John Locke on Peace through Surrender to Tyranny


Overthrowing tyrants is a public good with much greater social benefit than private benefit. Hence, when there is genuine tyranny, it is a serious problem that individuals, encouraged by their family and friends, will put the private benefit of being safe from reprisals by a tyrant over the public benefit of helping to overthrow the tyrant.

But what about the cost to everyone of a civil war to overthrow a tyrant? Typically, those who actively work to overthrow a tyrant bear a disproportionate share of the direct cost of a civil war relative to their share in the benefits from a better government. And in their altruistic concerns, emotionally mature opponents of tyranny will be likely to weight the costs on others of a civil war fairly against the benefits of a better government.

It may be that some individuals gain a huge private benefit of perceived glory or identity confirmation from opposing a tyrant, and so may not strike the right balance. But a more common criticism those opposing a tyrant may face is that their altruism toward strangers is unusually strong compared to their altruism towards friends and family members who may also suffer reprisals from the tyrant.

In any case, except for selfish reasons (when one is, oneself one of the family and friends of the opponent to tyranny), it seems like only rare situations would justify discouraging someone from fighting against tyranny, even though there is likely to be collateral damage. The reason is that most opponents to tyranny do care about collateral damage and try to weigh the costs of collateral damage against the benefits of a better government.

Where those who style themselves as opponents to tyranny don’t seem to care much about collateral damage—as when they send suicide bombers to kill civilians—then one should suspect they have other motives than simply opposing tyranny.

John Locke does not discuss these tradeoffs in quite so much depth, but in Sections 228 and 229 of Chapter XIX, “Of the Dissolution of Government” of his 2d Treatise on Government: Of Civil Government, he does speak to the basic justice of fighting against tyranny even if there will be some collateral damage—but speaks of collateral damage in ways that are not very vivid: “destructive to the peace of the world,” “If any mischief come in such cases,” “inconveniences.” In this way, I think John Locke tries to make the issue of collateral damage look smaller than it really is. By contrast, John Locke appropriately speaks very powerfully of the benefits of overthrowing a tyrant:

§. 228. But if they, who say it lays a foundation for rebellion, mean that it may occasion civil wars, or intestine broils, to tell the people they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or properties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were their magistrates, when they invade their properties contrary to the trust put in them; and that therefore this doctrine is not to be allowed, being so destructive to the peace of the world: they may as well say, upon the same ground, that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed. If any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbours. If the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has, for peace sake, to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered, what a kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only in violence and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an admirable peace betwixt the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance, yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf? Polyphemus’s den gives us a perfect pattern of such a peace, and such a government, wherein Ulysses and his companions had nothing to do, but quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured. And no doubt Ulysses, who was a prudent man, preached up passive obedience, and exhorted them to a quiet submission, by representing to them of what concernment peace was to mankind; and by shewing the inconveniences might happen, if they should offer to resist Polyphemus, who had now the power over them.

§. 229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is best for mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed, when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruction, and not the preservation of the properties of their people?

One of the interesting things John Locke is doing is to try to enlist a sense of honor and anger as motivations to oppose tyranny:

  • … they may as well say, upon the same ground, that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed.

  • If any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbours.

  • If the innocent honest man must quietly quit all he has, for peace sake, to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered, what a kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only in violence and rapine; and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors.

  • Who would not think it an admirable peace betwixt the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance, yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf?

  • … which is best for mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed …

The thing I worry about most is people who don’t really know what the situation is in a nation and think they are nobly opposing tyranny, when given the facts on the ground they are doing something else. This is a manageable problem, but gets worse when there are people actively trying to deceive others into imagining a tyranny that is not there. (Of course, tyrants try to do the opposite: to get people to think there is not tyranny when there is.)

For links to other John Locke posts, see these John Locke aggregator posts: