durably convince the young that there is a better way. Max Planck, the father of quantum mechanics, said “Science progresses funeral by funeral.” In a direction not quite as likely to be positive, society evolves from funeral to funeral as well—the funerals of those whose viewpoints do not persuade the young.

It is a very common foolishness to look down on children as unimportant. The deep end of common sense is to respect children and to bring to bear our best efforts, both intellectually and materially, to help them become the best representatives of our species that the universe has ever seen.

Quartz #42—>Make No Mistake about the Taper—The Fed Wishes It Could Stimulate the Economy More

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Here is the full text of my 40th Quartz column, “Make no mistake about the taper—the Fed wishes it could stimulate the economy more,” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on December 19, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© December 19, 2013: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2015. All rights reserved.


The US Federal Reserve announced yesterday that it would reduce the rate at which it would buy long-term government bonds and mortgage bonds—the long-awaited taper of quantitative easing. But the financial markets have the last word on which way monetary policy has shifted. And as Tyler Durden complained at zerohedge.com, the rise in stock prices and gold prices, and fall in long-term interest rates and the dollar, indicated that the Fed had moved in the direction of monetary stimulus. The reason is that in the financial markets, the reaction to Fed action is always an expectations game. The Fed announced a smaller cut in bond-buying than the financial markets expected, so the markets treated the Fed decision as a move in the direction of stimulus.

Yet the Fed, while tapering more gradually than expected, indicated that it wished it could stimulate the economy more. The majority decision said that as far as the labor market (and the closely related level of economic activity) is concerned, risks had “become more nearly balanced” but that “inflation persistently below its 2 percent objective could pose risks to economic performance.” Since the Fed cares about both the labor market and inflation, the means that overall the Fed thinks there is too little monetary stimulus. And the one dissenter, Boston Fed president Eric Rosengren, said that “with the unemployment rate still elevated and the inflation rate well below the target, changes in the purchase program are premature until incoming data more clearly indicate that economic growth is likely to be sustained above its potential rate.”

What is going on? Though the official statement doesn’t say so explicitly, the discussion of the Fed’s interest rate target makes it clear that if the current labor market and inflation situation were coupled with a federal funds rate of, say 2%, then the Fed would cut interest rates, which would provide a substantially bigger monetary stimulus than moderating the expected taper a bit. So the reason the Fed isn’t stimulating the economy more is not that it thinks the economy is in danger of overheating, but because it doesn’t like the tools it has to use when interest rates are already basically zero. Ben Bernanke said as much when he came to the University of Michigan back in January. Even the Fed doesn’t like QE or making the quasi-promises about future interest rates that go under the name of ‘forward guidance.” So it doesn’t stimulate the economy as much as it thinks the economy needs to be stimulated.

The solution to the dilemma of a Fed doing less than it thinks should be done because it is afraid of the tools it has left when short-term interest rates are zero? Give the Fed more tools. Unfortunately, it takes time to craft new tools for the Fed, but that is all the more reason to get started. (Sadly, even if all goes well in the next few years, this isn’t the last economic crisis we will ever have.) As I have written about herehere, and here, three careful and deliberate steps by the US government would make it possible for the Fed to cut interest rates as far below zero as necessary to keep the economy on course:

  • facilitate the development of new and better means of electronic payment and enhance the legal status of electronic money,
  • trim back the legal status of paper currency, and
  • give the Federal Reserve the authority to charge banks for storing money at the Fed and for depositing paper currency with the Fed.

If the Fed could cut interest rates below zero, it wouldn’t need QE, it wouldn’t need forward guidance, and it wouldn’t wind up begging Congress and the president to run budget deficits to stimulate the economy. And because the Fed understands interest rates—whether positive or negative—much, much better than it understands either QE or forward guidance, the Fed would finally know what it was doing again.

Quartz #41—>Gather ’round, Children, Here’s How to Heal a Wounded Economy

Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 41st Quartz column, “Gather ’round, children, here’s how to heal a wounded economy,” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on December 17, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

I did several followup posts to this column, including 4 YouTube videos:

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© December 17, 2013: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2015. All rights reserved.


University of Missouri-Kansas City professor Stephanie Kelton threw down the gauntlet for everyone serious about influencing economic policy into the next generation when she put out her MMT Coloring Book  as a downloadable stocking-stuffer (pdf). (MMT stands for “Modern Monetary Theory,” the name of Stephanie’s viewpoint.) In response, I tweeted:

…and sent out a plea for creative help with a macroeconomic coloring book laying out my views about monetary policy. Donna D’Souza answered my call and did a great job illustrating the story. The downloadable coloring book (pdf) and colored-in storybook (pdf) are our gift to you and your children and grandchildren during this season of lights. You can also read the colored-in storybook version just below, followed by an explanation of the economics behind the story.

Milton the Maltese Falcon represents Milton Friedman, who was one of the greatest champions of monetary policy the world has known and one of the most effective economists ever at explaining economics to the public. Milton Friedman used an equation for the effects of monetary policy that emphasized two things: the quantity of money and the velocity of money. Money sitting in a bank vault or under a mattress has no velocity, and drags down the average velocity of money throughout the economy. It is only when money is being lent out and used (to build factories, buy equipment, build houses, buy cars) that it stimulates the economy.

Of course, too much monetary stimulus is bad because it causes inflation (the balloon about to pop). But too little monetary stimulus is bad because it causes unemployment (the broken balloons). And how much stimulus a given amount of money provides depends a lot on whether it is at work in the economy (running around) or locked away in a bank vault, in a corporate treasury, or under a mattress, doing nothing.

The reason a lot of money has been lying around doing nothing is because the appropriate interest rate for the economy has been very low—below zero. If we had negative interest rates for a year or so, things would get back to normal. Without that tonic, bad times drag on and on.

A key thing to understand is that the rest of the government is preventing the Federal Reserve (Ben the Money Master and his friends) from doing what it needs to do to heal the economy. Here is how: the government prevents interest rates from going below zero by the way it handles paper currency. As things are now, holding a pile of paper currency is a way for people to earn a zero interest rate without putting their money to work in the economy.

There is a solution, due in its modern form to Willem Buiter, now chief economist of CitiGroup, who appears in the story as “Willem the Wise Warlock.” Buiter discusses various options for repealing what economists call “the zero lower bound”: the economically damaging government guarantee that anyone can lend as much as they want to the government at a zero interest rate just by keeping a big pile of cash. I have elaborated on one of Willem Buiter’s ideas in Quartzon my blog, and in presentations to central banks around the world, including the Federal Reserve Board.

If we do what it takes to make money sitting around doing nothing shrink, it will provide a strong boost to the economy as people put money to work in the economy. Not everyone will like it, but it will quickly bring full economic recovery, without the bad side effects of other means of trying to stimulate the economy (such as budget deficits or encouraging financial bubbles). Once the economy recovers, everything can go back to what people are used to. Some economists talk about the possibility that negative interest rates might be needed for a long time, but I don’t buy it. In my view, negative interest rates should only be needed for a short time during serious economic slumps. If the Fed and other central banks are given that authority, recessions can be brief and people can get back to work again.

One of the most important reasons we need to keep the economy in good working order—in this case with appropriate monetary policy—is so that economics can recede a bit more into the background of people’s lives. Then people can concentrate again on the things that should matter most: nurturing relationships with friends and family, creating wild, wonderful varieties of meaning in their lives, and taking time to stand in awe of the universe.

We all know that the way to prevent the troubles that would be caused by shooting ourselves in the foot is to avoid shooting ourselves in the foot. Just so, our economic troubles have a straightforward cause and a straightforward technical solution. Both the cause of our troubles and the essence of the solution to our troubles are told in Milton the Maltese Falcon’s ballad.

storybook-17

Quartz #40-->"The Hunger Games" Is Hardly Our Future--It's Already Here

Here is the full text of my 40th Quartz column, “The Hunger Games is hardly our future—it’s already here," now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on December 8, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© December 8, 2013: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2017. All rights reserved.

***********************************************************************

The Hunger Games paints an eerily apt picture of the world’s reality. The Capitol is the rich nations of the world: the US, Canada, Australia, Japan, Israel, New Zealand, some oil kingdoms, most European nations. The Districts are the poor nations of the world—Haiti, Nepal, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Papua New Guinea, many countries in central Asia and Africa, all of which have per capita incomes less than $10 per day.

The Capitol, with all of its abundance of food, advanced medical care, and gadgets, is surrounded by a giant high-tech, booby-trapped WALL. The point of the Games is to burrow through the WALL to get to the material paradise of the Capitol without getting killed or caught and sent back to the Districts to starve.

The most important difference between Suzanne Collins’s Hunger Games and my variant is that the poverty in the real world is unfathomably worse than the poverty depicted in the series. The only way I know to convey this to my students who have never left the United States is to read to them every word of Nicholas Kristof’s New York Times essay, “Where Sweatshops are a Dream.”

The other difference is that, in Suzanne Collins’s version, the evil the Capitol does with its Games has roots as deep as the nation itself, while in the United States, at least, we build a wall to keep immigrants out in contradiction to our own historical traditions and the example set by the founders of our nation. We do this not only heartlessly, for the sake of what are in all likelihood relatively small gains for a modest slice of our population, but also stupidly. The tight restrictions we impose on immigration come at great cost to our economy, to future government budgets and the future geopolitical power of the United States.

Are immigration restrictions necessary? There may be some limit to the speed at which we can take in newcomers. But there is good reason to think it is much higher than the current rate of immigration. In the decade from 1900 to 1910, immigration was over 1% of the US population per year. There were some strains, but things didn’t fall apart, and America is much stronger now because of those early 20th century immigrants and their descendants. For comparison, the number of permanent legal immigrants into the US now is only 0.33% of the US population per year and the entire stock of undocumented immigrants in the US, from many many years of migration, is only 3.7% of the US population—nothing close to the 1% immigration rate the US had in the first decade of the 20th century. And those immigrants would assimilate much more quickly into our communities if they didn’t have to hide in the shadows because of the laws that brand them as criminals.

The philosopher Michael Huemer gives a good discussion of the ethics of immigration restrictions here.  A key point is that many US citizens would love to host immigrants from other countries. Some Americans are preventing other Americans from welcoming immigrants as they would like to. And many people around the world would be delighted to come to the United States even if they were totally barred from receiving any public assistance whatsoever.

In the real world, exclusion is a form of cruelty that we take for granted. Keeping people out of a material paradise for no good reason turns utopia into dystopia. By keeping immigrants out, the United States—like the other rich nations of the world—plays the role of the Capitol in my twist on The Hunger Games. But all we need to do to change that is to honor once again the words on the Statue of Liberty: “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breath free …”

Quartz #39—>Gratitude Is More Than Simple Sentiment: It Is the Motivation That Can Save the World

Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 39th Quartz column, “Gratitude is more than simple sentiment; it is the motivation that can save the world,” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on November 28, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

This is my first Thanksgiving column; I am making it my New Year’s Day post as well. My Thanksgiving-inspired post in 2012 was

I also had a Christmas column this year, and a Christmas post last year:

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© November 28, 2013: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2015. All rights reserved.


As my regular academic work slows down in the days leading up to Thanksgiving, my thoughts have turned toward gratitude. In a visceral way, I feel thankful for my family, for my work, for the exhilarating November air on a brisk walk around my neighborhood, for my friends both here in Ann Arbor and online, and for being alive in this very interesting era—in what I believe is still close to the dawn of human history, yet a time of great abundance compared to what has gone before in past centuries.

Gratitude is a surprisingly powerful force in our souls—powerful enough to badly contradict simple economic models filled with “agents” who are in it only for themselves (and maybe for their dynasty of direct descendants). Evolutionary psychologists and evolutionary philosophers call gratitude reciprocal altruism, and point to it as a central part of what makes us human. We may not be the only species that displays reciprocal altruism, but we seem to be one of the few, and the only species in which we know reciprocal altruism to be associated with strong emotions of gratitude.

Gratitude is an important foundation of friendship, and for lucky people like me, of lasting marriages.  But gratitude is also one of the foundations of larger social units.Here, the trick, as near as I can make it out, is for a society to have a ready answer to the question “Where do all the good things in my life come from?” Or to be more precise, to have a ready answer to the question “And where does that come from?” For many cultures or subcultures, the answer at the end of the chain is God or other divine beings. At the other extreme, in the worst excesses of tyranny, the answer at the end of the chain is the great dictator himself (usually) or herself (still rare).When a culture—like the more secular side of American culture, or international cosmopolitan culture—has no ready answer to this question of what underlying power to be grateful to, it is bound to be harder to motivate people to do what it takes to keep society from flying apart at the seams—harder, but not impossible.

It matters how well we can encourage people to feel existential gratitude and then “pay it forward” by looking after the general welfare of their communities, humanity, or all of life. I am not talking about the desire to “save the world” in one particular way, but the desire to find one’s own way—or a way made one’s own—to make the world better than it would have been otherwise. Those who already feel in any measure the desire to save the world should contemplate how to kindle that desire in the hearts of others. A good place to start is to ponder (without exaggerating its strength) the origins of one’s own desire to do good in the world.

Like many a bookworm, I spent much of my childhood reading. That I was not destined to be an English professor was intimated by the way in which the voices of all the authors of most of the books I read merged into a single authorial voice. I felt a great deal of gratitude for those authors who made thoughts leap in my head and stories play out in my mind’s eye—gratitude, and admiration. I wanted to be like them someday—to be able to cause someone else the pleasure I got from reading. Later, as an adult, my reading of history and life experience at long last made me feel in my gut deep gratitude and admiration for the framers of the US Constitution that, for all its imperfections, has made it so I have had the freedom to believe as I choose, and to express those beliefs in both word and deed—even when others don’t agree. In all nations, and with all varieties of opinion, I hope that most of those who enter the public arena around the world have a desire to be like the wisest men and women in the past in trying to build a strong and good foundation for human flourishing and the flourishing of life itself for ages to come.

Energized by gratitude toward God, authors, framers, or the beautiful blended image of all those who have done us good, let us go forward to do what we can to make the world a better place. It won’t be easy. We need to be carefully self-reflective about our other motivesintelligent in our tactics, and always pay attention to the crucial task of trying to inspire others to take on the role of white hat as we go forward. But I believe the universe, though it may be heartless and too often cruel, is fair enough that even a very small army of human beings, honestly trying to do good, will make something good come to pass.

Quartz #38—>The Shakeup at the Minneapolis Fed and the Battle for the Soul of Macroeconomics—Again

blog.supplysideliberal.com tumblr_inline_mycespQ62L1r57lmx.png

Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 38th Quartz column, and 3d column coauthored with Noah Smith, “The shakeup at the Minneapolis Fed is a battle for the soul of macroeconomics—again.” I am glad to now bring it home to supplysideliberal.com, and I expect Noah will post it on his blog Noahpinion as well. It was first published on November 25, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

Our editor insisted on a declarative title that seriously overstates our degree of certainty on the nature of the specific events that went down at the Minneapolis Fed. I toned it down a little in my title above.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, just include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© November 25, 2013: Miles Kimball and Noah Smith, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2015. All rights reserved.

Then, as logically required by the notice above, check back at this link on my blog shortly before June 30, 2015 to see if you can keep it up beyond that time or not. (Noah has agreed to give permission on the same terms as I do.) You may also freely print paper copies until then, as long as they include the copyright notice. 

Reactions and Followup: This column received a fair bit of attention. Most was positive (for example, see this flag by Paul Krugman), but the column also generated a modest bit of controversy. Here is an early discussion of some reactions in a Facebook post of mine, and here is Noah’s brief response to some criticism by Stephen Williamson.

A few days after this column came out, I got a call from a reporter about the shakeup at the Minneapolis Fed when I was working with a student and so could only talk very briefly. He said that Ed Prescott was more optimistic about the future of Freshwater macro. In response, I quoted to the reporter this from the column: “It makes all the difference in the world when the number one event shaping the questions macroeconomists ask is no longer the Great Inflation of the 1970s, but the Great Recession.”

The reporter also quoted Ed Prescott as saying that Freshwater macroeconomists were more intellectually rigorous. I laughed, and pointed to Mike Woodford as someone I think of as being on the Saltwater side who is every bit as intellectually impressive and as intellectually rigorous as Ed Prescott. 


A personnel shakeup at the US Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis last week at first flew under the radar; by the time the Minneapolis Star-Tribune reported the news, followed by other news outlets, it had been percolating through the economist grapevine for weeks. But the world should be paying attention, because the shakeup may be a part of big changes that are happening at the Fed, as well as a tectonic shift in the field of economics itself.

What Happened

Two of the Minneapolis Fed’s most eminent and long-serving economists, Patrick Kehoe and Ellen McGrattan, have been fired. The Star-Tribune article makes it clear that their departure was not voluntary on the part of either researcher. (Fortunately, both Kehoe and McGrattan will be fine, career-wise—both have stellar publication records and tenured professorships at the University of Minnesota.)

Why did this happen? We cannot know, especially since Minneapolis Fed Chief Narayana Kocherlakota isn’t giving his side of the story. But Jeffrey Sparshot makes this possible connection in the Wall Street Journal

Mr. Kocherlakota switched in 2012 from opposing some of the Fed’s easy-money policies to calling for more aggressive Fed action to spur economic growth and employment. The move reflected a shift in his views on persistently high unemployment: He went from thinking the cause was largely structural (and thus could not be fixed with monetary policy) to thinking it was largely due to weak demand (which means it could be addressed through policies aimed at boosting demand).

In other words, although the Minneapolis Fed shakeup could be due to any number of reasons—a personality conflict, a disagreement over the Fed bank’s mission, etc.–one possibility is that the personnel changes are related to Fed officials’ changing attitude toward business cycles. To understand that possibility, it is crucial to understand an academic controversy that has been simmering for decades.

Freshwater vs. Saltwater

Patrick Kehoe, one of the economists dismissed from the Fed, is a key figure in a school of economics called “Freshwater Macroeconomics” (the other, Ellen McGrattan, is his frequent co-author). The labels “Freshwater” and “Saltwater” go back to the arguments and new ideas generated by the double-digit inflation in the 1970s. The names refer to the geography of key combatants in that period, when economists at the University of Chicago, Carnegie Mellon University and the University of Minnesota spearheaded the “Rational Expectations Revolution.” They believed that people are very, very smart and sensible in their economic decisions. Taken to its logical extreme, the idea of economic rationality led the Nobel-winning Freshwater pioneer Edward Prescott to argue that recessions are not economic failures, but instead are inevitable, healthy outcomes of economies responding to the uneven pace of technological progress. In other words, Prescott and the economists who followed his lead said that the government shouldn’t try to fight recessions.

If the Fed prints money to try to stimulate demand, they say, it will only succeed in creating inflation rather than reviving the economy. And given this view of rationality, Freshwater macroeconomics often pushes the idea that the government should keep its hands off the economy in other policy domains as well.

Prescott and his fellow-travelers established a bastion for this apotheosis of Freshwater macroeconomics at the University of Minnesota and the Minneapolis Fed. Patrick Kehoe carries that torch, being one of the greatest of the Freshwater macroeconomists to follow the founding generation, and one of the most extreme in his views.

The Freshwater school gained enormous clout in the ‘80s. But in the ‘90s, there was a counterattack from the coast. The Saltwater macroeconomists believed that recessions were economic failures, and that monetary policy was important in fighting them. Led by Michael Woodford, they adopted the tools and language of the Freshwater economists, and managed to convince many of their Freshwater brethren to reluctantly agree that monetary policy can, in fact, boost the economy. But one bastion of hard-line freshwater thinking held firm: “Minnesota macro.” The researchers at the University of Minnesota and the Minneapolis Fed have largely hung onto the belief that monetary policy can affect inflation, but can’t fight recessions.

But there is good reason to think that this view is losing credibility at the Fed.

Narayana Kocherlakota is an influential Fed official, and as such is an important bellwether of Fed thinking. His views have shifted decisively toward believing that monetary policy can stabilize the economy. What changed his mind? The answer is obvious: the Great Recession, and the failure of large purchases of long-term government bonds and mortgage-backed assets—QE—to create inflation. It makes all the difference in the world when the number one event shaping the questions macroeconomists ask is no longer the Great Inflation of the 1970s, but the Great Recession that still casts its shadow over the world.

Nor is Kocherlakota the only Fed official to change his mind. So even if the Minneapolis Fed shakeup wasn’t caused by a clash of ideas, the Fed’s shift toward Saltwater macro is a real phenomenon, and needs to be understood.

Freshwater Not So Fresh?

Whether people realize it or not, the thinking behind macroeconomic policy has such a decisive influence on the world that it is worth the effort for everyone to try to understand the central ideas and characteristics of the key schools of macroeconomics. Even many non-economists will remember John Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman; it is these economists whose ideas led to the theories of the Saltwater school. But very few people even know what Freshwater macro is. We hope to give you a little introduction.

We are hardly unbiased teachers for such an introduction; Miles has been an unabashed partisan of the Saltwater side since 1985, and Noah has often criticized Freshwater macro on his blog. But it is easier to see the failings of a rival school of thought than the failings of one’s own, so we feel it is okay to point out the weaknesses of Freshwater macroeconomics, and will leave to others the task of pointing out the failings of our own school of Saltwater macroeconomics. Besides our experience as partisans, we both have the advantage of the time we have spent at the University of Michigan, where both Freshwater and Saltwater macroeconomists have coexisted on very good terms for the 26 years Miles has been on the faculty and the years Noah spent as a graduate student there. So we hope we can give a critical, yet stillsympathetic view of Freshwater macroeconomics.

One reason it is easy for us to be sympathetic with Freshwater macroeconomics (at least when away from the heat of the battle) is that the central tenets of Freshwater macroeconomics simply exaggerate the main conceits of economics itself. Relative to other social scientists (and even more relative to the general public) economists (a) emphasize the idea of rationality, (b) take great pride in their skill at mathematics, and ( c ) think about the world by using formal models. These are all things that Freshwater macro has taken to extremes.

The idea of rationality is both a great strength and the greatest blind spot of economics. Economists routinely pretend in their models that everyone (with the possible exception of government officials) is infinitely intelligent—or at least smart enough to make excellent economic decisions, even in very complex environments. Although there is a touching humility to this pretense (not always matched by humility of economists in relation to the real flesh-and-blood people they interact with), it is not true. As a (good or bad) approximation to the truth, the assumption that everyone is very, very smart is a shortcut economists use to avoid impossible complications in their already difficult models; it is much easier to study the one correct economic decision in a given situation with given objectives than the thousands of ways someone could get things wrong. Sometimes economists forget that perfect rationality is only an approximation. Within Freshwater macroeconomics, however, to doubt perfect rationality is to commit at least a minor heresy.

On mathematical pride, we realize we are a pot calling the kettle black. Early in his career, Miles received a memorable critique of one of his papers from an anonymous referee that scolded him for an excessive pride in engineering mathematics. The key point he took was that, in economics, taking too much pride in one’s mathematical pyrotechnics can lead to a neglect of fully arguing one’s case and fully assessing the broader arguments at stake in understanding an economic phenomenon. (On the role of math in economics, also see 12.) Among Freshwater macroeconomists, the stock placed in mathematical skill is great enough that they have played a major role in making the advanced mathematics of “Real Analysis” a prerequisite for graduate school in economics, despite what we consider the very limited relevance of Real Analysis for understanding how the economy works. (As far as extra-high-level math goes, we think Convex Analysis and Perturbation Theory would be more useful.)

Advanced economic models are not easy to describe. Consider UCLA (now emeritus) professor Axel Leijonhufvud’s 1973 spoof (pdf), “Life Among the Econ.” It begins:

The econ tribe occupies a vast territory in the far North. Their land appears bleak and dismal to the outsider, and travelling through it makes for rough sledding; but the Econ, through a long period of adaptation, have learned to wrest a living of sorts from it. They are not without some genuine and sometimes even fierce attachment to their ancestral grounds, and their young are brought up to feel contempt for the softer living in the warmer lands of their neighbours, such as the Polscis and the Sociogs. …

Among the Econ,

… status is tied to the manufacture of certain types of implements, called “modls.” … Both the tight linkage between status and modl-making and the trend toward making modls more for ceremonial than for practical purposes appear, moreover, to be fairly recent developments, something which has led many observers to express pessimism for the viability of the Econ culture.

This assessment was too pessimistic. Economics has thrived since 1973, and well-crafted economic models have a lot to do with that success. But “Life among the Econ” gives a good picture of the role of bad models in economics—to show off the skill of the model builder without necessarily shedding any light on the world we live in. Part of the genius of economics is boiling down all the complexity of the real world to a few essential aspects that can be studied in depth. But if it is possible to carefully pare away less important aspects of the world in order to think deeply about the more important, it is also possible to carelessly pare away aspects of the world that don’t accord with an arbitrary set of traditions about how economic models should be done. In the case of Freshwater macroeconomics there is a large set of purity taboos prohibiting certain model elements (elements Saltwater economists think are necessary to explain the world). Freshwater macro also insists on following a certain standard template–complete with mathematical and empirical tools and conventions—that has been handed from Prescott and other early Freshwater pioneers. That template is seldom reexamined, leading many outsiders to believe that Freshwater macro is not so fresh.

Unlike politics, macroeconomics has been getting less polarized over time. Even before the Great Recession, the number of moderates who put Saltwater elements in Freshwater models or Freshwater elements into Saltwater models was growing over time, and the boundary between Freshwater and Saltwater economics blurred considerably. But the “Minnesota macro” folks remained the purest of the pure in their Freshwater convictions. In 2008, on the eve of the crisis, even as Saltwater economist Olivier Blanchard published a paper arguing that the two schools had essentially reached agreement, Kehoe published his own paper arguing vehemently that models with any Saltwater taint (in particular, the so-called “New Keynesian” models) were fundamentally flawed.

The Great Recession Tips the Scales

A few months later, at the end of 2008, America tumbled into its biggest economic slump since the Great Depression, soon followed by much of the rest of the world. Freshwater macroeconomists were left scratching their heads. How could this calamity represent the efficient outcome of a well-functioning economy? But the Saltwater New Keynesians—who included Fed chairman Ben Bernanke—had an answer: the economy had malfunctioned, and America needed the Fed to get us out of the hole. Bernanke and the Fed responded first by extraordinary measures to contain the financial crisis that was the immediate source of trouble, then lowering interest rates to zero and beginning an unprecedented campaign of Quantitative Easing.

As QE ramped up, disputes broke out among Fed economists. Some, like Philadelphia Fed president Charles Plosser (himself a noted Freshwater researcher) and Minneapolis Fed president Narayana Kocherlakota, argued that QE would put us in danger of inflation. But as the Fed’s printing presses rattled on and inflation failed to materialize, some “hard money” advocates had second thoughts. Last year, Kocherlakota declared that he had changed his mind, and now supported QE.

Whither the Freshwater School?

So what does it all mean? We are strong proponents of the idea that scientific progress—especially in economics—depends on a vigorous debate among widely divergent points of view. (See 123, and in the extreme 456.) So Freshwater macroeconomics has been a crucial part of the scientific ecosystem. Within the Federal Reserve System, Freshwater macroeconomists have played an important devil’s advocate role by highlighting potential dangers that saltier macroeconomists might be tempted to overlook in their eagerness to print money in search of economic recovery.

But we believe it would hinder scientific progress in macroeconomics if purist Freshwater views were to play a predominant role going forward, and could lead to policies whose costs would run into millions of lives disfigured by needless unemployment and uncounted trillions of dollars in lost GDP.

Scientifically, Freshwater macroeconomics plays an important role in laying out how the world should be if everyone thought like an economist. And improvements on Prescott’s Real Business Cycle Theory in particular have the potential to be a theory of where the economy should end up once short-run adjustments are complete. But gaining the insight we need into the world as it is requires:

  • accepting the existence of important aspects of the world that we don’t fully understand (such as prices and wages that don’t seem to adjust as quickly to economic circumstances as it seems they should) and incorporating them into our models (in ad hoc ways if necessary, or as brute facts),
  • bringing limitations on people’s ability to process information into our models (even though doing this will require arduous work), and
  • recognizing the complexity of human psychology.

Whither Monetary Policy?

In the conduct of monetary policy, it makes sense to give primacy to those who actually believe that monetary policy matters. The logic is straightforward. If what the Fed or other central bank does doesn’t matter, then any monetary policy is okay. But if monetary policy does matter, then those who believe that it matters are likely to have a better handle on how to deal with that weighty fact. Things aren’t quite so simple, since even purist macroeconomists believe that monetary policy affects inflation. But that just means that those who believe monetary policy matters more broadly can be trusted with many judgments as long as they are constrained to keep inflation from going up too high or falling down too low in a long-lasting way. But that is a rule for the conduct of monetary policy that is felt deep in the bones of almost all macroeconomists, Saltwater as well as Freshwater.  (There is a legitimate question of what the right long-run level of inflation is. Most central banks say 2%. Some Saltwater macroeconomists say 4%. Miles wants to make it possible to safely have zero inflation.)

There can be other effects of monetary policy besides recession-fighting (which purist Freshwater macroeconomists discount) and affecting inflation. Effects on financial stability are the most worrisome. Pointing out such possibilities is where Freshwater macroeconomists in the Fed and other central banks can still play a constructive role. But to the extent that recession-fighting and inflation are the main effects of monetary policy, it seems to us that a saltier approach that believes in the existence of both of these effects–and pays due attention to inflationary dangers–is a better place to start deliberations than a purist Freshwater approach that dismisses the possibility of recession-fighting from the get-go. And it seems clear that Fed officials like Kocherlakota, Lacker, and others have been shifting toward the saltier view.

What the Minneapolis Shakeup Means

Of course, this still leaves the question of whether the Minneapolis Fed shakeup is a part of this intellectual shift.

Kehoe and McGrattan’s dismissal drew loud protests from other members of the Freshwater school. Ed Prescott, the father of purist Freshwater macro, was quoted in the Star-Tribune article as saying “It sends a bad message…Something very good is breaking down rapidly.” Steve Williamson, a Freshwater economist at Washington University, blogged that Kocherlakota “seems intent on destroying the [Minneapolis Fed] as a research institution.” So whether or not the firings had anything to do with economic theories, Freshwater folks are concerned, and with good reason. A key part of the genesis of Freshwater macro was a desire to say something about monetary policy (i.e., why not to use it). If the Fed refuses to listen to leading Freshwater voices, then a big chunk of the real-world influence of this school of thought will be gone.

In any case, speculating on the reasons for what ultimately might boil down to simple personality conflicts is not our purpose here. Nor do we seek to offer any judgment on Kocherlakota’s personnel decision, which could have far-reaching impacts on the relationship between central banks and universities and the type of employment contracts offered by Fed banks. Instead, we want to highlight the tectonic shifts in economics itself. From that perspective, the shakeup may turn out to be part of the understandable rebalancing of macroeconomics in the Saltwater direction, as economists try to comprehend the Great Recession and figure out how to avoid an encore.

Quartz #37—>Larry Summers Just Confirmed that He is Still a Heavyweight on Economic Policy

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Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 37th Quartz column, “Larry Summers just confirmed that he is still a heavyweight on economic policy,” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on November 15, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© November 15, 2013: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2015. All rights reserved.


Janet Yellen was in the hot seat yesterday before the Senate Banking Committee. Due to a remarkably public vetting process, the presidential nomination for US Federal Reserve Chair that put her there also constituted a comedown for Yellen’s principal rival for the job: Larry Summers. At an International Monetary Fund Conference in honor of former Bank of Israel Governor—and earlier IMF chief economist—Stan Fischer on Nov. 8, Summers made a strong bid for continued relevance to economic policy-making as a private citizen with a trenchant speech. (David Wessel gives an overall report on the conference in this Wall Street Journal article.) Here is the speech:

Summers begins by crediting Fischer for inspiring him to be a macroeconomist, saying this of Fischer’s graduate course on Monetary Economics at MIT:  “It was a remarkable intellectual experience. And it was remarkable also because Stan never lost sight of the fact that this was not just an intellectual game: getting these questions right made a profound difference in the lives of nations and their peoples.” Summers transmitted that attitude to me as one of my professors at Harvard, and I have tried to hand it on to my own students.

After his praise of Fischer, Summers gives a conventional account of the financial crisis in the fall of 2008 and the largely successful efforts to contain that crisis. But the rest of his speech goes in surprising directions. Summers emphasizes the possibility of “secular stagnation” like that the Japanese economy has suffered in the last two decades. The extent of Japan’s stagnation is breathtaking: In 2013, the Japanese economy is only half the size economists in the 1990’s predicted it would be by now. Even here in the US, GDP is falling further and further behind what we would have predicted just a few years back, and the fraction of the population that has a job has hardly recovered at all in the past four years, despite the fact that the financial crisis was well-contained by November 2009.

What lies behind the stagnation the Japanese economy has suffered in the last two decades and that Summers fears for the United States? He suggests this:

Suppose that the short-term real interest rate that was consistent with full employment had fallen to negative 2% or negative 3% sometime in the middle of the last decade.

With a 2% rate of inflation, an interest rate 3% below inflation would be a negative 1% interest rate in ordinary terms (what macroeconomists would call a -1% nominal interest rate.) But conventional monetary policy can’t reach an interest rate as low as -1%, because anyone can lend as much as they want to the government at 0% by piling up paper currency. This is the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates that macroeconomists justly obsess over. The zero lower bound creates situations where interest rates seem low, but are not low enough to put the economy in high gear.

In the years before the financial crisis, financial excess propped the economy up without ever getting to the kind of excess demand that would push unemployment down to unsustainably low levels and cause higher inflation. In Summers’ words:

Even a great bubble wasn’t enough to produce any excess of aggregate demand…Even with artificial stimulus to demand, coming from all this financial imprudence, you wouldn’t see any excess.

After the financial crisis, the end of financial excess left too little demand and stagnant employment.

What can be done? It isn’t easy to fix things:

  • People grudgingly tolerate zero interest rates for years on end. But that is not enough.
  • It is hard to keep running huge budget deficits year after year after year—and Japan’s experience with trying to escape stagnation by government spending casts doubt about whether that would do the job.
  • There are serious concerns about doing quantitative easing for years with no end in sight.
  • Finally, Summers points out that the very financial regulations that could prevent another financial crisis tend to drive the interest rates people earn when they save further below the interest rates they pay when they borrow, effectively tightening the zero lower bound.

Here is Larry Summers’s conclusion, which stops just short of what the US and the world economy needs—a solution:

It is not over until it is over…We may well need, in the years ahead, to think about how we manage an economy in which the zero nominal interest rate is a chronic and systemic inhibitor of economic activity, holding our economies back, below their potential.

So let me return to versions of two of the questions I posed at the end of July, in “Three big questions for Larry Summers, Janet Yellen, and anyone else who wants to head the Fed.”

  1. Why not eliminate the zero lower bound entirely by changing the way we handle paper currency?
  2. Couldn’t we afford to have much stricter financial regulations—in particular high equity (“capital”) requirements—to avoid a future financial crisis if the zero lower bound were no longer a problem?

Though crucial, diagnosing a problem is not enough. Every diagnosis suggests places to look for a cure. If the zero lower bound is the problem, then getting rid of it is an obvious solution. The economists I talk to, including the many economists I have talked to in central banks around the world, recognize that the real difficulties in eliminating the zero lower bound are political difficulties rather than technical difficulties. So the major economies of the world and the many smaller ones that face the zero lower bound have a choice: politics as usual, with a real chance of secular stagnation, or paving the way for negative interest rates. Politics will stay the same until a critical mass of people do what it takes to make them different. Summers proved at the IMF conference that he is still an economic policy heavyweight—someone who could contribute a lot toward reaching that critical mass in the war against the zero lower bound, if he is willing to join the fight.

Quartz #36—>There's One Key Difference Between Kids Who Excel at Math and Those Who Don't

Here is the full text of my 36th Quartz column, and 2d column coauthored with Noah Smith, “There’s One Key Difference Between Kids Who Excel at Math and Those Who Don’t.” I am glad to now bring it home to supplysideliberal.com, and Noah will post it on his blog Noahpinion as well. It was first published on October 27, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here. In particular, don’t miss my follow-up column

How to Turn Every Child into a “Math Person.”

The warm reception for this column has been overwhelming. I think there is a hunger for this message out there. We want to get the message out, so if you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, just include both a link to the original Quartz column and to supplysideliberal.com.


“I’m just not a math person.”

We hear it all the time. And we’ve had enough. Because we believe that the idea of “math people” is the most self-destructive idea in America today. The truth is, you probably are a math person, and by thinking otherwise, you are possibly hamstringing your own career. Worse, you may be helping to perpetuate a pernicious myth that is harming underprivileged children—the myth of inborn genetic math ability.

Is math ability genetic? Sure, to some degree. Terence Tao, UCLA’s famous virtuoso mathematician, publishes dozens of papers in top journals every year, and is sought out by researchers around the world to help with the hardest parts of their theories. Essentially none of us could ever be as good at math as Terence Tao, no matter how hard we tried or how well we were taught. But here’s the thing: We don’t have to! For high school math, inborn talent is just much less important than hard work, preparation, and self-confidence.

How do we know this? First of all, both of us have taught math for many years—as professors, teaching assistants, and private tutors. Again and again, we have seen the following pattern repeat itself:

  1. Different kids with different levels of preparation come into a math class. Some of these kids have parents who have drilled them on math from a young age, while others never had that kind of parental input.

  2. On the first few tests, the well-prepared kids get perfect scores, while the unprepared kids get only what they could figure out by winging it—maybe 80 or 85%, a solid B.

  3. The unprepared kids, not realizing that the top scorers were well-prepared, assume that genetic ability was what determined the performance differences. Deciding that they “just aren’t math people,” they don’t try hard in future classes, and fall further behind.

  4. The well-prepared kids, not realizing that the B students were simply unprepared, assume that they are “math people,” and work hard in the future, cementing their advantage.

Thus, people’s belief that math ability can’t change becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The idea that math ability is mostly genetic is one dark facet of a larger fallacy that intelligence is mostly genetic. Academic psychology journals are well stocked with papers studying the world view that lies behind the kind of self-fulfilling prophecy we just described. For example, Purdue University psychologist Patricia Linehan writes:

A body of research on conceptions of ability has shown two orientations toward ability. Students with an Incremental orientation believe ability (intelligence) to be malleable, a quality that increases with effort. Students with an Entity orientation believe ability to be nonmalleable, a fixed quality of self that does not increase with effort.

The “entity orientation” that says “You are smart or not, end of story,” leads to bad outcomes—a result that has been confirmed by many other studies. (The relevance for math is shown by researchers at Oklahoma City who recently found that belief in inborn math ability may be responsible for much of the gender gap in mathematics.)

Psychologists Lisa Blackwell, Kali Trzesniewski, and Carol Dweck presented these alternatives to determine people’s beliefs about intelligence:

  1. You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you really can’t do much to change it.

  2. You can always greatly change how intelligent you are.

They found that students who agreed that “You can always greatly change how intelligent you are” got higher grades. But as Richard Nisbett recounts in his book Intelligence and How to Get It,they did something even more remarkable:

Dweck and her colleagues then tried to convince a group of poor minority junior high school students that intelligence is highly malleable and can be developed by hard work…that learning changes the brain by forming new…connections and that students are in charge of this change process.

The results? Convincing students that they could make themselves smarter by hard work led them to work harder and get higher grades. The intervention had the biggest effect for students who started out believing intelligence was genetic. (A control group, who were taught how memory works, showed no such gains.)

But improving grades was not the most dramatic effect, “Dweck reported that some of her tough junior high school boys were reduced to tears by the news that their intelligence was substantially under their control.” It is no picnic going through life believing you were born dumb—and are doomed to stay that way.

For almost everyone, believing that you were born dumb—and are doomed to stay that way—is believing a lie. IQ itself can improve with hard work. Because the truth may be hard to believe, here is a set of links about some excellent books to convince you that most people can become smart in many ways, if they work hard enough:

So why do we focus on math? For one thing, math skills are increasingly important for getting good jobs these days—so believing you can’t learn math is especially self-destructive. But we also believe that math is the area where America’s “fallacy of inborn ability” is the most entrenched. Math is the great mental bogeyman of an unconfident America. If we can convince you that anyone can learn math, it should be a short step to convincing you that you can learn just about anything, if you work hard enough.

Is America more susceptible than other nations to the dangerous idea of genetic math ability? Here our evidence is only anecdotal, but we suspect that this is the case. While American fourth and eighth graders score quite well in international math comparisons—beating countries like Germany, the UK and Sweden—our high-schoolers  underperform those countries by a wide margin. This suggests that Americans’ native ability is just as good as anyone’s, but that we fail to capitalize on that ability through hard work. In response to the lackluster high school math performance, some influential voices in American education policy have suggested simply teaching less math—for example, Andrew Hacker has called for algebra to no longer be a requirement. The subtext, of course, is that large numbers of American kids are simply not born with the ability to solve for x.

We believe that this approach is disastrous and wrong. First of all, it leaves many Americans ill-prepared to compete in a global marketplace with hard-working foreigners. But even more importantly, it may contribute to inequality. A great deal of research has shown that technical skills in areas like software are increasingly making the difference between America’s upper middle class and its working class. While we don’t think education is a cure-all for inequality, we definitely believe that in an increasingly automated workplace, Americans who give up on math are selling themselves short.

Too many Americans go through life terrified of equations and mathematical symbols. We think what many of them are afraid of is “proving” themselves to be genetically inferior by failing to instantly comprehend the equations (when, of course, in reality, even a math professor would have to read closely). So they recoil from anything that looks like math, protesting: “I’m not a math person.” And so they exclude themselves from quite a few lucrative career opportunities. We believe that this has to stop. Our view is shared by economist and writer Allison Schrager, who has written two wonderful columns in Quartz (here and here), that echo many of our views.

One way to help Americans excel at math is to copy the approach of the Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans.  In Intelligence and How to Get It,  Nisbett describes how the educational systems of East Asian countries focus more on hard work than on inborn talent:

  1. “Children in Japan go to school about 240 days a year, whereas children in the United States go to school about 180 days a year.”

  2. “Japanese high school students of the 1980s studied 3 ½ hours a day, and that number is likely to be, if anything, higher today.”

  3. “[The inhabitants of Japan and Korea] do not need to read this book to find out that intelligence and intellectual accomplishment are highly malleable. Confucius set that matter straight twenty-five hundred years ago.”

  4. “When they do badly at something, [Japanese, Koreans, etc.] respond by working harder at it.”

  5. “Persistence in the face of failure is very much part of the Asian tradition of self-improvement. And [people in those countries] are accustomed to criticism in the service of self-improvement in situations where Westerners avoid it or resent it.”

We certainly don’t want America’s education system to copy everything Japan does (and we remain agnostic regarding the wisdom of Confucius). But it seems to us that an emphasis on hard work is a hallmark not just of modern East Asia, but of America’s past as well. In returning to an emphasis on effort, America would be returning to its roots, not just copying from successful foreigners.

Besides cribbing a few tricks from the Japanese, we also have at least one American-style idea for making kids smarter: treat people who work hard at learning as heroes and role models. We already venerate sports heroes who make up for lack of talent through persistence and grit; why should our educational culture be any different?

Math education, we believe, is just the most glaring area of a slow and worrying shift. We see our country moving away from a culture of hard work toward a culture of belief in genetic determinism. In the debate between “nature vs. nurture,” a critical third element—personal perseverance and effort—seems to have been sidelined. We want to bring it back, and we think that math is the best place to start.

Follow Miles on Twitter at @mileskimball. Follow Noah at @noahpinion.

Quartz #35—>Get Real: Robert Shiller’s Nobel Should Help the World Improve Imperfect Financial Markets

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Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 35th Quartz column, “Get Real: Robert Shiller’s Nobel should help the world accept (and improve) imperfect financial markets,” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on October 16, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© October 16, 2013: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2015. All rights reserved.


With the world still suffering from the 2008 financial crisis, it is good to see Nobel prizes going to three economists who have set the bar for analyzing how stock prices and other asset prices move in the real world: Eugene Fama, Robert Shiller, and Lars Hansen. Eugene Fama is best known for setting the benchmark for how financial markets would work in a world of perfect efficiency. Robert Shiller pointed out that financial markets look much less efficient at the macroeconomic scale of financial market booms and busts than they do at the microeconomic level of prices for individual stocks. And Lars Hansen developed the statistical techniques that have served as the touchstone for arbitrating between competing views of financial markets.

In many respects the “popular science” account of the work of Fama, Hansen and Shiller, given by the official Nobel prize website, is excellent. But its understated tone does not fully convey the drama of Fama and Shiller painting two diametrically opposed pictures of financial markets. (Nor the beauty and the clarity of Hansen’s way of thinking about the statistical issues in refereeing between these opposing views—but that would be too much to expect in a popular science treatment.) Fama’s picture of financial markets is Panglossian: all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. In Shiller’s picture, financial markets are much more chaotic. As Berkeley economics professor and well-known blogger Brad DeLong puts it:

Financial markets are supposed to tell the real economy the value of providing for the future—of taking resources today and using them nor just for consumption or current enjoyment but in building up technologies, factories, buildings, and companies that will produce value for the future. And Shiller has, more than anyone else, argued economists into admitting that financial markets are not very good at this job.

Shiller’s view of financial markets that are swept up in successive excesses of optimism and pessimism allowed him to sound a warning of both the crash of the dot-com bubble in 2000 and the collapse of the house price bubble that interacted with high levels of leverage by big banks to bring down the world economy—to depths it still hasn’t recovered from.

Even when they don’t fully believe that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds, the imaginations of most economists are captivated by the image of perfect markets, of which Eugene Fama’s Efficient Markets Theory provides an excellent example. The bad part about economists being riveted by the image of perfect markets is that they sometimes mistake this image for reality. The good part is that this image provides a wonderful picture of how things could be—a vision of a world in which (in addition to the routine work of facilitating transactions) financial markets gracefully do the work of:

  • information acquisition and processing,
  • getting funds from those who want to save to firms and individuals who need to borrow, and
  • sharing risks, so that the only risks people face are their share of the risks the world economy as a whole faces—except for entrepreneurs, who need to face additional risks in order to be motivated to do whatever they can to make their businesses successful.

One way to see how far the world is from fully efficient financial markets is that perfect markets would function so frictionlessly that the financial sector itself would earn income that was only a tiny fraction of GDP, where in the real world, “finance and insurance” earn something like 8% of GDP (see 1 and 2,) with many hedge fund managers joining Warren Buffett on Forbes’ list of billionaires.

One reason the financial sector accounts for such a big chunk of GDP may be that information acquisition and processing is much harder in the real world than in pristine economic models. After all, there is a strong tradition in economics for treating information processing (as distinct from information acquisition) as if it came for free. That is, look inside the fantasy world of almost all economic models, and you will see that everyone inside has an infinite IQ, at least for thinking about economic and financial decisions!

In the real world, being able to think carefully about financial markets is a rare and precious skill. But it is worse than that. Those smart enough to work at high levels in the financial sector are also smart enough to see the angles for taking advantage of regular investors and taxpayers, should they be so inclined. Indeed, two of the most important forces driving events in financial markets are the quest for plausible, but faulty stories about how the financial markets work that can fool legislators and regulators on the one hand and stories that can fool regular investors. A great deal of money made by those in the financial sector rides on convincing people that actively managed mutual funds do better that plain vanilla index funds—something that is demonstrably false on average, at least. And a surprisingly large amount of money is made by nudging regular investors to buy high-fee plain vanilla index funds as opposed to low-fee plain vanilla index funds. (There is a reason why, for my retirement savings account, I had to drill down to the third or fourth webpage for each mutual fund before I could see what fees it charges.) Even those relatively sophisticated investors who can qualify to put their money into hedge funds have been fooled by the hedge funds into paying not only management fees that typically run about 2% per year, but also “performance fees” averaging about 20% of the upside when the hedge fund does well, with the investor taking the full hit when the hedge fund does badly. So one crucial requisite for financial markets to do what they should be doing is for regular investors to know enough to notice when financial operators are taking them for a ride (which as it stands, is most of the time, at least to the tune of the bulk of fees paid) and when they are getting a decent deal.

For getting funds from those who want to save to those who need to borrow, the biggest wrench in the works of the financial system right now is that the government is soaking up most of the saving. The obvious part of this is budget deficits, which at least have the positive effect of providing stimulus for the economy in the short run. The less obvious part is that the US Federal Reserve is paying 0.25% to banks with accounts at the Fed and 0% on green pieces of paper when, after risk adjustment, many borrowers (who would start a business, build a factory, buy equipment, do R&D, pay for an education, or buy a house, car or washing machine) can only afford negative interest rates. (See “America’s huge mistake on monetary policy: How negative interest rates could have stopped the Great Recession in its tracks.”)

Yet, the departure from financial utopia that I find the most heart wrenching is the failure of real-world financial markets to share risks in the way they do in our theories. If financial markets worked as they should:

  • There would be no reason for the people in a banana republic to suffer when banana prices unexpectedly went down—that contingency would have been insured just as routinely as our houses have fire insurance,
  • There would be no reason for people to suffer if house prices unexpectedly went down in particular metropolitan areas more than elsewhere, since home price insurance built into mortgages would automatically adjust the size of the mortgage,
  • There would be no reason for people to suffer if the industry they worked in did unexpectedly badly, since that possibility would be fully hedged.

Some of these things don’t happen because people don’t understand financial markets well enough. But some don’t happen because the financial markets have not developed enough to offer certain kinds of insurance. All three winners this year richly deserve to be Nobel laureates. I tweeted the day before the announcement in favor of Robert Shiller because he, more than anyone else, has been trying to make financial markets live up to this vision of risk sharing. It not just that this is a big theme in the books he has written. Shiller has also patented new types of financial assets to enhance risk sharing and helped create the Case-Shiller home-price index as a foundation on which home-price insurance contracts could be based. Shiller’s vision of risk sharing is far from being a reality, but one day, maybe it will be. If that day comes, the world will look back on Robert Shiller as much more than a Nobel-Prize-winning economist. As Brad DeLong says of Shiller: “Pay attention to him.”

Quartz #34—>Janet Yellen is Hardly a Dove—She Knows the US Economy Needs Some Unemployment

Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 34th Quartz column “Janet Yellen is Hardly a Dove–She Knows the US Economy Needs Some Unemployment” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on October 11, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© October 11, 2013: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2015. All rights reserved.

Below, after the text of the column as it appeared in Quartz, I note some of the reactions and explain some of the math behind the column.   


President Obama was right to say his appointment of Janet Yellen to head the US Federal Reserve has been one of his most important economic decisions. As the graph below shows, from the mid-1980s through 2007, monetary policy kept US GDP growth fairly steady, without needing much help from Keynesian fiscal policy. Economists talk about this period when GDP growth was much steadier than before as “The Great Moderation.” Monetary policy has done less well in years since the financial crisis in 2008, because the Fed felt it could not lower its target interest rate below zero, and has not been fully comfortable with its backup tools of quantitative easing and “forward guidance” about what it will do to interest rates years down the road.

Yellen’s academic research on the theory of unemployment points to one of the key reasons it is important to keep the growth of the economy steady. Let me explain.

With her husband George Akerlof, who was among recipients of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001, Yellen edited “Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market,” which gives one of the leading theories of why some level of unemployment persists even in good times, and why unemployment gets much worse in bad times. Yellen summarized the major variants of Efficiency Wage Theory. They all share the idea that firms often want to pay their workers more than their workers can get elsewhere. It might seem that employers would always want to pay workers as little as possible, but badly paid workers don’t care much about keeping their jobs.

Low pay affords workers an attitude of “Take this job and shove it!.” If workers have no reason to obey you because they are just as well off without the job—and owe you nothing—it will be hard to run a business. And if you hire someone at very low pay who actually sticks around, it is reasonable to worry about what is wrong with the worker that makes it so that worker can’t do better than the miserable job you are offering them. The way out of this trap is for an employer to pay enough that the worker is significantly better off with the job than without the job.

It might sound like a good thing that firms have a reason to pay workers more, except that, according to the Efficiency Wage Theory, firms have to keep raising wages until workers are too expensive for all of them to get hired. The reasoning goes like this: There will always be some jobs that are at the bottom of the heap. Suppose some of those bottom-of-the-heap jobs are also dead-end jobs, with no potential for promotion or any other type of advancement. If bottom-of-the-heap, dead-end jobs were free for the taking, no one would ever worry about losing one of those jobs. The Johnny Paycheck moment—when the worker says “Take this job and shove it”—will not be long in coming. If they were free for the taking, bottom-of-the-heap, dead-end jobs would also be subject to high turnover and low levels of emotional attachment to the firm.

The only way a bottom-of-the-heap, dead-end job will ever be worth something to a worker is if there is a something worse than a bottom-of-the-heap, dead-end job. In Efficiency Wage Theory, that something worse is being unemployed. To make workers care about bottom-of-the-heap, dead-end jobs, employers have to keep raising their wages above what other firms are offering until workers are expensive enough that there is substantial unemployment—enough unemployment that being unemployed is worse than having one of those bottom-of-the-heap, dead-end jobs. For the worker, Efficiency Wage Theory is bittersweet.

Some of what counts as unemployment in the official statistics arises from people in between jobs who simply need a little time to identify and decide among all the different jobs potentially available to them. And some is from people who have an unrealistic idea of what kinds of jobs are potentially available to them. But let me call the part of unemployment due to this Efficiency-Wage-Theory logic motivational unemployment. In the case of motivational unemployment, there will be people who are unemployed who are essentially identical to people who do have jobs. It is just bad luck on the part of the unemployed to be allotted the social role of scaring those who do have jobs into doing the boss’s bidding.

In criminal justice, swift, sure punishment does not need to be as harsh as slow, uncertain punishment. Just so, in Efficiency Wage Theory, the better and faster bosses are at catching worker dereliction of duty, the less motivational unemployment is needed. Because it is easier to motivate workers when worker dereliction of duty is detected more quickly, firms will stop raising wages and cutting back on employment at lower levels of unemployment.

There are other conceivable ways to reduce the necessity of motivational unemployment in the long run.

  1. If all jobs had advancement possibilities—that is, no jobs were dead-end jobs—it might be possible to motivate workers by the hope of moving up the ladder. This works best if workers actually learn and get better at what they do over time by sticking with a job.
  2. If doing what needs to be done on the job could be made more pleasant, it would reduce the need for the carrot of above-market wages or the stick of unemployment.
  3. If workers could trust firms not to cheat them and were required to pay for their jobs, they would be afraid of having to pay for a job all over again if they were fired.
  4. There could be a threat other than unemployment, such as deportation.
  5. Unemployment could be made less attractive.
  6. Worker’s reputations could be tracked more systematically and made available online.

To make possibilities 5 and 6 more concrete, let me mention online activist Morgan Warstler’s thought-provoking (if Dickensian and possibly unworkable) proposal that would make unemployment less attractive and would better track workers reputations: An “eBay job auction and minimum income program for the unemployed.” The program would require those receiving unemployment insurance or other assistance to work in a temp-job—within a certain radius from the worker’s home. The employer would go online to bid on an employee to hire and the wages would offset some of the cost of government assistance. Both the history of bids and an eBay-like rating system of the workers would give later employers a lot of useful information about the worker. Workers would also give feedback on firms, to help ferret out abuses. It is obvious that many of the policies that Efficiency Wage Theory suggests might reduce unemployment would be politically toxic and some (such as using the threat of deportation to keep employees in line) are morally reprehensible. But some of those policies merit serious thought.

What does Efficiency Wage Theory have to say about monetary policy? The details of how motivational unemployment works matter. Think about bottom-of-the-heap, dead-end jobs again. As the unemployment rate goes down in good times, the wage firms need to pay to motivate those workers goes up faster and faster, creating inflationary pressures. But the wages of those jobs at the bottom are already so low that when unemployment goes up in the bad times, it takes a lot of extra unemployment to noticeably reduce the wages that firms feel they need to pay and bring inflation back down. This is one of several, and possibly the biggest reason that the round trip of letting inflation creep up and then having to bring it back down is a bad deal. And a round trip in the other direction—letting inflation fall as it has in the last few years with the idea of bringing it back up later—is just as costly. (You can see the fall in what the Fed calls “core” inflation—the closest thing to being the measure of inflation the Fed targets—in the graph below.) It is much better to keep inflation steady by keeping output and unemployment at their natural levels.

The conventional classification divides monetary policy makers into “hawks,” who hate inflation more than unemployment and “doves” who hate unemploymentmore than inflation. Most commentators classify Janet Yellen as a dove. But I parse things differently. There can be serious debates about the long-run inflation target. I have taken the minority position that our monetary system should be adapted so that we can safely have a long-run inflation target of zero. But as long as there is a consensus on the Fed’s monetary policy committee that 2% per year (in terms of the particular measure of inflation in the graph above) is the right long-run inflation target, it is entirely appropriate for Janet Yellen to think that inflation below 2% is too low in any case, so that further monetary stimulus is beneficial not only because it lowers unemployment, but also because it raises inflation towards its 2% target level.

To see the logic, imagine some future day in which everyone agreed that the long-run inflation target should be zero. Then if inflation were below the target—in that case actually being deflation–then almost everyone would agree that monetary stimulus would be good not only because it lowered unemployment, but also because it raised inflation from negative values toward zero. Anyone who wants to make the case for a long-run inflation target lower than 2% should make that argument, but otherwise they should not be too quick to call Janet Yellen a dove for insisting that the Fed should keep inflation from falling below the Fed’s agreed-upon long-run inflation target of 2%.

Nor should anyone be called a hawk and have the honor of being thought to truly hate inflation if they are not willing to do what it takes to safely bring inflation down to zero and keep it there. Letting inflation fall willy-nilly because a serious recession has not been snuffed out as soon as it should have been is no substitute for keeping the economy on an even keel and very gradually bringing inflation down to zero, with all due preparation.

There is also no special honor in having a tendency to think that a dangerous inflationary surge is around the corner when events prove otherwise. One feather in Yellen’s cap is the Wall Street Journal’s determination that her predictions for the economy have been more accurate than any of the other 14 Fed policy makers analyzed. For the Fed, making good predictions about where the economy would go without any policy intervention, and what the effects of various policies would be, is more than half the battle. Differences in views about the relative importance of inflation and unemployment pale in comparison to differences in views about how the economy works in influencing policy recommendations. Having a good forecasting record is not enough to show that one understands how the economy works, but over time, having a bad forecasting record certainly indicates some lack of understanding—unless one is learning from one’s mistakes.

In the last 10 years, America’s economic policy-making apparatus as a whole made at least two big mistakes: not requiring banks to put up more of their own shareholders’ money when they took risks, and not putting in place the necessary measures to allow the Fed to fight the Great Recession as it should have, with negative interest rates. It is time for America’s economic policy-making apparatus to learn from its mistakes, on both counts.

As the saying goes, “It’s difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.” But I will hazard the prediction that if the Senate confirms her appointment, monetary historians 40 years from now will say that Janet Yellen was an excellent Fed chief. There will be more tough calls ahead than we can imagine clearly. As president of the San Francisco Fed from 2004 to 2010, and as vice chair of the Fed since then, Yellen has brought to bear on her role as a policymaker both skills in deep abstract thinking from her academic background and the deep practical wisdom also known as “common sense.” It is time for her to move up to the next level.


eactions and the Math Behind the Column

Ezra Klein: Given his 780,386 Twitter followers, a tweet from Ezra Klein is worth reporting. I like his modification to my tweet: 

No, she’s a human being RT @mileskimball: Don’t miss my column “Janet Yellen is hardly a dove”http://blog.supplysideliberal.com/post/63725670856/janet-yellen-efficiency-wages-and-monetary-policy

Andy Harless’s Question: Where Does the Curvature Come From? Andy Harless asks why there is an asymmetry—in this case a curvature—that makes things different when unemployment goes up than when it goes down. The technical answer is in Carl Shapiro and Joseph Stiglitz’ paper “Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device.” It is not easy to make this result fully intuitive. A key point is that unemployed folks find jobs again at a certain rate. This and the rate at which diligent workers leave their jobs for exogenous reasons dilute the motivation from trying to reduce one’s chances of leaving a job. The discount rate r also dilutes any threats that get realized in the future. So the key equation is 

dollar cost of effort per unit time 

                    =  (wage - unemployment benefit) 

                                                          · detection rate

÷ [detection rate + rate at which diligent workers leave their jobs                              + rate at which the unemployed find jobs + r]  

That is, the extra pay people get from work only helps deter dereliction of duty according to the fraction of the sum of all the rates that comes from the detection probability. And the job finding rate depends on the reciprocal of the unemployment rate. So as unemployment gets low, the job finding rate seriously dilutes the effect of the detection probability times the extra that workers get paid.

(The derivation of the equation above uses the rules for dealing with fractions quite heavily, backing up the idea in the WSJ article I tweeted as follows.

The Dividing Line: Why Are Fractions Key to Future Math Success?http://on.wsj.com/15rlupS

Deeper intuition for the equation above would require developing a deeper and more solid intuition about fractions in general than I currently have.)

Solving for the extra pay needed to motivate workers yields this equation:

(wage - unemployment benefit) 

           = dollar cost of effort per unit time 

· [detection rate + rate at which diligent workers leave their jobs                              + rate at which the unemployed find jobs + r]  ÷

                                  detection rate

In labor market dynamics the rates are high, so a flow-in-flow-out steady state is reached fairly quickly, and we can find the rate at which the unemployed find jobs by the equation flow in = flow out, or since in equilibrium the firms keep all their workers motivated,  

rate at which diligent workers lose jobs * number employed

= rate at which the unemployed find jobs * number unemployed.

Solving for the rate of job finding:

rate at which the unemployed find jobs 

= rate at which diligent workers leave their jobs 

· number employed  ÷  number unemployed

Finally, it is worth noting that

rate at which diligent workers leave their jobs

+ rate at which the unemployed find jobs

= rate at which diligent workers leave their jobs 

· [number unemployed + number employed]/[number unemployed]

= rate at which diligent workers leave their jobs 

÷ unemployment rate

Morgan Warstler’s Reply: The original link in the column about Morgan Warstler’s plan was to a Modeled Behavior discussion of his plan. Here is a link to Morgan Warstler’s own post about his plan. Morgan’s reply in the comment thread is important enough I will copy it out here so you don’t miss it:

1. The plan is not Dickensian. It allows the poor to earn $280 per week for ANY job they can find someone to pay them $40 per week to do. And it gives them the online tools to market themselves.

Work with wood? Those custom made rabbit hatches you wish you could get the business of the ground on? Here ya go.

Painter, musician, rabbit farmer, mechanic - dream job time.

My plan is built to be politically WORKABLE. The Congressional Black Caucus, the Tea Party and the OWS crowd. They are beneficiaries here.

2. No one in economics notices the other key benefit - the cost of goods and services in poor zip codes goes down ;:So the $280 minimum GI check buys 30% more! (conservative by my napkin math) So real consumption goes up A LOT.

This is key, bc the effect is a steep drop in income inequality, and mobility.

That $20 gourmet hamburger in the ghetto costs $5, and it’s kicking McDonalds ass. And lots of hipsters are noticing that the best deals, on things OTHER THAN HOUSING are where the poor live.

Anyway, I wish amongst the better economists there was more mechanistic thinking about how thigns really work.

Quartz #33—>Don't Believe Anyone Who Claims to Understand the Economics of Obamacare

Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 33d Quartz column “Don’t believe anyone who claims to understand the economics of Obamacare,“ now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on October 3, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© October 3, 2013: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2015. All rights reserved.

Below, after the text of the column as it appeared in Quartz, I have the original introduction, and some reactions to the column.  


Republican hatred of Obamacare and Democratic support for Obamacare have shut down the US government. Now might be a good time to remind the world just how far the country’s health care sector—with or without Obamacare—is from being the kind of classical free market Adam Smith was describing when he talked about the beneficent “invisible hand” of the free market. There are at least five big departures of our health care system from a classical free market:

1. Health care is complex, and its outcomes often cannot be seen until years later, when many other confounding forces have intervened.  So the assumption that people are typically well informed—or as well informed as their health care providers—is sadly false. (And the difficulties that juries have in understanding medicine create opportunities for lawyers to get large judgments for plaintiffs in malpractice suits.)

2. Even aside from the desire to cure contagious diseases before they spread, people care not only about their own health and the health of their families, but also the health of strangers. On average, it makes people feel worse to see others suffering from sickness than to see others suffering from aspects of poverty unrelated to sickness.

3. “Scope of practice” laws put severe restrictions on what health care workers can do. For example, there are many routine things that nurses could do just as well as a general practitioner, but are not allowed to do because they are not doctors–and the paths to becoming a “medical doctor” are strictly controlled.

4. Those who have insurance pay only a small fraction of the cost of the medical procedures they get, leading them to agree to many expensive medical procedures even in cases where the benefit is likely to be small.

5. In order to spur research into new drugs, the government gives temporary monopolies on the production of life-saving drugs—a.k.a. patents—that push the price of those drugs far above the actual cost of production. 

Sometimes these departures from a classical free market cancel each other out, as when insurance firms shield patients from the official price of a drug and make the cost of that drug to the patient close to the social cost of producing it, or when laws prevent outright quacks from performing brain surgery on an ill-informed patient. But one way or another, there is no obvious “free market” anywhere in sight. That doesn’t mean that the economic reasoning behind the virtues of the free market doesn’t help, it just means that when we think about health care policy, we swim in deep water.

At the level of overall health care systems, one of the most important things we know is that many other countries seem to get reasonably good health care outcomes while spending much less money than we do in the US. There are several factors that might contribute to relatively good health results in other countries:

  • There are large gains in health from making sure that everyone in society gets very basic medical care on a basis more regular than emergency room visits.
  • Most other countries have less of a devotion to fast food—and food from grocery store shelves that is processed to taste as good as possible (in the sense of “can’t eat just one”) without regard to overall actual (as opposed to advertising-driven) health properties.
  • Most other countries are either poor enough, or rely enough on public transportation, that people are forced to walk or ride bicycles significant distances to get to where they need to go every day.

Part of the recipe for spending less in other countries is the fact that they can cheaply copy drugs and medical techniques developed in the US at great expense, But, there are two simple ingredients to the recipe beyond that:

  • Ration procedures that don’t seem very effective (inevitably along with some inappropriate rationing as well)
  • Use the fact that most of the money for health care runs through the government as leverage to push down the pay of doctors and other health care workers.

My main concern about Obamacare is the fear that it will inhibit experimentation with different ways of organizing health care at the state level. So far that is only a fear, but it is something to watch for. But there is one way in which state-level approaches are severely limited: they can’t push down the pay of doctors and other health care workers without causing an exodus of doctors and other health care workers to other states. National health care reform can be more powerful than state-level health care reform if a key aim, stated or not, is to reduce the pay of doctors and other health care workers (and workers in closely connected fields, such as those who work in insurance companies) in order to make medical care cheaper for everyone else. Fewer stars would go into medicine if it paid less—but if most of the benefits from health care are from basic care, that might not show up too much in the overall health statistics. And if less-expensive nurses can do things that expensive doctors are now doing, those who would have been nurses will still do a good job if they end up becoming doctors because the pay is too low for the stars to fill the medical school slots.

Reducing the total amount of money flowing through the health care sector should reduce both the amount of health care and the price of health care. But even in a best-case scenario, in which reasonably judicious approaches to rationing and dramatic advances in persuading people to exercise and eat right kept the overall health statistics looking good, a reduction in the price and quantity of health care could mean a big reduction in income for those working in health care and related fields.

Still, the key wild card in judging Obamacare will be its effect on health care innovation. Subsidies may get people more care now, but crowd out government funding for basic medical research. Efforts to standardize medical care could easily yield big gains at the start as hospitals come up to best practice, yet that standardization could make innovation harder later on. An emphasis on cost-containment could encourage cost-reducing innovations, but discourage the development of new treatments that are very expensive at first, but could become cheaper later on. And Obamacare will tend to substitute the judgments of other types of health care experts in place of the judgments of business people, with unknown effects. Whatever the effects of Obamacare on innovation, we can be confident that over time these effects on innovation will dwarf most of the other effects of Obamacare in importance.

The October 2013 US government shutdown is only the latest of many twists and turns in the bitter struggle over Obamacare. A large share of the partisan energy comes from people who feel certain they know what Obamacare will do. But ideology makes things seem obvious that are not obvious at all. The social science research I have seen on health care regularly turns up surprises. To me, the most surprising thing would be if what Obamacare actually does to health care in America didn’t surprise us many times over, both pleasantly and unpleasantly, at the same time.


Here is my original introduction, which was drastically trimmed down for the version on Quartz: 

Republican hatred of Obamacare, and Democratic support for Obamacare, have shut down the “non-essential” activities of the Federal Government. So, three-and-a-half years since President Obama signed the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” into law, and a year or so since a presidential election in which Obamacare was a major issue, it is a good time to think about Obamacare again.

In my first blog post about health care, back in June 2012, I wrote:

I am slow to post about health care because I don’t know the answers. But then I don’t think anyone knows the answers. There are many excellent ideas for trying to improve health care, but we just don’t know how different changes will work in practice at the level of entire health care systems.  

That remains true, but thanks to the intervening year, I have high hopes that with some effort, we can be, as the saying goes, “confused on a higher level and about more important things.”

One thing that has come home to me in the past year is just how far the US health care sector—with or without Obamacare—is from being the kind of classical free market Adam Smith was describing when he talked about the beneficent “invisible hand” of the free market. 

Reactions: Gerald Seib and David Wessel Included this column in their “What We’re Reading” Feature in the Wall Street Journal. Here is their excellent summary:

The key to the long-run impact of Obamacare will be whether it smothers innovation in health care — both in the way it is organized and in the development of new treatments. And no one today can know whether that’ll happen, says economist Miles Kimball. [Quartz]

(In response, Noah Smith had this to say about me and the Wall Street Journal.) This column was also featured in Walter Russell Mead’s post "How Will We Know If Obamacare Succeeds or Fails.” (Thanks to Robert Graboyes for pointing me to that post.) He writes:

Meanwhile, at Quartz, Miles Kimball has a post entitled “Don’t Believe Anyone Who Claims to Understand the Economics of Obamacare.” The whole post is worth reading, but near the end, he argues that the ACA’s effect on innovation could eventually be the most important thing about it’s long-term legacy…

From our perspective, these are both very good places to start thinking about how to measure Obamacare’s impact. Of course, Tozzi’s metric is easier to quantify than Kimball’s: it will be difficult to judge how the ACA is or isn’t limiting innovation. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try: without innovation, there’s no hope for a sustainable solution to the ongoing crisis of exploding health care costs.

I have also been pleased by some favorable tweets. Here is a sampling:

Quartz #32—>Talk Ain't Cheap: You Should Expect Overreaction When the Fed Makes a Mess of Explaining Its Plans

blog.supplysideliberal.com tumblr_inline_mumuv8YTC61r57lmx.png

Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 31st Quartz column, “You should expect panic when the Fed makes a mess of explaining its plans," now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on September 19, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© September 19, 2013: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2015. All rights reserved.


Back in June, Ben Bernanke told the press:

If the incoming data are broadly consistent with this forecast, the Committee currently anticipates that it would be appropriate to moderate the monthly pace of [asset] purchases later this year.

That sentence was interpreted as signaling a tightening of the path of monetary policy, and rocked markets around the world. Bernanke and other members of the US Federal Reserve’s monetary policy committee made great efforts to fight that perception of tighter policy intentions, but it is only with yesterday’s announcement that

… the Committee decided to await more evidence that progress will be sustained before adjusting the pace of its [asset] purchases

the markets have been convinced that the Fed intends to continue to use the “quantitative easing” provided by buying long-term government bonds and mortgage-backed assets to stimulate the economy until things look better.

I agree with Justin Wolfers, writing in Bloomberg, that the way Bernanke talked in June about “tapering” off asset purchases was a serious mistake, only partly rectified by the Fed’s announcement today. But the real fault lies with an approach to monetary policy that relies so heavily on communicating the Fed’s future intentions.

Monetary policy’s dependence on what the Fed calls “communications” is problematic because members of the Fed’s monetary policy committee don’t even agree on what war they are fighting. Some view the battle as one of fighting back from a close call with the possibility of another Great Depression. Janet Yellen, the clear frontrunner to succeed Ben Bernanke now that Larry Summers has bowed out, is in this camp. Some just want to make sure monetary policy doesn’t contribute to another financial crisis. Still others worry about avoiding the inflationary mistakes of the 1970s. It is hard for a many-headed beast to signal a clear direction.

Secondly, the Fed’s approach of talk therapy is problematic because it is hard to communicate a monetary policy that is strongly stimulative now but will be less stimulative in the future. As I discussed in a previous column and in the presentation I have been giving to central banks around the world, adjusting short-term interest rates has an almost unique ability to get the timing of monetary policy right. Unfortunately, the US government’s unlimited guarantee that people can earn at least a zero interest rate by holding massive quantities of paper currency stands in the way of simply lowering short-term interest rates. Without being able to cut short-term rates, the two choices left are (a) stimulative both now and later or (b) not-so-stimulative either now or later. Since the appropriate level of monetary stimulus now and a year or two from now are likely to be different, it is easy to see how the Fed’s thinking—and the market’s interpretation of the Fed’s thinking—could oscillate between focusing on getting the right level of monetary stimulus now, and getting the right level of monetary stimulus later.

My own recommendations for the Fed are no secret:

  1. Eliminate the zero-lower bound on nominal interest rates—or at least begin making the case to Congress for that authority.
  2. Develop a more rule-based approach to monetary policy focused on the level of nominal GDP in which (aside from urgent crises like that in late 2008) the role of “judgment calls” would be limited primarily to judgments about the highest level of output consistent with avoiding a permanent increase in inflation. Such an approach would allow the Fed to speak with a more unified voice despite disagreements among members of the monetary policy committee.
  3. Deal with financial stability by raising equity requirements for banks and other financial firms rather than thinking that tight monetary policy is the key to financial stability.

Quartz #31—>America's Big Monetary Policy Mistake: How Negative Interest Rates Could Have Stopped the Great Recession in Its Tracks

Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 31st Quartz column, ”America’s huge mistake on monetary policy: How negative interest rates could have stopped the Great Recession in its tracks,” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on September 6, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© September 6, 2013: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2014. All rights reserved.

This post is a rearticulation of my argument for electronic money, focusing on the negative interest rates themselves. You can see links to all my other work on electronic money in “How and Why to Eliminate the Zero Lower Bound: A Reader’s Guide.”

An early draft had the following lead paragraph that was cut for reasons of brevity and focus, but that I think will be of interest to many readers:

John von Neumann, who revolutionized economics by inventing game theory (before going on to help design the first atom bomb and lay out the fundamental architecture for nearly all modern computers), left an unfinished book when he died in 1957: The Computer and the Brain. In the years since, von Neumann’s analogy of the brain to a computer has become commonplace. The first modern economist, Adam Smith, was unable to make a similarly apt comparison between a market economy and a computer in his books, The Theory of Moral Sentiments or in the The Wealth of Nations, because they were published, respectively, in 1759 and 1776—more than 40 years before Charles Babbage designed his early computer in 1822. Instead, Smith wrote in The Theory of Moral Sentiments:

“Every individual … neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it … he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.”

Now, writing in the 21st century, I can make the analogy between a market economy and a computer that Adam Smith could not. Instead of transistors modifying electronic signals, a market economy has individuals making countless decisions of when and how much to buy, and what jobs to take, and companies making countless decisions of what to buy and what to sell on what terms. And in place of a computer’s electronic signals, a market economy has price signals. Prices, in a market economy, are what bring everything into balance.


There’s a reason why the workings of the price system through supply and demand are taught as one of the first lessons when studying economics. This is where the action is. When people want to buy more of something than others want to sell, the price of that good goes up, signaling that more needs to be produced and less needs to be bought. When the opposite occurs (there’s more to sell than people want to buy), the price of that good goes down to signal that less needs to be produced and more needs to be bought to bring things into balance. Interference with those price signals lowers the IQ of the “invisible hand,” this competition that naturally guides markets.

One key set of prices in the economy are interest rates—which, after accounting for inflation, tell how much more one has to pay to buy something now instead of later. Interest rates are crucial in balancing the total amount of goods and services households and firms want to buy and use now with the total amount of goods and services they want to produce and sell now. Indeed, if anything prevents interest rates from adjusting appropriately to balance aggregate supply and demand, bad things happen: if interest rates are too low, the imbalance will cause the economy to overheat and generate inflation; if interest rates are too high, the imbalance will cause the economy to fall into a recession. Conversely, when interest rates do adjust appropriately, anytime the economy starts to overheat, interest rates go up to balance aggregate supply and demand and stop the overheating in its tracks; anytime the economy starts to fall into a recession, interest rates go down to balance aggregate supply and demand and stop the recession in its tracks.

There are two complications in the adjustment of interest rates that do not apply to other prices. First, short-run movements in interest rates are tangled up with money supply and demand. In practice, that means that central banks such as the Federal Reserve choose interest rates, not always appropriately. Second, there is a traditional floor of zero for interest rates. (There also used to be a ceiling of 5% on certain interest rates, but thankfully, that has receded into the mists of time.) Each of these is a big issue. Let me leave the details of appropriate interest rate setting by central banks to a later column, and focus here on the second wrench in the works of interest rate adjustment: the traditional floor of zero on interest rates, or as it is called by macroeconomic policy wonks, the “zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.”

Putting a floor of zero on interest rates is like cutting a wire in the economy’s computer. The importance of the zero lower bound (abbreviated to “ZLB” by said wonks) can easily be seen by googling “zero lower bound” and “John Taylor” + “zero lower bound.”

The paper Robert Hall presented at last month’s Jackson Hole conference (pdf) on monetary policy has a good statement of this widely-held view that the zero lower bound has been a major factor in the miserable course of economic events in the last few years (pdf). The simple truth is that the Great Recession was very painful and US unemployment is still painfully high five years later, primarily because of the zero lower bound. Even without the ZLB, there would have been some hit from the financial crisis that ensued with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on Sept. 15, 2008, but negative interest rates in the neighborhood of 4% below zero would have brought robust recovery by the end of 2009.

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The reason negative interest rates are needed during a serious recession (at least for countries that have low rates of inflation) is that businesses are scared to invest, banks are scared to make loans, and even better-off households are scared to spend when times are bad. If it is easy to sit on cash, then frightened businesses, banks and households that have a cash cushion will sit on cash. If businesses aren’t spending to build factories, buy machines, or do R&D, and households aren’t spending on things to make their lives better, everyone who is trying to produce and sell something is left in the lurch. Negative interest rates for idle cash would motivate those who would otherwise sit on that cash to take the risks to put it to use to build the economy. Those who needed safety the most could still get that safety, if they are willing to pay for it. But those willing to take risks would be rewarded. All of this would simply be the price system doing its work of keeping the economy on target, in the particular case of interest rates.

What is behind the tradition of a floor of zero on interest rates? First, when inflation is high, interest rates never get down as far as zero anyway. So people get used to interest rates above zero. Second, even in the absence of inflation, when the economy is healthy, there are many investment projects that have the potential to earn a good return. Thus, when the economy is healthy, businesses vying for the funds to do their investment projects push interest rates above zero. Consumers who see the advantage of getting a car or a house or an education now rather than later also help push interest rates above zero when the economy is healthy. So the zero lower bound only becomes a problem when an economy conquers the bulk of inflation and then has a bad recession.

The way that the traditional floor of zero for interest rates is enforced by government policy is by the government’s guarantee of what, leaving aside storage costs, amounts to an exactly zero interest rate on paper currency. As long as the government guarantees an interest rate of zero on paper currency, who would ever accept a significantly lower interest rate? As a technical matter, there is no difficulty in repealing the government’s current guarantee of a zero interest rate on paper currency and thereby freeing up all interest rates to go negative, if necessary. The key technical issue is to make it so there is no place to hide from the negative interest rates, not even by putting cash under the mattress; paper currency would earn more or less the same negative interest rate as money in bank accounts. See my first column on electronic money here and the presentation I have been giving at central banks around the world here. So it all comes down to interest rate politics. If, politically, the government doesn’t dare let interest rates go negative, they won’t be able to. But if the government quit gumming up the works of the price system by guaranteeing a minimum interest rate of zero, then negative rates would be quite possible, and even half-decent monetary policy using negative rates would be enough to prevent another Great Recession.

The key political arguments for high interest rates when the economy needs low rates center on being fair to savers. Saving helps people to be self-sufficient in times of trouble, rather than having to beg others for help. And when the economy is healthy, additional saving makes it possible to finance more investment that builds up the productive capacity of the economy. So as a character trait, being a saver is rightly praised. But there is a time and place for everything, and the middle of a recession is the one time when we need people to spend rather than save in order to balance the economy. So while, in general, it is appropriate to reward savers handsomely for saving—as positive interest rates do in good times—it is also appropriate to charge savers for saving in bad times when we desperately need those who have a little financial leeway to spend. In bad times, there is no way to earn a positive return on business investment without taking some risk. So it is right and proper for those who insist on total safety in those times to pay for that safe storage, just as people are accustomed to paying to keep their belongings in physical storage units. What is more, the imperative of rewarding savers for the virtue of saving argues for returning the economy to robust health and positive interest rates as soon as possible. During serious recessions, negative interest rates are the key to quick economic recovery. The relatively ineffective alternative is zero or near-zero interest rates for years and years. Therefore, both on grounds of effectiveness and kindness to savers, negative interest rates for a few quarters are better than zero interest rates for years and years.

Ultimately, the choice we face is whether:

(a) to make the economy stupid in the face of recessions by imposing a zero lower bound

(b) to steer away from the zero lower bound by permanently higher inflation, with all of its attendant costs, or

( c) to repeal the zero lower bound and allow negative interest rates for brief periods when economic recovery requires them.

To me, the best choice is clear.

Quartz #30—>How to Avoid Another Nasdaq Meltdown: Slow Down Trading (to Only 20 Times Per Second)

Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 30th Quartz column, ”How to avoid another Nasdaq meltdown: Slow down trading” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on August 23, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© August 23, 2013: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2014. All rights reserved.

The last paragraph of this column is especially heartfelt. 


Whatever the exact trigger that brought Nasdaq down today, it is likely that a contributing cause is the huge increase in lightning-fast high-frequency computer trading in recent years. Nathaniel Popper wrote in the New York Times in October 2012 that the profits from high-frequency-trading have started to fall because the volume of stock-trading has fallen in the wake of the Great Recession, but that

Many market experts have argued that the technical glitches that have recently hit the market have been a result of a broader trend of the market splintering into dozens of automated trading services and a lack of human oversight.

High-frequency trading has been controversial because of the idea that it takes advantage of slower human investors. Back in 2009, the New York Times’s Charles Duhigg detailed an insider account of one case of computers besting humans:

The slower traders began issuing buy orders [for Broadcom]. But rather than being shown to all potential sellers at the same time, some of those orders were most likely routed to a collection of high-frequency traders for just 30 milliseconds—0.03 seconds—in what are known as flash orders. While markets are supposed to ensure transparency by showing orders to everyone simultaneously, a loophole in regulations allows marketplaces like Nasdaq to show traders some orders ahead of everyone else in exchange for a fee.

In less than half a second, high-frequency traders gained a valuable insight: the hunger for Broadcom was growing.

In terms of fairness, this seems worse than the controversial two-second advance notice subscribers could get for the University of Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment. At least in that case, subscribers’ fees for the advance notice pay for the collection of scientifically valuable survey data. But what social benefit flows from letting high-frequency traders peek at market supply and demand 30 milliseconds before everyone else? It could be that giving high-frequency traders that kind of advantage entices them to provide liquidity in the market, selling to those who want to buy and buying from those who want to sell. But the magnitude of this supposed benefit is unproven. As Popper writes: “Regulators are still grappling with whether the rise of high-speed firms has been a net benefit or loss for investors.”

If letting high-frequency traders have an advantage measured in milliseconds doesn’t provide enough benefits to be worth the seeming unfairness, what can be done? One simple approach would be to have the market only clear 20 times per second, and insisting that all orders received by, say, 11:05:02.05 a.m., be treated in a totally even-handed way in that moment of market clearing (as buy and sell orders are matched). Further, it should be insisted that orders be absolutely secret from other traders until the moment of market clearing when that order is supposed to be revealed and executed. It is possible that having the market clear only 20 times per second would reduce the total amount of information processing done by the market every day, but discouraging high-frequency traders and their advantageous zero-sum game off sheer speed of execution might lead the traders to focus on more socially valuable forms of information processing.

In academic finance, concerns about high-frequency trading go under the heading of “market microstructure” issues. There are other bigger problems in finance at the macroeconomic level that I have talked about more than once. The best reason to fix unfairness—or even perceived unfairness—in market microstructure is so people aren’t distracted from noticing how those in the financial industry use low levels of equity financing (often misleadingly called capital) to shift risks onto the backs of taxpayers and rewards into their own pockets. In quantum mechanics, electrons can “tunnel” from one side of a barrier to another. Using massive borrowing to ensure later government bailouts, the financial industry has perfected an even more amazing form of tunneling: the art of tunneling money from the government so that the profits appear on their balance sheets and in their pockets long before the money disappears from the US Treasury in bailouts. By comparison with this financial quantum tunneling of money from the US taxpayer that has been a mainstay of the financial industry, high-frequency trading profits of a few billion dollars a year are small change.

Quartz #29—>The Complete Guide to Getting into an Economics PhD Program

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Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 29th Quartz column, ”The Complete Guide to Getting into an Economics PhD Program.” I am glad to now bring it home to supplysideliberal.com, and I expect Noah to post it on his blog Noahpinion, as well.  It was first published on August 16, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

Up to this point, this is by far my most popular Quartz column. In addition to great interest in the topic, I attribute the popularity of this column to Noah’s magic touch. Personally, I would rather read Noah’s blog than any other blog in cyberspace. That brilliant style shows through here; I think I managed not to spoil things too much in this column.   

This column generated many reactions, two of which you can see as guest posts on supplysideliberal.com: 

Jeff Smith is my colleague at the University of Michigan. He amplifies many of the things we say.  For a complete guide, be sure to see what Jeff has to say, too. What Bruce Bartlett had to say is worth reading simply because of his interesting career path.  

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© August 16, 2013: Miles Kimball and Noah Smith, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2014. All rights reserved.

Noah has agreed to give permission on the same terms as I do. 


Back in May, Noah wrote about the amazingly good deal that is the PhD in economics. Why? Because:

  1. You get a job.
  2. You get autonomy.
  3. You get intellectual fulfillment.
  4. The risk is low.
  5. Unlike an MBA, law, or medical degree, you don’t have to worry about paying the sticker price for an econ PhD:  After the first year, most schools will give you teaching assistant positions that will pay for the next several years of graduate study, and some schools will take care of your tuition and expenses even in the first year. (See what is written at the end of this post, after the column proper, for more about costs of graduate study and how econ PhD’s future earnings makes it worthwhile, even if you can’t get a full ride.)

Of course, such a good deal won’t last long now that the story is out, so you need to act fast! Since he wrote his post, Noah has received a large number of emails asking the obvious follow-up question: “How do I get into an econ PhD program?” And Miles has been asked the same thing many times by undergraduates and other students at the University of Michigan. So here, we present together our guide for how to break into the academic Elysium called Econ PhD Land:

(Note: This guide is mainly directed toward native English speakers, or those from countries whose graduate students are typically fluent in English, such as India and most European countries. Almost all highly-ranked graduate programs teach economics in English, and we find that students learn the subtle non-mathematical skills in economics better if English is second nature. If your nationality will make admissions committees wonder about your English skills, you can either get your bachelor’s degree at a—possibly foreign—college or university where almost all classes are taught in English, or you will have to compensate by being better on other dimensions. On the bright side, if you are a native English speaker, or from a country whose graduate students are typically fluent in English, you are already ahead in your quest to get into an economics PhD.)

Here is the not-very-surprising list of things that will help you get into a good econ PhD program:

  • good grades, especially in whatever math and economics classes you take,
  • a good score on the math GRE,
  • some math classes and a statistics class on your transcript,
  • research experience, and definitely at least one letter of recommendation from a researcher,
  • a demonstrable interest in the field of economics.

Chances are, if you’re asking for advice, you probably feel unprepared in one of two ways. Either you don’t have a sterling math background, or you have quantitative skills but are new to the field of econ. Fortunately, we have advice for both types of applicant.

If you’re weak in math…

Fortunately, if you’re weak in math, we have good news: Math is something you can learn. That may sound like a crazy claim to most Americans, who are raised to believe that math ability is in the genes. It may even sound like arrogance coming from two people who have never had to struggle with math. But we’ve both taught people math for many years, and we really believe that it’s true. Genes help a bit, but math is like a foreign language or a sport: effort will result in skill.

Here are the math classes you absolutely should take to get into a good econ program:

  • Linear algebra
  • Multivariable calculus
  • Statistics

Here are the classes you should take, but can probably get away with studying on your own:

  • Ordinary differential equations
  • Real analysis

Linear algebra (matrices, vectors, and all that) is something that you’ll use all the time in econ, especially when doing work on a computer. Multivariable calculus also will be used a lot. And stats of course is absolutely key to almost everything economists do. Differential equations are something you will use once in a while. And real analysis—by far the hardest subject of the five—is something that you will probably never use in real econ research, but which the economics field has decided to use as a sort of general intelligence signaling device.

If you took some math classes but didn’t do very well, don’t worry. Retake the classes. If you are worried about how that will look on your transcript, take the class the first time “off the books” at a different college (many community colleges have calculus classes) or online. Or if you have already gotten a bad grade, take it a second time off the books and then a third time for your transcript. If you work hard, every time you take the class you’ll do better. You will learn the math and be able to prove it by the grade you get. Not only will this help you get into an econ PhD program, once you get in, you’ll breeze through parts of grad school that would otherwise be agony.

Here’s another useful tip: Get a book and study math on your own before taking the corresponding class for a grade. Reading math on your own is something you’re going to have to get used to doing in grad school anyway (especially during your dissertation!), so it’s good to get used to it now. Beyond course-related books, you can either pick up a subject-specific book (Miles learned much of his math from studying books in the Schaum’s outline series), or get a “math for economists” book; regarding the latter, Miles recommends Mathematics for Economists by Simon and Blume, while Noah swears by Mathematical Methods and Models for Economists by de la Fuente. When you study on your own, the most important thing is to work through a bunch of problems. That will give you practice for test-taking, and will be more interesting than just reading through derivations.

This will take some time, of course. That’s OK. That’s what summer is for (right?). If you’re late in your college career, you can always take a fifth year, do a gap year, etc.

When you get to grad school, you will have to take an intensive math course called “math camp” that will take up a good part of your summer. For how to get through math camp itself, see this guide by Jérémie Cohen-Setton.

One more piece of advice for the math-challenged: Be a research assistant on something non-mathy. There are lots of economists doing relatively simple empirical work that requires only some basic statistics knowledge and the ability to use software like Stata. There are more and more experimental economists around, who are always looking for research assistants. Go find a prof and get involved! (If you are still in high school or otherwise haven’t yet chosen a college, you might want to choose one where some of the professors do experiments and so need research assistants—something that is easy to figure out by studying professors’ websites carefully, or by asking about it when you visit the college.)

If you’re new to econ…

If you’re a disillusioned physicist, a bored biostatistician, or a neuroscientist looking to escape that evilPrincipal Investigator, don’t worry: An econ background is not necessary. A lot of the best economists started out in other fields, while a lot of undergrad econ majors are headed for MBAs or jobs in banks. Econ PhD programs know this. They will probably not mind if you have never taken an econ class.

That said, you may still want to take an econ class, just to verify that you actually like the subject, to start thinking about econ, and to prepare yourself for the concepts you’ll encounter. If you feel like doing this, you can probably skip Econ 101 and 102, and head straight for an Intermediate Micro or Intermediate Macro class.

Another good thing is to read through an econ textbook. Although economics at the PhD level is mostly about the math and statistics and computer modeling (hopefully getting back to the real world somewhere along the way when you do your own research), you may also want to get the flavor of the less mathy parts of economics from one of the well-written lower-level textbooks (either one by Paul Krugman and Robin WellsGreg Mankiw, or Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok) and maybe one at a bit higher level as well, such as David Weil’s excellent book on economic growth) or Varian’s Intermediate Microeconomics.

Remember to take a statistics class, if you haven’t already. Some technical fields don’t require statistics, so you may have missed this one. But to econ PhD programs, this will be a gaping hole in your resume. Go take stats!

One more thing you can do is research with an economist. Fortunately, economists are generally extremely welcoming to undergrad RAs from outside econ, who often bring extra skills. You’ll get great experience working with data if you don’t have it already. It’ll help you come up with some research ideas to put in your application essays. And of course you’ll get another all-important letter of recommendation.

And now for…

General tips for everyone

Here is the most important tip for everyone: Don’t just apply to “top” schools. For some degrees—an MBA for example—people question whether it’s worthwhile to go to a non-top school. But for econ departments, there’s no question. Both Miles and Noah have marveled at the number of smart people working at non-top schools. That includes some well-known bloggers, by the way—Tyler Cowen teaches at George Mason University (ranked 64th), Mark Thoma teaches at the University of Oregon (ranked 56th), and Scott Sumner teaches at Bentley, for example. Additionally, a flood of new international students is expanding the supply of quality students. That means that the number of high-quality schools is increasing; tomorrow’s top 20 will be like today’s top 10, and tomorrow’s top 100 will be like today’s top 50.

Apply to schools outside of the top 20—any school in the top 100 is worth considering, especially if it is strong in areas you are interested in. If your classmates aren’t as elite as you would like, that just means that you will get more attention from the professors, who almost all came out of top programs themselves. When Noah said in his earlier post that econ PhD students are virtually guaranteed to get jobs in an econ-related field, that applied to schools far down in the ranking. Everyone participates in the legendary centrally managed econ job market. Very few people ever fall through the cracks.

Next—and this should go without saying—don’t be afraid to retake the GRE. If you want to get into a top 10 school, you probably need a perfect or near-perfect score on the math portion of the GRE. For schools lower down the rankings, a good GRE math score is still important. Fortunately, the GRE math section is relatively simple to study for—there are only a finite number of topics covered, and with a little work you can “overlearn” all of them, so you can do them even under time pressure and when you are nervous. In any case, you can keep retaking the test until you get a good score (especially if the early tries are practice tests from the GRE prep books and prep software), and then you’re OK!

Here’s one thing that may surprise you: Getting an econ master’s degree alone won’t help. Although master’s degrees in economics are common among international students who apply to econ PhD programs, American applicants do just fine without a master’s degree on their record. If you want that extra diploma, realize that once you are in a PhD program, you will get a master’s degree automatically after two years. And if you end up dropping out of the PhD program, that master’s degree will be worth more than a stand-alone master’s would. The one reason to get a master’s degree is if it can help you remedy a big deficiency in your record, say not having taken enough math or stats classes, not having taken any econ classes, or not having been able to get anyone whose name admissions committees would recognize to write you a letter of recommendation.

For getting into grad school, much more valuable than a master’s is a stint as a research assistant in the Federal Reserve System or at a think tank—though these days, such positions can often be as hard to get into as a PhD program!

Finally—and if you’re reading this, chances are you’re already doing this—read some econ blogs. (See Miles’s speculations about the future of the econ blogosphere here.) Econ blogs are no substitute for econ classes, but they’re a great complement. Blogs are good for picking up the lingo of academic economists, and learning to think like an economist. Don’t be afraid to write a blog either, even if no one ever reads it (you don’t have to be writing at the same level as Evan Soltas orYichuan Wang);  you can still put it on your CV, or just practice writing down your thoughts. And when you write your dissertation, and do research later on in your career, you are going to have to think for yourself outside the context of a class. One way to practice thinking critically is by critiquing others’ blog posts, at least in your head.

Anyway, if you want to have intellectual stimulation and good work-life balance, and a near-guarantee of a well-paying job in your field of interest, an econ PhD could be just the thing for you. Don’t be scared of the math and the jargon. We’d love to have you.


In case you are curious, let me say a little about the financial costs and benefits of an economics PhD.  At Michigan and other top places, PhD students are fully funded. Here, that means that the first year’s tuition and costs are covered (including a stipend for your living expenses). In years 2 through 5 (which is enough time to finish your PhD if you work hard to stay on track), as long as you are in good standing in the program, the costs of a PhD are just the work you do as a teaching assistant. So there are no out-of-pocket costs as long as you finish within five years, which is tough but doable if you work hard to stay on track. Tuition is relatively low in year 6 (and 7) if you can’t finish in 5 years. Plus, graduate students in economics who have had that much teaching experience often find they can make about as much money by tutoring struggling undergraduates as they could have by being a teaching assistant.

When a school can’t manage full funding, the first place it adds a charge is in charging the bottom-half of the applicant pool for the first year, when a student can’t realistically teach because the courses the grad students are taking are too heavy. That might add up to a one-time expense of $40,000 or so in tuition, plus living expenses.

On pay, the market price for a brand-new assistant professor at a top department seems to be at least $115,000 for 9 months, with the opportunity to earn more during the summer months. If you don’t quite make it to that level, University of Michigan PhD’s I have asked seem to get at least $80,000 starting salary, and Louis Johnston tweets that below-top liberal arts colleges pay a starting salary in the $55,000 to $60,000 range. But remember that all of these numbers are for 9-month salaries that allow for the possibility (though not the regularity) of earning more in the summer. Government jobs tend to pay 12-month salaries that are about 12/9 of 9-month academic salaries at a comparable level.

There is definitely the possibility of being paid very well in academic economics, though not as well as the upside potential if you go to Wall Street. For example, with summer pay included, quite a few of the full economics professors at the University of Michigan make more than $250,000 a year. (Because we are at a state university, our salaries are public.)

The bottom line is that the financial returns are good enough that you should have no hesitation begging or borrowing to finance your Economics PhD. (Please don’t steal to finance it.)

What about the costs of the extra year it might take to study math the way we recommend? If you have been developing self-discipline like a champion, but are short on money and summers aren’t enough, you could spend a gap year right after high school just studying math, living in your parents’ house at very low cost; most colleges will let you defer admission for a year after they have let you in.    

Update: 

I liked this comment that Kevin C. Smith (an MD) sent to Quartz:

Great advice!
I almost flunked Grade 8 because my math was so bad [back in the day they would flunk you for that, at least in Alberta.]
I wound up heading for medicine. A friend who was a few years ahead of me warned: “You’ll never make it if you are not good at math!”
I hired a math tutor in August [before University started], and did every question at the end of every chapter in every one of my text books. I could call my tutor when I got stuck [God bless her, wherever she is in the world today!] Math got to be fun after a while [like being really good at solving puzzles.]
You might add to you list of suggestions: hire a tutor do all the questions in all your textbooks
Long story short, I won the Gold Medal for Science, and have found that a really good grasp of math has helped my enjoyment of the world and of my work a lot.

Quartz #28—>Benjamin Franklin's Strategy to Make the US a Superpower Worked Once, Why Not Try It Again?

Link to the Column on Quartz

Here is the full text of my 28th Quartz column, ”Benjamin Franklin’s strategy to make the US a superpower worked once, why not try it again?” now brought home to supplysideliberal.com. It was first published on August 12, 2013. Links to all my other columns can be found here.

If you want to mirror the content of this post on another site, that is possible for a limited time if you read the legal notice at this link and include both a link to the original Quartz column and the following copyright notice:

© August 12, 2013: Miles Kimball, as first published on Quartz. Used by permission according to a temporary nonexclusive license expiring June 30, 2014. All rights reserved.


Ben Franklin was one of the greatest grand strategists in American history. He “had the vision of the Great Power of the New World” as refugees from the Old World poured in, writes Conrad Black in his page-turning, tour-de-force Flight of the Eagle: The Grand Strategies That Brought America from Colonial Dependence to World Leadership. Franklin then followed up that vision with brilliant diplomacy and sponsoring, along with George Washington, the constitutional efforts of Madison, Hamilton and Jay. 

The flow of immigrants to America was crucial not only in the initial rise of America as a credible power in the world, but also in dealing with the stain of slavery: the North would have been unable to defeat the South in the Civil War if the North had not had a three to one advantage in population because of its greater ability to attract immigrants.

Ratio of Per Capita GDP: China/US

In the rest of the 21st century, America faces another grand-strategic challenge: the challenge of China. Since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms were introduced in December of 1978, China’s economy has been growing at a ferocious pace. As former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers put it, at Chinese growth rates, “In a decade, an individual goes from walking to having a bicycle; in another decade to a motorcycle; in another decade or two to having an automobile.” Yichuan Wang explains in “How China’s poorest regions are going to save its growth rate,” the reason the Chinese economy can grow so fast is that it is in the midst of “catch-up growth”: that is, it can copy technologies that have already been researched and developed in other countries. As shown in the graph above, China went from a per capita GDP (income per person) less than 1/50 of the US level to a per capita GDP of roughly 1/6 the US level in the 30 years from 1980 to 2010. It will not be easy for China to get all the way to the US level of income per person, but with half-decent economic policies, it should have no problem getting to half the US level of income per person.

The reason China’s economic rise matters for US grand strategy is that China has a much larger population than the United States. Indeed, as the graph below shows, the US now has less than a quarter the population China has (the extreme measures China has taken to hold down its population growth since 1979 through its one-child policy have stabilized the ratio of US to Chinese population in recent years). Multiplying per capita GDP by population yields total GDP, so if China has ¼ the per capita GDP, but four times as many people, its total GDP will be the same size. More generally, if China gets to a larger fraction of US per capita GDP (see graph above) than the US population as a fraction of China’s population (see graph below), then China’s total GDP will be bigger. Although per capita GDP is what matters for people’s standard of living, total GDP is crucial for the ability of a country to wage war—or more importantly, to deter other countries from waging war against it. Power corrupts. So even though idealism has had some effect on US foreign policy (as Black details), it should surprise no one that the US has done some bad things as a superpower. Yet I am convinced that the combination of Chinese nationalism and “Communist” oligarchy—or the combination of Chinese nationalism with some tumultuous future political transition in China—would lead a dominant China to behave much worse than the US has.

Data source: Populstat and Census

Data source: Populstat and Census

What can be done to maintain US power relative to China? The worst answer would be to try to inhibit China’s economic growth. Berkeley economics professor and influential blogger Brad DeLong’s rhetorical question says it best:

Does it really improve the national security of the United States for schoolchildren in China to be taught that the United States sought to keep them as poor as possible for as long as possible?

An excellent answer is to do everything possible to foster long-run growth of per capita GDP in the US. At a minimum, this includes radical reform of our system of K-12 education, removing the barriers state governments put in the way of people getting jobs, and dramatically stepped-up support for scientific research. And it includes reform of both the US tax system and the balance in its government spending between (a) mailing people checks in direct government transfers and (b) investments in raising the productive capacity of the economy by, say, keeping roads and bridges in good repair. But when all is said and done, economic growth at the frontier of high living standards is simply harder than catch-up economic growth. So, short of some disaster for China that we should not wish on them, the ratio of China’s per capita GDP to US per capita GDP is bound to go up.

Fortunately, to add to the pro-growth policies listed above, there is another way to increase the size of the US economy that would be remarkably easy: expanding the United States economy—with all of its power to make people richer than they are in most other countries—to encompass a larger share of the world’s people. In the 19th century, many Americans felt a “manifest destiny” to expand the land that the US encompassed—westward, all the way to the Pacific. But in a modern economy, it is human beings and their skills (and the factories and machines their saving makes possible) that are the key to national wealth, not land.

So in the 21st century, we should view claiming more of the world’s people—not more of the world’s land—as the key to national wealth, and therefore, national power. And all we have to do to claim more of the world’s people for the US, is to open our doors to immigration, as the US did in the 18th and most of the 19th century. Ben Franklin knew that America would become a great nation because people from all over the world would eagerly move to America. The key to maintaining America’s preeminence in the world is to return to Ben Franklin’s visionary grand strategy of making many more of the world’s people into Americans.

Before the American Revolution, Franklin said that America “will in another century be more than the people of England, and the greatest number of Englishmen will be on this side of the water.” With a quarter-millennium of additional experience beyond what Franklin had seen, we know that America’s melting pot can make people from anywhere in the world (not just England) into Americans at heart within two generations. And we know that, together with all the other elements of this unbelievable American system, Franklin’s grand strategy for the rise of America worked once. It can work again to keep America on top.


Update: Steve Sailer has an interesting post pointing out the importance of birth rates, as well as the immigration rates I emphasize in the column. In order to keep an open mind, before reading Steve Sailer’s post, I recommend reading my post “John Stuart Mill’s Argument Against Political Correctness.” In his post Steve also points out that Ben Franklin favored English immigration over German immigration. 

Ezra and Evan’s Flag. I was very pleased to see Ezra Klein and Evan Soltas flag the column, and intrigued by the way they boiled it down:

KIMBALL: The Ben Franklin strategy to a U.S. renaissance. “The reason China’s economic rise matters for US grand strategy is that China has a much larger population than the United States…An excellent answer is to do everything possible to foster long-run growth of per capita GDP in the US. At a minimum, this includes radical reform of our system of K-12 education, removing the barriers state governments put in the way of people getting jobs, and dramatically stepped-up support for scientific research…The key to maintaining America’s preeminence in the world is to return to Ben Franklin’s visionary grand strategy of making many more of the world’s people into Americans.” Miles Kimball in Quartz.