Three Goals for Ph.D. Courses in Economics

Since I am teaching in the second-year macroeconomic field sequence this year, I have been thinking about the objectives for my teaching. I see three goals for a Ph.D. course:

  1. to teach some of the skills directly necessary to fill out the body of an economics paper, including the computations from data and from simulations (to be laid out in tables or figures), and how to write down the details of proofs.
  2. to give enough of a picture of how the world works to make it possible to begin to judge how important a potential research result might be: for one’s career, for the discipline of economics, and ultimately, in the potential contribution to overall social welfare. (On how the world works, see the recurring refrain in one of my most popular posts ever: “Dr. Smith and the Asset Bubble.”)
  3. to teach analytical tools that–with a few hours or a few days effort–can help one to predict the likely distribution of results one might get from a potential research project that might take months or even years.

a. For straight theory, the development of mathematical intuition is the key for predicting what a project might lead to.

b. For empirical work, key skills for predicting what a project might lead to are

  • understanding identification,
  • understanding the sources and characteristics of measurement errors, 
  • understanding at least rudimentary power analysis in the sense of knowing something about what goes into the standard errors one is likely to get, and
  • understanding that the data are endogenous in two very different senses: (i) data from naturally occurring situations come from a complex web of causal relationships and forces and (ii) economists can cause data to come into existence through surveys, field experiments and lab experiments to help fulfill their research objectives.

c. For computational work, such as a project using a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model, or a project simulating life-cycle consumption, labor supply and portfolio behavior, some key skills for predicting the likely behavior of a model are

  • understanding general comparative statics and comparative dynamics results;
  • understanding general principles about how models behave, such as key neutrality results that cut across large classes of models and often require intentional modeling devices in order to break (monetary neutrality, Ricardian neutrality, Modigliani-Miller, Wallace neutrality, etc.)
  • knowing how to design a set of graphs to get to the heart of what is going on in a model: graphs that serve the purpose for that advanced model that supply and demand serve for Economics 101 (see for example the graphs in my paper “Q-Theory and Real Business Cycle Analytics”); and
  • knowing how to compute quantitative results for a few simple models by hand in order to get a sense of the likely size of various effects. (You can see an example of what I mean in some of the chapters of my draft textbook “Business Cycle Analytics.”

Of course, in all of these areas, research experience and seeing what other people have done–both in published articles and in work presented in seminars–will also help one predict what a project will lead to. Unfortunately, seeing what other people have done is most helpful in understanding paths that are already well-trodden. But sound criticism of what other people have done is immensely helpful in teaching what to avoid. (Helpful hint: when reading papers, be very suspicious of what is claimed in abstracts. At least half the time, abstracts misrepresent what a paper has really accomplished.) Whether one’s own research experience ultimately leads to unique insight into the likely outcomes of various potential projects depends on the directions one strikes out in during the early days of one’s research career.

A Bare Bones Model of Immigration

Think of a Neoclassical model with inelastic labor supply (including inelastic retirement timing). I am going to focus on the effects that occur in the period of time before capital has had much chance to adjust. To keep the numbers simple, let’s imagine there are 100 million workers in the economy. Production is Cobb-Douglas (see my post “The Shape of Production: Charles Cobb’s and Paul Douglas’s Boon to Economics”), with the following shares:

  • 25% share for capital;
  • 50% share for skilled going to half the population
  • 25% share for unskilled labor going to half the working population.

What are the economic effects of allowing 1 million new workers: enough additional immigration to increase the population by 1%?

Case 1: All of the New Immigration is Unskilled. If all of the new immigration is unskilled, the amount of unskilled labor increases by 2% (from 50 million to 51 million). This increases output by .25 * 2% = .5 %. Unskilled labor gets ¼ of this bigger pie. With a .5% bigger pie and 2% more people to share it among, unskilled workers get a 1.5% reduction in their wage.  The skilled workers get the same share of a bigger pie, with no dilution, so they each get a .5 % increase in their wage. Capital also gets .5% more. This helps people in saving for retirement.

Case 2: All of the New Immigration is Skilled. Now the pie is .5 * 2% = 1% bigger (from 50 million to 51 million). With a 1% bigger pie and 2% more people to share it among, each skilled worker now gets 1% less. Unskilled workers get the same share of a bigger pie, with no dilution, so they each get a 1% increase in their wage. Capital also gets 1% more, which helps people in saving for retirement.

Case 3: 60% of the New Immigration is Skilled, 40% Unskilled. In this case, the amount of skilled labor increases by 1.2% (from 50,000,000 to 50,600,000), while the amount of unskilled labor increases by .8% (from 50,000,000 to 50,400,000). This increases output by (.5 * 1.2%) + (.25 * .8%) = .6% + .2% = .8%. Capital gets .8% more, which helps people in saving for retirement. Since there are .8% more unskilled workers to divide their share of the pie among, the unskilled wage is unaffected. The effect on the skilled wage is .8% - 1.2% = -.4% in this simple model.

Everything left out of this bare bones model suggests that in a richer model, output will ultimately grow more. If the skilled workers are willing to bet that the combination of higher returns to capital and the effects of capital accumulation, extra technological progress, the benefits of increasing returns to scale and diversity, and the share of the national debt and of unfunded government liabilities that immigrants will shoulder would make up for the -.4% reduction in wages they see in the bare bones model, the unskilled workers have no reason to object (except perhaps for cultural reasons), since even in the bare bones model, their wage is unaffected, and all other factors then push in the direction of doing better economically.

I suspect that something like the bare bones model of immigration lurks in the back of many brains, and is encoded as saying that immigration is good for capitalists, but not for workers. Therefore, to successfully argue their case, advocates of immigration must confront this bare bones model head on, explain what is missing, and convincingly argue what the quantitative effects of those missing pieces are.

Contra John Taylor

Having tweeted that John Taylor’s op-ed this morning, “Fed Policy is a Drag on the Economy” was “extraordinarily bad analysis,” I need to back up my view. Let me go point by point. Not all of John’s points are equally problematic.

1. Uncertainty about the effects of unwinding the Fed’s large asset positions in long-term government bonds and in mortgage-backed assets. John writes:

At the very least, the policy creates a great deal of uncertainty. People recognize that the Fed will eventually have to reverse course. When the economy begins to heat up, the Fed will have to sell the assets it has been purchasing to prevent inflation.

If its asset sales are too slow, the bank reserves used to finance the original asset purchases pour out of the banks and into the economy. But if the asset sales are too fast or abrupt, they will drive bond prices down and interest rates up too much, causing a recession. Those who say that there is no problem with the Fed’s interest rate and asset purchases because inflation has not increased so far ignore such downsides.

Unless the Fed is at the zero lower bound, its key tool is the federal funds rate that banks charge each other overnight. When it is time to raise rates above zero, the Fed can use movements in the federal funds rate–which have effects it understands from long experience. Although there is some uncertainty surrounding the exact size of the effects as the Fed unwinds its positions in long-term government bonds and mortgage-backed securities, the Fed is quickly gaining experience in that regard. More importantly, the overwhelming fact is that, when the short-term federal funds rate is held fixed the effects of balance sheet monetary policy on aggregate demand are small relative to the size of the positions involved, as I discussed in my post “Trillions and Trillions: Getting Used to Balance Sheet Monetary Policy.”

More polemically, it is worth pointing out that it is implausible for critics of Fed policy to say that (holding short-term rates fixed) changes in the holdings of long-term government bonds and mortgage-backed securities have no power to stimulate aggregate demand when the economy is in a slump, but going in the other direction, could have a dangerously powerful negative effect on aggregate demand once the economy is on the mend and asset positions are pulled back. The truth is that these effects were always likely to be modest in both directions, relative to the sizes of the assets purchases or sales involved. The power of balance sheet monetary policy is that these modest effects can be multiplied by huge movements in asset positions when necessary. But the very need to use huge movements in asset positions to get substantial effects should be reassuring when we contemplate unwinding those positions.

2. Low interest rates as fuel for speculation. Here, he says

The Fed’s current zero interest-rate policy also creates incentives for otherwise risk-averse investors—retirees, pension funds—to take on questionable investments as they search for higher yields in an attempt to bolster their minuscule interest income.

I can’t make sense of this statement without interpreting it as a behavioral economics statement about some combination of investor ignorance and irrationality and fraudulent schemes that prey on that ignorance and irrationality. The often-repeated claim that low interest rates lead to speculation cries out for formal modeling. I don’t see how such a model can work without some combination of investor ignorance and irrationality and fraudulent schemes preying on that ignorance and irrationality. (That is, I don’t see how the claim could hold in a model with rational agents and no fraud.) Whatever combination of investor ignorance and irrationality and fraudulent schemes preying on that ignorance an irrationality a successful model uses are likely to have much more powerful implications for financial regulation than for monetary policy. It is cherry-picking to point to implications of a not-fully-specified model for monetary policy and ignore the implications of that not-fully-specified model for financial regulation.

3. Low rates and zombie loans.

The low rates also make it possible for banks to roll over rather than write off bad loans, locking up unproductive assets. 

This is one of John’s best and most interesting points. It is a quirk of traditional loan contracts that the repayment rates expected by lenders are sometimes slower when nominal interest rates are low. This is a place where the free market should do its magic, with lenders making sure that the rates at which they are supposed to be repaid are adequate to help them identify badly-performing loans early on. The free market will get better at this the more experience businesses have with low nominal interest rate environments.

4. Political economy effects of low interest rates.

And extraordinarily low rates support and feed the spending appetites of Congress and the president, increasing deficits and debt.

As I wrote in “What to Do When the World Desperately Wants to Lend Us Money,” there are many ways that it is completely appropriate for the government to take low (real) interest rates into account in spending decisions. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be worried about the long-run balance between taxing and spending. Bill Clinton explained the balance of short-run and long-run issues well when he said

Now, let’s talk about the debt. Today, interest rates are low, lower than the rate of inflation. People are practically paying us to borrow money, to hold their money for them.

But it will become a big problem when the economy grows and interest rates start to rise. We’ve got to deal with this big long-term debt problem or it will deal with us. It will gobble up a bigger and bigger percentage of the federal budget we’d rather spend on education and health care and science and technology. It — we’ve got to deal with it.

I actually think this point is well understood by policy makers, but I wish all of their constituents understood it better. In any case, tight monetary policy to make voters worry more about the national debt seems a strange alternative to educating the voters about the debt problem.

5. Issues of institutional design and what the scope of the Fed’s responsibilities should be.  

More broadly, the Fed’s excursion into fiscal policy and credit allocation raises questions about its institutional independence and accountability. This reduces public confidence in the central bank.

I agree with this statement. It is clear that there are important issues of institutional design for dealing with financial crises in order to preserve the public’s trust in institutions after the handling a financial crisis. I also interpret John’s statement as referring to ongoing balance sheet monetary policy, rather than just the emergency stabilization of the financial system-There I agree with this statement as well, as can be seen in my Quartz column “Why the US needs its own sovereign wealth fund.” In the absence of electronic money (on electronic money, see my post “Paper Currency Policy: A Primer”), purchases of a wide range of assets is crucial once short-term rates hit zero, but there is no reason the purchase of long-term or risky assets needs to be done by the Fed. Confidence in the Fed would be greater if unavoidably controversial assets were taken over by another agency–the US Sovereign Wealth Fund that I propose. As long as asset purchases by the US Sovereign Wealth Fund are sufficiently large, careful calibration of monetary policy can be left to the Fed, which would retain plenty of tools to avoid over-stimulation of the economy. This division of labor would allow the US Sovereign Wealth Fund to serve as a political lightning rod for the Fed, which in turn would help preserve the independence of monetary policy. 

6. Effects of US monetary policy on the monetary policy of other countries.

There is yet another downside. Foreign central banks—whether they like it or not—tend to follow other central banks’ easy-money policies to prevent their currency from appreciating sharply, which would put their exporters at a disadvantage. The recent effort of the new Japanese government to force quantitative easing on the Bank of Japan and thus resist dollar depreciation against the yen vividly makes this point. This global increase in money risks commodity booms and busts as we saw in 2011 and 2012.

Here is my perspective on this:

  • There is a global slump.
  • This calls for stimulative monetary policy globally.
  • Therefore, it is good that expansionary US monetary policy helps to inspire expansionary monetary policy by other countries. 

The effect of monetary stimulus on commodity prices is a very interesting phenomenon that deserves a better treatment at some later date, but is not a reason to avoid monetary stimulus when monetary stimulus is called for. 

7. Forward guidance as a price ceiling causing disequilibrium??? Finally, let’s turn to John’s most remarkable claim–the one that inspired my statement that his op-ed had “extraordinarily bad analysis.” John writes:

…a basic microeconomic analysis shows that the policies perversely decrease aggregate demand and increase unemployment while they repress the classic signaling and incentive effects of the price system.

Consider the “forward guidance” policy of saying that the short-term rate will be near zero for several years into the future. The purpose of this guidance is to keep longer-term interest rates down and thus encourage more borrowing. A lower future short-term interest rate reduces long-term rates today because portfolio managers can, in a form of arbitrage, easily adjust their portfolio mix between long-term bonds and a sequence of short-term bonds.

So if investors are told by the Fed that the short-term rate is going to be close to zero in the future, then they will bid down the yield on the long-term bond. The forward guidance keeps the long-term rate low and tends to prevent it from rising. Effectively the Fed is imposing an interest-rate ceiling on the longer-term market by saying it will keep the short rate unusually low.

The perverse effect comes when this ceiling is below what would be the equilibrium between borrowers and lenders who normally participate in that market. While borrowers might like a near-zero rate, there is little incentive for lenders to extend credit at that rate.

This is much like the effect of a price ceiling in a rental market where landlords reduce the supply of rental housing. Here lenders supply less credit at the lower rate. The decline in credit availability reduces aggregate demand, which tends to increase unemployment, a classic unintended consequence of the policy.

Research presented at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association this month by Eric Swanson and John Williams of the San Francisco Fed is consistent with this view of credit markets. It shows that during periods of forward guidance, the long-term interest rate does not adjust to events that shift supply or demand as it does in normal periods. In addition, while credit to corporate businesses is up 12% over the past two years, credit has declined to noncorporate businesses where the low rate is more likely to be a disincentive for lenders. Peter Fisher, head of fixed income at the global investment-management firm BlackRock and a former Fed and Treasury official, wrote in September: “[A]s they approach zero, lower rates … run the significant risk of perversely discouraging the lending and investment we need.”

This is just wrong. To the extent that forward guidance has bite, the Fed is promising to shift the demand curve for assets in the future and thereby get to a particular equilibrium interest rate. This is not at all like rent control. The right analogy is, say, New York City getting rents to come down by reducing making it easier to get a building permit, or by subsidizing the building of new apartments. The Fed is pushing asset prices up and interest rates down by a combination of  buying assets now and promising to buy them in the future. There is a world of difference between a market intervention in which the government contributes to supply and demand and a price floor or ceiling. By buying assets, and promising to buy them in the future, the Fed is lowering an equilibrium interest rate. The details of the pattern of buying assets and promising to buy them in the future tends to keep the equilibrium interest rate at a certain level.

The fact that the Fed acts by changing the equilibrium interest rate matters, because John’s claim that lowering the interest rate will reduce the quantity of investment would hold only if what the Fed is doing really did act like an interest rate ceiling that makes asset demand lower than asset supply. But what the Fed is doing is adding to asset demand; the equilibrium between the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded continues to hold.  To translate into the effect on loans for construction, the purchase of equipment and consumer durables, or to fund startups, strong asset demand contributes to the supply of loans, both because banks issue assets to raise money for loans and because loans can  be packaged into assets. Anyone issuing and selling assets to raise funds can sell them much more easily when demand for assets is strong. Currently, the Fed is contributing in important ways to the demand for assets now and the expected demand for assets in the future. This makes loans easier and stimulates investment in buildings, equipment, etc.  

The bottom line is that it leads to very bad policy analysis if Fed asset purchases and promises of future asset purchases are mischaracterized as the kind of interest rate ceiling that leads to disequilibrium. Interest rate ceilings come in two types:

  • interest rate ceilings that cause the supply of assets on the seller side (representing borrowing) to exceed the demand for assets on the buyer side (representing lending);
  • interest rate “ceilings” that come from a commitment to buy as many assets as it takes to keep the equilibrium interest rate down at a certain level.   

John Taylor confuses these two types of interest rate ceilings.

 

Update: Also see "Contra Randal Quarles." 

Miles's First TV Interview: A US Sovereign Wealth Fund

Here is a link to my first TV interview. It was about my proposal for a US Sovereign Wealth Fund.

This interview was sparked by my Quartz column “Why the US Needs Its Own Sovereign Wealth Fund.”

The primary motivation for having a US Sovereign Wealth Fund is to give the Fed running room for monetary policy. (Its establishment is a powerful balance sheet operation–more powerful than quantitative easing with long-term government bonds or mortgage backed securities.) But I think there are other benefits of a sovereign wealth fund as wealth fund:

  1. making money for the taxpayer, 
  2. contributing to financial stability both directly by a contrarian investment strategy and indirectly through the financial expertise of its staff, and 
  3. serving as a political lightning rod to draw political controversy away from the Fed.

Q&A on the Financial Cycle

Question: eloquentwhimsy asked you:

What do you make of Claudio Borio’s new working paper (“The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt?”), in particular the idea of needing to model money as an active rather than “frictional” factor and the importance of debt and credit cycles (which is similar to Hyman Minsky’s work)? In particular, the idea that private sector debt-reduction should be the most important part of any solution to the recession has long struck me as the ultimate reason to see policies like yours (Federal Lines of Credit) as the future of Government stimulus which ultimately should seek to empower households and firms to pay down their debts. There are two primary benefits to this: cutting out the middleman of stimulus projects and eliminating “multiplier” estia.

Answer: It took me a long time to think through this one. I found Claudio Borio’s paper very interesting. Here are some thoughts:

  1. A great deal of our current trouble is due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. I think electronic money is the most straightforward way to get more aggregate demand and allow us to return to the natural level of output. 
  2. I am intrigued by your argument that Federal Lines of Credit, as described in my post “Getting the Biggest Bang for the Buck in Fiscal Policy” and in my short-run fiscal policy sub-blog http://blog.supplysideliberal.com/tagged/shortrunfiscal might also be helpful in balancing the economy in our current situation, even if we did have electronic money. Certainly, in the absence of electronic money, Federal Lines of Credit would help immensely, both to create additional aggregate demand and to reduce the most troublesome components of household debt. I have always thought that an important benefit of Federal Lines of Credit would be making households feel more secure so that they would spend more, even if a household does not actually need to draw on its Federal Line of Credit at all.   
  3. Claudio emphasizes the effects that the financial cycle has on the natural level of output. It occurred to me that my belief in a relatively high intertemporal elasticity of labor supply (see “What is a Supply-Side Liberal?”) indicates that the natural level of output might fluctuate quite a bit in response to financial phenomena. I am imagining, for example, a model that combines the irrational expectations of noise-trader models with the kind of machinery in models of “news shocks” such as Robert Barsky’s and Eric Sims’s “News Shocks and Business Cycles.”
  4. In relation to point 3, it is worth noting that, believing as I do that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for consumption is below 1 and that income and substitution effects for labor supply are of roughly the same size, permanently higher rate of return expectations should lower labor supply, not raise it. To have the increase in labor supply necessary to have an irrational financial boom raise the natural level of output, either or both (a) the increased rate of return needs to be perceived as temporary–which is very interesting in this context–or (b) the increased risk could cause precautionary saving in the form of increased labor supply as well as reduced consumption.
  5. The bottom line I would emphasize is that research on financial dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models–including those that have irrational elements–needs to be brought together with research on business cycle dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. As a step in that direction, a greater fraction of financial dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models should include elastic labor supply.

Steven Pinker on the Goal of Education

In the third-to-last and second-to-last paragraphs of The Stuff of Thought (pp. 438-439, emphasis added), Steven Pinker writes:

When all the pieces fall into alignment, people can grope their way toward the mouth of [Plato’s] cave. In elementary education, children can be taught to extend their number sense beyond “one, two, many” by sensing an analogy between an increase in rough magnitude and the order of number words in the counting sequence. In higher education, people can be disabused of their fallacies in statistics or evolution by being encouraged to think of a population as a collection of individuals rather than as a holistic figure. Or they can unlearn their faulty folk economics by thinking of money as something that can change in value as it is slid back and forth along a time line and of interest as the cost of pulling it forward. In science and engineering, people can dream up analogies to understand their subjects (a paintbrush is a pump, heat is a fluid, inheritance is a code) and to communicate them to others (sexual selection is a room with a heater and a cooler). Carefully interpreted, these analogies are not just alluring frames but actual theories, which make testable predictions and can prompt new discoveries. In the governance of institutions, openness and accountability can be reinforced by reminding people that the intuitions of truth they rely on in their private lives—their defense against being cheated or misinformed or deluded—also apply in the larger social arena. These reminders can militate against our natural inclinations toward taboo, polite consensus, and submission to authority. 

None of this, of course, comes easily to us. Left to our own devices, we are apt to backslide to our instinctive conceptual ways. This underscores the place of education in a scientifically literate democracy, and even suggests a statement of purpose for it (a surprisingly elusive principle in higher education). The goal of education is to make up for the shortcomings in our instinctive ways of thinking about the physical and social world. And education is likely to succeed not by trying to implant abstract statements into empty minds but by taking the mental models that are our standard equipment, applying them to new subjects in selective analogies, and assembling them into new and more sophisticated combinations. 

The one thing I want to add is: moral education serves an analogous purpose: to make up for the shortcomings in the behavior our untutored instincts would lead us into.

Steven Pinker on Scientific Etiquette

Steven Pinker, in The Stuff of Thought, pp. 437-438, writes:

… The intuition that ideas can point to real things in the world or can miss them, and that beliefs about the world can be true or just believed, can drive people to test their analogies for fidelity to the causal structure of the world, and to prune away irrelevant features and zero in on the explanatory ones.

Needless to say, this combination of aptitudes does not endow any of us with a machine for churning out truths. Not only is a single mind limited in experience and ingenuity, but even a community of minds won’t pool and winnow its inventions unless their social relationships are retuned for that purpose. Disagreements in everyday life can threaten our sense of face, which is why our polite interactions center on topics on which all reasonable people agree, like the weather, the ineptitude of bureaucracies, and the badness of airline or dormitory food. Communities that are supposed to evaluate knowledge, such as science, business, government, and journalism,  have to find workarounds for this stifling desire for polite consensus. At a scientific conference, when a student points out a flaw in a presenter’s experiment, it won’t do to shut her up because the presenter is older and deserving of respect, or because he worked very hard on the experiment and the criticism would hurt his feelings. Yet these reactions would be perfectly legitimate in an everyday social interaction based on authority or communality. 

… In science and other knowledge-driven cultures, the mindset of communality must be applied to the commodity of good ideas, which are each treated as resources to be shared. This is a departure from the more natural mindset in which ideas are thought of as traits that reflect well on a person, or inherent wants that comrades must respect if they are to maintain their communal relationship. The evaluation of ideas also must be wrenched away from our intuitions of authority: department chairs can demand larger offices and salaries, but cannot demand that their colleagues acquiesce to their theories. These radically new rules for relationships are the basis for open debate and peer review in science, and for the checks and balances and accounting systems found in other formal institutions.

Steven Pinker on How Taboos on What We Let Ourselves Think and Say Can Steer Us Wrong

Steven Pinker, in The Stuff of Thought, pp. 435, writes:

We can also be diverted from the brightly lit world of reality by the emotions infusing our language. The automatic punch of emotionally laced words can fool us into thinking that the words have magical powers rather than being arbitrary conventions. And the taboos on thinking and speaking that shield our personal relationships from the mutual knowledge that might break their spell can leave us incapacitated as we try to deal with problems at the unprecedented scale of a modern society. Scientific findings that seem to challenge authority or threaten social solidarity, from Copernican astronomy to evolutionary biology, have been shushed as if they were social faux pas, or condemned as if they were personal betrayals. And problems screaming for technical fixes, such as the American Social Security system, remain third rails that would electrocute any politician who touched them. Opponents can frame any solution as “putting a price on the welfare of our elderly citizens” (or our children, or our veterans), activating a taboo mentality that has a place in our dealings with family and friends but not in making policy for a nation of three hundred million people.

Steven Pinker on How the Free Market Makes Us Uneasy

Fiske’s taxonomy also accomodates a fourth relationship type [in addition to Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, and Exchange], which he calls Market Pricing. It embraces the entire apparatus of modern market economies: currency, prices, salaries, benefits, rents, interest, credit, options, derivatives, and so on. The medium of communication is symbolic numerals, mathematical operations, digital accounting and transfers, and the language of formal contracts. Unlike the other three relationship types, Market Pricing is nowhere near as universal. A culture with no written language and with a number system that peters out at “3” cannot handle even the rudiments of Market Pricing. And the logic of the market remains cognitively unnatural as well. People all over the world think that every object has an intrinsic fair price (as opposed to being worth whatever people are willing to pay for it at the time), that middlemen are parasites (despite the service they render in gathering goods from distant places and making them conveniently available to buyers), and that charging interest is immoral (despite the fact that money is more valuable to people at some times than at others).[See Thomas Sowell: Knowledge and Decisions.] These fallacies come naturally to an Exchange mindset in which distributions are fair only when equivalent quantities of stuff change hands. The mental model of face-to-face, tit-for-tat exchanges is ill equipped to handle the abstruse apparatus of a market economy, which makes diverse goods and services fungible among a vast number of people over great distances of time and space. 

As far as I can see, this takes Market Pricing out of the realm of human nature, and there seem to be no naturally developing thoughts or emotions tailored to it.

Scrooge and the Ethical Case for Consumption Taxation

Most of the popular discussion about tax fairness focuses on how much money people make. But it has always seemed to me that it is when people spend money on themselves that they incur whatever debt to society the principles of taxation ought to imply.

  • Suppose first that I made  $10 billion, and gave all but $100,000 of it away to take care of the poor. Should I really be taxed on the $10 billion that I no longer have, but already gave away, or only on the $100,000 that I then actually spend on myself? And with that much of the task of taking care of the poor taken off of the shoulders of the government, won’t it have enough money from taxing everyone’s spending to take care of the other necessary tasks of government?
  • Next, suppose I save the money. Then it is still indeterminate whether I will eventually spend the money on myself or give it away. Shouldn’t the government wait until it is clear whether I will spend the money or give it away to take care of the poor before the government taxes it?  Here, notice also that in saving the money for later use, I am making resources available for building factories or other places of business, which employ people.  
  • Now, suppose I give the money to my children. Then shouldn’t the government wait to see whether the children spend the money on themselves or give it away to take care of the poor before the government taxes it?

The essence of this argument is that it is only at the moment of consumption spending that I appropriate money for myself. Until then, I am only acting as a steward for those resources whose ultimate use has not yet been determined. And if I give money to my children, it is only at the moment of consumption spending that my children actually appropriate money for themselves. 

For the rest of the argument, click through to Steven Landsburg’s essay  “What I Like About Scrooge: In Praise of Misers.” Here is a short excerpt:

If you build a house and refuse to buy a house, the rest of the world is one house richer. If you earn a dollar and refuse to spend a dollar, the rest of the world is one dollar richer—because you produced a dollar’s worth of goods and didn’t consume them.

Postscript. Most of the tricky issues that remain after saying this much fall under the heading of defining “consumption spending.” But I maintain that income is much harder to define than “consumption spending” is.

There is one more point to be made about aggregate demand. If I am going to spend money on something sooner or later, I am being more helpful to society if I spend the money during a recession than if I spend it during a boom. But it would be even more helpful if during the recession I gave it away to take care of the poor (which would also add to aggregate demand, and alleviate suffering). When the economy is at the natural level of output or above, there is no social value in adding to aggregate demand, since that creates inflationary pressures that need to be counteracted. The benefit to those I employ is balanced out by the harm to those left unemployed because of the measures that will be taken to avoid inflation.

George Lakoff on Science

In “Whose Freedom: The Battle over America’s Most Important Idea,” p. 56, George Lakoff writes: 

But science is about more than mere belief or conjecture. Science is fundamentally a moral enterprise, following the moral imperative to seek truth. Science is fundamentally about freedom, freedom of inquiry into the truth without the bias of initial faith or belief. Within science as an institution, a “scientific theory” is in fact a material explanation of a huge range of data based on experiment and evidence. Within science, it is normal for theories to compete. The basis of competition is clear: amount of evidence, convergence of independent evidence from many areas, coverage of data, crucial experiments, degree and  depth of explanation. The judges of the competition are distinguished scientists who have spent their careers studying the scientific evidence.

In the science of biology, evolution wins the competition, governed by the rules of the scientific method, hands down. There are no other legitimate competitors. Freedom here is freedom of objective inquiry, on the basis of evidence and explanation. Other theories are free to enter the competition, but if they do not follow the rules of the competition, they will be eliminated–fairly and justly.

The Neomonetarist Perspective

In May 2000 I gave a series of three lectures on business cycle theory at Harvard’s Economics Department. In the first lecture, I presented a set of slides on “The Neomonetarist Perspective.” I have copied the contents of those slides below. Let me provide a few annotations. First, in the slides, I mention the concept of “real rigidity” introduced by Larry Ball and David Romer in 1990. Real rigidity makes prices adjust less even when firms have the chance to adjust their prices. My own treatment of real rigidity is in my 1995 paper “The Quantitative Analytics of the Basic Neomonetarist Model.”  Second, my views on the labor supply elasticity have shifted as a result of my 2008 paper with Matthew Shapiro: “Labor Supply: Are the Income and Substitution Effect Both Large or Both Small?” toward larger values since I wrote these slides. (However, the intensive Frisch labor supply elasticity of around 1 that Matthew and I find is still somewhat lower than that used in many real business cycle models.) Third, the qualitative analytics I mention are best illustrated by my working paper “Q-Theory and Real Business Cycle Analytics”–which also provides a methodological discussion consistent with “The Neomonetarist Perspective” below. Fourth, my textbook draft “Business Cycle Analytics” provides many illustrations of quantitative analytics. (Both of these are on my University of Michigan website.) 

Four Elements of the Neomonetarist Perspective

  1. Attributing the fluctuations at business cycle frequency primarily to the interaction of real and monetary shocks with sticky prices.
  2. Seeing the qualitative properties of “Real Business Cycle” models as descriptions of the decadal fluctuations of the economy rather than fluctuations at business cycle frequencies.
  3. Viewing with skepticism many of the parameter values, functional forms, and mechanisms that have become traditional in much of business cycle theory.
  4. Pursuing a research strategy that emphasizes detailed intuitive understanding and systematic analytical methods over purely numerical results.

Neomonetarist Modeling of Sticky Prices

(a) Background requirements for plausibility:

  • imperfect competition.
  • increasing returns to scale.
  • real rigidity.

(b) Macroeconomic effects of imperfect price flexibility lasting several years.

  • Price adjustment that is fast relative to adjustment of the capital stock, but slow relative to adjustment of output to demand. 
  • Overlapping price setting.  At any one time, only a small fraction of prices will be changed.
  • Leaning toward optimization.
  • Neoclassical, fully optimizing households.
  • Cost-Minimizing firms.
  • Price-setting modeled as optimization subject to important procedural constraints.
  • Variation in the actual markup as the link between the monetary, nominally sticky side of the model and the real equations of the model. 

The Argument for “Real Business Cycle Models” as Models of the Medium-Run Adjustment of the Capital Stock Rather than Models of Business Cycle Fluctuations:

(a) Basic “Real Business Cycle Models” are sophisticated versions of the “Solow Growth Model” of capital adjustment.

(b) With plausible parameter values, the endogenous rate of adjustment of the capital stock is on the order of ten years. 

(c ) Most shocks to total factor productivity (“technology”) should be essentially permanent; therefore, business cycle fluctuations must result from an endogenous business-cycle-frequency (about three-year) mechanism rather than from business-cycle-frequency movements in the driving variable of technology. 

(d) If the degree of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale are relatively small–and prices adjust several times faster than the capital stock–“Real Business Cycle Models” are good models of the medium-run adjustment of the capital stock even when prices are sticky in the short run.

A New Take on Parameter Values and Functional Forms

(a) Prescott’s original strategy of calibrating models of economic fluctuations by looking at a wide range of micro-economic, partial equilibrium and long-run trend evidence and logic needs to be pursued with greater earnestness.  Prescott’s genuine contribution here is the approach, not the particular parameter values and functional forms he chooses.  Flexible functional forms should be preferred where possible; functional form restrictions need to be justified.  

(b) There is no microeconomic or partial equilibrium evidence of high labor supply elasticities.  The arguments of Rogerson and Hanson are not an adequate defense of high labor supply elasticities.  Effort-elicitation models of efficiency wages also do not justify high labor supply elasticities. 

(c ) There is no microeconomic or partial equilibrium evidence of a strong response of nondurable consumption to the real interest rate. 

(d) There is a great deal of microeconomic and long-run-trend evidence that the income and substitution effects of a permanent increase in the real wage approximately cancel.

Three Analytical Toolboxes

(a) Approximation theory.

  • The certainty equivalence approximation links the perfect foresight model to the corresponding stochastic model.
  • Writing down a discrete-time model and then taking a continuous-time limit yields the most insight into a model. 
  • The approximation of a hierarchy of adjustment speeds allows one to deal with more than one state variable in an intuitive way. 

(b) Qualitative analytics.

  • Analyzing the partial equilibrium pieces of a model with model-specific graphs and the principles of monotone comparative statics. 
  • Contemporaneous general equilibrium.
  • Dynamic general equilibrium on the phase diagram. 
  • Steady state comparative statics.

(c ) Quantitative analytics.

  • Steady-state relationships.
  • Log-linearization around the steady-state.
  • Calculation of the convergence rate and impulse responses.

Raj Chetty on Taxes and Redistribution

Several people have asked me where they could learn more about the economics of taxes. David Agrawal (a Michigan Ph.D. who is now at the University of Georgia) pointed out to me that Raj Chetty, one of the top experts in the world on the economics of taxes and redistribution, has put his lectures on taxes and redistribution online.

Here is the homepage for Raj Chetty’s lectures.

Here is a direct link to the videos on YouTube.

Neil Irwin: American Manufacturing is Coming Back. Manufacturing Jobs Aren't

Sometimes a sector of the economy has so much technological progress that over many decades, output in the sector increases while inputs into the sector–particularly the amount of labor used–decreases. Agriculture went through this transformation first. In more recent decades, manufacturing employment has been shrinking while manufacturing output has been growing. Just as we need only a few farmers to feed everyone, we are moving toward a world where we only need a few people to manufacture things, while almost everyone is employed in the service sector.

Neil Irwin describes this transformation in his post “American manufacturing is coming back. Manufacturing jobs aren’t.”

Joshua Hausman: More Historical Evidence for What Federal Lines of Credit Would Do

This is the second guest post by Joshua Hausman on supplysideliberal.com.

An excellent historical analogy to Miles’s Federal Lines of Credit proposal are the 1931 loans to World War I veterans that I discussed in a guest blog post in August. As I described then, in 1924, Congress promised to pay World War I veterans a large bonus in 1945. When the Depression threw many out of work, veterans lobbied for early payment of the bonus. Congress acquiesced in 1931 by allowing veterans to borrow up to 50 percent of the value of their bonus. The main chapter of my dissertation focuses on the larger payment to veterans that occurred in 1936. In this blog post, I summarize my paper and discuss its possible implications for the success of a Federal Lines of Credit program.

Background

Despite their ability to take loans after 1931, veterans continued to demand immediate cash payment of the entire, non-discounted, value of their bonus. Tens of thousands camped out in Washington, DC from May to July 1932 to lobby Congress and the President for immediate payment (see picture). Rather than agree to their demands, President Hoover allowed General Douglas MacArthur to use soldiers and tanks to evict the veterans from Washington. Soldiers burned down veterans’ shacks in Anacostia. This forcible eviction provoked a political reaction that helped propel Franklin Roosevelt to victory the next year. 

  • Although popular history often emphasizes Roosevelt’s New Deal spending, FDR was in fact a deficit hawk, who raised taxes as much as he increased spending. Consequently, Roosevelt opposed payment of the bonus. But eventually, in January 1936, widespread popular support led Congress to override Roosevelt’s veto and authorize payment.

In June 1936 the typical veteran received $550, more than annual per capita income and enough money to buy a new car. In aggregate, the Federal government issued 3.2 million veterans bonds worth $1.8 billion or 2% of GDP. As a share of the economy, bonus payments were roughly the same size as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the Obama stimulus) in 2009.

This payment had a loan component analogous to a Federal Lines of Credit program since it allowed veterans access to money in 1936 that they were supposed to receive in 1945. Furthermore, taking the money as cash in 1936 came with an interest rate penalty: veterans were issued bonds in $50 denominations and could cash as many or as few of them as they desired. If they held the bonds, they would receive 3 percent interest every year until 1945. Just as one pays interest when one borrows money from a bank, veterans had to forgo interest if they chose to cash their bonus in 1936.

But the 1936 legislation also was an outright gift, since it increased the present value of veterans’ lifetime income. In particular the legislation forgave interest on loans that they had taken against the bonus, and gave veterans in 1936 the same nominal sum they had been supposed to receive in 1945. In my paper, I calculate that for the typical veteran roughly half the bonus amount received in June 1936 was an increase in present value lifetime income.

Effects of the bonus

Out of the $1.8 billion of bonds issued to veterans through June 30, 1936, $1.2 billion were cashed in June and July 1936. A further 200 million were redeemed in late summer and fall. Thus 80 percent of the dollar value of the bonds was cashed in 1936. This in itself suggests large effects from giving veterans access to cash; more generally, it suggests that a program giving individuals access to low interest rate loans, as Federal Lines of Credit would do, can be quite popular. 

My paper explores whether and how veterans spent this money. The primary source of evidence is a household consumption survey administered by the Works Progress Administration and the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1935 and 1936. By exploiting variation in when households were surveyed and in the likelihood that a household included a veteran, I estimate a marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of the bonus of 0.7, meaning that out of every dollar of bonus bonds received, the typical veteran spent 70 cents. This result is confirmed by other, independent, sources of evidence. 

Interestingly, an MPC of 0.7 is as large as that measured from the 2001 tax rebates and 2008 stimulus payments, programs that did not have a loan component. If veterans’ spending were only influenced by the part of the bonus that represented a change in the present value of their lifetime income, then it would be almost impossible to explain the amount of spending I observe. An MPC of 0.7 out of the total bonus implies a MPC out of the increment to lifetime income of about 1.4 (since the increment to lifetime income was roughly half the bonus amount). This is implausible. Instead, the much more likely explanation is that veterans’ spent more in 1936, not only because their lifetime income was higher, but because the bonus meant access to a low interest rate loan at a time when liquidity constraints were pervasive.

Further evidence on the bonus’s effects comes from differences in the proportion of the population made up of veterans across states and cities. This variation meant significant geographic variation in bonus payments received. The figure at the top of this post juxtaposes the change in new car purchases from 1935 to 1936 in a state against the number of veterans per capita as measured in the 1930 census in that state. The slope implies that for every additional veteran in a state, roughly 0.3 more new cars were sold in 1936. In the paper, I show that this result is robust to controlling for a variety of different possible confounding variables. 

A third source of evidence on veterans’ spending behavior is an unpublished survey by the American Legion that asked 42,500 veterans how they planned to use their bonus. Veterans told the American Legion that they planned to consume 40 cents out of every dollar and to spend an additional 25 cents out of every dollar on residential and business investment. Evidence from the 2001 and 2008 Bush tax rebates suggests that such ex ante surveys are likely to significantly understate the total cumulative spending response (see section 5 of my paper for more on this argument). Thus, the prospective MPC of 0.4 measured in the American Legion Survey is consistent with an actual MPC that was significantly higher. 

Aggregate time series are also consistent with a large spending response. GDP grew 13.1 percent in 1936, more rapidly than in any other year of the 1930s. In the paper, I estimate that the bonus contributed 2.5 to 3 percentage points to this growth.

Conclusion

My results are encouraging evidence for the efficacy of Federal Lines of Credit, since they suggest that even when a large portion of a transfer payment is a loan (roughly half in the case of the veterans’ bonus), the MPC can be high. 2012 is not 1936, of course, and particular features of the 1936 economy may have contributed to unusually high spending from the bonus, specifically on durables. Still, at a minimum, my results suggest that further research on the efficacy of Federal Lines of Credit is desirable. 

Sources

The Bonus March photo is from http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/images/at0058f2as.jpg

All other material is taken from my job market paper, with sources documented there. One other paper, Telser (2003), examines the 1936 bonus in detail. Telser studies a variety of time series and concludes that the bonus “brought a large measure of recovery to the economy’‘ (p. 240).

Steven Johnson: We're Living the Dream, We Just Don't Realize It

In my post “The True Story of How Economics Got Its Nickname ‘The Dismal Science,’” I told how economics got its nickname “the dismal science” as a result of the opposition of John Stuart Mill (who was a noted economist as well as philosopher) to slavery. But the nickname sticks partly because people think of economists as bearers of bad news. But in fact, economists are prominent among those who remind people that over the long haul “Things Are Getting Better.” Steven Johnson’s article “We’re Living the Dream, We Just Don’t Realize It” has the same message.  For a book-length treatment of this theme, I recommend The Progress Paradox: How Life Gets Better While People Feel Worse

The economic slump we are in will someday be over. We should not let it falsely color our picture of the broad, progressive sweep of modern history. 

How African Statistics are Worse and African Economies are Better than You Think

This is an interesting summary on the African Arguments website of the book “Poor Numbers: How We are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do About It” by Morten Jerven. There are many problems with government economic statistics in Africa. But the emphasis in this summary is that by using historical weights they often give much too much weight to declining or stagnant sectors of an economy as compared to the growing, dynamic sectors of an economy. Thus, much of the economic growth is missed.   

How Marginal Tax Rates Work

Here is an exercise. What is wrong with the way the people quoted below are thinking?

1. Kristina Collins, a chiropractor in McLean, Va., said she and her husband planned to closely monitor the business income from their joint practice to avoid crossing the income threshold for higher taxes outlined by President Obama on earnings above $200,000 for individuals and $250,000 for couples.

Ms. Collins said she felt torn by being near the cutoff line and disappointed that federal tax policy was providing a disincentive to keep expanding a business she founded in 1998.

“If we’re really close and it’s near the end-year, maybe we’ll just close down for a while and go on vacation,” she said.

2. … [the extra money that comes with a raise] “is nice, but it could very well bump you into the next tax bracket, possibly leaving you with less money than you had before the raise.”

For an answer, see the wikipedia entry on “Tax Rate” and Matthew Yglesias’s posts “Nobody Understands How Taxes Work,”  “Tax Whiners Don’t Understand How Marginal Tax Rates Work,” and “Tax Ignoramuses.”