This is a talk I gave April 7, 2016, at a conference on Quadratic Voting spearheaded by Glen Weyl. Just click on the picture. You can also see the other presentations at the conference by clicking on the link below the picture. Seeing the other presentations in the conference that you can access made me more interested in Quadratic Voting.
Here is a link to the paper corresponding to this talk. Here is the official website of the published paper in the journal Public Choice. Below is the abstract of the published paper.
Quadratic voting and the normalized gradient addition mechanism are both social choice mechanisms that confront individuals with quadratic budget constraints, but they are applicable in different contexts. Adapting one or both to apply to the same context, this paper explores the relationship between these two mechanisms in three contexts: marginal adjustments of continuous policies, simultaneous voting on many public choices, and voting on a single public choice accompanied by private monetary consequences. In the process, we provide some formal analysis of quadratic voting when (instead of money) votes are paid for with abstract tokens that are equally distributed by the mechanism designer.