My Corner of the Blogosphere: As of July 1, 2012

I find it interesting to see how the blogosphere is interconnected. Not counting RSS feed subscribers, there were 14,956 total visits to my blog between when I first had Google Analytics set up on June 3 and June 30th. Of those 9,174 were referrals from a link on some other site. I have listed the top 30 sources of referrals. I also listed the 65th, since like the 17th, it illustrates that some blogs are so big that even a comment on them can be a noticeable source of referrals. In the caption for “Mark Thoma on Rainy Day Funds for States” I wrote that Mark’s Economist’s View blog is the center of the economics blogosphere. It is indeed the largest source of referrals to my blog, followed by Greg Mankiw, Google, Twitter, and Noah Smith.

Number of Visits from Each Referral Source

1. Mark Thoma: 1558

2. Greg Mankiw (US): 1213

3. Google: 850

4. Twitter: 844

5. Noah Smith (US):  803

6. Mike Konczal (Rortybomb at nextnewdeal):   313

7. Ezra Klein (washington post): 300

8. Tyler Cowen (Marginal Revolution): 233

9. Facebook: 212

10. Scott Sumner (The Money Illusion): 202

11. Stephen Williamson: 143

12. Brad DeLong: 119

13. Karl Smith and Adam Ozimek (Modeled Behavior): 92

14. Clive Crook (theatlantic.com): 83

15. David Andolfatto: 75

16. Noah Smith (UK):  75

17. Comment on a Matthew Yglesias slate.com article: 68

Adam: Yup. Miles Kimball has an excellent post on this topic too: http://blog.supplysideliberal.com/post/25423469963…

18. Greg Mankiw (Germany): 62

19. Evilsax (DiaryofaRepublicanHater): 57

20. Real Clear Policy: 57

21. Stephen Williamson (Spain):  56

22. Greg Mankiw (UK): 52

23. Tumblr: 50

24. Greg Mankiw (Australia): 43

25. Greg Mankiw (India): 41

26. Stephen Williamson (Germany): 39

27. Greg Mankiw (Italy): 38

28. Greg Mankiw (Canada): 37

29. Noah Smith (Germany):  37

30. Noah Smith (Canada): 35

65. Comment on Mark Shea (patheos.com): 14

So, I as a “progressive” and a Catholic have always had a lot of suspicion of free-market Economics, be it Austrian or Chicago school. My first Economics class came as a sophomore in college after some snobby Republican sniffed at me “You just don’t understand Economics.” My plan was to make sure no-one could tell me that with a straight face again. So I took an Economics class with an extreme libertarian professor (who currently writes at this blog:

http://www.thebigquestions.com/blog/.

I couldn’t help it, I liked him (still do). He would indulge me after class in long conversations about trade, taxation, redistribution, utility theory, etc. I also discovered that I really liked Economics. One Economics class became two, two became a double major, and a double major in Math and Economics became a three year stint in a PhD program in another “conservative” Economics department. Now I would call myself a “supply-side liberal.”

http://blog.supplysideliberal.com/post/23959666073/what-is-a-supply-side-liberal

I still believe strongly that our society has a basic responsibility to minister to the poor, provide health care for the sick, educate the young (all of them!), and so on. However, I now believe (and the evidence for this appears overwhelming) that taxation and regulation have real manifest costs to economic growth, which is necessary for social welfare for rich and poor alike. I think it’s irresponsible to consider a policy without considering those costs.

I am also quite irritated with the self-entitled attitude so many wealthy people appear to have. Accusations of “class war” from the wealthy to the poor are absurd. The wealthy in this country have it great. They will continue to have it great no matter who runs our government. Their concerns have no relevance to me, it’s how our policies impact their actions that I consider relevant. As one more link (and beware of profanity), I think this video sums up their point of view quite well.

The physical geography of visitors to supplysideliberal.com is also interesting. It shows how international the blogosphere is. Here is the breakdown of visits by city:

  1. New York: 936
  2. Ann Arbor: 667
  3. Washington: 650
  4. London: 313
  5. Chicago: 293
  6. Toronto: 154
  7. Seattle: 149
  8. Los Angeles: 142
  9. San Francisco: 142
  10. Boston: 134
  11. Sydney: 118
  12. Houston: 114
  13. Cambridge: 111
  14. Borlange, Sweden: 101
  15. Philadelphia: 100
  16. Minneapolis: 98
  17. Singapore: 94
  18. Arlington: 93
  19. Bonn: 92
  20. Columbia, MD: 92
  21. Tucson: 91
  22. Montreal: 90
  23. Berlin: 89
  24. Austin: 87
  25. Miami: 83
  26. Paris: 75
  27. Melbourne: 74
  28. San Diego: 71
  29. Atlanta: 71
  30. Canberra: 67
  31. Nei-Hu (near Taipei): 63
  32. Ottawa: 60
  33. Berkeley: 59
  34. Dunn Loring: 58
  35. Brisbane: 57
  36. Oakland: 55
  37. Buenos Aires: 54
  38. Goteborg: 54
  39. Portland: 53
  40. Bethesda: 52
  41. Jakarta: 51
  42. Barcelona: 49
  43. Hong Kong: 49
  44. Vienna: 45
  45. Copenhagen: 45
  46. Madrid: 43
  47. Amsterdam: 43
  48. Munich: 42
  49. Staten Island: 42
  50. Dallas: 42

An Upgraded Sidebar for supplysideliberal.com

My daughter Diana Kimball and I have upgraded the sidebar. Those of you who read supplysideliberal.com on an RSS feed might want to go to supplysideliberal.com’s actual website once to see what is available on the sidebar.  Here are some changes:

  1. We put the “Archive” link near the top, since I use it a lot to get the links needed to reference earlier posts. The “Archive” link is also the only easy way to get links for old link posts whose title leads to a reference rather than my post itself.  (I have vowed to avoid link posts from now on.)
  2. I added a link to “A More Personal Bio: My Early Tweets.” This includes some very early tweets about my personal objective function as well as about some early family background and background relevant to my blogging. You can also see a few pictures of my hobby of using Magnetix to do three-dimensional geometry.  
  3. There is a link to the June 2012 Table of Contents, a post that also includes a retrospective of my blog’s first month.
  4. As an experiment, I have enabled Tumblr’s “Ask me anything” button. The rules are that you can ask me anything, but I will choose whether or not to answer. (For example, I am not going to answer tumblrbot’s question about “my favorite inanimate object” since that is too extraneous to the purposes of this blog.) I especially welcome questions about real world economic issues that might get me thinking of possible future posts.

The Euro and the Mediterano

Before the Eurozone was formed, many economists warned that it would cause problems because it is impossible to have one monetary policy that is right for all the economies of a diverse set of countries. And having one currency means having one monetary policy. But the symbolism of a common currency for the project of binding Europe together politically seemed too valuable to give up. So the varied countries in the Eurozone (the blue countries in the map below), have had a one-size-fits-all monetary policy–eleven of them since January 1, 1999, and others since they joined the Eurozone later on. (The last to join was Estonia, in January 1, 2011.)

blog.supplysideliberal.com tumblr_m6ffb1FpqA1r57lmx.png

Now, in 2012, countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece could use more expansionary monetary policy than what is right for Germany and some other countries in the North of the Eurozone. Getting back an independent monetary policy requires getting back one’s own currency and so requires exiting the Eurozone. But it is hard to exit the Eurozone in an orderly way–and exiting in a disorderly way risks causing another financial crisis. The aim of this post is to propose an orderly way to restore some degree of monetary policy independence to the different parts of the Eurozone. It might roil financial markets too, so I am not necessarily advocating it, but I see it is preferable to any country simply exiting the Eurozone.

So my objective here is to design a minimum-distance modification to the Eurozone that adds some ability to adjust monetary policy independently for different parts of the Eurozone. The basic idea is “one central bank, two currencies.” In this plan, the Eurozone remains together and the European Central Bank (ECB) continues to determine monetary policy for the entire Eurozone. But the ECB now decides monetary policy for both a “North Euro” and a “South Euro.” The North Euro and the South Euro start out with an exchange rate of 1 to 1, but ultimately are allowed to drift apart in value.

One could easily go further by having one central bank for the North Euro and another central bank for the South Euro, but the policy of “one central bank, two currencies” would help assure the markets that the monetary policy of the South Euro wouldn’t go wild. In the ECB, there could be an informal understanding that the views of those from the relevant countries had a greater weight in setting the monetary policy for those countries, but the official voting rules would be as now: votes from the entire Governing Council of the ECB would apply to both the monetary policy for the North Euro and the monetary policy for the South Euro. In this context, we are in the realm of the second, third or fourth best.  One can’t expect a perfect setup given the original economic sin (which might have been an original political virtue) of setting up the Eurozone as it is in the first place.

The official names of “North Euro” and “South Euro” are helpful to make clear that legally they are both “Euros” (which, of course, doesn’t really solve the legal mess that dividing currencies creates). But I am imagining that the press and the public would soon use a different naming convention: that the “North Euro” would end up being called just the “Euro” by almost everyone, while the “South Euro” would end up being called the “Mediterano.”

Future Heroes of Humanity and Heroes of Japan

Noah Smith has a new post, “‘Science’ Without Falsification is No Science,” that questions whether macroeconomics is an empirical science based on solid data. Noah’s post is attracting attention. For example, Mark Thoma comments on it in his own post “'Science’ Without Falsification.

Noah points out that macroeconomists have been arguing over the same things for a long time with no resolution; only decisive central bank actions have provided "experimental” evidence strong enough to convince most macroeconomists of something they didn’t already believe. Just so, massive balance sheet monetary policy on the part of the Bank of Japan could put to rest the idea that balance sheet monetary policy doesn’t work. The Bank of Japan has amazing legal authority to print money and buy a wide range of assets, and has the rest of the government actually pushing for easier monetary policy. So they could do it. They just need to buy assets chosen to have nominal interest rates as far as possible above zero in quantities something like 30% or more of annual Japanese GDP. Japan needs monetary expansion, particularly if it is going to raise its consumption tax, and would be doing the world a huge service by settling the scientific question of whether Wallace neutrality applies to the real world.

I spent two weeks at the Bank of Japan in each of May 2008 and May 2009 precisely because I think there is no central bank in the world that could do more to help the world economy as a whole, as well as Japan’s, by improving its monetary policy. I know that some on the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy committee do not think that printing money and buying massive quantities of assets will work. But the value of experimentation in economic policy is vastly underrated: trying a policy of “print money and buy assets” on a massive scale such as 30% or more of the value of annual GDP is the way to find out. And there is no country in the world for which the possible side effect of permanently higher inflation would be more harmless.  The Bank of Japan has officially set an inflation target at 1%, which is 1% higher than where Japan is at, and there would be nothing terrible about having a 2% inflation target, like the inflation targets for the Fed and the European Central Bank. So the Bank of Japan should do it. If the Bank of Japan shifts to such a decisive policy, those pushing for this approach on its monetary policy committee will ultimately go down in history as heroes of humanity as well as heroes of Japan. That statement is written with every ounce of seriousness and passion I am capable of. 

Health Economics

I am slow to post about health care because I don’t know the answers. But then I don’t think anyone knows the answers. There are many excellent ideas for trying to improve health care, but we just don’t know how different changes will work in practice at the level of entire health care systems.

Much of the political heat over health care reform has to do with the perception on both sides that the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) is a move in the direction of redistribution. As a mode of redistribution it has many of the same issues as other modes of redistribution.  Redistribution is good, but when financed on a massive scale by the government, it can also be a budget buster. The extent to which this budget-busting aspect of a large amount of additional redistribution can be muted by extra efficiencies wrung out of the health care system is simply unknown.

An aspect of our public policy even before the affordable care act has been favoring health care expenditures relative to other forms of consumption.  In particular, people have long been able to pay for health insurance–but not most other forms of consumption–with pre-tax dollars. I think this can be justified by the fact that most of us are seriously bothered by thinking of others suffering without adequate medical care much more than we are bothered by thinking of others not being able to take family trips or having a small house or car. So it is worth something to us if others tilt their spending toward health care more than they would without any push toward health care spending in the tax system. As an example of a less subjective externality from health care, I think people’s psychological problems often cause them to act in ways harmful to their friends, extended families and coworkers, so I think it is appropriate for policy to tilt people’s spending toward any form of psychological care that can be shown to be effective at improving how people treat others around them along with whatever other effects it has. (Tilting should not be allowed to totally suppress price signals that indicate that some forms of psychological care require many more resources to provide than others.)

This principle of subsidizing what benefits others besides the one choosing how much health care to use is helpful in showing what forms of health care should not be favored. For example, plastic surgery for people who already look OK has at best mixed effects on how others feel. Am I misremembering the former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi wanting to subsidize plastic surgery for the benefit of his own viewing pleasure? But those who are in social competition may feel worse off, and I think this externality is stronger than the Berlusconi externality. So, depending on the strength of different externalities, it may make sense for public policy to discourage plastic surgery for people who already look OK rather than encourage it. The ethical status of envy of others’ plastic-surgery enhanced looks–let alone the Berlusconi externality–is not an easy question, but at least one can say that the argument for using policy to tilt people towards spending on plastic surgery is muddy at best, and the default should be no tilt.

On wringing efficiencies out of the health care system so that we can hope to afford the large amount of additional redistribution in the Affordable Care Act, to me it seems crucial to have a great deal of experimentation rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. On the constitutional question of what the Federal Government can do and what States should be left to decide, Greg Mankiw refers to a previous Mankiw post saying that from an economic point of view taxes, subsidies and fines can all be equivalent. The 16th amendment to the constitution gives the Federal Government breathtaking power:

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

But what the Federal Government can do in relation to the States is not the same as what is should do.  Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, in a dissenting opinion in 1932 said: 

It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.

This has come to be known as the “laboratories of democracy” principle, which I have always found very attractive. In the case of the Affordable Care Act, I believe that whether we are ultimately able to wring efficiencies out of the health care system depends on how much state-level experimentation is allowed. And that in turn is largely a matter of how the next President (whoever that turns out to be) interprets the Affordable Care Act. So even though I think it unlikely that the Affordable Care Act can be repealed, given the difficult designed in by our founders of getting any new legislation through Congress, it matters whether a President is elected who will give many waivers to states to try different experiments with health care. I hope that journalists–and others who get the chance to ask questions of the two major candidates–press them on this question of how freely they would give waivers for states to try various experiments if, as is most likely, the Affordable Care Act is not repealed.    

There is an obvious role for the economics profession in such state-level experimentation on how to deliver health-care. The government needs to ensure that there is adequate data collection in relation to these various experiments, and economists need to analyze that data. More generally, with health care spending at 17.4% of US GDP and rising, we need more economists working on health care issues than ever. In addition to current health economists redoubling their efforts, it is high time for economics departments around the country to give more prominence to health economics in graduate training than they have, so that there will be more health economists in the future. And I hope that where they reasonably can, empirical economists (and theorists) who do not now think of themselves as health economists tilt their research agendas toward figuring out health care. I stand by my statement that no one knows the answers for health care. But I hope someday that will no longer be true.  

Thoughts on Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Wake of the Great Recession: supplysideliberal.com's First Month


This post will serve as the Table of Contents for the first month of supplysideliberal.com.  But it is more than that. It is a chance to reflect on questions such as

Where have I been coming from in the posts so far?

Why am I here writing a blog?

Where am I going from here?

Only the most important reflections come before the Table of Contents proper. Lesser musings come after the Table of Contents.  

The most important thing to say about where I have been coming from is that all the posts are meant to last. I try to make each major post and most minor posts count as parts of overarching arguments that  extend over many posts. And I hope that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, so that anyone who reads the entire thread of posts in a given topic area will learn something they wouldn’t have learned from reading each post in isolation.

I think of blogging as an art form that I am undertaking seriously as a beginning novice.  My lodestone for literary structure here is my favorite television series Babylon 5.  In Babylon 5, the first season seems episodic, but in fact each episode lays part of the foundation for the narrative arc that picks up in earnest with the second season.  Some of the charm of a blog is in its unexpected turns as a blogger interacts with others online.  I want to have that and an overall progression.  

As to my motivations for beginning a blog, there are many personal motivations that I will talk about in due course. But I know that the one thing that has given me some sense of urgency to start now rather than wait until later is seeing the world economy flounder in the wake of the Great Recession. It is galling to see the world suffering below the world’s natural level of output when, in my contrarian view, getting sufficient aggregate demand is fundamentally an easy problem compared to the long-run challenge of balancing concerns about tax distortions against the value of redistribution and other government spending.

On where I am going from here in this blog, let me say that I have the titles of many potential posts kicking around in my head, each potential post struggling for primacy so it can be the next one written. They can’t all win at any given moment, and I don’t think I can maintain the pace I have kept so far, let alone increase that pace. And responding to other things currently going on in the blogosophere and in the news takes a certain degree of precedence. But there is a lot coming. 

The Table of Contents below is organized by topic area. Monetary Policy comes first because responding to other bloggers and to events has led to the most posts in that area. Monetary policy is one way I believe we have plenty of tools to get sufficient aggregate demand. The other way to get sufficient aggregate demand is through Short-Run Fiscal Policy. But in everything I say about short-run fiscal policy, I worry a lot about the effects on the national debt and work to find novel ways to minimize those effects.  The third topic area heading is Long-Run Fiscal Policy–the issues that motivate the title of my blog.

The last substantive heading is Long Run Economic Growth. I am not a growth theorist or a growth empiricist, and so am not qualified to say as much as I would like to be able to say about Long Run Economic Growth. But Long Run Economic Growth is arguably the most important subject in all of Economics. I have often thought that if I had started graduate school just a few years later, I would have focused on studying economic growth in my career, as my fellow Greg Mankiw advisee David Weil has to such good effect.  

Under the last two headings in the Table of Contents, I organize posts on Blog Mechanics and Columnists, Guest Posts and Miscellaneous Reviews. (I put many reviews under the relevant substantive heading because they help to understand the thread of the argument.) I will talk more about these aspects of the blog and about blog statistics after the Table of Contents.  

TABLE OF CONTENTS: FIRST MONTH

Monetary Policy

Balance Sheet Monetary Policy: A Primer

Stephen Williamson: “Quantitative Easing: The Conventional View”

Trillions and Trillions: Getting Used to Balance Sheet Monetary Policy

Karl Smith of Forbes: “Miles Kimball on QE”

Scott Sumner: “‘What Should the Fed Do?’ is the Wrong Question”

Is Monetary Policy Thinking in Thrall to Wallace Neutrality?

A Proposal for the supplysideliberal Community’s First Public Service Project: a wikipedia Entry on “Wallace Neutrality”

Mike Konczal: What Constrains the Federal Reserve? An Interview with Joseph Gagnon

Going Negative: The Virtual Fed Funds Rate Target

The supplysideliberal Review of the FOMC Monetary Policy Statement: June 20th, 2012

Justin Wolfers on the 6/20/2012 FOMC Statement

Should the Fed Promise to Do the Wrong Thing in the Future to Have the Right Effect Now?

Wallace Neutrality and Ricardian Neutrality

Future Heroes of Humanity and Heroes of Japan

The Euro and the Mediterano

Short-Run Fiscal Policy

Getting the Biggest Bang for the Buck in Fiscal Policy

Reihan Salam: “Miles Kimball of Federal Lines of Credit”

National Rainy Day Accounts

Leading States in the Fiscal Two-Step

Mark Thoma on Rainy Day Funds for States

Long-Run Fiscal Policy

What is a Supply-Side Liberal?

Can Taxes Raise GDP?

Clive Crook: Supply-Side Liberals

Why Taxes are Bad

A Supply-Side Liberal Joins the Pigou Club

“Henry George and the Carbon Tax”: A Quick Response to Noah Smith

Avoiding Fiscal Armageddon

Mark Thoma: Laughing at the Laffer Curve

Health Economics

Long-Run Economic Growth

Leveling Up: Making the Transition from Poor Country to Rich Country

Mark Thoma: Kenya’s Kibera Slum

Blog Mechanics

Miles’s Tweets

Miles’s Curriculum Vitae

Comments on supplysideliberal.com

Notice of Revocable Permission to Reproduce Content from this Blog with Appropriate Attribution to this Blog and Notice of Miles Spencer Kimball’s Copyright

@mileskimball on twitter

suppysideliberal.com on Facebook

Columnists, Guest Posts, and Miscellaneous Reviews

An Early-Bird Tweet from Justin Wolfers

Noah Smith: “Miles Kimball, the Supply-Side Liberal”

Gary Cornell on Andrew Wiles

Diana Kimball on the Beginnings of supplysideliberal.com

Gary Cornell on Intergenerational Mobility

supplysideliberal.com Takes on a Math Columnist: Gary Cornell on the Financial Crisis

Diana Kimball: Recording Skype Conversations on a Mac

Mike Sax: Review of (Some) Economics Blogs

Let me say a few words about blog mechanics, columnists, reviews and blog statistics.   The most important blog mechanics are indicated by links at the sidebar. But the posts under Blog Mechanics provide a little more detail. On all the blog mechanics, I owe a great debt to my daughter Diana Kimball

I have already said it in several posts, but let me say again that those who are not following my tweets are missing a lot. I have been having a lot of fun engaging with the news of the day and with other people’s tweets. And I routinely tweet announcements of new posts appearing on the blog itself.

Among the Miscellaneous Reviews, the one I recommend most highly is Noah Smith’s.  I owe a lot to Noah’s encouragement and help with this blog. I see this blog as part of the Noahpinion universe.  

On blog statistics, I will do a separate post a little later on traffic sources, which is interesting because it helps show the shape of my corner of the blogosphere.  My first post was on Memorial Day, May 28, 2012, exactly one month ago. I didn’t get Google Analytics set up until a few days later, so those statistics are from Sunday, June 3 on (and end at midnight last night). Google Analytics reports 20,386 total pageviews, 13,392 visits, and 7,411 unique visitors. I got some help “grep"ing to verify that the Google Analytics statistics do not include the now 593 subscribers receiving the posts on Google Reader unless they also click separately from Google Reader. Together with the 62 Tumblr subscribers, that adds up to 655 subscribers, plus some number of subscribers on Facebook that I can’t separate out from other Friends and however many subscribers I have on other platforms I don’t know about. Finally, I have 353 Twitter followers. The mismatch between that and the number of subscribers to the blog itself is why I have been making a point of recommending following my tweets.

To me, this past month has been a heady time. The excitement of starting a new blog that has been so generously welcomed has caused me some of the most pleasant insomnia that I have ever experienced. One of the reasons I expect to slow my pace somewhat is that once that enthusiastic insomnia wears off, I will have less time to blog.   

Update: I added posts from the rest of June, 2012 to the Table of Contents above so that from now on monthly tables of contents can be based squarely on calendar months.  

Mike Sax: Review of (Some) Economics Blogs

It is always interesting to read reviews. Google Analytics helped me find Mike Sax’s very interesting review as a significant source of referrals. I thought I would share this with you. Let me give a disclaimer: the opinions about other blogs are Mike’s, not mine.  Consider my level of endorsement the same as if I had approved it as a comment. Also, the title of Mike’s blog, “Diary of a Republican Hater” does not apply to me. I like Republicans very much and I like Democrats very much. I hope that each side feels I agree with them on those views that they think can most clearly be defended by rational argument. Thanks to Mike for permission to reprint this review:

NGDPLT, ‘Wallace Neutrality" and Related Matters

I can now stand out of a limb and say that the start of Miles Kimbal’s Supply Side Liberal blog is a very positive development for all of us who want a better and deeper understanding of all matters Econ. Since the crisis one positive has been a veritable flowering of Econ blogs along the lines of what the French Salons were back in the 18th century for intellectual discourse on the news of the day. 

Many as I do read Sumner’s Money Illusion and other MMers like Nick Rowe, Lars Christensen, et al as well of course as the “Saltwater” guys like Krugman and Delong. Then of course you have the MMTers-today’s Post Keynesians-at places like Economic Perspectives and the Center of the Universe-Walter Mosler’s blog. Another good one is Cullen Roch who is even within MMT heretical breaking up into yet another school-MMR. There are many others I’m not mentioning that are tremendous-Noahpinion, Bill Woolsely…

Through all of it what I’ve personally sought certainly is for true teachable moments-I want to learn and understand the marcro and monetary system better. Of course whether you are reading an MM blog, an MMT or a New Keynesian blog of course the author usually has a strongly advocated point of view. This is not a problem as far as I’m concerned-I too have a point of view. I’m basically I’d say a Post Keynesian though I’m not sure I’m ready to embrace the MMT tag-it seems somewhat cultish too me.

I think it can’t be denied that if any one person comes closet to epitiomizing the flowering of Econ since 2009 it may be Sumner himself. Certainly no one doubts his point of view but I don’t see how you can deny he’s been a “tree shaker.” I use that phrase thinking of what Jesse Jackson used to say-“I’m a tree shaker not a jelly maker!”

This doesn’t mean Sumner’s right. I think it’s still very open to question whether he’s right about NGDP level targeting working exactly the way he assures us it will. But no doubt he has captured the imagination of many Econ bloggers no doubt. 

What NGDPT has going for it is for one thing the “vaccuum effect.” No other theory in the Macro world right now is so suggestive, intuitive, and has such reach in terms of explanatory power. It does remind in me in some way of Chomsky’s linguistic revolution in the 60s. Whether he was right or not, Chomksy couldn’t be beaten because no one else could suggest a system that seemed to explain so much. Here I can’t but think of Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Recvolutions

In this way Sumner is very much like his hero-he is Friedman 2.0 in the sense that his NGDPLT idea is probably the most intuitive and trendy single monetary idea since Friedman’s 3% money supply growth rule. 

Still as Noah Smith has suggested, intuitiveness is not in itself proof of truth. Friedman’s Rule was also highly intuitive and yet it was a disaster. That doesn’t mean I can tell you right now what might be the hole in NGDPLT. I’m not certain there is one that it will go as badly askew as Friedman’s Rule just that it could. 

As I understand Noah, this is the problem with going by intuition alone and why models are also helpful. They offer us a way to check ideas without the trial and error of seeing whether or not it fails empirically. David Andolfatto recently dida post that used the OLG model to test NGDPLT that-depending on which assumptions are used, doesn’t get it done. As to whether or not OLG is an acceptable model, well that’s of course another discussion but Andolfatto suggests that those who have a problem should read a Woodford piece that shows its soundness. 

“Even though the model delivers a plausible interpretation of some recent macroeconomic developments, a NGDP target is not an obvious solution. But of course, as I said, the model is highly abstract. It is likely missing some features of the real world that NGDP target proponents think are important. If this is the case, then I’d like to hear what they are, and how these elements might be embedded in the model above. If nothing else, it would be a contribution to the debate if we could just get straight what assumptions we are making when stating strong propositions concerning the desirability of this or that policy.”

http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2012/06/ngdp-targeting-in-olg-model.html?showComment=1338923968907#c1452928314545044264

My reservations of NGDP come more on the side of MMTers like Dan Kervick. What I can’t help but noitce is that Sumner insists on the idea that the fiscal multiplier is zero if the central bank does it’s job. This certainly makes it reasonable to ask if he has a political agenda. But what Kervick and company argue is that what is considered “monetary” vs. “fiscal” operations is itself a political question on the level of definitions. You could say that it’s the Morgan Warstler version of NGDPLT-what it offers is simply backdoor austerity. In addition I think there’s a case to be made that monetary and fiscal policy refer to different parts of the body so to speak. You could argue that monetary policy pertains largely to the financial system-the stability of banking-while fiscal policy relates to the real economy. 

His big question right now is “Wallace Neutrality” a term quite honestly that I’m not too familiar with but seems based on its use to be related to the liquidity trap:

“Although I plan to keep tight editorial—and for the most part, authorial—control over this blog itself, in a broader sense I view supplysideliberal as a collective enterprise. I hope readers of this blog will gel into an online community that goes beyond this blog. This will be a community of thoughtful people who do not all think alike; they need not be “Supply-Side Liberals” by the definition given in my first post “What is a Supply-Side Liberal? Anyone who comes to this website frequently belongs to the supplysideliberal community (which means, for example, that the 535 people who have put this blog on their RSS feeds automatically qualify)." 

"It is my hope that in some way, the supplysideliberal community becomes something more than just this blog. But it is good to take things in small steps, even if the small steps follow each other in quick succession. So I have a proposal for a medium-sized undertaking as our first collective project outside of this blog: bringing into existence a wikipedia entry on “Wallace Neutrality.”

"If you think this is a good idea, the key step will be to get the entry started, which I think can be done based on Noah Smith´s post “Does Steve Williamson Think Printing Money Can´t Cause Inflation?” and the comments on my post “Is Monetary Policy Thinking in Thrall to Wallace Neutrality?”Once the entry is started, it can be revised in the light of further comments on this blog, reading of one or more of Wallace´s papers, etc. Because of the importance of highlighting the assumption of Wallace Neutrality behind much of the discussion of monetary policy during our current economic troubles, I believe this would be a great service to the world.”

“Could one of you take the lead on this?”

“I definitely can´t do it all myself. In terms of my personal priorities in relation to monetary policy, in the next while I will be writing about how people’s views on Wallace neutrality inform their views on current monetary policy debates, and what I think should be done given my belief in departures from Wallace neutrality. In setting out the nature of Wallace neutrality itself, I need help. I think a wikipedia entry would be a great way to collate our collective wisdom on this. And I think it would be a great start toward our becoming something more than just this blog”

So Wallace Neutrality evidently informs an answer to Noah’s question about Stephen Williamson not thinking monetary policy can cause inflation among others. So if so it would seem to offer some pretty high stakes. 

I myself don’t know much about starting a Wiki paper-it isn’t hard but hopefully this will give us a real opportunity for a meeting of the minds. I probably could start a Wiki paper-it’s easy. We’ll see if others have an interest. 

Mark Thoma: Laughing at the Laffer Curve

In my first post “What is a Supply-Side Liberal?” I wrote

I believe the harm to the productive performance of the economy caused by taxes and regulations is serious (though seldom serious enough that a reduction in taxes would raise revenue).

Mark Thoma’s post (title above is a link) shows that the weight of informed opinion is behind my parenthetical remark. I can verify that since I started econ grad school in 1982, having attended many economics seminars and having had many informal discussions with economists, I have never in person heard an academic economist argue that tax cuts raise revenue, with the possible exception of Larry Lindsey (Greg Mankiw’s and my boss when we were both section-leaders in Harvard’s Ec 10). Larry Lindsey argued that cuts in capital gains tax rates would cause investors to change the timing of capital gains realizations enough that cutting capital gains tax rates would raise revenue now–implicitly at the expense of revenue later, though he didn’t emphasize that.  

One reason that tax cuts don’t raise revenues is that the effect of taxes on GDP is itself complex, and can go either way. See my posts “Can Taxes Raise GDP?” and “Why Taxes are Bad.” If marginal tax rates can be cut both now and in the future it raises efficiency (a good thing) but it will typically make people feel richer as well, so that work hours won’t go up much, if at all (also a good thing).  

Update: Scott Sumner pointed out to me that the disagreement of economists with the statement

A cut in federal income tax rates in the US right now would raise taxable income enough so that the annual total tax revenue would be higher within five years than without the tax cut.

indicates that the overwhelming majority of economists don’t believe that tax cuts can raise revenue for Keynesian reasons either.  (And actually, disagreeing with this statement means not believing that the combination of supply-side and demand-side effects of tax cuts is enough to lead to an increase in tax revenue.) On the question of whether tax cuts can raise revenue for Keynesian reasons, see Valerie Ramey’s Powerpoint discussion of a recent paper by Brad Delong and Larry Summers.

supplysideliberal.com on Facebook

Thanks to Diana Kimball’s technical assistance, Facebook is now another way to subscribe to this blog and my twitter activity at the same time.  Almost all my Facebook activity will consist of whatever is forwarded from my blog and my twitter activity, so you won’t have many extraneous things to wade through.  

There are some photos posted by others, which I think is a plus, especially right now when you can see pictures of me and my son Jordan in front of architecture by the amazing Gaudi in Barcelona. (Jordan is an undergraduate studying Economics at Ohio State University. Jordan is 19 and Diana is 25.)

If you want to subscribe to this blog and my twitter activity on Facebook, just search for Miles Kimball and request me as a friend.  I will routinely approve friend requests as soon as I get a chance.

Mark Thoma on Rainy Day Funds for States

I have to apologize to many in the blogosphere for not having been a regular blog reader in the past and so not being aware of posts preceding mine that are clearly relevant to my posts and so deserve acknowledgement.  Unfortunately, writing this blog on top of all my other duties as an economics professor and in my private life also doesn’t leave me a lot of time for reading everything out there that I ideally should be reading.  So please do let me know of things out there that are highly relevant to my posts and I will make an effort to acknowledge them–assuming I agree that they are highly relevant.  This post is an acknowledgement of an article by Mark Thoma that is extremely relevant to one of my posts.  Mark let me know by tweeting about his prior article with @mileskimball included in the tweet. 

Back in October 26, 2010, Mark Thoma suggested in the Fiscal Times that the Federal Government help states out financially in return for states setting up rainy day funds.  (I have to apologize to many in the blogosphere for not having been a regular blog reader in the past and so not being aware of many things that people have said.)  This is very similar to my proposal in “Leading States in the Fiscal Two-Step."  So (assuming that, like Ben Bernanke, Mark thinks more fiscal stimulus is in order at this point) both Mark and I are calling for this kind of action.  One difference in our proposals is that I am suggesting that the Federal Government effectively require the states to repay the money given them now, and then go beyond that to accumulate positive balances in their rainy day fund.  Thus, my proposal will not add to the Federal Government’s debt in the end, while Mark’s will. 

Also, note that since my proposal works through changing the timing of Federal Medicaid Contributions, the Federal Government can easily do it unilaterally, and the effective rainy day fund requires no state legislative or executive action in order to come into existence. 

Wallace Neutrality and Ricardian Neutrality

Neil WallaceDiscoverer of Wallace NeutralityRobert BarroRicardian Neutrality Revivalist

Scott Sumner posted a speedy reply to the question I posed for him in “Should the Fed Promise to Do the Wrong Thing in the Future to Have the Right Effect Now?  His answer, like mine, is "No!”

On the whole, it turns out that the two of us are in relatively close sympathy. On my side, I certainly think that the Fed should be clear about its medium-term objective, in the spirit of nominal GDP targeting, though there are some details to come in my upcoming post “Optimal Monetary Policy: A Primer” that will diverge from overly simple versions of nominal GDP targeting. As for shorter-run targets to get to a medium-run target in the spirit of nominal GDP, near Wallace neutrality means that the changes in quantities needed to be on target for a given effect on nominal GDP can change dramatically as key assets reach the zero lower bound.  (See my post“Trillions and Trillions: Getting Used to Balance Sheet Monetary Policy.”)  So especially when the zero lower bound is an issue, I think stating things in interest rate terms (despite the complexities that entails) has some advantage over stating things in terms of asset quantities.

On Scott’s side, he clearly states he does not believe that Wallace neutrality is an accurate description of the real world:

In theory Wallace is right and Kimball is wrong, but in practice Kimball is right, because the conditions for Wallace neutrality to hold would probably never occur in the real world.  This will take some explanation, so bear with me.

I wouldn’t quite say I am wrong in theory, but it is true that simple theoretical models definitely “want” to have Wallace neutrality.  It takes some doing–on the research frontier–to theoretically model departures from Wallace neutrality like those that I believe exist in the world.  This is a great research area for graduate students looking for a research topic.  It is worth many dissertations because it is not good enough to have a departure from Wallace neutrality in your model, it needs to be plausible as a description of why the real world departs from Wallace neutrality.  Since different economists will have different judgments about how realistic various alternative mechanisms are, it will be good to have many different models of departures from Wallace neutrality, using different mechanisms. 

In terms of how economic theory works, let me draw a history-of-economic-thought analogy between Wallace neutrality and Ricardian neutrality.  Ricardian neutrality is the proposition that for a given path of government purchases, tax rebates won’t have any important effect on the economy because the tax rebates lead to higher government debt, which unavoidably leads to higher future taxes to pay for that debt, which in turn leads, according to the theory, to enough extra private saving to pay for those extra taxes, which is exactly enough extra saving to satisfy the government’s extra borrowing needs.  Despite the complexity of this story, simple macroeconomic models very much “want” to have Ricardian neutrality.  But in the history of 20th century economic thought, most economists immediately disbelieved Ricardian neutrality as a description of the real world when Robert Barro revived interest in Ricardian neutrality.  These disbelievers were very successful when they set out to find cogent reasons why Ricardian neutrality might not hold in more realistic models.  (However, the tendency of simple models to exhibit Ricardian neutrality has ensured that an important minority of economists still believe to this day that it is an accurate description of the real world.) 

The difference in the theoretical status of Wallace neutrality as compared to Ricardian neutrality is that we are earlier in the process of putting together good models of why the real world departs from Wallace neutrality.  Studying theoretical reasons why the world might not obey Ricardian neutrality was frontier research 25 years ago.  Showing theoretical reasons why the world might not obey Wallace neutrality is frontier research now

Let me make one last point.  Scott mentions various ways to stimulate the economy when the fed funds rate is already at zero:

Consider all the “foolproof” escapes from the liquidity trap.  My NGDP targeting idea, Svensson’s currency depreciation, Friedman/Kimball’s massive QE, etc.

It turns out that every single one of these require a departure from Wallace neutrality.  I will talk about the purchases of foreign assets that make Svensson’s proposal work in a future post about international finance.  Here I want to point out that NGDP targeting to work also needs either (a) implicit promises to overstimulate the economy in the future to get stimulus now OR (b) departures from Wallace neutrality.  In particular, it seems to me that if nominal GDP targeting were combined with a rule that the Fed would only purchase short-term Treasury bills that it would indeed work through (a) implicit promises to overstimulate the economy in the future.  (I will explain how I am defining “overstimulating” in my upcoming post “Optimal Monetary Policy: A Primer.”)  But if the Fed is willing to contemplate purchases of other assets that still have a positive interest rate, then nominal GDP targeting would work by (b) implicitly committing to buy enough of those other assets to head toward the nominal GDP target, even if it take trillions and trillions of dollars worth of asset purchases.  That is very close in spirit to the kind of thing I am recommending.

Should the Fed Promise to Do the Wrong Thing in the Future to Have the Right Effect Now?

Scott Sumner: Professor of Economics at Bentley University and Author of the Blog TheMoneyIllusion

Scott Sumner: Professor of Economics at Bentley University and Author of the Blog TheMoneyIllusion

The question of the title is a question for Scott Sumner in particular.  A few months ago, Scott Sumner used a phrase very similar to what I used in my post “Going Negative: The Virtual Fed Funds Rate Target” in his post “What Ben Bernanke Can Learn from Humpty Dumpty.”  Scott talks about a “shadow fed funds rate target.”  I considered that phrase for my proposal, but set it aside because I thought it sounded too much like the fed funds rate target of the Shadow Open Market Committee, an organization of prominent economists of a certain viewpointwho critique the Fed’s actions.  (Once upon a time the Shadow Open Market Committee was Monetarist and relatively hawkish in its monetary policy recommendations–that is, leaning toward recommending tight monetary policy–but the current membership seems pretty mainstream to me.)  The word “virtual” not only evokes the “virtual reality” of computers that allows the impossible, but also the “virtual particles” of quantum mechanics which can arise even in empty space, stealing the energy for a ghostly existence using the opening provided by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. 

In addition to using “shadow” instead of “virtual,” there is a crucial difference between Scott Sumner’s proposal and mine.  I am envisioning the Fed as using the virtual fed funds rate target to communicate what it intends to do in the near future with balance sheet monetary policy.  Scott wants the Fed to use a shadow fed funds rate to communicate what it will do in the more distant future.  Aside from “doing whatever it takes” to reach a nominal GDP goal, I am not clear about exactly what the Fed is communicating it will do in the future. 

One possible meaning of a shadow fed funds rate target that may or may not be what Scott has in mind is as follows.  I hope that Scott will clarify his position, either by saying that the following interpretation is consistent with what he intends, even if he thinks the emphasis is off, or by distancing himself from the following view.  Believers in Wallace neutrality as applied to the real world think that the only way the Fed can do more stimulus once the fed funds rate is at zero is to promise to overstimulate the economy in the future once the fed funds rate has lifted off from zero.  For example, even with Wallace neutrality, the Fed can stimulate the economy now by promising to keep the fed funds rate at zero so long that the economy will get overheated in the future.  This would be very different from what I recommend.  The great virtue of balance sheet monetary policy (which works by taking advantage of departures from Wallace neutrality)–and therefore with the virtual fed funds rate target that communicates the stance of balance sheet monetary policy–is that it avoids making promises to do the wrong thing in the future in order to have the right effect now.

Justin Wolfers on the 6/20/2012 FOMC Statement

Justin catches one very important thing that my recent post on the FOMC statement neglected to zero in on:

Fed admits it failed: “inflation over the medium term will run at or below the rate that it judges most consistent with its dual mandate.”

For reasons I will explain in my upcoming post “Optimal Monetary Policy: A Primer,” the translation of the Fed’s phrase that Justin highlights is:

It turns out we had monetary policy too tight in the last while.  If only we had known earlier where we see the economy is headed now, we should have been more expansionary, using balance sheet monetary policy.

The supplysideliberal Review of the FOMC Monetary Policy Statement: June 20th, 2012

The Fed–or, technically, the Federal Open Market Committee, abbreviated FOMC–came out with its June 20, 2012 monetary policy statement an hour and a half ago.  I want to offer a review of the statement.  This will be as much about parsing what the FOMC means as it is a critique.  This review should be read in the context of my monetary policy post “Going Negative: The Virtual Fed Funds Rate Target,” and the rest of my monetary policy thread.  (See the previous and first buttons at the bottom of this and other posts for the rest of my monetary policy thread.)  There are three things I noticed in the FOMC statement.  

First, the FOMC thinks the economy needs more monetary stimulus:

To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy.

The key words for that interpretation are “To support a stronger economic recovery …” where I have added the italics.  If they want a stronger recovery, they must think it is not strong enough.  The FOMC particularly mentions jobs and housing (earlier in the statement) as areas where the economy is not strong:

However, growth in employment has slowed in recent months, and the unemployment rate remains elevated…. Despite some signs of improvement, the housing sector remains depressed.

In addition to wanting a “stronger economic recovery,” the FOMC thinks the economy needs more monetary stimulus because of the European debt crisis.  This is how they say it:

Furthermore, strains in global financial markets continue to pose significant downside risks to the economic outlook.

Since monetary policy only affects the economy with about a six to nine month lag, steering the economy with monetary policy is like steering a giant ocean liner.  The FOMC needs to look not only at where the economy is now, but where it might be during the next six to nine months.  And one place the economy might be in the next six months is reeling from the European debt crisis.  Extra monetary stimulus now is an insurance policy. 

Second, the FOMC has not yet heeded my warning against appearing (at least to some audiences) to be promising to keep interest rates lower in the future than they otherwise would think was best, in order to stimulate the economy now.  (See “Going Negative: The Virtual Fed Funds Rate Target,” which also offers an alternative communications strategy.)  Again, let me emphasize that I do not think they are saying that.  I am only saying that they will be interpreted by many observers to be saying that.  Fortunately, as long as they are not really saying that, and remember in the future that they were not saying that, the harm will be quite contained.  Just below are the words at issue.  See if you think the (mis)interpretation I am worrying about is a danger:

In particular, the Committee decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions–including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run–are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.

Third, the FOMC declares that it does not believe in Wallace neutrality.  (See “Is Monetary Policy Thinking in Thrall to Wallace Neutrality?” and the rest of my monetary policy thread.)  Here is what they say:

The Committee also decided to continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities. Specifically, the Committee intends to purchase Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to 30 years at the current pace and to sell or redeem an equal amount of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of approximately 3 years or less. This continuation of the maturity extension program should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative.

I have italicized the key sentence that implies that the FOMC as a body does not believe in Wallace neutrality, as applied to the real world.  Wallace neutrality would imply that changing the maturity structure of Treasury securities (selling relatively short-term government bonds and buying relatively long-term government bonds) could not affect interest rates or “make broader financial conditions more accomodative."  Note that it is not easy to interpret the FOMC statement as changing the maturity of Treasury securities in order to signal a lower path of the fed funds rate in the future, since it already talked about the future path of the fed funds rate earlier in its statement (as quoted above).  I applaud the FOMC’s clear rejection of Wallace neutrality as a good description of the real world.

Illustration Note Added to "Leading States in the Fiscal Two-Step"

[Note on the cartoon:  My technical and blog etiquette expert Diana Kimball tells me it is proper etiquette to acknowledge the origin of photos by linking to the source.  I won’t go back and do that on all of my earlier posts, but I wanted to give you the link to this one because I found it early on, and then was frustrated that I couldn’t find it when it came time to post “Leading States in the Fiscal Two-Step."  I love this cartoon.  It is much better than the cartoon I previously had of Uncle Sam dancing with Lady Liberty.  Here is the link.  From the site, it looks as if you can ask people online to draw pictures for you pro bono–something useful for every blogger to know.  Has anyone had any experience with this?]

For the post "Leading States in the Fiscal Two-Step” itself, click on the title.  This is a tumblr link post.  (You can always tell a link post because if you hover over the title, a rightarrow appears.) 

Mark Thoma: Kenya's Kibera Slum

This is another tumblr link post.  The title links to a post by Mark Thoma, who does the excellent economics blog aggregator Economist’s View.  Mark writes about his personal observations in Kenya.  He is struck by the importance of corruption in understanding the experience of Kenyans.  This is consistent with one of the emphases in my last post “Leveling Up: Making the Transition from Poor Country to Rich Country.”

Leveling Up: Making the Transition from Poor Country to Rich Country

A Home in Jakarta, Indonesia (at the intermediate levels of development)

A Home in Jakarta, Indonesia (at the intermediate levels of development)

Deirdre McCloskey posted her wonderful essay “Factual Free-Market Fairness” on bleedingheartlibertarians.com a few days ago.  In it, she focuses on the follies of government.  Her essay has generated a huge debate: 193 comments so far.  These are central issues being debated. For example,  here are Noah Smith’s comments.  Noah points out that governments have also done good things and that some of the most successful economies in the world have high tax rates and high levels of government spending. 

I have several reactions (which I will put here rather than in Deirdre’s comment thread where you would have trouble finding them in the thick forest of surrounding comments). First, regulation is much like distortionary taxation in its costs, only worse.  In particular, by mandating a particular way of doing things, regulation often tends to stifle innovation in a way that distortionary taxation doesn’t.  But regulation, like distortionary taxation, typically has benefits as well as (often fearsome) costs.  One of Deirdre’s key points is that the costs can often outweigh the benefits even for the intended beneficiaries of a regulation.

One of the biggest questions in all of the social sciences is why some countries are rich and some countries are poor, with per capita incomes differing by more than a 100 times from poorest to richest.  (The richest countries have per capita incomes above $40,000 per year; the poorest countries have per capita incomes below $400 per year.)  Let me give you my view on that question in a nutshell. 

The entry levels in the quest to become a rich country are the hardest.  The basic problem is that any government strong enough to stop people from stealing from each other, deceiving each other, and threatening each other with violence, is itself strong enough to steal, deceive, and threaten with violence.  Designing strong but limited government that will prevent theft, deceipt, and threats of violence, without perpetrating theft, deceipt, and threats of violence at a horrific level is quite a difficult trick that most countries throughout history have not managed to perform.  To see how difficult this is, think of how strong a temptation it is for a sovereign to simply take someone’s accumulated wealth. As long as the rulers of a country regularly succumb to this temptation, no one in that country will work very hard to accumulate wealth unless he or she has some form of special protection from such takings.  Also think of how difficult it is to have a strong enough military to avoid falling prey to the next country over, without having the military take over and run one’s country for its own benefit.

The intermediate levels in the quest to become a rich country are somewhat easier: establishing the rule of law and stamping out corruption.  If unchecked, corruption and the arbitrary decisions that are the antithesis of the rule of law act like huge tax distortions that discourage commerce and industry. 

In comparison to the earlier levels, the advanced levels in the quest to become a rich country are a piece of cake: keeping tax rates reasonable while providing key public goods such as roads and other public works, getting monetary policy right, encouraging education and science, and fostering the environmental amenities that are part of what should be counted as “being rich” even though environmental amenities don’t happen to be counted in GDP.  Most of the economic policy issues I am addressing on this blog are at this advanced level.  Even governments of countries at these advanced levels that get the balance of taxing and spending wrong are still doing very well by having in place the basics of preventingtheft, deception and threats of violence; perpetrating only a little theft, deception and threats of violence (except perhaps internationally); maintaining the rule of law and keeping down corruption.  When looking at an advanced country that has very high tax rates, the right question is not “Is it still rich even with high tax rates?” but “Would it be even richer if it had lower marginal tax rates and less regulation?"  There are some European countries that might have what it takes to be much richer countries than the United States if only they liberalized their economies by cutting marginal tax rates and loosened regulations that make it hard for new firms to get started. 

Note: Much of what I am saying here comes from my reading of my favorite economics textbook: David Weil’s book Economic Growth.  Any reader of this blog would learn a lot by sitting down to read this book.

Mike Konczal: What Constrains the Federal Reserve? An Interview with Joseph Gagnon

Thayer Hall at Harvard

Thayer Hall at Harvard

Anyone who has been following the monetary policy debates on this blog will be interested in this interview with Joseph Gagnon. Joseph was an insider at the Fed, but now works at the Peterson Institute for International Economics: thus he can speak freely. 

Here is one exchange in the interview:

Mike Konczal: Let’s start with the basics. Does a random person – not at the highest levels, but among those who make up most of the researchers and workers – at the Federal Reserve think that the Fed is “out of ammo”? What are their opinions on how well previous expansionary monetary policy at the zero bound, like QE2 and Operation Twist, have worked to bolster the economy?
Joseph Gagnon: Let me start by linking to a blog post from a former classmate at his new blog, Miles Kimball’s Balance Sheet Monetary Policy: A Primer, that spells out what the Fed could do and why it would work. However, he ignores some of the legal restrictions on what the Fed can do. (See below.)

Joseph goes on to detail exactly what legal restrictions the Fed faces on what assets it is allowed to purchase.  Though there may be some legal interpretation here, I can tell you that it matches the view of legal restrictions facing the Fed that I heard from Fed staffers when I visited the Fed as detailed in my second post, Getting the Biggest Bang for the Buck in Fiscal Policy.“ I will refer to this interview in the future as a source for understanding the legal restrictions facing the Fed. 

Joseph was my undergraduate classmate: our dorm rooms were only a few steps away from each other freshman year in Thayer Hall on the Yard.  I am delighted to be in contact with him again through the blogosphere.

Going Negative: The Virtual Fed Funds Rate Target

Note: This post is about quantitative easing (QE). Don’t miss my posts on negative interest rate policy proper. I have the links to those posts and to my related academic papers in “How and Why to Eliminate the Zero Lower Bound: A Reader’s Guide.


Balance sheet monetary policy presents what the folks at the Fed call a “communications” problem.

This “communications” problem matters because balance sheet monetary policy is, as it should be, the Fed’s primary tool once the fed funds rate (

the very short-term interest rate at which banks lend to each other overnight

) has already been brought down to essentially zero.

Take what the press called QE2 (Quantitative Easing, Round 2) for example: the Fed announced in November 2010 that it would buy $600 billion dollars worth of long-term government bonds.Because many (though not all) of the households and firms from whom the Fed bought these long-term government bonds were reasonably content to switch into holding short-term government bonds or close substitutes to cash instead, much of the effect of the $600 billion dollar purchase was neutralized and QE2 had more or less the modest positive effect that the Fed had expected it to have.As I discussed in my post “Trillions and Trillions: Getting Used to Balance Sheet Monetary Policy,” large headline numbers for asset purchases, associated with modest effects, are typical of balance sheet monetary policy.Aside from“communications,” this is not a serious difficulty for monetary policy, since the Fed is perfectly capable of printing money and purchasing trillions of dollars worth of assets if it needs to.And it is perfectly capable of focusing its purchases on assets with interest rates that are still above zero and can be pulled down closer to zero. But the public can be forgiven for getting scared when it sees massive asset purchases and only modest effects.

So what should the Fed do?I know this is an area where the Fed will carefully listen to and at least consider advice, so I feel a duty to do my best to come up with a constructive suggestion before tomorrow’s monetary policy setting meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).  Because my suggestion is very specific, in the rest of this post, I will use the more precise “FOMC” instead of its approximate synonym “the Fed” that I have used when talking about monetary policy in other posts.  Let me first say what I think the FOMC shouldn’t do in communicating balance sheet monetary policy intentions.  Here is what the FOMC said in its official statement in November 2010:

To promote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate, the Committee decided today to expand its holdings of securities. The Committee will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings. In addition, the Committee intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75 billion per month.

This FOMC statement led to front page newspaper articles prominently featuring the $600 billion figure. Later on, newspaper articles appeared saying that the Fed had done this large amount of asset purchases with little subsequent effect.  So I worry that having the large dollar figure in people’s minds causes many to doubt the efficacy of balance sheet monetary policy–something that I think is dangerous given the importance of expectations and confidence.  Highlighting the large dollar figure for asset purchases also causes others, including those in high places, to think that the Fed is doing too much, despite the action having only modest aggregate demand effects. I worry that facing such ill-informed criticism could lead the FOMC to do less than it would otherwise judge that it should. 

So what can be done instead to accurately convey the FOMC’s intentions?  Since balance sheet monetary policy leads to relatively modest interest rate movements for a given amount of asset purchases, my argument is that it would give the public a more accurate idea of the Fed’s intended effects if the FOMC’s decision could be stated in interest rate terms rather than in terms of asset quantities.  That is what the FOMC usually does in normal times when the fed funds rate is above zero: it announces how much it is going to raise or lower the fed funds rate. The way the fed funds rate is raised or lowered in normal times is primarily by having the New York Federal Reserve Bank sell or buy some quantity of 3-month Treasury bills.  But the quantity of 3-month Treasury bills the New York Fed is going to sell or buy is not emphasized.   

One could imagine having the FOMC statement focus on some other particular interest rate, say the rate on 2-year Treasury notes.  But this faces two related objections.   As I pointed out in my post “Balance Sheet Monetary Policy: A Primer”:

It is logically possible that sellers might sell all of a particular asset to   the Fed before its interest rate gets down to zero.

This logical possibility is most likely to actually occur for something such as 2-year Treasury notes that have many very close substitutes.  (For example, among the many close substitutes for the newly issued 2-year Treasury notes that define the 2-year interest rate are the 2-year Treasury notes issued last month, which now have a remaining maturity of 23 months.)  This presents two problems.  First, since people are worried about the Fed “monetizing the debt”–that is, taking on the inherently inflationary role of trying to fund the Federal Government–it creates another type of “communications” problem if the Fed owns all of the Federal Government’s debt, even if only at one specific maturity.  The second problem is that the New York Fed may not be able to meet a specific interest rate target on that particular asset, since it may have purchased all of the asset before that interest rate target is reached.  And it is a very big communications problem if the New York Fed can’t do what the FOMC says it is going to do.  This would hurt the credibility of the FOMC, which is its most precious asset. 

What I propose is that the FOMC say something like this when it feels that monetary policy should be more expansionary than a fed funds rate of zero alone will provide:

In addition to keeping the federal funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent, the Committee will undertake purchases of other securities in amounts estimated to provide an effect on aggregate demand equivalent to what a reduction in the federal funds rate target of 2 percent would normally provide.  

(Of course, they should substitute the correct number where I have put “2%.”) This could be followed by some guidance about what mix of asset purchases would be involved–say 50% long-term government bonds, 50% Fannie Mae securities–without saying exactly what quantities would be purchased.  The financial markets and the press would eventually figure out what kinds of quantities were involved, but these numbers would be more likely to be reported in the middle of a newspaper article, and might not even make it to the front page. 

The “virtual fed funds rate target” of my title is my suggestion for how the press could report this action by the FOMC:

The Federal Reserve today set a virtual fed funds rate target of -2%.  Since the fed funds rate is already close to zero, the Fed is slated to buy various assets (including long-term government bonds and mortgage-backed securities from Fannie Mae) in order to achieve the same stimulus that reducing the fed funds rate by 2% normally would accomplish. 

And here is the headline:

FED SETS VIRTUAL FUNDS TARGET AT -2%

To me, this sounds much less inflammatory than

FED SET TO BUY $600 BILLION OF BONDS

Another plus. In addition to the advantages I have emphasized of avoiding misunderstanding by the public, the virtual fed funds rate target will also help avoid another type of misunderstanding by those who watch monetary policy closely.  In its most recent statement, the FOMC said 

In particular, the Committee decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions–including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run–are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.

In saying that the federal funds rate is likely to stay low through late 2014, I think the FOMC is simply informing people about its thinking by making a prediction about what it is going to do in the future, emphasizing that what it will actually do depends on future conditions.  But despite the clarity of its words, some people read into this something more: they think the FOMC is saying that it is promising to keep the fed funds rate in the future lower than it otherwise would in order to stimulate the economy now.  The reason they think this is that in formal models that exhibit Wallace neutrality,  the only way to get more oomph from monetary policy once the fed funds rate is at zero is by promising to overstimulate the economy in the future when the fed funds rate will no longer be at zero. (On Wallace neutrality, see my crowd-sourcing post “Is Monetary Policy Thinking in Thrall to Wallace Neutrality?” and its comment thread, as well as “Trillions and Trillions: Getting Used to Balance Sheet Monetary Policy,” and Noah Smith’s post “Does Steve Williamson Think Printing Money Can’t Cause Inflation?”)  I will save for another post a rundown of some of those (especially those in the blogosphere) who believe in the implication of Wallace neutrality that I have bolded and italicized above.  For now I simply want to recommend that the FOMC distance itself from this view.  If the FOMC believes that balance sheet monetary policy works, as I think it does, there is no need to promise to overstimulate the economy in the future (when the fed funds rate is above zero) in order to stimulate it now (when the fed funds rate is zero).  And even more, I hope that the FOMC doesn’t in the future feel that it has made such a promise to overstimulate the economy that it must then follow through on.

The beauty of the virtual fed funds rate target is that it communicates the idea that it is likely to be a while before the FOMC raises the fed funds rate above zero without any danger of being misconstrued as a promise.  It is natural for the fed funds rate target–including the virtual fed funds rate target–to evolve gradually over time as information about the state of the economy comes in.  (More on that in a future post.)  If, say, the virtual fed funds rate target were currently at -2%, it would be a reasonable inference that the fed funds rate target was not likely to get above zero for some time, unless there was dramatic new information about economic activity or inflation.  So the virtual funds rate target communicates the likelihood that a near-zero fed funds rate is likely to continue for some time, without any appearance of tying the FOMC’s hands. 

Of all the policy proposals I have made so far in this blog, this is the only one that I think can be implemented immediately.  There is no reason the FOMC couldn’t use this idea in its statement tomorrow or Wednesday.  I strongly urge any of the Federal Reserve System’s staff economists who read this post and agree with this idea, or who simply think it deserves consideration, to forward a link to others in the Federal Reserve System–and of course to take advantage of opportunities to communicate this idea to members of the FOMC itself.